Deference to Adverse Credibility Findings Based on Credible‑Fear Interview Inconsistencies and Implausible Smuggling Narratives: Commentary on Parminder Singh v. Bondi

Deference to Adverse Credibility Findings Based on Credible‑Fear Interview Inconsistencies and Implausible Smuggling Narratives: Commentary on Parminder Singh v. Bondi

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Parminder Singh v. Bondi, No. 25‑3306 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025), is a textbook illustration of how federal courts review adverse credibility determinations in asylum and related protection claims. Although designated “Not Recommended for Publication” and therefore non‑precedential under Sixth Circuit rules, the opinion is doctrinally important in several respects:

  • It reinforces the breadth of immigration judges’ discretion in making credibility findings under the REAL ID Act.
  • It confirms that inconsistencies between a credible‑fear interview and later hearing testimony can properly sustain an adverse credibility finding when the interview record has “indicia of reliability.”
  • It underscores that an applicant’s professed ignorance of smuggling logistics may be deemed implausible and thus damaging to credibility.
  • It reiterates the strict exhaustion requirement for arguments not presented to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
  • It restates the demanding standard for due process claims based on alleged immigration‑judge bias or improper BIA fact‑finding.

The case involves an Indian national, Parminder Singh, who claimed persecution on account of his political opinion as a member of a Sikh‑aligned party in India (the “Mann Party”). He sought asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, principally on the basis of an adverse credibility determination. The BIA affirmed. Singh then petitioned for review in the Sixth Circuit.

The appellate court denied the petition, holding that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s credibility finding and that Singh’s due process arguments failed. This commentary unpacks the factual background, the court’s reasoning, the interplay with prior precedent, and the decision’s broader implications for asylum practice and immigration adjudication.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Singh’s Entry and Credible‑Fear Interview

Parminder Singh, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States without inspection in November 2018. He was apprehended soon thereafter. An asylum officer conducted a credible‑fear interview—a threshold screening used to determine whether an individual who expresses fear of return has a “significant possibility” of establishing eligibility for asylum in a full hearing.

At that interview, Singh claimed:

  • He joined the “Mann Party,” a Sikh‑separatist‑affiliated political party, in January 2018.
  • Members of the rival Congress Party assaulted him twice in 2018 because of his political involvement.

He described:

  1. First assault (June 2018) – While hanging Mann Party posters advertising a blood‑donation drive:
    • Four Congress Party members confronted him, pressured him to join their party, and beat him when he refused.
    • A doctor treated facial bruising and stomach pain.
    • Police refused to take a complaint, citing Congress Party influence.
  2. Second assault (August 2018) – While returning home from a wedding on his motorcycle:
    • A vehicle “came around [him] and stopped in front of [his] motorbike.”
    • Five Congress Party members got out and beat him with sticks.
    • Nearby farmers intervened; assailants threatened to kill him next time.
    • He received injections and pain medication for lower‑back and thigh pain.

Singh left India about a month later. His parents retained an unnamed “agent” who arranged a multi‑country route (India → Thailand → Cambodia → Vietnam → back to Thailand → Mexico → U.S. border). Singh asserted that:

  • The agent procured his passport and visas and booked his flights.
  • The agent connected him in Mexico with another person who took his passport and never returned it.
  • He then entered the United States without inspection.

B. Application for Relief and IJ Hearing

Singh later filed an application for asylum, listing “political opinion” as the basis and also seeking withholding of removal and CAT protection. He submitted:

  • Affidavits from his mother, neighbors, and friends;
  • His medical records; and
  • Country conditions reports.

At the merits hearing, he again described the two assaults but altered key details, especially about the second incident.

1. Inconsistencies about the First Assault

At the credible‑fear interview, Singh said the June beating occurred when he refused to join the Congress Party. At the hearing, he instead testified that:

  • The men beat him because he refused to remove Mann Party posters he was hanging, not because he refused to join the Congress Party.

The IJ treated this as one inconsistency (though the BIA ultimately focused on the second assault and travel narrative).

2. Serious Inconsistency about the Second Assault

The second incident produced a more dramatic inconsistency:

  • Credible‑fear interview: The car “came around [him] and stopped in front of [his] motorbike” and then the men exited and beat him with sticks.
  • Hearing testimony: Singh now claimed that Congress Party members:
    • Hit him from behind with their car,
    • Knocked him off the motorcycle, causing him to skid across the pavement,
    • Then beat him with “hockey sticks.”

He attributed scars on his leg and arm to skidding across the pavement after being struck from behind.

When the IJ pressed him on why the credible‑fear notes did not mention being struck from behind:

  • Singh repeatedly said he had been “very nervous” and “very scared” during the credible‑fear interview and could not recall exactly what he had told the officer.
  • He insisted that his hearing testimony was the truth.
  • Only when questioned by his own attorney did he attempt to reconcile the versions, claiming that both accounts were true: the car first struck him from behind and then moved to stop in front of him.

3. Implausibility of the Travel Narrative

Singh testified that:

  • His parents hired an agent whose name he did not know (or could not recall).
  • He did not know how much money his parents paid the agent.
  • He could not explain why he took such a circuitous route through Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and back.
  • He claimed he simply followed the agent’s instructions without asking questions.

The IJ found it implausible that someone in Singh’s position—personally interacting with the agent and undertaking a complicated, high‑risk journey—would have so little information about the cost, the agent’s identity, or the reason for the specific route.

C. IJ and BIA Decisions

1. The IJ’s Adverse Credibility Finding and Denial of Relief

The IJ concluded that Singh was not a credible witness based on four main considerations:

  1. Inconsistent descriptions of both assaults between the credible‑fear interview and the hearing testimony.
  2. Failure to give a persuasive explanation for omitting the claim that the vehicle struck his motorcycle in the credible‑fear interview.
  3. Perceived implausibility of the medical evidence, given the claimed severity of the assaults and lack of detail in records about serious or causally linked injuries.
  4. Implausibility of Singh’s professed ignorance of basic facts relating to the agent and the logistics of his travel route.

On that basis, the IJ denied:

  • Asylum and withholding of removal (statutory), holding that the central narrative of persecution lacked credibility.
  • CAT protection as well, but after separately considering the objective evidence in recognition that an adverse credibility finding is not automatically fatal to a CAT claim.

2. Appeal to the BIA

On appeal, Singh challenged only the IJ’s adverse credibility determination; he did not appeal the IJ’s denials “on the merits” (i.e., even assuming credibility, that the legal standards were not met). Nor did he challenge the IJ’s CAT analysis based on objective evidence.

The BIA:

  • Affirmed the adverse credibility determination, relying particularly on:
    • The inconsistency regarding whether and how the vehicle struck the motorcycle in the second assault.
    • The implausibility that Singh would know so little about his travel logistics.
  • Noted an alternative ground: even apart from credibility, because Singh failed to appeal the IJ’s denial of his claims “on the merits,” his claims would be denied regardless of the credibility issue.

3. Petition for Review to the Sixth Circuit

In the Sixth Circuit, Singh raised:

  • A challenge to the adverse credibility finding and his resulting ineligibility for:
    • Asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158,
    • Withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and
    • Protection under CAT (implemented by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–18).
  • A due process challenge:
    • Alleging IJ bias and lack of neutrality;
    • Alleging improper or impermissible BIA fact‑finding.

The Sixth Circuit denied the petition in full.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The court’s reasoning can be summarized in three primary holdings:

  1. Adverse credibility determination affirmed. Applying the deferential “substantial evidence” standard, the court held that no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find Singh credible, given:
    • His inconsistent accounts of the second assault; and
    • The implausibility of his professed ignorance about his smuggling arrangements.
    These two factors were the BIA’s stated bases and thus the focus of appellate review.
  2. Arguments not exhausted or not preserved were disregarded.
    • Challenges to the IJ’s handling of affidavits and certain interpreter/cultural arguments were deemed forfeited for failure to raise them before the BIA, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
    • The CAT claim based on objective evidence was likewise not before the court because Singh had not contested the IJ’s CAT analysis before the BIA or in his petition for review.
  3. No due process violation. The court held that:
    • Singh failed to show that the IJ abandoned the role of impartial adjudicator or became a “zealous advocate.”
    • The BIA did not impermissibly “engage in fact‑finding” when it inferred that Singh must have stopped his motorcycle before being beaten; this was a reasonable inference from the credible‑fear notes, not new fact‑finding.

Consequently, the court denied Singh’s petition for review and left the removal order in place.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion sits firmly within a well‑developed body of Sixth Circuit and statutory precedent. The main authorities are:

1. Substantive Eligibility Standards

  • Asylum & “refugee” definition – 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 & 1101(a)(42); Bonilla‑Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 2010).
    The court restates that to qualify for asylum, a person must be a “refugee,” meaning someone unable or unwilling to return to their country because of past persecution or a well‑founded fear of future persecution on account of one of the protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, particular social group, or political opinion). Bonilla‑Morales is cited for this standard.
  • Withholding of removal – 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174 (6th Cir. 2016).
    Withholding of removal requires a higher burden: the applicant must show it is “more likely than not” that they would be persecuted on a protected ground if removed. Marouf is cited as the controlling articulation of that standard.
  • CAT protection – 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); El‑Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2009).
    For CAT relief, the applicant must show that it is more likely than not that they would be “tortured” if removed. El‑Moussa is cited for the principle that the same credibility standard applies to asylum, withholding, and CAT claims.

2. Credibility Determinations under the REAL ID Act

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
    This provision (enacted by the REAL ID Act) governs credibility determinations in asylum claims. It directs IJs to consider:
    • “Demeanor, candor, or responsiveness”;
    • Internal and external “consistency” of the applicant’s statements;
    • The “plausibility” of those statements; and
    • Any inaccuracies or falsehoods, “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
    The court cites this statutory language and relies on Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 2014), which interprets and applies it.
  • Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2007).
    Cited for the proposition that evaluating credibility is the IJ’s “first step” in assessing eligibility for protection.
  • El‑Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2009).
    Confirming that the same credibility standard applies across asylum, withholding, and CAT claims.

3. Standard of Review – “Substantial Evidence” and Deference to the IJ/BIA

  • Hachem v. Holder, 656 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2011).
    The court uses Hachem for the rule that IJ credibility findings are factual findings reviewed under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard.
  • Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 2014).
    This decision is central:
    • It reiterates the statutory rule that inconsistencies need not go to the heart of the claim to support an adverse credibility finding.
    • It articulates the “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” threshold for overturning credibility findings.
  • Masiko v. Holder, 562 F. App’x 469 (6th Cir. 2014).
    Cited for the observation that IJs have “substantial leeway to make the credibility call.”
  • Al‑Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2009); Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174 (6th Cir. 2016).
    These cases govern the scope of appellate review when the BIA issues its own opinion. The court:
    • Reviews the BIA’s opinion directly;
    • Also reviews the IJ’s reasoning to the extent the BIA adopts it; and
    • Focuses on the specific grounds the BIA invoked—in this case, the inconsistency in the second assault narrative and the implausible ignorance about travel logistics.

4. Use of Credible‑Fear Interview Notes – “Indicia of Reliability”

  • Koulibaly v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2008).
    The court relies on Koulibaly to uphold the use of an asylum (or credible‑fear) interview record as a basis for evaluating credibility when that record shows “sufficient indicia of reliability”—such as:
    • Administration of an oath;
    • Confirmation that the applicant understands the interpreter;
    • Inclusion of questions and summarized answers.
    Singh’s credible‑fear record met those criteria.

5. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
    The statute requires that a noncitizen exhaust administrative remedies before raising issues in a petition for review. The court uses this to hold that:
    • Arguments about IJ’s failure to consider affidavits;
    • Interpreter‑related concerns; and
    • Certain cultural explanations for not asking questions about travel—
      were forfeited because they were not raised to the BIA.

6. Due Process and Alleged IJ Bias or BIA Fact‑Finding

  • Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2005).
    Establishes that due process claims in removal proceedings are reviewed de novo.
  • Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971 (6th Cir. 2009).
    Affirms that noncitizens facing deportation are entitled to a “full and fair hearing” under the Fifth Amendment.
  • Rranxburgaj v. Mukasey, 286 F. App’x 268 (6th Cir. 2008); Ndrecaj v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2008).
    Provide the standard that a procedural defect constitutes a due process violation only if it is fundamentally unfair and “might have led to a denial of justice.”
  • Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 2016).
    Sets out the two‑step inquiry:
    1. Was the proceeding defective?
    2. If so, did the defect cause prejudice?
    Also stresses the right to “an unbiased arbiter who has not prejudged” the case and clarifies that bias exists where an IJ abandons neutrality and becomes a “zealous advocate.”
  • Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021).
    Cited in a footnote for the proposition that issues not raised to the BIA, such as a CAT claim based solely on objective evidence, are not preserved for judicial review.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Adverse Credibility Finding: Inconsistency in the Second Assault Account

The central pillar of the opinion is the court’s acceptance of the IJ and BIA’s reliance on Singh’s inconsistent descriptions of the second assault.

Key points in the court’s reasoning:

  • Singh conceded that he had given different accounts at different times.
  • The difference was not trivial; it went to:
    • Whether he was actually struck by the assailants’ vehicle,
    • Whether he suffered road‑rash type injuries from skidding on pavement,
    • And thus to the severity of the harm and the reliability of his narrative.
  • The IJ questioned him repeatedly and gave him several opportunities to explain the inconsistency. His responses—mainly that he was frightened and confused during the credible‑fear interview—were found unpersuasive.
  • Only after IJ questioning did he offer a blended theory that both accounts were simultaneously true (car hit from behind, then stopped in front), which the IJ reasonably viewed as a belated and self‑serving attempt at reconciliation.

Under the REAL ID standard, the IJ was allowed to consider “any inaccuracies or falsehoods” regardless of whether they went to the heart of the claim. Here, the inconsistency plainly did touch the core of the persecution narrative, making the case for adverse credibility even stronger.

The court also rejected Singh’s attempts to undermine reliance on the credible‑fear record:

  • “Cherry‑picking” argument. The court noted that the statute explicitly authorizes the IJ to consider any inconsistency; thus, singling out conflicting statements is not improper but rather part of normal credibility analysis.
  • Interpreter‑change theory. Singh argued that a shift in interpreters during the credible‑fear interview “may have” contributed to discrepancies. The court found this:
    • Insufficiently explained; and
    • Forfeited, because it was never raised before the BIA.
  • Non‑verbatim record argument. Singh questioned the reliability of the credible‑fear notes, as they are not a word‑for‑word transcript. The court relied on Koulibaly to hold that such summaries are nonetheless reliable when they contain:
    • An oath;
    • Confirmation of understanding of the interpreter;
    • Questions and summarized answers;
    • No contemporaneous objections about accuracy or understanding.
    Those conditions were satisfied, and even at the hearing Singh confirmed understanding the interpreters and questions.

2. Adverse Credibility Finding: Implausible Smuggling Narrative

The second pillar is the IJ’s reliance on the implausibility of Singh’s professed ignorance of key details of his smuggling arrangements.

The IJ found it unreasonable that:

  • Singh did not know (or could not state) the name of the agent who personally facilitated his travel;
  • He did not know how much money his parents paid for the journey;
  • He could not explain why he traveled through multiple countries (including a “back‑and‑forth” sequence) instead of taking a more direct path; and
  • He claimed this ignorance was due to cultural norms about not questioning his parents’ decisions.

The BIA and Sixth Circuit concluded:

  • The IJ adequately explained why these points were implausible; this was not a vague or unreasoned disbelief.
  • The cultural‑norm explanation was not presented to the IJ or BIA and was thus forfeited.
  • Even if the cultural claim had been raised earlier, it would not overcome the fact that Singh personally interacted with the agent and could still say virtually nothing about him or the arrangements.

This aspect of the decision signals that courts may treat professed ignorance about smuggling logistics skeptically when:

  • The applicant had direct interactions with smugglers; and
  • The journey was complex and costly—circumstances in which individuals typically know or can recall at least basic facts.

3. Treatment of Corroborating Evidence

Singh argued that the IJ failed to give proper weight to affidavits from his mother, neighbors, and a purported eyewitness, as well as a Mann Party official.

The Sixth Circuit:

  • Found this argument forfeited because it was not raised before the BIA.
  • Noted, in any event, that these affidavits did not cure the specific credibility concerns:
    • None mentioned that Singh’s motorcycle was struck by a vehicle; hence they did not corroborate the particular element that the IJ found suspect.

The opinion therefore subtly underscores an important practical point: corroborating evidence must engage with the specific disputed or incredible aspects of the testimony. Affidavits that simply reassert the overall story, or that omit key disputed details, are of limited value in overturning an adverse credibility finding.

4. Exhaustion and the CAT Claim

Although the IJ separately analyzed CAT protection based on objective evidence, Singh did not challenge that analysis before the BIA or in his petition for review. The court, citing Singh v. Rosen, held that:

  • Failure to challenge the CAT denial before the BIA meant the issue was not exhausted under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
  • Failure to challenge it in the petition for review meant it was not before the court in any event.

Consequently, the court expressly declined to consider whether the objective evidence might independently show that Congress Party members would more likely than not torture Singh upon return.

5. Due Process: Alleged IJ Bias

Singh argued that the IJ was biased and not a neutral arbiter, thus depriving him of due process. The Sixth Circuit applied the two‑step test from Bi Qing Zheng:

  1. Was the hearing defective (e.g., because the IJ was biased)?
  2. If so, did that defect prejudice the outcome?

On the first step, the court held:

  • An IJ must remain an “unbiased arbiter who has not prejudged” the case and must not become a “zealous advocate.”
  • Singh presented no concrete evidence that the IJ crossed that line—no showing of hostility, predisposition, or improper conduct.
  • The IJ’s skepticism, questioning, and adverse credibility finding are ordinary judicial functions and do not, by themselves, indicate bias.

Because Singh failed to establish a defect at step one, the court did not reach the prejudice analysis in any meaningful detail. The due process claim was rejected on the threshold ground.

6. Due Process: Alleged Improper BIA Fact‑Finding

Singh also claimed that the BIA engaged in improper fact‑finding when it stated, as a “fact,” that he had told the asylum officer he stopped his motorcycle on his own during the second assault.

The Sixth Circuit responded:

  • The credible‑fear notes did not explicitly say he voluntarily stopped the motorcycle; they merely described the car pulling in front of him and then the assailants beating him.
  • However, it is a reasonable inference that at some point, the motorcycle must have come to a stop for the assailants to pull him to the ground and beat him with sticks.
  • This is an ordinary inference from existing evidence, not “new” fact‑finding prohibited by regulation or due process.

This confirms that:

  • The BIA may analyze evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the record without violating regulations that limit new fact‑finding; and
  • Due process is not offended merely because the BIA characterizes facts in a way the petitioner disagrees with, so long as that characterization is a plausible reading of the record.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT – Key Differences

  • Asylum (8 U.S.C. § 1158)
    • Discretionary relief.
    • Standard: “Refugee” definition—past persecution or a well‑founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground.
    • Can lead to lawful permanent residence and eventually citizenship.
  • Withholding of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3))
    • Mandatory if standard is met, but narrower in benefits.
    • Standard: More likely than not (over 50%) that the person would be persecuted on a protected ground.
    • Does not usually lead to a green card; only bars removal to a particular country.
  • Convention Against Torture (CAT) (8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–18; 1208.16(c)(2))
    • Mandatory if standard is met.
    • Standard: More likely than not that the person would be tortured (a higher severity threshold) by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.
    • No need to show persecution on a protected ground; the motive can be non‑political or non‑discriminatory.

B. “Adverse Credibility Determination” and “Substantial Evidence” Review

An adverse credibility determination means the IJ does not believe the applicant’s testimony, at least as to critical parts of the story. Under U.S. immigration law (especially after the REAL ID Act):

  • Credibility can be judged on:
    • How the applicant testifies (demeanor, responsiveness);
    • How consistent their story is over time and across documents; and
    • Whether the story appears plausible given background facts.
  • The IJ can consider any inconsistency, even on seemingly minor points, as relevant to overall truthfulness.

On appeal, the “substantial evidence” standard is extremely deferential:

  • The reviewing court does not ask whether it might have reached a different conclusion, but whether any reasonable adjudicator must reach the opposite conclusion.
  • To overturn an adverse credibility determination, the petitioner must show that every reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find the testimony credible. This is a very high bar.

C. Credible‑Fear Interview and “Indicia of Reliability”

A credible‑fear interview is an early screening conducted shortly after apprehension. Its purpose is not to make a final asylum decision but to determine if the person should be allowed to pursue a full claim before an IJ.

Courts recognize potential limitations (stress, trauma, language barriers, not a verbatim transcript), but will treat the notes as reliable if:

  • The applicant is under oath;
  • Translation is provided and understood;
  • The questions and answers are recorded in some detail; and
  • No timely objections are made about misunderstanding or misrecording.

Such records can then be compared to later hearing testimony, and discrepancies may support an adverse credibility finding.

D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before challenging an immigration decision in federal court, a noncitizen generally must:

  1. Raise all legal and factual challenges before the BIA (the administrative appeal body); and
  2. Specify those issues again in the petition for review to the court of appeals.

If an argument is not made to the BIA, it is usually considered “unexhausted” and cannot be raised later in federal court (8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). This is why several of Singh’s arguments (affidavit treatment, interpreter issues, CAT objective evidence) were not considered.

E. Due Process, IJ Neutrality, and BIA Fact‑Finding

In immigration proceedings, due process does not give a right to:

  • A particular outcome; or
  • A perfect or error‑free process.

It does guarantee:

  • A fair hearing;
  • Notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard;
  • An impartial decision‑maker.

IJ Bias Standard: An IJ is biased in a constitutional sense only if they abandon their role as an impartial arbiter and essentially become an advocate. Mere skepticism, rigorous questioning, or an adverse credibility finding is not enough.

BIA Fact‑Finding Limits: Regulations generally bar the BIA from engaging in its own new fact‑finding on appeal. However, the BIA may:

  • Review factual findings for clear error; and
  • Draw reasonable inferences from the record evidence.

What is prohibited is the creation of new facts not previously part of the record; interpreting existing facts is allowed.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Practical Implications for Asylum Applicants and Counsel

  1. Consistent narratives from the start are critical.
    The decision underscores that statements made in credible‑fear interviews can have lasting consequences. Applicants and counsel must:
    • Ensure the narrative given at the earliest stage is as accurate and complete as circumstances allow;
    • Review credible‑fear notes carefully in preparation for the merits hearing; and
    • Be prepared with specific, plausible explanations for any discrepancies.
  2. Credible‑fear interviews are not “off the record.”
    Despite being preliminary, these interviews can form a key part of the evidentiary record. Courts will treat them as reliable if the formalities are observed.
  3. Smuggling logistics matter for credibility.
    Applicants who traveled with the help of smugglers should be prepared to explain:
    • How they found the smuggler or agent;
    • Roughly what was paid and by whom;
    • The broad outline of the route and why it was chosen.
    Complete professed ignorance—particularly where the applicant personally interacted with the agent—can be deemed implausible.
  4. Corroborating evidence must target the weak points.
    Affidavits or documents that merely repeat the core story, but do not address the precise inconsistencies the IJ finds problematic, are unlikely to rehabilitate credibility.
  5. Exhaustion is not a technicality; it is outcome‑determinative.
    Counsel must:
    • Raise every significant legal and factual issue to the BIA, including due process claims;
    • Challenge all aspects of denials (e.g., both credibility and merits, as well as any separate CAT analysis);
    • Reiterate those challenges in the petition for review.
    Failure to do so will bar judicial review of potentially meritorious arguments.

B. Doctrinal Significance within the Sixth Circuit

While non‑precedential, the decision reflects and reinforces several important doctrinal trends in Sixth Circuit immigration jurisprudence:

  • High deference to IJ credibility findings. The court once again emphasizes that reversal is appropriate only if any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. This continues a long line of cases giving IJs broad discretion in credibility assessments.
  • Expansive view of what can support adverse credibility. The court affirms that:
    • Inconsistencies about the mechanics of an attack—even if arguably not central to the political motive—are fair game;
    • Plausibility (or implausibility) of travel narratives can independently support an adverse credibility finding.
  • Strong endorsement of Koulibaly’s “indicia of reliability” framework. This opinion reaffirms that detailed, sworn interview notes—albeit non‑verbatim—are reliable evidence for credibility analysis.
  • Constrained role for due process challenges. The court’s treatment of IJ bias and BIA fact‑finding arguments confirms that due process is violated only in rare, egregious circumstances. Most disagreements about how evidence was weighed or interpreted fall within the realm of ordinary appellate review, not constitutional error.

C. Specific Relevance to Indian Political Asylum Claims

Although the decision does not turn on Indian country conditions, it has practical resonance for Indian nationals and others claiming persecution by dominant political parties:

  • The court does not dispute that Congress Party supporters in certain areas may intimidate or attack political opponents; rather, it denies relief because it does not credit this applicant’s particular account.
  • Applicants from India alleging party‑based violence (e.g., Congress Party, BJP, regional parties) should therefore:
    • Provide consistent, factually specific narratives about each alleged incident of harm;
    • Submit medical and police records that clearly link injuries and complaints to the described attacks where possible; and
    • Offer affidavits that address specific disputed facts (e.g., whether a vehicle was used, how serious injuries were).

VII. Conclusion

Parminder Singh v. Bondi demonstrates the decisive role that credibility plays in asylum, withholding, and CAT cases, and the difficulty of overturning adverse credibility findings on judicial review. By approving the IJ’s reliance on:

  • Material inconsistencies between a credible‑fear interview and later hearing testimony; and
  • The perceived implausibility of an applicant’s ignorance of smuggling logistics,

the Sixth Circuit reinforces a robust deferential posture toward immigration adjudicators applying the REAL ID Act’s credibility framework.

The decision further illustrates the importance of issue preservation: arguments about interpreter problems, cultural explanations, treatment of affidavits, and CAT objective evidence must be raised to the BIA or they are lost. Finally, the court’s rejection of due process claims grounded in alleged IJ bias and purported BIA fact‑finding confirms that only clear departures from neutrality or fair procedure will support constitutional relief in removal proceedings.

Though unpublished, Singh is an instructive guide for practitioners: early statements matter, details of smuggling arrangements matter, and careful, comprehensive advocacy before the BIA is indispensable for meaningful judicial review.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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