De-Minimis Commerce, Digital Probable Cause & Arrest-on-Sight:
The Fourth Circuit’s Multi-Faceted Clarification in United States v. Ordonez-Zometa

1. Introduction

On 17 June 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit published an opinion that, while affirming the convictions of three MS-13 gang members, delivers a suite of doctrinal clarifications touching four distinct areas:

1. When officers may effect a traffic stop solely to execute an existing felony warrant for a passenger.
2. The limits of police misstatements during custodial interrogation and their impact on voluntariness.
3. The quantum of probable cause needed to obtain broad digital-age warrants (cell phones, social-media accounts, residences) where gang activity is alleged.
4. The continuing vitality of the “de-minimis effect” test for the interstate-commerce element in RICO and VICAR prosecutions.

Because the Court addressed each doctrine in an integrated fact pattern involving transnational gang activity, the opinion will likely become a reference point for trial judges, investigators and litigators grappling with modern evidentiary environments.

2. Background of the Case

• Parties: The United States prosecuted Jose Domingo Ordonez-Zometa (clique leader), Jose Henry Hernandez-Garcia, and Jose Rafael Ortega-Ayala—members of the Los Ghettos Criminales Salvatruchas (LGCS), a Maryland clique of MS-13.
• Facts: In March 2019 the defendants orchestrated the brutal stabbing of a 16-year-old gang member, transported the body from Maryland to Virginia, set it ablaze, and cleaned the crime scene.
• Procedural Posture: After Maryland and Virginia state investigations, a federal grand jury indicted the trio on RICO conspiracy, VICAR murder & conspiracy, and evidence-tampering counts. The district court (Judge Paula Xinis) denied multiple suppression motions and ultimately sentenced each defendant to life plus concurrent terms. All three appealed.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous panel (Judges King, Gregory, Heytens), Judge King affirmed across the board:

• Traffic Stop & Arrest: Stopping the Nissan to execute the outstanding Virginia murder warrant—and, alternatively, on the automobile-exception theory—was constitutionally reasonable.
• Interrogation Statements: Despite a detective’s erroneous suggestion that post-arrest silence could be used against the accused, the statements remained voluntary; § 3501(c) did not apply because defendants were in state custody, not federal.
• Digital & Residential Warrants: Affidavits linking Ortega-Ayala to gang activity supplied probable cause; officers also acted in good faith under United States v. Leon.
• Rule 33 Motion: The district judge correctly distinguished Rule 29’s standard from Rule 33’s and did not err in denying a new trial based on alleged impeachment of a cell-site expert.
• Interstate Commerce Element: Western Union transfers, interstate Uber rides, interstate phone communications, and social-media coordination easily satisfied the RICO/VICAR de-minimis commerce requirement.

4. In-Depth Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• United States v. Hensley (1985) – Authorized vehicle stops when officers know of an outstanding warrant. The panel treated the warrant as dispositive, echoing Hensley’s reasoning that knowledge of a warrant supplies probable cause.
• Illinois v. Gates (1983) – “Totality of the circumstances” probable-cause test guided both the traffic-stop and search-warrant analyses.
• Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (2011) – Cited for the principle that subjective police motives are irrelevant; objective facts control.
• United States v. Leon (1984) – Underpinned the good-faith exception saving any arguable warrant defect.
• Colorado v. Connelly (1986) & Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) – Provided the voluntariness framework; the panel stressed the absence of “coercive police activity.”
• Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) – Guided the harmless-error discussion for hypothetical confession suppression.
• United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez (1994) – Confirmed § 3501(c) applies only after federal arrest; decisive against the presentment-delay argument.
• United States v. Cornell (4th Cir. 2015) – Reaffirmed the “minimal threshold” for commerce; heavily relied on in sustaining the RICO/VICAR counts.

4.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 Traffic Stop & Arrest Warrant

The panel held that:

1. Knowledge of a valid felony warrant for Ordonez-Zometa alone justified stopping the vehicle, regardless of a minor turn-signal violation.
2. Even absent the warrant, officers had probable cause to believe the Nissan was itself an instrumentality of the murder (automobile exception).
3. Waiting until the suspect entered the car was not an “undue delay” nor an impermissible tactic; objective reasonableness trumped alleged subjective motives.

4.2.2 Interrogation & Miranda Voluntariness

Central points:

• Detective DeLeon’s misstatement about silence being used against the defendant, while erroneous, was a single comment not accompanied by threats or promises—insufficient to overbear will.
• Comfort breaks, water, relocation to a less formal room, and the suspect’s continued willingness to speak supported voluntariness.
• Any hypothetical error was harmless in light of overwhelming independent evidence.

4.2.3 § 3501(c) Presentment Rule

Because the arrest was on a state murder warrant, the six-hour “safe harbor” for federal presentment never triggered. This cleanly disposes of many hybrid-custody disputes encountered in joint state-federal investigations.

4.2.4 Digital & Home Search Warrants

The affidavits:

• Linked Ortega-Ayala to LGCS and described MS-13’s reliance on phones & social media.
• Recounted witness statements that the murder video circulated digitally.
• Chronologically placed the suspect returning to his residence with potential physical evidence.

Together, these facts created a “fair probability” evidence would be present. Even if marginal, the Leon good-faith doctrine blocked suppression.

4.2.5 Rule 29 vs. Rule 33 Standards

The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s dual-track analysis:

• Rule 29: Viewed evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
• Rule 33: Expressly acknowledged its discretion to weigh evidence but found no miscarriage of justice, especially given corroborated cooperating-witness testimony.

4.2.6 De-Minimis Interstate Commerce

Payments via Western Union to El Salvador, interstate Uber travel, cell-site communications, and cross-border phone calls collectively satisfied the “minimal threshold” under both RICO and VICAR. The court reiterated that Congress intended a broad sweep and refused to raise the evidentiary bar.

4.3 Potential Impact

1. “Arrest-on-Sight” Validation: Officers within the Fourth Circuit can rely more confidently on Hensley to perform vehicle stops based solely on a passenger’s felony warrant—without fear of later suppression.
2. Digital-Era Probable Cause: Investigators may cite gang reliance on smartphones and social media as a sufficient nexus for broad electronic warrants, provided they articulate usage patterns.
   → Defense counsel should expect uphill battles unless they can show the affidavits are truly “bare bones.”
3. Interrogation Advisories: The opinion warns detectives that misstatements about constitutional rights remain risky but, absent coercion, may not doom a statement—dialing back defendants’ leverage in close cases.
4. Hybrid-Custody Presentment: Clarifies that § 3501(c) is triggered only after an initial federal arrest, a crucial point in multi-jurisdiction gang and organized-crime probes.
5. RICO/VICAR Commerce Element: Reinforces the government’s low burden; even ride-sharing and remittances suffice, discouraging motions for judgement on interstate-commerce grounds.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

• RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act): Federal statute targeting patterns of racketeering. Requires (a) an enterprise and (b) conduct of its affairs through racketeering, plus (c) an interstate-commerce nexus.
• VICAR (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering): Criminalizes violent acts committed to maintain or increase position in a racketeering enterprise. Imports RICO’s commerce element.
• De-Minimis Commerce Test: Government need only show a “non-trivial” effect on interstate commerce—e.g., using phones, money wiring, or vehicles moving across state lines.
• Leon Good-Faith Exception: Evidence seized under a warrant later found invalid is still admissible if officers reasonably relied on it.
• § 3501(c) Six-Hour Rule: Confessions obtained within six hours of a federal arrest are admissible; outside that window, delay must be reasonable. No application where custody is purely state-based.
• Rule 29 vs. Rule 33: Rule 29 asks, “Could any rational jury convict?”; Rule 33 asks, “Does the verdict create a miscarriage of justice even though sufficient evidence exists?”

6. Conclusion

United States v. Ordonez-Zometa is more than an affirmance of gang-related convictions; it is a doctrinal primer. The Fourth Circuit:

• Sides firmly with objective-reasonableness analysis in warrant-based vehicle stops;
• Temporizes voluntariness challenges premised on isolated police misstatements;
• Blesses comprehensive digital searches when affidavits spell out modern communication habits of criminal enterprises;
• Re-affirms that § 3501(c) remains tethered to initial federal custody; and
• Re-endorses the light “de-minimis” touch for interstate-commerce under RICO and VICAR.

Practitioners should anticipate heavier reliance on the decision in litigating suppression motions, crafting warrant affidavits for electronic data, and briefing Rule 33 motions. The judgment ultimately underscores an old yet resilient theme: when investigators articulate common-sense connections between crime and evidence—especially in a transnational gang context—Fourth Amendment and due-process challenges will seldom prevail.