Introduction

In United States v. Brooks, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether two federal firearms statutes—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun under the National Firearms Act, or NFA)—can be constitutionally enforced after the Supreme Court’s decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024). The court held that both statutes are constitutional as applied to the defendant and rejected his facial challenges.

The case arose after Maysville, Kentucky police stopped Dalton Brooks, who had multiple prior felony convictions, and found in his car an unregistered short-barreled 12-gauge shotgun, another 12-gauge shotgun, narcotics, a scale, and a crossbow. Brooks moved to dismiss the federal indictment on Second Amendment grounds. The district court denied the motion, Brooks pled guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional rulings, and he received a 57-month sentence. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The opinion does two principal things. First, relying on United States v. Williams (6th Cir. 2024), it reaffirms that § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional as applied to “dangerous” felons and that prior convictions for assault and drug trafficking render a defendant presumptively dangerous. Second, invoking United States v. Bridges (6th Cir. 2025) and longstanding Supreme Court precedents (Miller and Heller), it holds that short-barreled shotguns are “dangerous and unusual” weapons outside the Second Amendment’s protection, so § 5861(d)’s registration requirement may be enforced against Brooks.

Summary of the Opinion

• Framework: Applying Bruen and Rahimi, the court asked (1) whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the defendant’s proposed conduct, and (2) if so, whether the government has shown consistency with the historical tradition of firearm regulation.
• Section 922(g)(1): The court rejected a facial challenge because the statute has constitutional applications, as recognized in Williams. As applied, Brooks is “presumptively dangerous” given his prior assault and drug trafficking convictions, so disarmament under § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.
• Section 5861(d): The court held that short-barreled shotguns are “dangerous and unusual” within the meaning of Heller’s limitation on Second Amendment protection, as clarified by Miller and reinforced by Sixth Circuit precedent in Bridges. Because such weapons are not “in common use” for lawful purposes like self-defense, the government may punish possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun consistent with the Second Amendment. Sister circuits have reached the same conclusion post-Bruen/Rahimi.
• Result: The district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed; the conviction and sentence stand.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s reasoning is anchored in—and carefully constrained by—recent Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court authority:

• Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Established the current “text-and-history” framework. Courts first ask whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the regulated conduct. If yes, the government must justify the regulation by analogy to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, eschewing interest-balancing means-ends analysis.
• Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Clarified how courts conduct this historical inquiry, endorsing relevantly similar historical analogues and recognizing the constitutionality of disarming individuals who are dangerous (there, persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders). Rahimi also reaffirmed that a facial challenge fails if a statute has constitutional applications.
• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): The Sixth Circuit’s key post-Bruen decision on § 922(g)(1). Williams held the statute constitutional in many of its applications and, critically, constitutional as applied to “dangerous” persons. It authorized courts to consult a defendant’s criminal record and recognized presumptive dangerousness from crimes “against the body of another human being” (e.g., assault) or inherently dangerous crimes like “drug trafficking.” Williams also indicated that rebutting this presumption is exceptionally difficult.
• United States v. Bridges, 150 F.4th 517 (6th Cir. 2025): The Sixth Circuit’s seminal “type-of-weapon” decision after Bruen, sustaining 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)’s machinegun ban under the historical “dangerous and unusual” doctrine. Bridges confirms that weapons not in common lawful use for self-defense and capable of inflicting disproportionate harm fall outside the Second Amendment’s protection.
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense but underscored a “longstanding” limitation excluding “dangerous and unusual” weapons. Heller read Miller to mean that weapons not “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns,” are not protected.
• United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939): Upheld enforcement of the NFA against unregistered short-barreled shotguns because such weapons were not shown to be in common use for lawful purposes or ordinary militia equipment.
• Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (2025): Emphasized that what removes certain weapons from Second Amendment coverage is their disproportionate capacity for harm relative to personal protection needs—language echoed by the Sixth Circuit to underscore why short-barreled shotguns are “unusual.”
• Sister Circuit Alignment on § 5861(d): United States v. Rush, 130 F.4th 633 (7th Cir. 2025); United States v. Robinson, No. 23-12551, 2025 WL 870981 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025) (per curiam); United States v. Saleem, No. 23-4693, 2024 WL 5084523 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 2024) (per curiam). Each upholds the NFA’s registration regime for short-barreled rifles/shotguns in the wake of Bruen and Rahimi, relying on Miller/Heller’s dangerous-and-unusual doctrine.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Bruen/Rahimi Framework

The panel followed the two-part inquiry:

• Textual coverage: Does the Second Amendment’s plain text cover the defendant’s proposed conduct?
• Historical justification: If so, has the government shown that the challenged regulation is consistent with the historical limits of the right?

2) Section 922(g)(1): Felon-in-Possession

• Facial challenge: The court summarily rejected Brooks’s claim that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in all applications, citing Rahimi’s rule that a facial challenge fails where the statute has valid applications and Williams’s holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional in many circumstances.
• As-applied challenge: The court applied Williams’s “dangerous persons” principle. Courts may assess dangerousness by examining the defendant’s criminal history; assault and drug trafficking convictions create a presumption of dangerousness. Brooks had both. Because he offered no rebuttal—and Williams indicates such a showing would be “very difficult”—the court held § 922(g)(1) constitutional as applied to him.

3) Section 5861(d): Unregistered Short-Barreled Shotgun

• Step one—Text: A short-barreled shotgun is an “arm,” and Brooks is among “the people,” so the conduct is presumptively within the Amendment’s coverage.
• Step two—History: Relying on the “dangerous and unusual” limitation recognized in Heller (and rooted in Miller’s analysis), the court concluded that short-barreled shotguns are not “in common use” for lawful purposes and are ill-suited to self-defense due to their disproportionate capacity for harm. Bridges supplies the Sixth Circuit’s post-Bruen blueprint for “type-of-weapon” challenges, and its reasoning maps neatly onto short-barreled shotguns. Because such weapons fall outside the Second Amendment’s protection, the government may criminalize their possession when not registered under the NFA.
• Inter-circuit harmony: The decision aligns the Sixth Circuit with the Seventh, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits, all of which have upheld § 5861(d) post-Bruen/Rahimi.

What Is New or Clarified Here?

• Post-Bruen validation of § 5861(d) in the Sixth Circuit: Although Miller and Heller cast long shadows over short-barreled shotguns, this opinion expressly applies the Bruen/Rahimi framework—via the Sixth Circuit’s own decision in Bridges—to uphold § 5861(d) as applied to a short-barreled shotgun. It thereby confirms the statute’s continued enforceability post-Bruen within the Sixth Circuit.
• Reinforcement of Williams’s “dangerous persons” standard: The opinion reaffirms that assault and drug trafficking convictions make a defendant presumptively dangerous and that as-applied challenges by such defendants to § 922(g)(1) will generally fail unless a demanding rebuttal is made.

Impact and Implications

1) Section 922(g)(1) Litigation in the Sixth Circuit

• Narrowed as-applied pathway: After Williams and this opinion, defendants with violent offenses or drug trafficking histories will face an uphill battle in challenging § 922(g)(1). The opinion signals that courts may summarily reject as-applied challenges where the criminal history fits Williams’s presumptively dangerous categories.
• Potential carve-outs: The decision does not foreclose as-applied challenges by individuals with remote, nonviolent, or regulatory offenses, but it leaves Williams’s demanding framework intact. Litigants seeking relief must marshal substantial evidence to overcome the dangerousness presumption or demonstrate inapplicability.
• Circuit landscape: Some circuits have recognized narrower or different approaches to § 922(g)(1) as applied to nonviolent offenders (e.g., the Third Circuit’s en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General). Within the Sixth Circuit, however, Williams governs, and Brooks underscores its vitality post-Rahimi.

2) National Firearms Act Enforcement for Short-Barreled Shotguns

• Stable footing post-Bruen/Rahimi: This opinion, together with Bridges, indicates that NFA restrictions on certain weapon types survive Bruen when those weapons are dangerous and unusual. Short-barreled shotguns and machineguns fit that category.
• Registration vs. ban: While § 5861(d) is a registration requirement rather than an outright ban, the court’s analysis proceeds from the premise that short-barreled shotguns lie outside the Second Amendment’s scope entirely. If they can be banned consistent with Heller/Miller, a fortiori, the government may require registration and penalize noncompliance.
• Forecast for related items: The reasoning suggests that other weapons with similar characteristics—i.e., those not in common lawful use and capable of disproportionate harm—will be difficult to protect under the Second Amendment within the Sixth Circuit. However, discrete items not squarely addressed by Miller/Heller/Bridges (e.g., suppressors) may prompt more nuanced litigation about whether they are “arms” and whether they are “dangerous and unusual.”

3) Day-to-Day Practice

• For prosecutors: When defending § 922(g)(1), emphasize the defendant’s qualifying criminal convictions and Williams’s dangerousness framework. For § 5861(d) cases, cite Miller, Heller, and Bridges to establish that short-barreled shotguns are outside the Amendment’s scope and that registration enforcement is constitutional.
• For defense counsel: As-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) will require robust evidence that the defendant is not dangerous despite prior convictions—something Williams deems difficult. On § 5861(d), absent a novel historical showing that short-barreled shotguns are in common lawful use for self-defense, post-Bruen challenges are unlikely to succeed within the Sixth Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all its applications. It usually fails if there is any set of circumstances where the law can be constitutionally applied. An as-applied challenge contests the law’s constitutionality as applied to the specific person or facts.
• Bruen framework: Courts ask whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct, and if so, whether the law is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Modern cost-benefit balancing is out; history and analogy are in.
• “Dangerous and unusual” weapons: A historical limitation recognized by Heller that excludes from Second Amendment protection weapons that are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes (i.e., not “in common use”), especially those capable of disproportionate harm relative to personal defense needs.
• “Common use”: A functional concept from Heller and Miller assessing whether a weapon is typically owned by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes such as self-defense. Weapons in common use receive protection; those that are not, particularly if unusually dangerous, do not.
• Presumptively dangerous persons: Under Williams, individuals with certain convictions (e.g., assault, drug trafficking) are presumed dangerous, justifying disarmament consistent with historical practice. The presumption can theoretically be rebutted, but the burden is heavy.
• National Firearms Act (NFA): A federal regulatory scheme requiring registration of certain weapon types (e.g., machineguns, short-barreled rifles/shotguns). Possessing a covered weapon without registration violates § 5861(d).
• Short-barreled shotgun: A shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches in length, covered by the NFA due to its concealability and destructive potential at close range—features courts associate with “dangerous and unusual” status.
• “Not recommended for publication”: In the Sixth Circuit, unpublished decisions are nonprecedential; they do not bind future panels. Here, the court relies on binding published precedents (Williams and Bridges), so the outcome’s principles remain authoritative even if this particular disposition is unpublished.
• Per curiam: An opinion issued in the name of the court rather than attributed to a specific judge, often signaling a straightforward application of existing law.

Unresolved or Narrowly Addressed Questions

• Scope of “dangerousness”: Williams provides examples (assault, drug trafficking), but the boundaries for other offenses (e.g., certain nonviolent felonies) remain fact-dependent.
• Evidentiary burden to rebut dangerousness: Brooks did not attempt to rebut, and Williams signals that overcoming the presumption is “very difficult,” but standards for what suffices are still developing case by case.
• Registration versus prohibition: Because short-barreled shotguns are outside the Second Amendment’s scope, the panel did not analyze whether registration could independently be justified even if the weapon were protected. That question remains for other contexts or items.
• Application to other NFA items: The opinion’s logic likely covers short-barreled rifles as well, but other items (e.g., suppressors) may trigger threshold disputes about whether the item is an “arm” and what historical traditions apply.

Conclusion

United States v. Brooks provides a clear, post-Bruen roadmap within the Sixth Circuit for two frequently litigated firearms provisions. On § 922(g)(1), the court doubles down on Williams’s “dangerous persons” framework: defendants with assault and drug trafficking convictions are presumptively dangerous, and as-applied challenges will almost certainly fail absent extraordinary rebuttal. On § 5861(d), the court, guided by Bridges and Supreme Court precedent in Miller and Heller, holds that short-barreled shotguns are “dangerous and unusual” and thus not protected by the Second Amendment; their possession without registration remains criminal.

The decision aligns the Sixth Circuit with sister circuits and emphasizes continuity rather than disruption after Bruen and Rahimi: the Constitution secures a core right to keep and bear arms for self-defense while accommodating a historical tradition of disarming dangerous individuals and excluding from protection weapon types that are not commonly used for lawful purposes and that pose disproportionate risks. As such, Brooks will serve as a practical touchstone for district courts confronting similar challenges and signals that, at least within the Sixth Circuit, the core architecture of federal felon-in-possession and NFA enforcement remains intact.

Key takeaways:

• Section 922(g)(1) survives facial attack and remains constitutional as applied to defendants with violent or drug trafficking histories under Williams’s “dangerous persons” rubric.
• Section 5861(d) is enforceable against possession of unregistered short-barreled shotguns because such weapons are “dangerous and unusual” under Heller/Miller; Bridges supplies the controlling Sixth Circuit lens for type-of-weapon challenges.
• Post-Bruen/Rahimi, courts continue to rely on well-established historical limits—disarmament of dangerous persons and exclusion of “dangerous and unusual” arms—to uphold longstanding federal firearm regulations.