Curtailing Private Enforcement and Clarifying Jury Instruction Duties:
Citizen’s Arrest Limits and Lesser‑Included Offenses in Ser (Georgio) v. State

I. Introduction

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Ser (Georgio) v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 57 (Nov. 20, 2025), is a significant criminal law opinion that clarifies two important areas:

Citizen’s Arrest Scope: The court holds that Nevada’s citizen’s arrest statute, NRS 171.126, does not authorize a private person to arrest someone for a federal felony committed outside the arrestor’s presence. When the crime is not committed in the arrestor’s presence, citizen’s arrests are confined to Nevada felonies.
Lesser‑Included Offense Instructions: The court holds that trial courts in Nevada are not required to give lesser‑included‑offense instructions sua sponte. Defendants must request such instructions to preserve the issue for appeal. In doing so, the court expressly overrules the longstanding rule in Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), to the extent it mandated sua sponte lesser‑included instructions.

The case arises from a failed “citizen’s arrest” by appellant Georgio Mont Ser, who took it upon himself to enforce federal obscenity laws against Charlotte and Lucy Campbell, pornography producers whose content he believed violated 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (distribution of obscene materials in interstate commerce). Ser’s actions culminated in a violent home entry, physical struggle, and multiple felony convictions.

This commentary analyzes the decision’s background, the court’s statutory interpretation and doctrinal moves, the treatment of evidentiary and jury‑instruction issues, and the broader implications for Nevada criminal practice and citizen’s arrest law.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Events

Charlotte and Lucy Campbell, then married, worked in the production of pornographic films. Charlotte posted some of these videos to social media. Ser viewed several of these videos and concluded they violated federal obscenity law—specifically, the federal felony prohibition on distribution of obscene materials in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 1465.

After reporting the alleged obscenity to various law enforcement agencies and receiving no affirmative response, Ser decided to take matters into his own hands by attempting a citizen’s arrest of the Campbells.

1. First visit

Ser went to the Campbells’ residence disguised as a pizza delivery worker.
He brought a taser, handcuffs, duct tape, and pepper spray.
When Lucy answered the door, Ser tried to pull her out of the house and detain her.
The Campbells shut the door and called the police; officers later arrested Ser.
Ser was released without charges but warned to stay away from the home.

2. Second visit

Ser returned and left documents at the doorstep but did not confront the Campbells.

3. Third visit

By this time, Charlotte and Lucy were divorced, and Lucy had moved out.
Charlotte was at home with her boyfriend.
Ser knocked on a window to get attention, then entered the house through a side door.
Charlotte, having heard noise, went upstairs with her firearm to investigate.
Ser encountered Charlotte upstairs; Charlotte pointed the firearm at him.
A violent struggle ensued. Ser tackled Charlotte and punched her repeatedly while trying to seize the gun.
The firearm discharged several times during the struggle (no one was seriously injured).
Ser ultimately gained control of the firearm, but Charlotte managed to unload it while Ser held it.
Charlotte went downstairs and called 911. All parties then went outside to await the police; Ser still had the weapon until he heard Charlotte tell the operator that he was armed.

B. Charges and Trial

Ser was arrested and charged in Clark County with:

Attempted second‑degree kidnapping
Second‑degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon
Residential burglary while in the possession of a firearm
Assault with a deadly weapon
Battery with substantial bodily harm
Stalking

At trial, Ser’s primary theory was that his conduct was legally justified as a citizen’s arrest of Charlotte and Lucy for federal obscenity violations. To support this defense, he sought to introduce:

Descriptions of the videos he had seen,
Cross‑examination about the Campbells’ pornography production and distribution, and
Unredacted versions of his recorded post‑arrest statements to police explaining his motives and legal theory.

The district court:

Ruled that Nevada’s citizen’s arrest statute does not allow citizen’s arrests for federal crimes,
Concluded Ser had not laid a sufficient factual foundation that the Campbells had committed a felony for purposes of a citizen’s arrest defense,
Found that entry into a home under NRS 171.138 would still require exigent circumstances (for police) and limited Ser’s reliance on that statute,
Excluded most of the proffered obscenity‑related evidence, and
Refused to instruct the jury on a citizen’s arrest defense.

Ser was convicted on all of the relevant charges. He appealed, arguing primarily that:

He was wrongly prevented from mounting his citizen’s arrest defense.
The district court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser‑included offense of false imprisonment as to the kidnapping charges.
The court mishandled juror questions, mistrial motions, and that the evidence was insufficient on several counts.

III. Summary of the Court’s Opinion

Justice Bell, writing for a unanimous panel (Justices Parraguirre and Stiglich concurring), affirms Ser’s convictions and issues several key holdings:

Citizen’s Arrest Limited to Nevada Felonies Outside Presence:
Interpreting NRS 171.126 and related provisions (NRS 171.178, NRS 193.120), the court holds that when a crime is not committed in the arrestor’s presence, a private person’s citizen’s arrest authority extends only to felonies against the State of Nevada. It does not authorize arrest for federal felonies committed outside the arrestor’s presence. Therefore, Ser had no lawful citizen’s arrest defense based on federal obscenity law, and the evidentiary exclusions and denial of a citizen’s arrest instruction were not error.
No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Lesser‑Included Offenses:
The court holds that a district court is not required to instruct the jury on a lesser‑included offense unless the defendant requests it. Failure to request such an instruction means the issue is forfeited and subject only to plain error review on appeal. To adopt this rule, the court expressly overrules Lisby v. State “to the extent” it mandated that trial courts must sua sponte give lesser‑included‑offense instructions when the evidence might support acquittal on the greater and conviction on the lesser.
Application to Ser’s Case:
Applying the new and clarified rules, the court concludes:
- Ser was not legally entitled to make a citizen’s arrest under NRS 171.126 for the federal obscenity offense he alleged, since that offense occurred online and outside his presence.
- The district court correctly excluded the bulk of Ser’s “obscenity” evidence and declined to instruct on citizen’s arrest.
- Because Ser did not request a false‑imprisonment instruction, the court reviews the omission for plain error and finds none.
- The court also rejects Ser’s remaining claims concerning juror questions, mistrial motions, sufficiency of the evidence on multiple counts, and cumulative error.
Policy Concerns about Citizen’s Arrest Statutes:
Although constrained by the statutory text, the court openly expresses “deep concerns” about the breadth and dangers of Nevada’s citizen’s arrest regime—especially NRS 171.138, which authorizes private persons to “break open” doors or windows when making a citizen’s arrest. The court underscores the risk of violent confrontations and invites the Legislature to consider reform.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Scope of Nevada’s Citizen’s Arrest Statute

1. Statutory framework

The central statutory provision is NRS 171.126, which allows a private person to arrest another in three situations:

“For a public offense committed or attempted in the person’s presence.”
“When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the person’s presence.”
“When a felony has been in fact committed, and the private person has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.”

On its face, the statute uses the term “felony” in subsections (2) and (3) without specifying whether it includes federal felonies. Because the alleged obscenity violation occurred online (distribution over the internet), it did not occur “in [Ser’s] presence” as required by subsection (1). Thus, Ser could only justify his actions under subsections (2) or (3), which hinge on whether the “felony” in question can include a federal offense.

The court interprets NRS 171.126 in harmony with related statutes:

NRS 193.120(2): Defines a felony as “a crime which may be punished by death or by imprisonment in the state prison” (emphasis added). This definition is inherently state‑centric and keyed to Nevada’s penal system.
NRS 171.178(2): Governs the post‑arrest procedure after a citizen’s arrest, requiring the private arrestor to deliver the arrestee to a peace officer, who must then take the arrested person before a magistrate “empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the State of Nevada” (emphasis added).

Taken together, these provisions strongly suggest that the Legislature contemplated citizen’s arrest in relation to state offenses, not crimes against “any other sovereign,” i.e., federal or other jurisdictions’ crimes.

2. Precedents guiding the statutory interpretation

The court’s interpretive methodology relies on familiar principles:

Plain language and harmonization: Citing Clay v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 129 Nev. 445, 451, 305 P.3d 898, 902 (2013), the court begins with statutory text and reads NRS 171.126 “in harmony with other rules and statutes.”
Legislative awareness of existing law: Relying on Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers v. Nevada Self‑Insurers Association, 126 Nev. 74, 84, 225 P.3d 1265, 1271 (2010), the court presumes the Legislature enacts statutes with knowledge of the existing statutory framework, including definitions of “felony” and the mechanisms for handling citizen’s arrests.
Standard of review: Because Ser’s evidentiary and instructional claims turn on statutory interpretation, the court applies de novo review, citing State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).

3. The core holding: No citizen’s arrest for federal felonies committed outside the arrestor’s presence

The court ultimately holds:

“Reading our citizen’s arrest statute in harmony with these provisions requires us to conclude that when the crime is committed outside the arrestor’s presence, a citizen’s arrest is only authorized for Nevada felonies, and Ser was not legally entitled to make a citizen’s arrest for a perceived violation of federal obscenity law.”

Key features of this holding:

It is explicitly limited to crimes not committed in the arrestor’s presence. The court does not decide whether “public offense” in NRS 171.126(1) might reach certain federal crimes committed in the arrestor’s presence.
It draws a clear sovereign‑based boundary: “felony” in NRS 171.126(2)–(3) is confined to crimes punishable as felonies under Nevada law.
Because distribution of obscenity is a misdemeanor under Nevada law (NRS 201.249), but a felony only in its federal form (18 U.S.C. § 1465; 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4)), Ser could not bootstrap federal felony status into the Nevada citizen’s arrest statute.

Once this interpretation is adopted, the rest of the court’s analysis follows:

Ser had no legal entitlement to a citizen’s arrest defense.
Evidence aimed at proving the Campbells’ violation of federal obscenity law became legally irrelevant to any valid defense and properly excludable under ordinary relevance and prejudice standards.
The district court was correct not to instruct the jury on citizen’s arrest as a justification defense, because a jury need not be instructed on a legally unavailable defense.

4. Constitutional context: Private actors and the Fourth Amendment

The court notes a critical constitutional nuance: the Fourth Amendment and its Nevada analog (Art. 1, § 18) limit government actors, not private citizens. Citing Radkus v. State, 90 Nev. 406, 408, 528 P.2d 697, 698 (1974), the court underscores that constitutional search‑and‑seizure protections do not apply to private individuals acting on their own.

This makes NRS 171.138 particularly alarming from a policy perspective: it allows a private person, purporting to conduct a citizen’s arrest, to “break open a door or window” after announcing their purpose. Unlike police forced‑entry rules, these private entries are not subject to Fourth Amendment suppression remedies.

5. Policy critique and invitation to the Legislature

Even as it enforces the statute’s current text, the court issues a candid warning about Nevada’s citizen’s arrest laws:

It stresses the “risk” to both arrestors and arrestees, citing scholarship such as Ira P. Robbins, Vilifying the Vigilante: A Narrowed Scope of Citizen’s Arrest, 25 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 557 (2016), and the classic Note, The Law of Citizen’s Arrest, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 502 (1965).
It notes that citizen’s arrest doctrines were historically justified when there were no professional police forces (citing Flanders et al., The Puzzling Persistence of Citizen’s Arrest Laws and the Need to Revisit Them, 64 How. L.J. 161 (2020)), conditions that no longer prevail.
It highlights the disconnect between the supposed protective “knock‑and‑announce” requirement in NRS 171.138 and the reality that a stranger without badges or legal training forcing entry into a home will likely provoke armed resistance, undermining the safety rationale behind knock‑and‑announce rules (see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006)).

The court characterizes NRS 171.138 as inviting “tragic situations in which a homeowner kills or injures a would-be citizen’s arrestor who is acting as the law presently allows.” However, it acknowledges that narrowing or repealing this authority is a legislative function.

B. Overruling Lisby and the New Rule on Lesser‑Included Offense Instructions

1. The old rule: Lisby v. State

In Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), the Nevada Supreme Court had established three scenarios for lesser‑included offense (LIO) instructions. The third scenario, relevant here, held that if:

“there is evidence which would absolve the defendant from guilt of the greater offense or degree but would support a finding of guilt of the lesser offense or degree,”

then the lesser‑included instruction was mandatory, without request. This imposed a sua sponte duty on trial courts to consider and give LIO instructions whenever the evidence could support a lesser conviction, even if the defense did not ask for it.

2. Ser’s argument based on Lisby

Ser claimed that false imprisonment is a lesser‑included offense of kidnapping and that evidence suggested:

He aimed only to bring Charlotte and Lucy to the police,
He did not intend to commit the aggravated elements of kidnapping, and
The jury could thus acquit him of kidnapping but convict him of false imprisonment.

Relying on Lisby, he argued that the district court had an independent obligation to give a false‑imprisonment instruction, whether or not he requested it. Because the court did not do so, he argued the omission should be reviewed under a harmless error standard instead of plain error, analogizing to the sua sponte limiting‑instruction requirement in Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 30 P.3d 1128 (2001).

3. The new rule: LIO instructions must be requested

The court decisively rejects this reading of Lisby going forward. It holds:

“[W]e now hold that a defendant must request a lesser‑included‑offense jury instruction to preserve a challenge to the district court’s failure to provide that instruction for appeal. In doing so, we overrule the portion of Lisby that required a district court to sua sponte instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses.”

Two main rationales are given.

(a) Tactical choice belongs to the defense

The court emphasizes that requesting a lesser‑included instruction is often a strategic decision:

Defendants might want to deny the jury a “middle ground” option, forcing an all‑or‑nothing choice on the greater offense.
A lesser‑included instruction can be a double‑edged sword: it may increase the chance of some conviction even where the jury might otherwise acquit entirely.

Because of this, the court concludes that whether to pursue a lesser‑included theory is “a tactical choice properly reserved for defendants and their counsel.” If a defendant deliberately forgoes an LIO instruction to try to win outright acquittal, that strategic choice should not support an appellate complaint that the court failed to give an unrequested instruction.

(b) The burden on trial courts

The court also notes the practical burden of requiring trial courts to identify and instruct on all possible lesser‑included offenses sua sponte:

For each charged crime, the court would have to identify all lessers,
Then evaluate the evidence to see whether a rational jury could acquit on the greater but convict on each proposed lesser,
All without prompting from the parties.

By contrast, the sua sponte instruction required in Tavares is tightly cabined: it applies only in “a single, clearly delineated situation” (admission of other‑act evidence) and is mechanically triggered when such evidence is admitted. The court views the Tavares obligation as far more administrable than a broad, case‑wide LIO duty.

Thus, the court “places this burden where it properly lies—with the defendant.” Defense counsel must request lesser‑included instructions if they wish to preserve the issue for appellate review.

4. Standard of review: from harmless error to plain error

Because Ser did not request a false‑imprisonment instruction, the court treats the issue as forfeited and applies the plain error standard articulated in Martinorellan v. State, 131 Nev. 43, 49, 343 P.3d 590, 593 (2015), and Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018):

The error must be “so unmistakable that it is apparent from a casual inspection of the record,” and
The defendant must show that the error affected substantial rights by causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

The court finds no plain error:

Ser’s primary theory was not that he lacked intent to detain, but that he was legally justified in doing so (citizen’s arrest).
Given that theory, the district court had no obvious reason to introduce an unrequested lesser offense that would undercut the binary of guilty/justified that Ser’s strategy implied.
Moreover, because the evidence was sufficient to support the kidnapping conviction, failure to instruct on false imprisonment is harmless even under more demanding standards (see Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 756–57, 121 P.3d 582, 590 (2005)).

Thus, Ser cannot show a clear, outcome‑determinative error, and his LIO claim fails.

C. Other Issues: Juror Questions, Mistrial Motions, and Sufficiency of Evidence

1. Juror questions and hearsay

During trial, a juror submitted a question for the detective who interviewed Ser. The juror wanted to know Ser’s “exact or clear reason” for making the citizen’s arrest and why he targeted the Campbells specifically. The district court declined to pose the question, reasoning that it would require the detective to repeat Ser’s out‑of‑court statements, which, coming from a juror rather than the State, would constitute inadmissible hearsay.

The court affirms this exercise of discretion:

Vaughn v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 6, 563 P.3d 295, 302 (2025), confirms that allowing juror questions is committed to the trial court’s discretion.
Flores v. State, 114 Nev. 910, 913, 965 P.2d 901, 902–03 (1998), holds that only questions permissible under the rules of evidence should be asked.
While the State can introduce Ser’s statements as admissions of a party opponent (NRS 51.035(3)), there is “no mechanism” for a juror to do the same.

Because the proposed question called for hearsay beyond what the State chose to elicit, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

2. Denial of motions for mistrial

Ser argued that he was forced to proceed under a trial strategy (citizen’s arrest defense) that the court ultimately undercut by excluding most supporting evidence, and so the court should have granted a mistrial.

Applying the abuse‑of‑discretion standard from Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 981, 36 P.3d 424, 431 (2001), the court notes:

Ser himself requested that the district court postpone certain admissibility rulings until after he testified, meaning the timing of the evidentiary decision was, in part, at his urging.
Trial strategies are frequently undermined by evolving evidentiary rulings or changed circumstances (e.g., a witness dying, as in United States v. Saldarriaga, 987 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993)); this does not automatically entitle a defendant to a mistrial.

Finding no clear abuse, the court upholds the denial of the mistrial motions.

3. Sufficiency of evidence on major counts

The court applies the familiar sufficiency standard from Origel‑Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998): viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could any rational trier of fact find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt?

(a) Attempted kidnapping and kidnapping with a deadly weapon

Intent to detain against will: NRS 200.310(2) defines second‑degree kidnapping as involving intent to keep a person “detained against the person’s will.” The court points to:
- Ser’s first visit, where he arrived with a taser, pepper spray, duct tape, and handcuffs while disguised as a delivery worker; a rational jury could infer intent to forcibly detain Lucy (attempted kidnapping).
- His third visit, where he surreptitiously entered the home, engaged in a violent struggle, and had already been warned previously by law enforcement; a jury could reasonably infer he intended to detain Charlotte against her will and take her into his custody.
Not merely incidental detention: Under Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 272–73, 130 P.3d 176, 179 (2006), kidnapping convictions cannot rest solely on restraint incidental to another crime without increased danger or independent significance. Here, Ser’s was to detain and transport the Campbells to law enforcement. The court reasons that the other crimes (battery, burglary, assault, stalking) are incidental to the kidnapping, not vice versa, so Mendoza does not invalidate the kidnapping conviction.
Deadly weapon enhancement: For the kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon count, Ser argued that his use of the firearm did not facilitate detention. The court disagrees:
- Ser seized the firearm during the struggle and retained it until after the parties went outside and Charlotte told 911 that Ser was armed.
- Berry v. State, 125 Nev. 265, 277, 212 P.3d 1085, 1093 (2009), holds that whether the weapon was unloaded or inoperable is irrelevant for a deadly weapon enhancement (a point later limited on unrelated grounds by State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 245 P.3d 550 (2010)).
- Allen v. State, 96 Nev. 334, 336, 609 P.2d 321, 322 (1980), teaches that “use” of a deadly weapon does not require actual harm; conduct that produces fear of harm or force is enough.
The court concludes that a rational jury could infer that Ser’s retention of the firearm contributed to Charlotte’s continued detention and fear, satisfying the deadly‑weapon enhancement.

(b) Assault with a deadly weapon

Assault under NRS 200.471(1)(a)(2) is the intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. For assault with a deadly weapon, the weapon need not be loaded or operable, as reaffirmed in State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Bankhead), 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 573 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2025).

Evidence supporting Ser’s conviction included:

Charlotte’s testimony that she had to struggle to unload the weapon once Ser took control of it.
Her testimony that Ser pointed the gun at her during the struggle, at a time when it was still firing.

From this, a rational juror could conclude that Ser intentionally placed Charlotte in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm using the firearm, satisfying the elements of assault with a deadly weapon.

(c) Residential burglary while in possession of a firearm

NRS 205.060(1)(a) defines burglary as entering a dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein. Kidnapping is a felony under NRS 200.330.

Because the evidence supports the finding that Ser entered the home with intent to kidnap Charlotte, the burglary conviction stands. His possession of the firearm during the offense supports the “while in possession of a firearm” enhancement.

4. Cumulative error

Finally, the court rejects Ser’s cumulative error claim, citing Belcher v. State, 136 Nev. 261, 279, 464 P.3d 1013, 1031 (2020): where no individual error is shown, “there is nothing to cumulate.”

V. Clarifying Complex Concepts

A. Citizen’s arrest

A citizen’s arrest is an arrest made by a private person rather than by law enforcement. Historically rooted in eras before modern policing, such statutes permit private individuals to apprehend suspected wrongdoers under limited circumstances.

In Nevada, NRS 171.126 recognizes three such circumstances, but for crimes not in the arrestor’s presence, this decision makes clear that the crime must be a Nevada felony. Private citizens cannot lawfully cross the boundary into enforcement of federal felonies committed elsewhere or online.

B. “Felony” versus “Misdemeanor” and sovereigns

A felony under Nevada law is a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state prison (NRS 193.120(2)).
A misdemeanor is a less serious crime, generally punishable by up to six months in local jail.
Crucially, whether conduct is a felony under federal law (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1465, with a maximum of five years’ imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4)) does not make it a Nevada felony unless Nevada’s statutes classify the same conduct as a felony.

The decision turns on this mismatch: obscenity distribution is a Nevada misdemeanor, so it cannot be the predicate felony for a Nevada citizen’s arrest when committed outside the arrestor’s presence.

C. “In the person’s presence”

For citizen’s arrest under NRS 171.126(1), the offense must be committed or attempted “in the person’s presence.” Courts interpret this to mean the arrestor personally observes the offense as it occurs.

In Ser’s case, the distribution occurred online. Citing United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 282 (1st Cir. 2012), the court notes that “distribution” takes place when a person makes files available for others—here, through internet uploads—not in the physical presence of someone viewing the internet later. Thus, there was no qualifying offense “in [Ser’s] presence” for subsection (1).

D. Lesser‑included offense (LIO)

A lesser‑included offense is one whose elements are all contained within a greater offense. If you commit the greater offense, you necessarily commit the lesser.

For example, false imprisonment (unlawful restraint of another’s liberty) is often considered a lesser‑included offense of kidnapping (unlawful restraint with additional elements such as intent to detain for particular purposes).

Before this decision, Nevada law (under Lisby) sometimes required trial courts to sua sponte give LIO instructions. After Ser, the rule is:

Defense must request: The defendant and counsel must ask for an LIO instruction if they want it.
Forfeiture and plain error: If they do not, appellate review is limited to plain error, a demanding standard requiring a clear, outcome‑determinative mistake apparent from the record.

E. “Sua sponte” and standards of review

Sua sponte means “on its own motion.” A court acts sua sponte when it takes an action without a party’s request.
Harmless error review asks whether an error likely affected the verdict; if not, the conviction stands.
Plain error is stricter: the mistake must be obvious and must have affected the defendant’s substantial rights, causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice (Martinorellan).

By eliminating the sua sponte duty for LIO instructions, the court shifts most such claims into the realm of plain‑error review absent a timely request.

F. Kidnapping and “incidental” detention

Nevada, like many jurisdictions, is wary of transforming every robbery or assault into a kidnapping merely because the victim was briefly restrained. Under Mendoza, a separate kidnapping conviction cannot rest solely on restraint “incidental” to another offense unless it:

substantially increases the risk of harm, or
has independent significance apart from the other crime.

In Ser’s case, the court concludes that kidnapping was not incidental to another crime; it was, in fact, his principal objective, with other crimes incidental to that detention objective.

G. Deadly weapon enhancements and unloaded weapons

Nevada law treats display or use of a deadly weapon during certain crimes as an aggravating factor. Consistent with Berry and Allen:

The weapon need not be loaded or operable (Berry).
“Use” of the weapon includes conduct that reasonably induces fear of harm (Allen), not just actual shooting or striking.

Bankhead confirms that assault with a deadly weapon similarly does not require a loaded, operable weapon—the fear and apparent ability to inflict harm are central.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Practical limits on private enforcement of federal law

The most immediate impact of Ser is its clear boundary: citizen’s arrests in Nevada cannot be predicated on federal felonies committed outside the arrestor’s presence. Private individuals cannot lawfully:

Attempt to arrest suspected violators of federal crimes (e.g., federal obscenity laws, certain cybercrimes, immigration offenses, federal weapons crimes) simply because they believe those crimes have occurred online or elsewhere, and
Rely on Nevada’s citizen’s arrest statute to justify forceful detentions or home entries in service of such federal enforcement.

This is an important clarification for:

Activist groups and private “vigilantes” who might attempt to enforce federal norms on their own, especially in the internet context.
Civil libertarians and criminal defense attorneys concerned about overreach by private actors.

B. Defense practice: the imperative to request LIO instructions

On the jury‑instruction front, the overruling of Lisby changes defense counsel’s obligations in a concrete way:

Defense lawyers must now affirmatively consider and, where appropriate, request lesser‑included‑offense instructions, particularly in serious felony cases like homicide, kidnapping, or sex offenses.
Failure to request such instructions will ordinarily be treated as a strategic choice, limiting appellate review to plain error and making reversals far less likely.
This may also have implications for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in post‑conviction proceedings, as defendants may assert that counsel was deficient in failing to request reasonable LIO instructions.

C. Trial court workload and clarity

For trial judges, the decision:

Relieves them of a broad, amorphous obligation to scour the record for all conceivable LIOs and instruct on them without prompting.
Encourages a more adversarial, party‑driven approach: if the defense sees a plausible lesser theory, it must raise it.

However, even without a formal sua sponte duty, prudent judges may still raise LIO issues in conference where appropriate, particularly in capital or high‑stakes cases, to ensure a fair and accurate verdict. The decision does not forbid such judicial initiative; it simply does not require it.

D. Citizen’s arrest as a reform target

The court’s extensive dicta criticizing NRS 171.138 and the broader citizen’s arrest scheme signals a strong institutional discomfort with the status quo. Legislators and policy advocates can draw on this opinion to:

Restrict or clarify when private individuals may break into homes under color of a citizen’s arrest.
Align citizen’s arrest provisions with modern expectations of professional policing and public safety.
Consider training or notification mechanisms if any broad citizen’s arrest powers remain.

The court’s concern is especially acute where citizen’s arrest statutes intersect with Nevada’s robust self‑defense and defense‑of‑habitation doctrines. The risk of deadly confrontations between armed homeowners and self‑appointed “arrestors” is clear.

E. Harmonizing with broader national trends

Nationally, several high‑profile incidents involving alleged “vigilante” citizen’s arrests have prompted calls to narrow or repeal such statutes. The Nevada Supreme Court’s reasoning—in grounding citizen’s arrest firmly in Nevada felony law, critiquing the historical justifications, and highlighting safety concerns—places Nevada within this broader reevaluation.

VII. Conclusion

Ser (Georgio) v. State is a consequential opinion in Nevada criminal law for two principal reasons.

Citizen’s Arrest Clarified: The court cabin’s Nevada’s citizen’s arrest authority to state felonies when the crime is not committed in the arrestor’s presence, foreclosing private enforcement of federal felonies via citizen’s arrest in such circumstances. This forecloses the legal justification Ser sought for violently entering a home to “arrest” alleged federal obscenity violators.
Lesser‑Included Instruction Doctrine Recast: By overruling Lisby in part, the court reassigns responsibility for lesser‑included‑offense instructions squarely to the defense. Absent a defense request, the omission of such instructions is reviewed only for plain error, significantly narrowing the circumstances under which a conviction will be reversed for failure to instruct on a lesser offense.

Alongside these holdings, the court affirms that Ser’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, that the district court managed juror questions and mistrial motions within its discretion, and that there were no cumulative errors. The opinion also serves as an explicit invitation to the Nevada Legislature to reconsider the breadth and dangers of NRS 171.138 and related citizen’s arrest provisions.

In sum, Ser marks an important recalibration of the relationship between private citizens, state criminal law, and the trial process in Nevada. It narrows the conditions under which private individuals may use force to “enforce the law,” reinforces the tactical autonomy of defendants and their counsel in seeking lesser‑included instructions, and reinforces doctrinal clarity in areas that directly affect both trial practice and public safety.

Curtailing Private Enforcement and Clarifying Jury Instruction Duties: Citizen’s Arrest Limits and Lesser‑Included Offenses in Ser (Georgio) v. State