Curing Defective Notices to Appear with Subsequent Hearing Notices: The Sixth Circuit’s Post‑Campos‑Chaves Framework in Alfonso Tum‑Tojin v. Bondi

I. Introduction

The decision in Alfonso Tum-Tojin v. Pamela Bondi, No. 21‑3677 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025) (not recommended for publication), illustrates how the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Campos‑Chaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447 (2024), has reshaped challenges to in absentia removal orders based on defective Notices to Appear (NTAs).

The petitioner, a Guatemalan national who entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor, sought to reopen his removal proceedings and rescind an in absentia removal order entered after he failed to appear for a master calendar hearing. His primary argument was that the original NTA initiating proceedings was statutorily deficient because it omitted the time and place of the hearing as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), and that this defect should invalidate the in absentia order or the immigration court’s jurisdiction.

The Sixth Circuit, applying Campos‑Chaves and its own precedent, rejected those arguments. The court held that:

A deficient NTA can be “cured” by a subsequent Notice of Hearing (NOH) that specifies time and place, thereby defeating a motion to rescind an in absentia order based on lack of notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
Defects in an NTA do not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction once a charging document is filed and later supplemented with proper hearing notices.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b), which allows the time and place of the hearing to be provided separately from the initial NTA, is not ultra vires to § 1229(a)(1).
A new “claims-processing rule” theory regarding § 1229(a)(1), not raised before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), is unexhausted and therefore not reviewable.

Although the opinion is non‑precedential, it clearly sets out how the Sixth Circuit understands and applies the post‑Campos‑Chaves framework to NTAs, in absentia removal, and related procedural arguments. It is particularly significant for noncitizens and practitioners seeking to challenge removal orders based on defective NTAs in the Sixth Circuit.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Petitioner’s Entry and Initial Proceedings

Alfonso Tum-Tojin, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States near Roma, Texas, in August 2015 at the age of sixteen. He was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and classified as an unaccompanied minor. On August 7, 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with an NTA.

Crucially, that NTA did not specify the date, time, or location of his initial hearing; it ordered him to appear at a future date “to be determined.” This omission is the central defect he later invoked. After about two months in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, he was released to his brother in Ohio.

On October 21, 2015, DHS mailed a Notice of Hearing (NOH) to the brother’s address, providing the specific date, time, and place of Tum-Tojin’s first master calendar hearing (MCH). He attended this hearing in person on November 3, 2015. DHS then served three additional NOHs for further MCHs on March 10, 2016, April 21, 2016, and July 7, 2016, by mail or in person.

At the April 21, 2016 hearing, Tum-Tojin was:

Personally served with an NOH for the July 7, 2016 MCH;
Orally advised of the July 7 hearing date; and
Warned of the consequences of failing to appear.

Despite this, he did not appear at the July 7, 2016 MCH.

B. The In Absentia Removal Order and Later Discovery

Due to his failure to appear, the Immigration Judge (IJ) deemed his asylum application abandoned and ordered his removal to Guatemala in absentia. The written decision was mailed to the address on record—the brother’s address. Tum-Tojin contended that he never received this order.

He asserted that he only discovered the existence of the removal order two years later, on August 11, 2018, after submitting a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) because he had not heard from the immigration court “for a while.”

C. Motion to Reopen and Rescind

On October 15, 2018, more than two years after the in absentia removal order, Tum-Tojin filed a motion with the IJ to:

Reopen his removal proceedings; and
Rescind the in absentia order of removal.

He advanced two principal arguments:

Statutory deficiency of the NTA: The original August 7, 2015 NTA did not comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) because it did not specify the time and place of the hearing. He argued that this defect justified rescission of the in absentia order and/or reopening.
Exceptional circumstances and sua sponte reopening: He claimed he missed the July 7 hearing because he did not know the hearing date. He relied on his brother for transportation and for communicating dates due to his lack of English and inability to drive. He argued that his brother failed to inform him of the July hearing and that these facts constituted “exceptional circumstances” or warranted the IJ’s sua sponte reopening power under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b).

The IJ denied the motion, finding:

No good cause for reopening, given that Tum-Tojin had been personally served with the July 7 NOH and orally advised of the hearing and consequences of non‑appearance; and
Any defect in the original NTA was “cured” by subsequent NOHs, as evidenced by his attendance at earlier hearings.

D. Appeal to the BIA and Petition for Review

Tum-Tojin appealed to the BIA, essentially repeating his arguments about:

The NTA’s statutory deficiency;
The alleged lack of notice for the July 7 hearing;
Exceptional circumstances; and
Authority for sua sponte reopening.

The BIA dismissed the appeal, holding that:

The subsequent NOHs cured the defective NTA;
His exceptional circumstances claim was untimely under the statute’s 180‑day deadline; and
The IJ acted within her discretion in refusing sua sponte reopening.

Tum-Tojin then filed a timely petition for review in the Sixth Circuit. The petition was held in abeyance for nearly four years while he pursued prosecutorial discretion, which ultimately failed. The petition then moved forward on four main issues:

Whether the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen and rescind, based on the NTA’s noncompliance with § 1229(a)(1);
Whether the deficient NTA deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction;
Whether 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) is ultra vires to § 1229(a)(1); and
Whether the NTA violated a claims-processing rule under § 1229(a)(1), and whether he could be deemed to have waived or forfeited any objection.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Clay, joined by Judges Moore and White) denied the petition for review. The key holdings can be summarized as follows:

In absentia rescission and notice: Although the original NTA was statutorily deficient for failing to list time and place, later NOHs providing that information satisfied the notice requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2). Under Campos‑Chaves, receipt of such a compliant NOH bars rescission of an in absentia order on “lack of notice” grounds under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
Jurisdiction of the immigration court: Sixth Circuit precedent (notably Hernandez‑Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2018)) holds that immigration court jurisdiction vests when a charging document is filed, even if the initial NTA omits time and place later supplied by an NOH. Thus, the immigration court had jurisdiction over Tum-Tojin’s case.
Validity of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b): The regulation, which allows immigration courts to provide the initial hearing time and date separately from the NTA, does not conflict with § 1229(a)(1). It is a permissible procedural rule and not ultra vires.
Unexhausted claims-processing theory: Tum-Tojin’s new argument that § 1229(a)(1) is a claims-processing rule whose violation he could not waive (due to age and circumstances) was not raised before the BIA. Because he failed to exhaust this theory, the Sixth Circuit concluded it lacked authority to consider it under § 1252(d)(1).

On this basis, the court affirmed the BIA’s denial of reopening and rescission.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

A. Supreme Court NTAs Trilogy and Campos‑Chaves

1. Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018)

In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that an NTA that fails to specify the time and place of a removal hearing does not trigger the “stop‑time rule” for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). The Court emphasized that § 1229(a)(1) requires the NTA to specify “the time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” The decision led many litigants to argue that such defective NTAs were invalid for various statutory and jurisdictional purposes.

2. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021)

Niz-Chavez extended Pereira’s reasoning by holding that, for purposes of the stop‑time rule, the required information must be contained in a single document; the government could not cure a defective NTA by supplying missing information in a later notice. The Court focused on the statutory language referring to “a” notice to appear, reading it as a “single document” requirement for stop‑time purposes.

3. Campos‑Chaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447 (2024)

Campos‑Chaves substantially reshaped the landscape. Unlike Pereira and Niz‑Chavez, which addressed the stop‑time rule, Campos‑Chaves dealt with motions to rescind in absentia removal orders for lack of notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The Supreme Court held that, in this context, an NTA’s failure to specify time and place can be cured by a later NOH that provides that information in accordance with § 1229(a)(2).

Thus, a noncitizen who:

Receives an NTA that is defective under § 1229(a)(1), but
Later receives an NOH that complies with § 1229(a)(2)’s notice requirements

cannot rescind an in absentia order based on § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)’s “lack of notice” provisions. The Sixth Circuit correctly recognizes that this doctrinal shift is dispositive in Tum‑Tojin’s case.

B. Sixth Circuit NTA and Jurisdiction Precedents

1. Hernandez‑Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2018)

Hernandez‑Perez held that immigration court jurisdiction vests when a charging document—such as an NTA—is filed, even if the NTA does not list the time and place of the hearing. When a subsequent NOH later provides that information, the omission in the NTA does not divest jurisdiction. This case has been central to rejecting arguments that defective NTAs deprive immigration courts of jurisdiction.

2. Santos‑Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2019)

Santos‑Santos reaffirmed that jurisdiction is governed by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13‑.14, which define and regulate “charging documents.” It also recognized that the government bears the burden of showing notice to obtain an in absentia order, but that the burden shifts to the noncitizen to prove lack of notice to set that order aside.

3. Ramos Rafael v. Garland, 15 F.4th 797 (6th Cir. 2021)

In Ramos Rafael, the court stated that for jurisdictional purposes it is not necessary that all required information (such as time and place) be included in a single document. This explicitly rejected the argument that Niz‑Chavez’s “single document” logic applies to immigration court jurisdiction.

C. BIA and Regulatory Precedents

1. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b)

Section 1003.18(b) allows immigration courts (or DHS, in certain contexts) to specify the time, date, and place of the hearing in an NOH where it is not “practicable” to include such information in the initial NTA. This arrangement—initial NTA plus later NOH—is central to modern removal practice.

2. Matter of Fernandes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 605 (BIA 2022)

Fernandes held that the requirements in § 1229(a)(1) are nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules subject to waiver and forfeiture if a noncitizen fails to object in proceedings. At the same time, it emphasized that such objections must be timely raised.

3. Other cited authorities

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978): the Supreme Court reiterated that, absent constitutional or exceptional constraints, agencies have broad discretion to craft their own procedural rules—an important foundation for upholding regulations like 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b).
Patel v. Barr, 788 F. App’x 352 (6th Cir. 2019): rejected challenges to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18 as ultra vires, relying on Santos‑Santos and confirming the compatibility of these regulations with § 1229(a).

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. In Absentia Rescission and the Effect of Campos‑Chaves

1. The statutory framework

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C), a noncitizen may seek to rescind an in absentia removal order on three grounds:

Exceptional circumstances (filed within 180 days);
Lack of notice in accordance with § 1229(a)(1) (NTA requirements) or § 1229(a)(2) (NOH requirements); or
Incarceration at the time of the hearing through no fault of the noncitizen.

A motion based on lack of notice (§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)) or incarceration may be filed “at any time.” The government must prove proper notice by clear and convincing evidence to secure an in absentia order. After the order issues, the noncitizen bears the burden to show lack of notice to obtain rescission.

2. The NTA defect and pre‑2024 law

The Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Tum-Tojin’s August 7, 2015 NTA was statutorily defective under § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) because it did not list a time and place. The panel even notes that if this case had been decided before 2024, his argument “would likely prevail.” That statement reflects the pre‑Campos‑Chaves view—shaped by Pereira and Niz‑Chavez—that a defective NTA could not be cured by later notices for certain statutory purposes.

3. Post‑Campos‑Chaves cure by NOH

Campos‑Chaves changed that analysis specifically for in absentia rescission motions. The Sixth Circuit follows the Supreme Court’s new approach:

An NTA that lacks time and place does not, by itself, constitute full statutory notice under § 1229(a)(1).
However, a later NOH that provides the specific hearing date, time, and place constitutes notice “in accordance with” § 1229(a)(2).
If the noncitizen receives such an NOH, he or she cannot rescind an in absentia order under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) on the theory of “no notice.”

Applied to Tum-Tojin:

He received multiple NOHs specifying the time and place of his hearings;
He appeared at earlier hearings (including one where he was personally served and orally advised of the July 7 hearing);
Therefore, he received statutory notice under § 1229(a)(2), and his claim of lack of notice fails under Campos‑Chaves.

Once this doctrinal step is taken, the result is straightforward: he cannot use § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) to rescind the in absentia order, regardless of the original NTA’s defect. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening on lack‑of‑notice grounds.

B. Jurisdiction and Defective NTAs

Tum-Tojin next argued that the IJ never acquired jurisdiction because the original NTA was defective and therefore not a valid “charging document” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a). The Sixth Circuit rejects this argument as foreclosed by its prior decisions.

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a), jurisdiction vests and proceedings commence “when a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court.” The Sixth Circuit has consistently held:

An NTA that omits time and place but is later supplemented by a compliant NOH is still a “charging document” for jurisdictional purposes.
The completeness of the NTA under § 1229(a)(1) is a separate question from the court’s jurisdiction under the regulations.

Citing Hernandez‑Perez, Ramos Rafael, and Santos‑Santos, the court reiterates that:

The immigration court’s jurisdiction does not depend on whether all statutory elements of § 1229(a)(1) are contained in the NTA.
It is enough that jurisdiction vests when a charging document is filed and that subsequent NOHs provide the necessary time and place information.

Thus, the defective NTA did not deprive the IJ of jurisdiction, and the BIA’s rejection of this argument was correct.

C. Validity of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b): Ultra Vires Challenge

Tum-Tojin contended that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b)—which permits the time and place of the hearing to be provided later, in an NOH—is ultra vires (beyond the authority conferred by statute) because § 1229(a)(1) unambiguously requires this information in the NTA itself.

The court rejects this contention for two main reasons:

No conflict with statutory text: Section 1229(a)(1) indeed lists the information an NTA must contain to satisfy that provision. But § 1003.18(b) does not purport to change those statutory requirements; instead, it governs the agency’s procedural mechanism for scheduling and noticing hearings when it is impracticable to specify the time and place in the initial NTA.
Deference to agency procedural rules: Relying on Vermont Yankee, as well as its own decisions in Santos‑Santos and Patel, the court concludes that agencies are allowed to structure their procedures so long as they do not contravene statutory limits. Section 1003.18(b) falls within that permissible zone of procedural rulemaking.

The regulation, in other words, is consistent with § 1229(a): it allows the agency to deliver information in more than one document while still respecting the statute’s substantive notice requirements. That reading is now reinforced by Campos‑Chaves, which expressly accepts the notion that statutory notice can be satisfied through an NOH, at least for in absentia rescission.

D. Claims-Processing Rules and Administrative Exhaustion

Tum-Tojin raised, for the first time in the Sixth Circuit, a new theory: that § 1229(a)(1) is a claims-processing rule (as per Matter of Fernandes) and that his NTA violated that rule in ways he could not knowingly waive or forfeit, given his status as a minor relying on his brother. From this he attempted to argue that any waiver or forfeiture of objections to the NTA’s defects should not be enforced against him.

The Sixth Circuit declined to reach the merits of this theory because it had not been raised before the BIA. The court applied 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), which provides that a court may review a final order of removal only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”

Relying on Cuevas‑Nuno v. Barr, 969 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2020), and Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that:

Issue exhaustion is required: a petitioner must present each claim to the BIA.
The court looks to the BIA briefing to determine what claims were adequately raised.

Because Tum-Tojin’s BIA brief did not argue that § 1229(a)(1) is a claims-processing rule or that he could not knowingly waive or forfeit objections, this theory was unexhausted. The panel therefore refused to consider it.

Notably, the opinion frames this as a jurisdictional bar, even though the Supreme Court’s decision in Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023), clarified that § 1252(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional but mandatory claims-processing rule. The panel cites Ramani as “abrogated on other grounds by Santos‑Zacaria,” but still uses jurisdictional language. Practically, however, the effect is the same: unexhausted arguments will not be heard.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Post‑Campos‑Chaves Limits on Rescinding In Absentia Orders

The core practical impact is clear: in the Sixth Circuit, where a noncitizen has actually received a subsequent NOH specifying the time and place of a hearing, it will be extremely difficult—often impossible—to rescind an in absentia order on “lack of notice” grounds under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), even if the original NTA was defective under § 1229(a)(1).

This decision underscores several points for practitioners:

Rescission based on lack of notice now hinges on whether the noncitizen received a compliant NOH, not on whether the original NTA was defective.
If the record reflects personal service and oral advisals of the hearing date and consequences of non‑appearance, arguments based on lack of notice are very unlikely to succeed.
The only remaining path to rescission in many such cases may be exceptional circumstances under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), which is subject to a strict 180‑day deadline.

B. Jurisdictional Arguments Based on NTA Defects Are Effectively Foreclosed

This opinion reaffirms that in the Sixth Circuit, NTA defects are not jurisdictional. Attempts to vacate orders on that basis will almost certainly fail unless and until the court or the Supreme Court revisits its longstanding interpretation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13‑.14.

The case reinforces that:

Challenges to NTA defects should be framed as claims-processing or due process arguments, not jurisdictional ones.
Noncitizens must raise such objections in the immigration court and before the BIA to preserve them.

C. Continued Validity of the “Two‑Step Notice” System

By upholding 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) and endorsing the cure‑by‑NOH model, the decision aligns the Sixth Circuit firmly with the prevailing agency practice of:

Issuing an initial NTA that may omit time and place; and
Following up with one or more written NOHs to provide (and later modify) hearing dates.

This “two‑step” system is now doctrinally secure in the Sixth Circuit, at least for in absentia and jurisdictional contexts.

D. The Importance of Exhaustion and Raising Legal Theories Early

Tum-Tojin’s failure to present his claims-processing theory to the BIA highlights a recurring lesson: new legal theories—even if based on the same underlying facts—must be preserved at the administrative level. The Sixth Circuit will not consider them if they are raised for the first time on petition for review.

This has special significance in a rapidly evolving area like NTA jurisprudence, where new Supreme Court and BIA decisions frequently recast the legal framework. Practitioners should:

Update their arguments at the BIA level when new precedents appear (e.g., Fernandes, Campos‑Chaves), and
Explicitly flag both statutory and claims-processing theories to preserve them for judicial review.

E. Vulnerable Populations: Unaccompanied Minors and Reliance on Caregivers

The underlying facts raise policy concerns. Tum-Tojin was a sixteen-year-old unaccompanied minor, reliant on an older brother for communication and transportation. He claimed he did not understand English and could not drive himself.

Despite these circumstances, the panel found that the combination of:

Personal service of the July 7 NOH at the April hearing,
Oral advisals by the IJ about the hearing date, and
Warnings regarding the consequences of failure to appear

constituted sufficient statutory notice. The fact that he relied on his brother, who allegedly failed to relay information, was not enough to show “no notice” under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), especially after Campos‑Chaves.

This underscores that, doctrinally:

“Actual” notice, as shown in the hearing record, will generally prevail over later claims of miscommunication within a family or support network.
Arguments about the fairness of imposing consequences on vulnerable minors are now more likely to sound in due process or discretionary relief (e.g., prosecutorial discretion, sua sponte reopening) rather than in statutory notice or jurisdictional defects.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Notice to Appear (NTA)

An NTA is the formal charging document that starts removal proceedings. By statute (§ 1229(a)(1)), it is supposed to include several items, including:

The nature of the proceedings;
The alleged violations of immigration law;
The noncitizen’s rights (to counsel, to present evidence, etc.); and
The time and place of the initial hearing.

In practice, many NTAs issued in recent years omitted the actual time and place, listing them as “to be determined.” This created a wave of litigation about whether such NTAs comply with § 1229(a)(1) and what legal consequences follow from noncompliance.

B. Notice of Hearing (NOH)

An NOH is a separate document, usually sent by the immigration court, that informs the noncitizen of the specific date, time, and place of a hearing. Under § 1229(a)(2), the government can use NOHs to schedule or reschedule hearings and must provide written notice of any change in time or place.

After Campos‑Chaves, a compliant NOH can cure a time/place omission in the original NTA for purposes of in absentia rescission.

C. In Absentia Removal Orders

An in absentia removal order is entered when a noncitizen fails to appear at a scheduled hearing. The IJ must find that:

The noncitizen was provided written notice of the hearing in accordance with § 1229(a); and
No exceptional circumstances excused the failure to appear.

Such orders can be rescinded if the noncitizen later proves lack of notice, incarceration, or exceptional circumstances (within 180 days).

D. Jurisdiction vs. Claims-Processing Rules

Jurisdictional rules define a court’s power to hear a case. If jurisdiction is lacking, the court must dismiss and cannot act at all.
Claims-processing rules govern how parties must proceed (e.g., deadlines, filing requirements). They do not limit the court’s power, but they are usually mandatory and can bar relief if not followed—though they can sometimes be waived or forfeited.

The Sixth Circuit and BIA treat § 1229(a)(1) requirements as claims-processing rather than jurisdictional. By contrast, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) governs jurisdiction (when proceedings begin), and the court has held that jurisdiction is triggered by filing a charging document, even if it is not statutorily perfect.

E. Ultra Vires

A regulation is “ultra vires” if it goes beyond the authority granted by Congress in a statute. To show that a regulation like 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) is ultra vires, a challenger must demonstrate a clear conflict between the regulation and the governing statute (§ 1229(a)). The court here found no such conflict.

F. Sua Sponte Reopening

Immigration judges and the BIA have a limited, discretionary authority to reopen cases “sua sponte” (on their own motion), even when statutory deadlines have passed. This is generally reserved for truly exceptional cases. Courts of appeals usually cannot review denials of sua sponte reopening except in rare circumstances involving legal or constitutional error.

In this case, the BIA and IJ declined to reopen sua sponte, and the Sixth Circuit did not disturb that exercise of discretion.

VIII. Conclusion

Alfonso Tum‑Tojin v. Bondi provides a concrete example of how the post‑Campos‑Chaves legal landscape operates in the Sixth Circuit. The court:

Confirms that a defective NTA (missing time and place) can be cured by subsequent NOHs for purposes of in absentia rescission under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii);
Reaffirms that such defects do not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction once an NTA is filed and later supplemented;
Upholds the validity of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) as a permissible procedural regulation; and
Emphasizes strict enforcement of administrative exhaustion, barring new claims-processing theories not raised before the BIA.

For noncitizens and practitioners, the decision narrows the utility of NTA‑defect arguments in challenging in absentia orders and jurisdiction. Going forward, successful challenges in the Sixth Circuit are likely to focus on:

Demonstrating actual non‑receipt of NOHs or other notice documents;
Timely asserting exceptional circumstances within statutory deadlines;
Raising all potential legal theories—including claims-processing and due process arguments—at the earliest possible stage before the IJ and BIA.

While the opinion is unpublished and formally non‑precedential, its synthesis of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit doctrine provides a clear roadmap for how the court will treat defective NTAs, in absentia orders, and procedural challenges in the wake of Campos‑Chaves.