Criminal Violence, Nexus, and Exhaustion in Asylum Law:
Commentary on Eliseo Ismael Chanchavac‑Leon v. U.S. Attorney General

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the unpublished per curiam decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Eliseo Ismael Chanchavac‑Leon v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 24‑14057 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025) (non‑argument calendar; not for publication). Although non‑precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion is highly instructive on several recurring features of removal litigation:

• the “nexus” requirement in asylum and withholding claims where the feared harm arises from general criminal activity,
• the consequences of failing to exhaust particular protected‑ground theories (such as indigenous status) before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
• the evidentiary and state‑action requirements under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and
• the “reasoned consideration” standard governing appellate review of BIA decisions.

The petitioner, Eliseo Ismael Chanchavac‑Leon, a Guatemalan national and member of the K’iché indigenous group, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection after two frightening encounters with unknown armed men who discussed kidnapping him, extorting him, and forcing him into criminal activity. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, the BIA affirmed, and the Eleventh Circuit denied his petition for review.

The case exemplifies the circuit’s continued tight approach to:

• claims arising out of gang‑type or criminal violence,
• administrative exhaustion following Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023), and
• what suffices as “reasoned consideration” by the BIA.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Chanchavac‑Leon is a Guatemalan citizen of K’iché indigenous origin. While in Guatemala, he experienced two incidents:

1. First incident: On the way to a convenience store, three adults followed him. He did not know them or their intentions. He managed to evade them by hiding and running home. He never reported this to the police.
2. Second incident: Again traveling to a store, he was approached by five armed men, unknown to him, who:
   • grabbed him,
   • discussed whether to kidnap him or demand a ransom in one week,
   • threatened to kill him if he did not join their criminal activities, and
   • hit him in the face and stomach.
   A passing car caused the men to flee; he ran home. He again did not report the matter to the police. Instead, based on his parents’ advice, he left Guatemala.

In support of his application, he submitted:

• a news article about the arrest of five kidnappers in Guatemala, and
• a U.S. Department of State human rights report on Guatemala.

At the merits hearing, through counsel, his particular social group (PSG) for asylum purposes was defined as “children targeted for recruitment.” No separate theory based on indigenous (K’iché) identity was advanced as an operative ground for persecution.

B. Procedural History

1. DHS charged him as removable; through counsel, he admitted the allegations and conceded removability. The IJ sustained the charge.
2. He applied for:
   • asylum,
   • withholding of removal, and
   • protection under the CAT.
3. The IJ:
   • accepted his factual account, including that the attackers discussed recruiting him into a criminal organization and/or kidnapping and extorting him,
   • denied asylum and withholding because he failed to show a nexus between the harm and a protected ground (here, membership in the proposed PSG “children targeted for recruitment”), and
   • denied CAT relief because he failed to show that the Guatemalan government, or someone acting on its behalf or with its acquiescence, would likely torture him.
4. The BIA:
   • dismissed the appeal,
   • agreed there was no nexus to a protected ground, characterizing the harm as “general criminal violence,” and
   • agreed he had not shown it was “more likely than not” that the Guatemalan government or its agents would participate in or acquiesce to his torture.
5. On petition for review to the Eleventh Circuit, he challenged:
   • the nexus determination for asylum, and
   • the adequacy of the BIA’s “reasoned consideration” for both his asylum and CAT claims.
   He did not develop any argument challenging the denial of withholding of removal in his appellate brief.

C. Holdings

The Eleventh Circuit held:

1. Withholding of removal abandoned: Because the petitioner did not raise any argument regarding withholding of removal in his opening brief, that issue was abandoned under circuit law (Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.).
2. Unexhausted indigenous‑status theory: His argument that he was persecuted “on account of” his K’iché indigenous status was not exhausted before the IJ or BIA. Relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) and Laguna Rivera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., the court refused to consider it.
3. No nexus for asylum to the asserted PSG: Substantial evidence supported the IJ/BIA finding that the attackers were motivated by general criminal objectives (kidnapping, extortion, recruitment) rather than by the petitioner’s membership in the asserted PSG “children targeted for recruitment.” The court rejected the claim that the agency misapplied the legal nexus standard.
4. CAT claim properly denied: The record did not show that the Guatemalan government, or someone acting with its acquiescence, would more likely than not torture the petitioner if returned; on the contrary, his own news article showed the government arresting kidnappers.
5. BIA gave reasoned consideration: The BIA’s opinion, read together with the IJ’s, adequately considered the key issues and evidence; it was not required to discuss each document or line of testimony to satisfy the “reasoned consideration” requirement.

The petition for review was therefore denied in its entirety.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The panel draws on a familiar group of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court authorities, each serving a distinct role.

1. Scope and Standard of Review

• Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009)
  Establishes that the court generally reviews only the BIA’s decision unless the BIA expressly adopts or relies on the IJ’s reasoning. In this case, because the BIA agreed with certain IJ findings, the court reviewed both where appropriate.
• Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792 (11th Cir. 2016)
  Clarifies that when the BIA “explicitly agrees with” the IJ’s reasoning on an issue, the Eleventh Circuit examines both decisions on that point. Here, that meant the court looked to both the BIA and IJ on the nexus and CAT findings.
• Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2009)
  Distinguishes between:
  • legal conclusions (reviewed de novo) and
  • factual findings (reviewed for substantial evidence).
  Applied here, the correctness of the legal nexus standard is a question of law, but whether the record shows a nexus is a factual question reviewed with deference.
• Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2006)
  Articulates the “substantial evidence” test: the court must affirm if the agency’s decision is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,” even if the evidence might also support a contrary result.

2. Substantive Asylum Law & Nexus

• 8 U.S.C. § 1158
  Provides that asylum may be granted to a “refugee,” defined as a person unable or unwilling to return to his country because of persecution or a well‑founded fear of persecution “on account of” race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. A protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution.
• Sanchez‑Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2021)
  Emphasizes the “nexus requirement”: the applicant must link the past or feared harm to one of the five protected grounds. This decision is central to the court’s reiteration that fear of criminal violence, without more, is not enough; the violence must be because of a protected ground.
• Rivera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 815 (11th Cir. 2007)
  Clarifies that persecutors may have mixed motives. As long as one protected ground is “a central reason” for the harm, asylum may still be granted even if the persecutor also has other (e.g., financial or criminal) motives.
• Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2006)
  Stands for the proposition that general private criminal activity does not, without more, amount to persecution “on account of” a protected ground. This is the key authority supporting the conclusion that the attacks on Chanchavac‑Leon, as described, were manifestations of general criminal violence, not persecutory acts linked to a protected status.

3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

• 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)
  Requires a noncitizen to exhaust all administrative remedies “available as of right” before seeking judicial review. After Santos‑Zacaria, this requirement is treated as a claim‑processing rule rather than jurisdictional, but it remains mandatory when properly raised by the government.
• Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023)
  The Supreme Court held that § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional but a mandatory claim‑processing rule. It must be enforced when the government invokes it, but may be waived or forfeited.
• Laguna Rivera v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 130 F.4th 915 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Applied here to hold that because the government asserted non‑exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit would not review an asylum theory (persecution based on K’iché indigenous status) that had not been properly presented to the BIA.

4. Abandonment of Issues on Appeal

• Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)
  Holds that issues not raised and argued in the opening brief are deemed abandoned. Using Sapuppo, the panel treats withholding of removal as abandoned because the petitioner’s brief did not separately challenge the BIA’s withholding ruling.

5. Reasoned Consideration

• Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2019)
  Articulates the “reasoned consideration” requirement: the BIA must show it has considered the issues raised and explain its decision in terms sufficient for judicial review. The court reviews alleged failures of reasoned consideration de novo.
• Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2015), overruled in part on other grounds by Santos‑Zacaria
  Holds that the BIA must consider all evidence but need not discuss every piece of evidence or every claim in detail. It suffices if the decision, read as a whole, shows that the BIA considered the core issues and evidence. The reliance on Indrawati for this point remains valid after Santos‑Zacaria, which affected only the exhaustion aspect of that case.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Abandonment of Withholding of Removal

The opinion begins by noting that Chanchavac‑Leon’s appellate brief did not raise any challenge to the BIA’s withholding‑of‑removal ruling. Under Sapuppo, issues not clearly argued in the opening brief are deemed abandoned. Even though withholding of removal shares many elements with asylum (but with a higher “more likely than not” standard), the court treats it as a distinct form of relief that must be independently briefed.

This underscores a practical point: counsel must separately and expressly argue each form of relief on petition for review; general references to “asylum and withholding” may not preserve both.

2. Exhaustion and the New K’iché‑Status Theory

On petition for review, Chanchavac‑Leon argued that the IJ and BIA erred by not addressing whether he was persecuted because of his status as a K’iché indigenous person. The Eleventh Circuit refused to consider this argument for two interlocking reasons:

• He did not raise indigenous status as an operative protected ground before either the IJ or the BIA. Although the record mentioned his K’iché identity, his counsel framed the PSG exclusively as “children targeted for recruitment,” and not as indigenous youth or K’iché community members.
• Under § 1252(d)(1), as interpreted in light of Santos‑Zacaria and applied in Laguna Rivera, a petitioner must exhaust the claim (i.e., the protected ground theory and legal arguments) before the agency. Because the government invoked non‑exhaustion, the court enforced the claim‑processing rule and declined to review the new indigenous‑status theory.

The panel thus draws a clean line between:

• Facts in the record (e.g., that the petitioner is K’iché), and
• Legal theories or grounds for relief (e.g., “I was persecuted on account of being K’iché”).

Facts alone do not suffice. The protected ground must be explicitly invoked as a basis for persecution before the BIA, or it will not be reviewed on appeal if the government raises exhaustion.

3. The Nexus Requirement and General Criminal Violence

The core legal issue is whether Chanchavac‑Leon’s experiences established the required nexus between the harm he suffered and a protected ground, specifically membership in the proposed PSG “children targeted for recruitment.”

The governing principles are:

• Persecution must be “on account of” a protected ground. That ground must be “one central reason” for the persecutors’ actions (§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Sanchez‑Castro).
• Generalized criminal motives (e.g., extortion, kidnapping, recruitment for criminal activity) do not by themselves satisfy the nexus requirement (Ruiz).
• Criminal motives can coexist with protected‑ground motives; mixed motives do not defeat asylum if a protected ground remains a central reason (Rivera).

The IJ accepted the petitioner’s account of the second incident and even described the attackers’ conduct as an attempted kidnapping and recruitment into a “criminal organization,” with potential extortion. Nevertheless, the IJ concluded there was no indication that the men targeted him because he was a member of the PSG “children targeted for recruitment.” The BIA agreed.

On review, the Eleventh Circuit:

• stressed that the IJ did not say that the presence of a criminal motive automatically precluded nexus; rather, the IJ said the criminal nature of the acts was “not dispositive” of persecution but, given the record, no protected‑ground motive was evident at all, and
• affirmed that the record supported the characterization of the incidents as “general criminal violence” rather than targeted persecution based on a protected characteristic.

Crucially, the attackers:

• were unknown to the petitioner,
• did not reference his age, identity, or social status in a way tied to a protected ground,
• spoke in terms of kidnapping, ransom, and recruitment for crime, and
• gave no indication that they distinguished him as part of any broader socially distinct group.

On this record, the court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that the harm, though serious, was motivated by opportunistic criminality, not by his membership in the proposed PSG.

One subtle but important point: the court does not address whether “children targeted for recruitment” is a cognizable particular social group under asylum law (i.e., whether it is defined with particularity and is socially distinct). The opinion assumes the PSG arguendo and denies relief at the nexus stage. That is typical when the record makes the causation problem relatively straightforward.

4. The CAT Claim: State Action and Probability of Torture

For protection under the CAT, a noncitizen must show that it is “more likely than not” that he will be subjected to torture in the country of removal, and that such torture will be:

• inflicted by, or
• with the consent or acquiescence of,

a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the BIA’s conclusion that this standard was not met because:

• The petitioner offered no evidence that the Guatemalan government or its officials were involved in, supported, or turned a blind eye to his attackers’ conduct.
• The general “conditions of criminal upheaval” in Guatemala, while troubling, do not themselves show that he personally would more likely than not be tortured with government acquiescence.
• Significantly, the news article he submitted actually undercut his CAT claim by showing that the Guatemalan authorities were arresting kidnappers, suggesting the government was attempting to combat such violence rather than tolerating it.

The decision therefore reinforces a consistent line in CAT jurisprudence: widespread violence or ineffective policing does not, without more, equate to governmental acquiescence in torture.

5. Reasoned Consideration

Chanchavac‑Leon argued that the BIA’s handling of his asylum and CAT claims lacked “reasoned consideration.” The Eleventh Circuit, applying Ali and Indrawati, rejected that argument.

The court explained that:

• The BIA acknowledged the key facts (two incidents, threats, attempted recruitment) and articulated the dispositive reasons for its decision: lack of nexus for asylum and absence of evidence of government acquiescence for CAT.
• The BIA was not required to discuss every piece of evidence in detail. It sufficed that the BIA’s reasoning could be followed and allowed meaningful judicial review.
• The IJ specifically discussed the evidence, including the news article and the State Department report, and the BIA adopted or agreed with those findings.

In sum, the panel held that the agency had:

“considered the issues raised and announced [its] decisions in terms sufficient to enable review.”

That is all that reasoned consideration requires under Eleventh Circuit precedent.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

1. Unpublished but Persuasive

The opinion is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and thus is not binding precedent under Eleventh Circuit Rule 36‑2. However, it remains:

• a reliable indicator of how panels will handle similar fact patterns, and
• a source of persuasive reasoning for litigants and IJs confronting claims based on criminal or gang‑related violence.

2. Reinforcement of a Strict Nexus Approach in Criminal‑Violence Cases

The decision fits squarely within a long‑running Eleventh Circuit trend: fear of gangs, criminals, or generalized violence almost never suffices for asylum unless:

• a clearly defined, legally cognizable PSG is articulated, and
• there is concrete evidence that the persecutors target the applicant because of that group membership, not simply because the person is vulnerable or present.

Future applicants basing claims on recruitment threats or extortion should expect close scrutiny of:

• what the persecutors said at the time of the attacks,
• whether they expressed any hostility to a protected characteristic, and
• whether independent country‑conditions evidence shows that a particular group is singled out as such.

3. Exhaustion: The Importance of Framing Protected Grounds Before the BIA

Practically, Chanchavac‑Leon is a cautionary tale. Even though the record noted that the petitioner was K’iché, the failure to:

• clearly assert “K’iché indigenous people” (or a related formulation) as a protected ground, and
• argue persecution on that basis to the IJ and BIA,

meant that the Eleventh Circuit would not review that theory once the government raised non‑exhaustion.

After Santos‑Zacaria and Laguna Rivera, counsel must:

• identify all relevant protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, PSG) in the administrative proceedings,
• link facts to those grounds (e.g., discrimination or targeting of indigenous communities), and
• re‑assert those grounds before the BIA in appellate briefing.

Failure to do so may irretrievably forfeit potentially stronger protected‑ground theories.

4. Reasoned Consideration: Concise BIA Decisions Are Often Enough

The decision confirms that, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, the BIA can issue relatively concise, formulaic decisions without running afoul of the reasoned‑consideration requirement, so long as:

• the BIA mentions the core issues,
• references the key factual findings, and
• explains why the legal standards are not met.

For practitioners, this means that challenges based solely on the brevity or generality of the BIA’s explanation will usually fail. To succeed, a petitioner must show that:

• a major issue was ignored,
• the reasoning was internally inconsistent or incoherent, or
• the BIA clearly misread the record.

5. CAT: Government Efforts to Combat Crime Can Undermine Claims of Acquiescence

The CAT portion underscores that:

• evidence that the government arrests or prosecutes criminal actors may weigh against a finding of official “acquiescence,” even if crime remains widespread, and
• generalized violence and weak state capacity are not, standing alone, enough to establish a CAT claim.

CAT applicants should therefore aim to present:

• evidence of police collusion or corruption,
• documented failures to act in the face of specific threats, or
• policy‑level tolerance of abuses,

rather than relying solely on evidence that a country struggles with crime.

IV. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Asylum vs. Withholding of Removal vs. CAT

• Asylum
  • Discretionary relief.
  • Requires past persecution or well‑founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground.
  • “Well‑founded fear” is a relatively lower standard (a reasonable possibility of persecution).
• Withholding of Removal
  • Mandatory if criteria are met.
  • Similar protected‑ground requirement, but the standard is higher: the applicant must show it is “more likely than not” that his life or freedom would be threatened.
  • In this case, the issue was abandoned on appeal and not considered.
• Convention Against Torture (CAT)
  • No protected ground requirement.
  • Requires showing it is “more likely than not” that the applicant will be tortured.
  • Torture must involve state action: inflicted by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.

B. “Nexus” and “Particular Social Group”

Nexus refers to the causal link between the harm and a protected ground. The persecutor must act because of the victim’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.

A particular social group (PSG) typically must:

• share an immutable or fundamental characteristic,
• be sufficiently defined (particularity), and
• be recognized in the society in question as a distinct group (social distinction).

In Chanchavac‑Leon, the PSG was defined as “children targeted for recruitment.” The court did not decide whether this is a legally cognizable PSG because it found that, regardless, there was no nexus: the record did not show that the attackers targeted him as a member of that PSG rather than merely as a convenient target for crime.

C. “Reasoned Consideration”

“Reasoned consideration” means the IJ and BIA must:

• address the main arguments and issues the applicant presents,
• note the central pieces of evidence, and
• produce an explanation that allows a reviewing court to understand what the agency decided and why.

They are not required to:

• refer to every exhibit,
• quote every line of testimony, or
• write a lengthy opinion.

In this case, the BIA summarized the incidents, stated that the record showed general criminal violence but no nexus, and cited the absence of evidence of official involvement in torture. That was enough.

D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Exhaustion requires a noncitizen to:

• present each legal theory and issue to the BIA first, giving the agency a fair opportunity to rule on it, and
• raise challenges to the IJ’s decision in a way that alerts the BIA to the specific alleged errors.

After Santos‑Zacaria, failure to exhaust is not a jurisdictional defect but a claim‑processing problem. When the government invokes § 1252(d)(1), the court will refuse to consider unexhausted issues. That is what occurred with the K’iché‑indigenous‑status argument here.

V. Conclusion

Eliseo Ismael Chanchavac‑Leon v. U.S. Attorney General is a compact but revealing illustration of how the Eleventh Circuit handles asylum and CAT claims arising from general criminal violence, particularly when:

• the record shows opportunistic criminality (extortion, kidnapping, recruitment) but little evidence of a protected‑ground motive,
• key protected‑ground theories (such as indigenous identity) are left undeveloped before the BIA, and
• the BIA’s decision is concise yet addresses the central points of law and fact.

The decision reinforces several practical lessons:

1. General criminal violence is not enough. Without evidence that attackers act because of a protected characteristic, the nexus requirement fails.
2. Every protected ground must be clearly raised and argued below. Simply having relevant facts in the record is not sufficient to preserve a legal theory for judicial review.
3. CAT claims require proof of state action or acquiescence. General law‑enforcement problems or crime levels, especially when combined with evidence that the government sometimes prosecutes offenders, will not usually carry the burden.
4. The BIA need not write at length to satisfy reasoned consideration. A concise but coherent explanation, grounded in the record and correctly applying governing law, will typically be affirmed.

While non‑precedential, Chanchavac‑Leon provides a clear example of current Eleventh Circuit thinking in asylum and CAT cases involving gang‑like criminal activity and illustrates the continued force of exhaustion, nexus, and reasoned‑consideration doctrines in the post‑Santos‑Zacaria landscape.