Crick v. Rogers: Denial of a State Evidentiary Hearing as a Merits Adjudication – Re-affirming “Double Deference” Under AEDPA

1. Introduction

Crick v. Rogers, No. 24-6190 (10th Cir. July 3, 2025), is a United States Court of Appeals decision that addresses the intersection of ineffective-assistance claims, AEDPA deference, and the procedural posture of state evidentiary-hearing denials. The petitioner, Carl Douglas Crick, Jr., an Oklahoma inmate convicted of multiple sexual offenses, sought a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call exculpatory witnesses and by not objecting to improper vouching testimony. After the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) denied relief—and declined to grant a state evidentiary hearing—the federal district court likewise rejected his petition. Mr. Crick then applied for a Certificate of Appealability (COA) from the Tenth Circuit.

The primary questions before the Court of Appeals were:

Whether the OCCA’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing constituted an “adjudication on the merits” triggering AEDPA deference.
Whether, under the “double deference” standard, reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s rejection of the ineffective-assistance claims.

The Tenth Circuit answered both questions in the State’s favor, denied the COA, and dismissed the appeal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (McHugh, Baldock & Eid, JJ.) held:

Mr. Crick did not make the requisite “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The OCCA’s summary denial of an evidentiary hearing while citing and applying Strickland v. Washington constituted a merits adjudication; therefore, federal courts must extend AEDPA’s highly deferential review.
The OCCA’s application of Strickland was not unreasonable. Counsel’s decisions about witness testimony were strategic, and any alleged errors did not prejudice the defense.
Comparisons to Williams v. Taylor were inapt because the factual record in Crick lacked the wholesale investigative failure present in Williams.

Having found no debatable issue among reasonable jurists, the Tenth Circuit denied the COA and ended the matter.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Governs ineffective-assistance claims (deficient performance + prejudice).
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) – Defines the COA threshold of “debatable” merit when the district court reaches the merits.
House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 2008) – Clarifies “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses under AEDPA.
Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2013) – Holds that denial of a state evidentiary hearing often equals merits adjudication deserving AEDPA deference.
Harris v. Sharp, 941 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2019) – Coins the “doubly deferential” standard (Strickland + AEDPA).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) – Landmark ineffective-assistance case where counsel’s investigative failure was found unconstitutional.
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013) – Emphasizes that state courts are adequate fora for vindicating federal rights under AEDPA.

The panel relied heavily on Lott for procedural posture and Harris for the level of deference, distancing itself from the fact pattern in Williams.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court progressed through three analytical layers:

COA Gate-Keeping: Because the district court reached the merits, Slack requires Mr. Crick to show that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s decision. This is an intentionally high bar.
AEDPA Deference: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court contradicted or unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably determined facts. Here, the Tenth Circuit underscored that the OCCA applied the correct rule—Strickland—and therefore a petitioner must overcome “deference upon deference.”
Application of Strickland: The panel concluded:
- Deficient Performance: Trial counsel’s decision not to call certain witnesses involved discretionary judgment. Counsel had investigated, found testimony duplicative, inadmissible, or marginally probative, and made a strategic choice.
- Prejudice: Even if counsel erred, there was no reasonable probability the verdict would have been different. The offered testimony was either cumulative or collateral.

Because the OCCA had already made similar determinations, the Tenth Circuit found no unreasonable application of Strickland.

3.3 Impact

Crick re-affirms two doctrinal points with practical consequences:

State Evidentiary-Hearing Denials = Merits Adjudications.
When a state appellate court denies an evidentiary hearing while applying the substantive constitutional standard, federal courts must treat the ruling as a merits decision, thereby imposing AEDPA’s strict limitations. This discourages habeas petitioners from arguing that procedural denials by state courts somehow open the door to de novo federal review.
“Double Deference” Is Alive and Well.
The opinion reinforces the towering hurdle that ineffective-assistance claimants face in federal habeas. To succeed, a petitioner must thread the needle between Strickland’s own deferential performance review and AEDPA’s additional presumption of reasonableness. Appellate courts are unlikely to grant a COA in the absence of strikingly egregious missteps by counsel.

For defense lawyers, the case underscores the importance of documenting strategic decisions; for habeas counsel, it signals that allegations of witness omissions must show more than theoretical helpfulness—they must establish that state courts were objectively unreasonable in rejecting those claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Appealability (COA): A permission slip required before a habeas petitioner can appeal. Granted only if the petitioner makes a substantial showing that a constitutional right was violated.
AEDPA Deference: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 sharply limits federal review of state convictions. Federal courts may overturn state decisions only when they are not merely wrong but objectively unreasonable.
“Double Deference”: When a claim is governed by a deferential constitutional test (e.g., Strickland) and AEDPA’s statutory deference. The petitioner must clear two deferential hurdles simultaneously.
Evidentiary Hearing (State Level): A proceeding in which the state court takes live testimony or new evidence to evaluate a post-conviction claim. Denial of such a hearing, when accompanied by substantive analysis, can itself be a merits ruling.
Vouching Testimony: When a witness improperly expresses personal belief in the truthfulness of another witness—generally disfavored because it invades the jury’s credibility determination.

5. Conclusion

Crick v. Rogers adds another brick to the wall of deference protecting state court judgments from collateral attack. By labeling the OCCA’s denial of an evidentiary hearing as a merits adjudication and reiterating the “double deference” standard, the Tenth Circuit makes clear that habeas petitioners cannot circumvent AEDPA by casting state procedural rulings as non-merits based. The decision will likely be invoked in future cases to fend off COA requests predicated on allegedly inadequate state post-conviction procedures.

In practical terms, petitioners must marshal compelling, fact-rich showings of both deficient performance and prejudice—grounded in Supreme Court precedent—to invite serious federal review. Crick v. Rogers stands as a cautionary tale: without overwhelming evidence of counsel’s ineffectiveness and resultant prejudice, a habeas claim will rarely survive the twin barriers of Strickland and AEDPA.