Coyle v. McFarland: Excusable Neglect, Rule 56(f) Continuances, and Public Right‑of‑Way Disputes in South Dakota Trespass Law

I. Introduction

In Coyle v. McFarland, 2025 S.D. 63, the South Dakota Supreme Court confronted a deceptively simple neighborhood dispute over a driveway that turned into a significant appellate decision on:

• When a party is entitled to a continuance under SDCL 15‑6‑56(f) (Rule 56(f)) to obtain discovery in response to a motion for summary judgment;
• How SDCL 15‑6‑6(b) (Rule 6(b)) “excusable neglect” should be applied to late responses to summary judgment motions; and
• The interaction between subdivision plats, subdivision improvement agreements (SIAs), and public dedication of street rights‑of‑way in a civil trespass context.

Along the way, the Court also expressly adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164 principle that a mistaken belief about land ownership does not negate the intent element of civil trespass. The opinion reverses a partial summary judgment that had effectively forced the homeowners to remove part of their driveway and any vehicles from what the trial court treated as their neighbors’ land—even though no discovery had occurred and the damages later proved to be merely nominal.

The decision thus sits at the intersection of civil procedure, tort law, and real‑property law, and provides strong guidance to South Dakota trial courts and litigants on how to handle early summary judgment motions, discovery continuances, and late filings when counsel is dealing with serious personal upheaval.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background and Parties

The dispute involves adjoining property owners in Belle Fourche’s Willow Creek Estates Subdivision:

• Defendants/Appellants: Kenneth and Kelli McFarland, owners of Lot 25A (and Lot 24). Their house and attached garage were already built when they purchased Lot 25A; the driveway leads to Walworth Street, and they also park along an adjacent dirt road they believe lies in the Walworth Street right‑of‑way.
• Plaintiffs/Appellees: Jeremy and Abbey Coyle, who later purchased Lot Q1, a wrap‑around lot behind and alongside the McFarlands’ property, including some of what had been “Lot Q” of the Valley View Addition.

In 2023, the Coyles obtained a survey indicating that approximately fifty square feet of the McFarlands’ concrete driveway encroached on Lot Q1. The Coyles treated this as an encroachment and, amid escalating friction, sued for civil trespass, alleging that the portion of the driveway and parked vehicles on Lot Q1 deprived them of the use, enjoyment, and full value of their property.

The McFarlands responded that there is a public right‑of‑way for Walworth Street along the entire southeastern boundary of Lot 25A, based largely on a series of plats, SIAs between the developer (Dacar, Inc.) and the City of Belle Fourche, and City ordinances governing subdivision approval and improvements. If the disputed strip is public right‑of‑way, they reasoned, then they were not trespassing on the Coyles’ land.

B. Procedural Posture

The procedural sequence is central to the Supreme Court’s decision:

1. June 7, 2023: The Coyles file their trespass action.
2. July 28 – August 9, 2023: Counsel appears for the McFarlands and files an answer, denying trespass and asserting that the proper boundary includes a full Walworth Street right‑of‑way under the SIA.
3. August 28, 2023: The Coyles file a motion for partial summary judgment, supported by affidavits (including the City attorney and a surveyor) and a statement of undisputed material facts. Hearing is set for September 28.
4. September 14, 2023: Deadline under SDCL 15‑6‑56(c) for the defendants’ response (14 calendar days before the hearing). No response is filed by that date.
5. September 15, 2023: The Coyles file a “protective objection,” asking the court to bar late evidence and deem their facts admitted under SDCL 15‑6‑56(c)(3).
6. September 18–20, 2023: The McFarlands move for a continuance, and their counsel files an affidavit under SDCL 15‑6‑56(f), requesting at least 60 days to conduct discovery (including depositions of developers, title professionals, and public officials) necessary to oppose the motion.
7. September 21, 2023: The circuit court denies the continuance via email, adopting the reasons in the Coyles’ objections and focusing on untimeliness.
8. September 25, 2023: Counsel emails the court and opposing counsel explaining that his long‑term marriage had abruptly broken down and his wife’s affair had come to light, causing intense personal distress and leading him to miss the summary judgment deadlines. He also files a late response to summary judgment and to the Coyles’ fact statement, plus a renewed request to continue.
9. Summary judgment hearing: The circuit court again denies the continuance as untimely, deems the Coyles’ factual statements admitted under SDCL 15‑6‑56(c)(3), and grants partial summary judgment on liability for trespass, ordering the immediate removal of the encroaching part of the driveway and any vehicles from Lot Q1. Only damages are reserved for trial.
10. November–December 2023: With new counsel, the McFarlands move for relief from the order under SDCL 15‑6‑60(b) (Rule 60(b)) and/or reconsideration. Their former counsel supplies a more detailed affidavit describing several months of debilitating stress and inability to focus. The court, while acknowledging the preference for merit‑based decisions, denies relief, emphasizing that “rules are rules.”
11. September 3, 2024: At the damages trial, the Coyles state they have concluded their damages are only nominal and decline to present more than nominal damages evidence. The court enters a final judgment incorporating the earlier partial summary judgment.

C. Holding

The Supreme Court reverses and remands. Its core conclusions are:

1. Rule 56(f affidavits are “responses” governed by the 14‑day deadline in SDCL 15‑6‑56(c), but courts retain discretion under SDCL 15‑6‑6(b) to enlarge that period upon a showing of excusable neglect.
2. The defendants’ Rule 56(f) showing was substantively adequate. Before any discovery, they submitted detailed affidavits explaining what facts they needed and from whom, how those facts bore on whether a public right‑of‑way existed, and why the information was not yet available.
3. There was excusable neglect under Rule 6(b). Counsel’s severe, documented personal crisis, the early stage of litigation, his quick efforts to correct his mistake once discovered, the presence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the lack of meaningful prejudice to the Coyles combined to make the denial of additional time an abuse of discretion.
4. The trial court abused its discretion by denying a continuance and granting summary judgment based solely on missed deadlines, effectively precluding discovery on a genuinely disputed property boundary.
5. The Court expressly adopts Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164: a mistaken but honest belief in one’s ownership does not defeat the intent element of civil trespass—but emphasizes that in this case the defendants assert a different point: that they were on public right‑of‑way, not on the plaintiffs’ land.

Because it finds reversible error in the denial of the continuance, the Court declines to reach whether the denial of the later Rule 60(b) motion or the substantive grant of summary judgment was independently erroneous.

Chief Justice Jensen and Justices Kern and Salter join the majority opinion by Justice DeVaney. Justice Myren dissents, arguing the circuit court acted within its discretionary range, particularly in denying post‑judgment relief under Rule 60(b).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Rule 56(f) and Discovery‑Related Continuances

The opinion relies on and extends a line of South Dakota cases interpreting SDCL 15‑6‑56(f) (the state analogue to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)/(f)):

• Davies v. GPHC, LLC, 2022 S.D. 55, 980 N.W.2d 251. Reiterates that a party opposing summary judgment is entitled to discovery where necessary to oppose the motion. It requires a Rule 56(f) affidavit to:
  • Identify the probable facts not currently available and steps taken to obtain them;
  • Explain how additional time will allow the nonmovant to rebut the movant’s assertion of no genuine issue of material fact; and
  • Explain why facts precluding summary judgment cannot be presented at the time.
  The Court in Davies held the affidavit there was too cursory and non‑particularized to justify a continuance.
• Stern Oil Co. v. Border States Paving, Inc., 2014 S.D. 28, 848 N.W.2d 273. Similarly holds that a Rule 56(f) affidavit must show how further discovery will defeat summary judgment; generic assertions that “more discovery is needed” are insufficient.
• Betty Jean Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC, 2024 S.D. 48, 11 N.W.3d 71. A more recent case in which the Court held a detailed Rule 56(f) affidavit sufficient, reversing a denial of a continuance. The Court aligns Coyle with Strom, finding the affidavits here similarly specific and purposeful.

2. Enlargement of Time and Excusable Neglect under Rule 6(b)

On the timeliness issue, the Court invokes SDCL 15‑6‑6(b), the general rule governing extensions of time, and the case law construing “excusable neglect”:

• Donald Bucklin Construction v. McCormick Construction Co., 2013 S.D. 57, 835 N.W.2d 862. Recognizes that motions to enlarge time under SDCL 15‑6‑6(b)(2) made after the deadline require a showing of excusable neglect. The Court emphasizes that excusable neglect under Rule 6(b) is “closely analogous” to the neglect needed to set aside defaults or final judgments under SDCL 15‑6‑55(c) and 15‑6‑60(b). Key principles:
  • Excusable neglect has no fixed meaning and should be interpreted liberally to ensure cases are tried on the merits.
  • It is neglect of a type that a reasonable, prudent person might commit under similar circumstances.
  • Factors include the existence of a meritorious defense and the prejudice (if any) to the opposing party.
• Colton Lumber Co. v. Siemonsma, 2002 S.D. 116, 651 N.W.2d 871. Treated a motion that did not expressly invoke Rule 6(b) as, in substance, a motion to enlarge the time to answer. The Coyle Court similarly applies Rule 6(b) to the late Rule 56(f) request, even though the original motion did not cite it by name.
• South Dakota Public Assurance Alliance for Pennington County v. McGuire, 2018 S.D. 75, 919 N.W.2d 745. Found excusable neglect where counsel promptly admitted their mistake in affidavits, quickly filed complaints, and were not engaging in dilatory tactics. Coyle analogizes to this case in evaluating the attorney’s response once he realized he had missed the deadline.
• Leighton v. Bennett, 2019 S.D. 19, 926 N.W.2d 465. Declined to find excusable neglect where counsel offered no affidavit or factual basis explaining the missed deadline. Coyle contrasts its record—multiple detailed affidavits and a credible explanation of severe personal upheaval—with Leighton.

3. Civil Trespass and Mistaken Belief of Ownership

On substantive tort law, the opinion builds on and extends:

• Benson v. State, 2006 S.D. 8, 710 N.W.2d 131. Adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 definition of civil trespass: one is liable if he intentionally and without privilege:
  • (a) enters land in the possession of another or causes a thing or third person to do so; or
  • (b) remains on the land,
  regardless of whether harm occurs.
• Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164 (1965). The Court expressly adopts this Restatement section, which states that one who intentionally enters land is liable for trespass even if acting under a mistaken but reasonable belief that he has a right to be there. The Court notes that the intent element is satisfied by intending to be on the land, not by knowing that the land belongs to another.
• Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 575 U.S. 632 (2015) and Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010). Cited not as binding but as illustrations of the broad principle that a mistaken understanding of the law does not negate intent in civil liability contexts, including, as Jerman notes, trespass.
• Out‑of‑state cases such as Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 26 A.3d 136 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011), and Teasley v. Roberson, 115 So. 211 (Miss. 1928), reinforcing that mistaken beliefs about ownership do not excuse trespass.

4. Dedication of Public Rights‑of‑Way

The property‑law dimension of the opinion engages several leading South Dakota cases on street dedication:

• Selway Homeowners Ass’n v. Cummings, 2003 S.D. 11, 657 N.W.2d 307. Emphasizes that real estate cannot be dedicated to public use by accident or inference. Dedication is akin to a contract:
  • There must be an unconditional offer by the landowner (grantor) to create a public highway, and
  • There must be an unconditional acceptance by the appropriate public entity.
  The Court uses Selway to frame the Coyles’ argument that the only clear dedication here was shown on the 2007 plat and did not extend beyond the original Lot 25 corner.
• Tinaglia v. Ittzes, 257 N.W.2d 724 (S.D. 1977). Recognizes both express and implied dedications, statutory and common‑law. A dedication is express when manifested by words, and implied when inferred from acts and circumstances. Common‑law dedication rests on equitable estoppel—owners are estopped from denying public rights where their conduct invited public reliance.
• Nelson v. Garber, 2021 S.D. 32, 960 N.W.2d 340. In a dispute over whether a roadway was public or private, the Court again acknowledged express and implied dedications under SDCL 11‑3‑12 and common law. It looked at:
  • Language (or absence) of dedication on the plat;
  • Longstanding public use of the road;
  • The developer’s intentions as shown by subdivision patterns; and
  • Affidavits of neighboring owners and county officials.
  Coyle invokes Nelson to show that the existence and scope of a right‑of‑way can turn on developer intent, public use, and governmental conduct, often requiring evidentiary development—precisely what the defendants sought through discovery.
• Niemi v. Fredlund Township, 2015 S.D. 62, 867 N.W.2d 725. Cited via Nelson for the proposition that implied dedication is premised on equitable estoppel, focusing on the landowner’s conduct and the public’s reliance.

5. Statutes, Ordinances, and Covenants

The opinion also references several non‑case authorities:

• SDCL 11‑3‑12. Governs statutory dedication of land to the public through recorded plats.
• City of Belle Fourche Ordinances 16.12.080 and 16.16.010. These require:
  • That no plat be approved unless either required improvements are installed or an SIA is signed; and
  • That the SIA be approved by the City Engineer and City Attorney and recorded with the plat.
  They are critical to the defendants’ argument that the 2013 and 2015 SIAs (requiring improvements “within the full length of the right‑of‑way adjacent to the southeast boundary of Lots 24 and 25A”) inform or condition the ultimate location and scope of the Walworth Street right‑of‑way.
• Willow Creek Estates Subdivision Covenants. Require the subdivision’s building committee to approve driveway locations. The McFarlands proffered that developer James Dacar, as a member of the building committee, would testify that the driveway was approved on the assumption it lay within the intended future right‑of‑way and would not have been approved if believed to encroach on a private neighbor’s lot.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 56(f) Affidavit as a “Response” Subject to Deadlines

The Court first clarifies a procedural point: although SDCL 15‑6‑56(f) does not itself specify when a Rule 56(f) affidavit must be filed, SDCL 15‑6‑56(c) provides that, unless the court orders otherwise, “any response or reply” to a summary judgment motion must be served at least 14 calendar days before the hearing.

A Rule 56(f) affidavit seeking more time is a “response” within the meaning of § 56(c). Accordingly:

• The defendants’ Rule 56(f) affidavit, filed only 8 days before the hearing, was untimely under the default rule in § 56(c); and
• The trial court could, but was not required to, excuse that untimeliness by exercising its discretion under Rule 6(b) (excusable neglect).

This clarification is significant: it prevents parties from treating Rule 56(f) as an “anytime” safety valve divorced from the summary judgment schedule. But it is only the starting point; the Court then examines whether strict enforcement of the deadline was appropriate in this case.

2. Substantive Adequacy of the Rule 56(f) Showing

Before turning to timeliness, the Court addresses the content of the Rule 56(f) affidavits. Under Davies, Stern Oil, and Strom Trust, a nonmovant must do more than assert “we need discovery.” The affidavits must describe:

• What information is lacking;
• Who likely possesses it;
• What steps have been or will be taken to obtain it; and
• How it could create a genuine issue of material fact.

The Court finds the defendants met this standard:

• The litigation was in its infancy—just over two months from filing—and no discovery had occurred when the summary judgment motion was filed.
• Defense counsel’s affidavit:
  • Identified specific deponents: public officials familiar with platting and recording requirements, the developer (Dacar), title company personnel (e.g., Black Hills Title, Stewart Title), and the Register of Deeds;
  • Explained that City ordinances require SIAs to be recorded with plats and asserted that the SIA applicable to Lot Q1 had been mistakenly omitted and only belatedly recorded in May 2023;
  • Indicated that discovery would show that platting/recording procedures were not followed when Lot Q1 was platted, and that the SIAs and preliminary subdivision plans were intended to establish a continuous right‑of‑way along the southeast boundary of what became Lot 25A; and
  • Explained that these facts would directly bear on whether the disputed strip is part of a public right‑of‑way rather than a segment of Lot Q1, and therefore whether any trespass occurred at all.

In light of the complexity of the platting history (preliminary 2002 plat, 2007 plat, 2013 Lot 25 plat, 2015 Lot 25A plat, and 2019 Lot Q1 plat), the overlapping SIAs, and the municipal ordinances, the Court holds that:

“Based on the record, there appear to be material facts in dispute relating to the legal determination of the boundaries of the lots at issue in this trespass suit.” (¶ 44)

Thus, substantively, the defendants’ Rule 56(f) affidavits would have justified a continuance had timeliness not been an issue.

3. The Underlying Property Question: Is There a Public Right‑of‑Way?

While not deciding the boundary dispute, the Court undertakes enough property‑law analysis to establish that the question is genuinely debatable and fact‑dependent:

• Express dedication theory (Coyles’ view):
  • The 2007 plat shows Walworth Street dedicated along the eastern edge of proposed Lot 25, ending at its northeast corner.
  • Later plats (2013 Lot 25, 2015 Lot 25A, 2019 Lot Q1) do not extend the right‑of‑way beyond that point; they simply enlarge Lot 25/25A into former Lot Q territory without showing additional dedicated right‑of‑way.
  • Under Selway, because dedication requires an unmistakable offer and acceptance, the absence of express dedication language or depiction beyond the original corner means no further public right‑of‑way was created.
• Implied/statutory dedication theory (McFarlands’ view):
  • Tinaglia and Nelson recognize implied and common‑law dedication based on owner conduct and public reliance.
  • The 2013 and 2015 SIAs—required by City ordinance as a precondition of plat approval and to be recorded with the plats—obligated the subdivider to complete improvements “within the full length of the right‑of‑way adjacent to the southeast boundary of Lots 24 and 25A … prior to or as a condition of approval of any subdivision plat of Lot Q.”
  • The developer and building committee approved the driveway in its present location, purportedly on the view that it lay within the planned right‑of‑way; sewer lines and utilities were reportedly installed in that corridor.
  • The City later recorded the 2015 SIA against Lot Q1 in May 2023 after the prior failure was brought to the Register of Deeds’ attention, suggesting error or oversight in the original recording.

Against this background, the Court notes that developer intent, City approval practices, and subdivision patterns (like in Nelson) could all bear on whether, despite imperfections in the plats or recording, a public right‑of‑way of the intended “full length” abuts Lot 25A. Determining that issue without discovery, based solely on one side’s affidavits deemed admitted by default, is inconsistent with the summary judgment standard.

Importantly, the Court does not hold that a right‑of‑way actually exists along the full southeastern boundary of Lot 25A. Rather, it concludes that:

• The issue is sufficiently complex and fact‑intensive that the defendants were entitled to discovery under Rule 56(f) before being foreclosed from contesting it; and
• By denying any continuance and deeming plaintiffs’ assertions admitted, the trial court prematurely resolved a materially disputed question of title under the guise of procedural default.

4. Intent in Trespass and Adoption of Restatement § 164

In an important doctrinal move, the Court responds to the parties’ arguments about the intent element of trespass:

• The Coyles emphasized that civil trespass is an intentional tort and argued that the defendants’ asserted good‑faith belief about the boundary could not negate intent.
• Relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164, the Court agrees and formally adopts the principle that:
  • To be liable for trespass, a person need only intend to be physically present on the land in question; and
  • A mistaken belief—whether of law or fact—about who owns the land or whether one has a right to be there does not excuse the trespass, however reasonable that belief may be.

However, the Court quickly adds that this principle is not dispositive of the case because the defendants are not saying “we thought this was ours but it was actually yours.” Instead, they say, “this strip is not yours or ours; it is a public street right‑of‑way.” If they are correct, then they have not “entered land in the possession of another” at all, and one of the core elements of trespass would be missing. That is again a boundary and dedication issue, not simply an intent issue.

5. Excusable Neglect under Rule 6(b)

Having determined that the defendants made a meritorious Rule 56(f) showing, the Court returns to the timeliness problem. The question is whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to enlarge the response time under SDCL 15‑6‑6(b)(2), which permits extensions requested “after the expiration of the specified period” where “the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.”

Key aspects of the Court’s reasoning:

• Nature of the neglect. Defense counsel did not ignore the case:
  • He appeared and filed an answer;
  • He missed the 14‑day summary judgment response deadline amid a marital crisis of unusual intensity: his wife filed for divorce and he discovered her affair with a longtime friend;
  • He averred that these events caused “significant, often debilitating stress,” with grief, anxiety, and inability to focus—a sworn explanation consistent with serious disruption that a reasonable person might experience.
• Prompt corrective action. Once counsel realized, through the plaintiffs’ September 15 “protective objection,” that he had missed the deadline:
  • He moved for a continuance on September 18;
  • He filed Rule 56(f) affidavits on September 20, explaining specific discovery needs;
  • He emailed the court and opposing counsel on September 25, candidly disclosing his personal circumstances; and
  • He filed a late response to the summary judgment motion and the statement of undisputed facts the same day.
  This mirrors the behavior in McGuire, where excusable neglect was found: immediate acknowledgment and corrective action, with no indication of gamesmanship.
• Stage of the litigation. The lawsuit was barely 2½ months old when the summary judgment motion was filed. The answer had been on file for only two weeks. Neither side had conducted discovery. Courts more freely excuse neglect in early stages when no trial date is threatened and the case is far from final resolution.
• Meritorious defense. The defendants offered a substantial boundary and dedication defense—potentially dispositive of liability—that the Court found sufficiently plausible to warrant further exploration. This factor weighs heavily toward resolving the dispute on the merits rather than on a procedural default.
• Prejudice (or lack thereof). The Coyles argued they would be prejudiced because a protective order in a related harassment proceeding limited Abbey’s ability to stop or stand within fifty feet of the McFarlands’ home and to place cameras near it, thereby affecting her use of portions of Lot Q1. The Court found this claim unpersuasive:
  • The area affected was a small strip including the driveway edge, which had been in place and visible when the Coyles bought Lot Q1; and
  • At the damages trial, the Coyles themselves conceded that any damages were “truly” nominal and not worth the court’s time to prove, undercutting any claim of substantial prejudice from a modest delay.

Balancing these factors under the liberal approach to “excusable neglect” endorsed in Donald Bucklin, the Court concludes that:

“The relevant factors related to requests for a continuance supported a finding that excusable neglect existed under the circumstances here. We conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by not giving due consideration to the fact that the litigation was in its infancy and no discovery had occurred, the McFarlands’ meritorious request for Rule 56(f) relief, the nature of their counsel’s personal circumstances, and the lack of actual prejudice to the Coyles.” (¶ 51)

6. Abuse of Discretion and Appellate Review

The standard of review is abuse of discretion—“a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.” The majority holds that the trial court crossed that line by:

• Treating the Rule 56(f) request as if timing alone decided the issue, rather than engaging with the substantive adequacy of the affidavits and the excusable‑neglect factors; and
• Effectively converting a missed deadline in an early‑stage case into a dispositive adjudication on liability and injunctive relief, despite a substantial unresolved property‑rights controversy and nominal damages.

Notably, the trial court expressed discomfort with its own decision, acknowledging that the law favors “finality” and “merit‑based” decisions and that it did not “like to do things this way,” but felt constrained by the rules. The Supreme Court reads SDCL 15‑6‑6(b) and its own precedents to say that the rules themselves contain flexibility precisely to allow merit‑based adjudication when neglect is excusable.

7. The Dissent’s Competing View

Justice Myren’s dissent underscores the tension inherent in applying a discretionary standard:

• He agrees that the Rule 56(f) affidavit was untimely under SDCL 15‑6‑56(c) and that, on that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in initially denying the continuance.
• He points out that the more detailed explanation of counsel’s personal challenges came only later, through the Rule 60(b) motion, after the court had already granted summary judgment.
• He emphasizes that the circuit court, by the time of the Rule 60(b) motion, was “fully aware of all the circumstances” and nevertheless concluded that relief was unwarranted.
• For him, even if appellate judges might have weighed those circumstances differently, that is not enough to find an abuse of discretion under the deferential standard of review.

In short, the dissent would affirm, treating the trial court’s insistence on compliance with deadlines as within the permissible range of choices, particularly given that the defendants had multiple opportunities to seek timely extensions or present fuller explanations earlier.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Summary Judgment Practice and Rule 56(f) in South Dakota

The decision sends several clear signals to trial courts and litigants:

• Early summary judgment motions are permissible, but courts must be cautious. When plaintiffs move for summary judgment before any discovery and shortly after the answer, nonmovants are especially likely to need Rule 56(f) relief. Denying such relief should be the exception, not the rule, especially where material issues (like a boundary or title dispute) are inherently fact‑intensive.
• Rule 56(f) affidavits must be specific, but litigants now have a blueprint. The Court endorses affidavits that:
  • Identify specific deponents and documents;
  • Explain how particular facts (e.g., developer intent, municipal procedures, title practices) would bear on legal theories (e.g., implied dedication); and
  • Link the requested discovery to disputed elements of the claim or defense.
  Vague references to “needing discovery” remain insufficient, but well‑crafted affidavits like those in Coyle and Strom Trust must be taken seriously.
• Timeliness matters, but is not absolute. Parties must heed the 14‑day response rule for summary judgment and for Rule 56(f) requests; however, where deadlines are missed despite diligence and due to excusable neglect, Rule 6(b) provides a safety valve that courts are expected to apply liberally—especially early in a case and absent real prejudice.

2. Attorney Personal Crises and Excusable Neglect

The Court’s treatment of counsel’s divorce and discovery of his spouse’s affair as a ground for excusable neglect is notable. It does not create a categorical rule, but it recognizes that:

• Serious, sudden personal upheaval can reasonably impair a lawyer’s ability to function; and
• Where the lawyer acts promptly and transparently once aware of the lapse, and where the opposing party suffers minimal prejudice, strict enforcement of deadlines may be “a fundamental error of judgment.”

This sets an important tone for future cases involving mental health, family crises, or other major disruptions in counsel’s life. It implicitly encourages:

• Early, candid communication with courts and opposing counsel about such difficulties; and
• Judicial flexibility grounded in the twin goals of fairness and adjudication on the merits.

3. Trespass Law: Mistaken Belief Is Not a Defense

By expressly adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164, the Court clarifies South Dakota trespass law:

• The “intent” in trespass is the intent to be on the land, not the intent to violate someone’s property rights.
• A good‑faith but incorrect belief—whether based on a bad survey, prior owner’s representations, or a misreading of the law—does not shield a defendant from liability for trespass if he is in fact on another’s land without privilege.

This will impact:

• Boundary disputes: Litigants cannot rely on “we thought the line was here” as a complete defense to liability, although such beliefs may still be relevant to the scope of equitable relief or to damages.
• Encroachments by improvements: Fences, driveways, and sheds built in the wrong place may still produce liability even if installed in bona fide reliance on erroneous plats or representations.

At the same time, Coyle underscores that if the land is not in fact “in the possession of another” (e.g., if it is a public right‑of‑way), there is no trespass to begin with. Thus, accurately determining who holds title or possessory rights remains vital.

4. Real Property and Municipal Law: Dedications and SIAs

The opinion, while not resolving the dedication question, reinforces several themes in South Dakota real‑property and municipal law:

• Plats are not the whole story. Even where a plat does not expressly show dedication beyond a certain point, SIAs, subdivision ordinances, developer conduct, and public use can contribute to implied or common‑law dedication analyses.
• Municipal recording practices matter. Ordinances requiring SIAs to be recorded with the plat underscore that the content of those agreements is part of what prospective purchasers should consider, and failures to record may create confusion later. Coyle demonstrates how such failures can lead to serious boundary disputes years after initial development.
• Developers’ and committees’ approvals have evidentiary weight. Covenants giving a building committee authority to approve driveway locations, and the committee’s historical approvals, can speak to the intended location of future streets and rights‑of‑way, supporting or undermining claims of implied dedication.

Future litigation involving subdivision streets, cul‑de‑sacs, and partially built rights‑of‑way will likely rely on Coyle—together with Nelson and Selway—to argue whether a roadway segment is public or private, and whether city or county approval processes were properly followed.

5. Procedural Fairness and “Merits over Technicalities”

Finally, Coyle articulates a strong preference that:

• Disputes as to core property rights not be finally decided through procedural defaults when there is a plausible substantive defense and the case is in its early stages; and
• Rule‑based deadlines be enforced with an awareness of Rule 6(b)’s flexibility and the overarching purpose of civil procedure—to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.

This does not mean deadlines are optional. It does mean that when neglect is excusable, litigants act quickly to cure omissions, and prejudice is minimal, trial courts that choose the harshest possible consequence (here, granting dispositive relief and ordering physical alteration of property) risk reversal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Judgment: A procedure where the court decides a case (or specific issues) without a full trial because there is no “genuine issue of material fact” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, based on the evidence in the record (affidavits, documents, depositions).
• Partial Summary Judgment: Summary judgment that resolves some but not all issues—for example, liability but not damages, or one claim among many.
• SDCL 15‑6‑56(f) (Rule 56(f) Continuance): Allows a party opposing summary judgment to ask for more time to obtain affidavits, take depositions, or conduct discovery if they cannot yet present facts essential to oppose the motion. The request must be supported by a detailed affidavit explaining why the evidence is not yet available, what it is likely to show, and how it will matter.
• SDCL 15‑6‑6(b) (Rule 6(b) Extension of Time and Excusable Neglect): Permits the court to extend deadlines. If the time has already expired, the party must show that their failure to act resulted from “excusable neglect”—a mistake or oversight that a reasonable person might make under the circumstances, evaluated liberally to favor decisions on the merits.
• Excusable Neglect: Not just any neglect; it must be accompanied by a credible reason (e.g., sudden illness, family crisis, non‑obvious miscalculation) and prompt effort to correct the error. Courts consider whether the case is early or late, whether there is a real defense, and whether the other side is harmed by the delay.
• Civil Trespass: Intentionally going onto (or remaining on) land in the possession of another without consent or other legal privilege. Under Coyle, the “intent” required is the intent to be on the land, not the intent to wrongfully invade someone else’s rights. A good‑faith mistake about ownership is not a complete defense.
• Right‑of‑Way: A strip of land reserved for public travel (e.g., a street) or for specific uses like utilities. Public rights‑of‑way are typically dedicated by plat or deed and accepted by a governmental entity; they may also arise by implied dedication based on long public use and owner conduct.
• Dedication (of a Road): The act by which a landowner gives land for public use, such as a street. It can be:
  • Express—clearly indicated on a plat or in a deed and accepted by government; or
  • Implied—inferred from the owner’s actions and the public’s reliance (common‑law dedication), often analyzed as an equitable estoppel.
• Subdivision Improvement Agreement (SIA): A contract between a developer and a city or county whereby the developer agrees to install streets, utilities, and other infrastructure to specified standards. In Belle Fourche, SIAs must be approved and recorded with the plat, and can refer to future rights‑of‑way and required improvements.
• Abuse of Discretion: A standard of appellate review. A court abuses its discretion when it makes a fundamental error of judgment, chooses an option outside the range of permissible choices, or reaches a decision that is arbitrary or unreasonable given the facts and law.

V. Conclusion

Coyle v. McFarland is far more than a quarrel over fifty square feet of concrete. It is a leading South Dakota case on:

• How and when courts should grant Rule 56(f) continuances for discovery in response to early summary judgment motions;
• The flexible, merit‑protective role of Rule 6(b)’s “excusable neglect” standard, particularly when counsel faces serious personal crises and acts promptly to correct mistakes;
• The doctrinal clarification that a mistaken belief in one’s right to occupy land does not negate the intentional nature of civil trespass; and
• The continuing importance of subdivision plats, SIAs, municipal ordinances, and developer conduct in determining whether a strip of land is a private lot or part of the public right‑of‑way.

By reversing a partial summary judgment that rested primarily on missed deadlines and deemed admissions, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that civil procedure is not a trap for the unwary but a framework intended to promote fair, merit‑based resolutions. At the same time, the Court did not excuse carelessness; it required a detailed Rule 56(f) showing, credible evidence of excusable neglect, and an absence of meaningful prejudice to the opposing party.

On remand, the parties will finally have the opportunity to develop a full factual record on the key question: whether the disputed strip is in fact part of a public Walworth Street right‑of‑way or part of the Coyles’ Lot Q1. Whatever the ultimate outcome on the merits, Coyle will guide South Dakota courts and practitioners for years to come in handling summary judgment timing, discovery continuances, attorney missteps, and the contours of civil trespass and public street dedications.