I. Introduction

This decision squarely resolves a long‑developing split among Texas intermediate courts of appeals over a deceptively simple question: who decides whether an employee’s injury occurred in the “course and scope” of employment when that question arises only as part of an employer’s workers’ compensation exclusive‑remedy defense in a tort suit?

In The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka, the Supreme Court of Texas holds that the Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Division” or “DWC”) does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury was work‑related where:

• the employee has not filed a workers’ compensation claim,
• the dispute does not arise in the “compensability” context, and
• the employee’s requested relief does not depend on entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

The Court confirms that, in this setting, the district court retains subject‑matter jurisdiction to adjudicate course‑and‑scope and the associated exclusive‑remedy defense. This ruling narrows the reach of administrative “exclusive jurisdiction” and clarifies the respective roles of trial courts and the Division in Texas workers’ compensation disputes.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Accident

Respondent Rita Oteka was a faculty member at The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (“UTRGV”). She voluntarily attended a commencement ceremony to support former students. While walking to her car after the event, she was struck and injured by a vehicle driven by a university police officer.

The University is self‑insured for workers’ compensation purposes. As required, it reported the incident to its third‑party claims administrator, which in turn notified both Oteka and the Division that it was denying workers’ compensation benefits. The denial letter gave three reasons:

1. Oteka was seeking treatment under her personal health insurance and was not pursuing workers’ compensation benefits;
2. there was no supporting medical evidence; and
3. based on its investigation, the injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of her employment.

Critically, Oteka never contested this denial and never filed a workers’ compensation “compensation claim” with the Division within the one‑year statutory period or thereafter. She alleges that she did not do so precisely because she agreed that her injuries were not work‑related.

B. The Tort Suit and Exclusive‑Remedy Defense

More than a year after the incident, Oteka filed a negligence suit against the police officer. Under the Tort Claims Act, UTRGV, as a governmental employer, was substituted in as the defendant pursuant to a Rule 11 agreement.

The University answered and, among other things, asserted the exclusive‑remedy defense under Labor Code § 408.001(a), arguing that:

• Oteka was a covered employee under the workers’ compensation system; and
• her injury was in the course and scope of employment, making workers’ compensation benefits her exclusive remedy.

For the first time, the work‑related nature of the injury became disputed—only in connection with this affirmative defense.

The parties filed cross‑motions for summary judgment on the exclusive‑remedy issue:

• Oteka’s position: the injury was not work‑related; attendance at the ceremony was voluntary and she had already left the event when injured.
• The University’s position: clinical‑track faculty were expected to attend at least one ceremony per year to satisfy service requirements, and the injury occurred in a parking lot used as an access point for the ceremony; therefore, it was in the course and scope of employment.

C. The Claims Administrator’s Reversal and Plea to the Jurisdiction

Before the trial court ruled on the summary‑judgment motions, the University’s claims administrator reversed course. Some thirty‑one months after the incident—and about a year after the University first raised its exclusive‑remedy defense—the administrator sent a letter to Oteka stating that her injury “has been accepted as compensable” and that benefits would be paid.

The very next day, the University filed a plea to the jurisdiction. It argued that:

• the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a covered employee’s injury occurred in the course and scope of employment;
• because Oteka had not filed a compensation claim and obtained a Division determination, she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and
• accordingly, the district court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction over the suit.

The University initially sought dismissal with prejudice, later conceding at oral argument in the Supreme Court that abatement to allow administrative proceedings might be a more appropriate remedy. The district court denied the plea, and the University brought an interlocutory appeal under Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(8).

D. Court of Appeals and Conflicting Intermediate Authority

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi–Edinburg) affirmed. It held that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction “does not extend to all cases that touch on workers’ compensation issues” and that trial courts regularly decide whether the exclusive‑remedy defense applies in ordinary personal‑injury suits.

In doing so, the court aligned itself with one line of intermediate decisions (e.g., Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann) holding that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction is limited to disputes about entitlement to benefits, not every issue somehow related to workers’ compensation. The court explicitly acknowledged that other courts of appeals had taken the opposite view and required exhaustion before a court could decide whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment.

The University sought review, pointing to cases such as:

• In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co.
• Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc.
• In re Hellas Construction, Inc.
• In re Prentis, and
• In re Texas Mutual Insurance Co. (San Antonio 2025),

all of which broadly stated that the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to decide “compensability” and therefore, by implication, course‑and‑scope issues in any context. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve this split.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Holding

The Court holds that the Division of Workers’ Compensation does not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether an injury was work‑related when:

• the course‑and‑scope question arises only because the employer asserts the workers’ compensation exclusive‑remedy defense, and
• the employee’s requested relief does not depend on entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

Consequently:

• The district court’s subject‑matter jurisdiction is not divested.
• No exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this posture.
• The case may proceed in district court, with course‑and‑scope determined in that forum.

More broadly, the Court:

• reaffirms that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction extends to disputes over entitlement to benefits and claims arising from the handling of workers’ compensation claims;
• clarifies that not every issue “touching on” workers’ compensation is within the Division’s exclusive province; and
• expressly disapproves intermediate authorities that had required administrative exhaustion simply because the exclusive‑remedy defense—and hence course‑and‑scope—was at issue.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Constitutional and Administrative Law Framework

The Court begins with first principles of Texas jurisdiction:

• Under Article V, § 8 of the Texas Constitution and Government Code §§ 24.007–.008, district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, with authority over “all actions, proceedings, and remedies” unless the Constitution or Legislature expressly provides otherwise.
• Administrative agencies, in contrast, are “legislative creations” possessing only those powers “expressly conferred and necessary to accomplish [their] duties” (In re CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 156). They do not enjoy a presumption of adjudicative jurisdiction.
• A party asserting agency exclusive jurisdiction bears the burden of making a “compelling showing” that the Legislature intended to displace district‑court jurisdiction (Pape Partners, Ltd. v. DRR Family Props. LP, 645 S.W.3d 267, 272; S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 436–49).

Exclusive administrative jurisdiction may arise either from:

1. an express grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to the agency; or
2. a “pervasive regulatory scheme” showing that the administrative process was intended to be the exclusive means to remedy the problem presented (Pape Partners, quoting In re Entergy Corp.).

Even then, courts must determine whether the particular dispute falls within the scope of the agency’s exclusive authority. If it does, trial courts lack jurisdiction pending exhaustion of administrative remedies (CenterPoint Energy).

B. The Workers’ Compensation Scheme and Exclusive Remedy

The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act embodies the classic trade‑off:

• Employees give up their common‑law right to sue their employers for work‑related injuries in exchange for no‑fault, prompt, and more certain benefits (see Labor Code §§ 406.031, .034).
• Employers accept statutory liability for such benefits but gain limited and predictable exposure and the exclusive‑remedy defense (Labor Code § 408.001).
• The Division of Workers’ Compensation (within the Department of Insurance) administers this system and has exclusive jurisdiction to determine entitlement to compensation benefits (American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 804).

The exclusive‑remedy statute, § 408.001(a), provides that recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of a covered employee against the employer for a “work‑related injury.” A “compensable injury” is defined as one that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable under the Act (Lab. Code § 401.011(10)).

The Act sets out a carefully structured four‑level dispute‑resolution process in Chapter 410:

1. Benefit review conference (informal mediation‑like process);
2. Contested case hearing;
3. Appeal to the Division’s appeals panel; and
4. Judicial review, with a modified de novo standard for compensability and eligibility questions, and substantial‑evidence review for other issues.

The Court has repeatedly held that this administrative process is the exclusive avenue for resolving disputes over:

• whether benefits are owed (e.g., Fodge); and
• the investigation, handling, or settlement of workers’ compensation claims (e.g., In re Accident Fund General Ins. Co., In re Crawford & Co.).

C. The Court’s Core Reasoning: Why Exclusive Jurisdiction Does Not Apply Here

1. The Nature of the Dispute

The Court emphasizes that this case is not a dispute about entitlement to benefits. Several features are key:

• Oteka never filed a compensation claim with the Division.
• She seeks only common‑law personal‑injury damages in district court.
• Her claim does not depend on any finding that she is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.
• The course‑and‑scope question arose only when the University asserted the exclusive‑remedy defense in the tort suit.

When she sued, it was undisputed—indeed confirmed in writing by the University’s claims administrator—that the injury was not in the course and scope of employment.

2. No Express Grant of Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Course-and-Scope in This Posture

The University conceded that the Legislature has not expressly granted the Division exclusive jurisdiction to decide the exclusive‑remedy defense itself or all of its elements (course and scope, coverage, employee status, etc.). It instead argued that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction over “compensability” necessarily encompassed course‑and‑scope whenever that issue arises.

The Court rejects this over‑reading. It distinguishes between:

• Compensability disputes, where course and scope is an element in determining whether benefits are payable and the Division’s jurisdiction is exclusive; and
• Defensive use of course‑and‑scope in a civil suit where no benefits are claimed and no compensation claim is pending.

3. Structural Argument: No Procedure to Obtain a Stand‑Alone Course-and-Scope Determination

The Court’s most important structural point is that the Act provides no mechanism to obtain a free‑standing course‑and‑scope determination from the Division in the absence of a compensation claim:

• Only an employee (or someone acting on the employee’s behalf) can file a “compensation claim” (Lab. Code § 409.003), which is defined as a claim for payment of benefits based on an injury arising in the course and scope of employment (Lab. Code § 401.011(5), (10), (11)).
• The entire Chapter 410 process is triggered by a disputed workers’ compensation claim, not by a general dispute over course‑and‑scope, and the Division may direct parties to a benefit review conference only in a “disputed workers’ compensation claim” (Lab. Code § 410.023(a)).

Under the University’s theory, an employee who firmly believes her injury is not work‑related, and who only wishes to pursue a tort claim, would be forced to file a workers’ compensation claim (asserting she is entitled to benefits) solely so she can argue before the Division that her own claim fails because the injury was not in the course and scope of employment.

The Court describes this as an “unnatural” and “unusual” procedure that the statutory text does not support. An employee would have to:

1. file a claim for benefits she neither desires nor believes are owed;
2. likely face no contest from an employer asserting exclusive remedy (who would welcome a finding of compensability as a shield in court);
3. then try to defeat her own claim before the Division to preserve a tort remedy.

The Court concludes that the Legislature did not intend this paradoxical route to be the exclusive path for resolving defensive course‑and‑scope disputes.

4. Presumption in Favor of District‑Court Jurisdiction

Because the Act neither expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction over this type of controversy, nor creates a workable administrative pathway to resolve it, the presumption in favor of district‑court jurisdiction prevails. The Court invokes its recent administrative law decisions (Pape Partners, CenterPoint Energy, In re Oncor) for the proposition that:

• exclusive jurisdiction cannot be inferred lightly; and
• mere regulation of an issue does not entail that the agency must resolve all private disputes touching on that issue.

The Court analogizes to the rule that a federal question raised only as a defense does not create federal jurisdiction; similarly, the presence of an “agency question” in a defense does not, by itself, create exclusive administrative jurisdiction.

5. Consistency with Supreme Court Precedent Addressing Exclusive Remedy on the Merits

The Court notes that it has previously decided the merits of exclusive‑remedy disputes—including course‑and‑scope questions—without ever suggesting that those disputes belonged exclusively to the Division. Examples include:

• Walls Regional Hospital v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 1999): nurses sued their hospital for negligence in allowing a physician to sexually harass them. The Court directly addressed whether their injuries occurred in the course of employment and held that the exclusive‑remedy bar applied. It did not vacate or abate for a Division determination.
• Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2005): the Court adjudicated employer‑status and coverage issues related to exclusive remedy.
• Waste Management of Texas, Inc. v. Stevenson, 622 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. 2021): the Court decided an employee‑status issue within the exclusive‑remedy framework.

While none of these decisions expressly discussed the Division’s jurisdiction, the Court observes that if exclusive jurisdiction truly existed in these contexts, it would have been obliged to raise the issue sua sponte and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (S.C. v. M.B.; City of Houston v. Rhule). The absence of such a jurisdictional objection in these cases is persuasive, though not formally precedential, support for allowing courts to resolve exclusive‑remedy disputes directly.

6. Express Disapproval of Contrary Intermediate Case Law

To eliminate confusion, the Court expressly disapproves the holdings (to the extent inconsistent with this opinion) in:

• In re Texas Mutual Ins. Co. (San Antonio 2025);
• In re Prentis (Houston [1st Dist.] 2024);
• In re Hellas Construction, Inc. (Austin 2022);
• Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc. (San Antonio 2018); and
• In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co. (Houston [14th Dist.] 2003).

Those opinions had treated all course‑and‑scope issues, whenever and however raised, as matters within the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court now limits that view: the Division’s exclusivity is confined to disputes about benefits and claims arising from the carrier’s handling of workers’ compensation claims, not to every defensive course‑and‑scope dispute in civil litigation.

D. Safeguards Against Circumvention and the Role of Abatement

1. Concern: “Two Bites at the Apple” and Increased Litigation Costs

The University and amicus Texas Mutual argued that allowing district courts to determine course‑and‑scope in tort suits will invite plaintiffs to:

1. forego or delay filing a compensation claim,
2. litigate in tort court in hopes of a larger recovery, and
3. only seek workers’ compensation benefits later if they lose in court.

They warned this would undermine the balance of the workers’ compensation system, increase litigation costs, and frustrate the Act’s goals of quick and efficient dispute resolution (Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430).

The Court acknowledges these concerns but concludes that existing statutory and prudential safeguards mitigate the risk.

2. The One‑Year Filing Deadline and “Good Cause” Limitation

Labor Code § 409.003 requires an employee to file a compensation claim within one year of the injury. If she fails to do so, the employer and carrier are relieved of liability under the Act, unless:

• the claim is uncontested; or
• “good cause” exists for the late filing (§ 409.004).

“Good cause” must exist continuously until the claim is actually filed (Lee v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 294), and is judged by whether the claimant exercised the diligence of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances (Hawkins v. Safety Casualty Co., 207 S.W.2d 370).

The Court explicitly states that a mere desire to “take a shot” at a larger tort recovery before seeking benefits does not constitute good cause. Thus, a plaintiff who intentionally delays filing a compensation claim in order to gamble on a tort suit risks permanently forfeiting workers’ compensation benefits.

Because most civil cases will not fully resolve—especially through appeal—within one year, a risk‑averse employee would typically need to file a compensation claim before the deadline to preserve any possible benefit entitlement. This timing reality significantly blunts the fear of systematic circumvention.

3. Prudential Abatement of Parallel Proceedings

The Court also points to the judiciary’s ability to use abatement as a practical tool when:

• a tort suit is pending in district court; and
• a related workers’ compensation proceeding (involving the same injury and course‑and‑scope issue) is pending before the Division.

Drawing analogies from other contexts (Dolenz v. Continental Nat’l Bank; Kallinen v. City of Houston; In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.), the Court notes that trial courts may:

• abate civil actions “for reasons of comity, convenience and orderly procedure,”
• avoid conflicting rulings and unnecessary expense by waiting on an agency’s resolution of overlapping issues, and
• ensure efficient use of judicial and administrative resources.

A workers’ compensation proceeding that squarely addresses course‑and‑scope and entitlement to benefits may, in some cases, render parts of the tort suit moot or narrow the issues. Abatement in such cases can promote consistency and efficiency.

The Court, however, is careful to note that:

• no parallel administrative proceeding was pending in Oteka, and
• the University had, until oral argument, sought dismissal rather than abatement.

Accordingly, the Court does not decide the precise circumstances under which a trial court should or must abate in favor of a pending workers’ compensation proceeding. It merely recognizes abatement as a potential doctrinal and practical tool.

V. Key Precedents and Their Influence

A. Cases Supporting the Court’s Limitation of Exclusive Jurisdiction

1. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2001)

Fodge is central to the Court’s understanding of the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction. There, the Court held that only the Division may determine a claimant’s entitlement to compensation benefits, and a court cannot award tort damages for denial of benefits unless and until the Division has decided that those benefits were in fact due.

Oteka reaffirms this principle but cabins it: Fodge governs disputes about benefits themselves. It does not imply that the Division must decide every course‑and‑scope question raised defensively in unrelated tort litigation where no benefits are claimed.

2. In re Accident Fund General Ins. Co. & In re Crawford & Co.

These decisions held that the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive process and remedies for claims arising out of a carrier’s investigation, handling, or settlement of workers’ compensation claims. They underscore the breadth of the Act’s preemptive effect in that specific domain.

Again, Oteka acknowledges this line of cases but emphasizes their domain‑specific nature: they concern claims that arise from the workers’ compensation process itself, not independent negligence suits between employees and employers or co‑workers/governmental units.

3. Walls Regional Hospital v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 1999)

As noted above, Walls is powerful practical evidence that the Court has historically considered itself competent—and jurisdictionally authorized—to decide whether injuries are within the course and scope of employment for exclusive‑remedy purposes. The Court in Oteka leverages this prior practice to rebut the notion that the Division’s jurisdiction over compensability is all‑encompassing in any context.

4. In re Oncor Electric Delivery Co., 630 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2021)

In Oncor, the Court considered the Public Utility Commission’s jurisdiction to interpret tariffs and determine rate issues but refused to treat every dispute touching on a tariff as within the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction. It emphasized that:

• agency jurisdiction must match the statute’s text and the specific regulatory scheme; and
• a defense that implicates agency issues does not automatically confer agency jurisdiction over a private dispute.

Oteka applies this reasoning by analogy: the mere fact that the exclusive‑remedy defense implicates course‑and‑scope— a concept the Division frequently decides in benefits disputes—does not transform the Division into the exclusive decision‑maker for all such disputes.

B. Competing Court of Appeals Decisions Disapproved

The Court explicitly disapproves, to the extent inconsistent, intermediate decisions that adopted a broad view of the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction over course‑and‑scope questions, such as:

• In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co. (2003);
• Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc. (2018);
• In re Hellas Construction, Inc. (2022);
• In re Prentis (2024); and
• In re Texas Mutual Ins. Co. (2025).

These cases had extrapolated from Fodge and similar authorities an expansive rule that any dispute about whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment must first go through the Division. Oteka corrects this over‑extension.

C. Intermediate Authorities the Court Implicitly Endorses

Conversely, the Court’s holding effectively vindicates the line of appellate decisions that limited the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction to benefits‑entitlement disputes, most notably:

• Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2018, pet. denied);
• Medrano v. Kerry Ingredients & Flavours, Inc., 2021 WL 1323432 (Fort Worth 2021); and
• In re Recess Arcade Bar, LLC, 2024 WL 3048577 (Austin 2024).

These cases recognized that trial courts may decide exclusive‑remedy defenses in ordinary negligence suits where the plaintiff is not seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Oteka assures that this more limited approach now governs statewide.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Exclusive Remedy”

The “exclusive remedy” rule in workers’ compensation means:

• If an employee is covered by workers’ compensation insurance and the injury is work‑related,
• the employee generally cannot sue the employer in tort for that injury,
• but instead is limited to the statutory benefits provided under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

This trade‑off protects employers from unpredictable tort liability while guaranteeing employees a baseline of compensation regardless of fault.

2. “Course and Scope of Employment”

“Course and scope of employment” is the legal test for whether an injury is “work‑related.” Although defined in the Labor Code, in plain language it asks:

• Was the employee engaged in activities related to her job duties or in furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs?
• Did the injury occur while performing such work, or in activities reasonably incidental to it (including some travel situations)?

Here, the unresolved merits question is whether voluntarily attending a graduation ceremony and walking back to one’s car at a leased facility satisfied that test for a clinical‑track faculty member.

3. “Compensability”

“Compensability” refers to whether an injury is covered by the workers’ compensation system so that benefits are payable. It typically includes:

• whether the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment;
• whether statutory exceptions apply (e.g., willful intent, intoxication, certain acts of third parties); and
• whether other preconditions for coverage are met.

The Division’s jurisdiction is exclusive over compensability disputes in the context of benefit claims.

4. “Exclusive Jurisdiction” and “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies”

An agency has “exclusive jurisdiction” when the Legislature has assigned it the sole authority to make an initial determination on a particular type of dispute. When that is true:

• a trial court cannot decide the dispute until the administrative process has run its course; and
• the parties must “exhaust administrative remedies” (complete the agency’s process) before seeking judicial review.

In Oteka, the Court holds that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to course‑and‑scope disputes raised only as part of an exclusive‑remedy defense in a lawsuit where no benefits are sought.

5. “Plea to the Jurisdiction”

A plea to the jurisdiction is a procedural device used to challenge a court’s subject‑matter jurisdiction—its power to hear a case. Governmental entities often use such pleas to assert immunity from suit or, as here, to argue that an agency has exclusive jurisdiction. An order granting or denying such a plea is immediately appealable by interlocutory appeal (Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8)).

VII. Impact and Implications

A. Clarified Boundary Between Courts and the Division

The most significant doctrinal contribution of Oteka is a clearer demarcation of the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction:

• Exclusive to Division:
  • disputes over entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits;
  • compensability issues arising within that benefits framework; and
  • claims arising from the carrier’s investigation, handling, or settlement of workers’ compensation claims.
• Within district courts’ purview:
  • course‑and‑scope determinations raised solely in connection with an exclusive‑remedy defense where no compensation claim is pending;
  • employee/employer status and coverage issues when arising as part of a tort dispute not predicated on benefit entitlement; and
  • tort claims between employees and employers (or governmental units standing in the employer’s shoes) that do not seek benefits or challenge claim handling.

B. Practical Consequences for Litigation Strategy

1. For Employees / Plaintiffs

Employees injured in incidents with ambiguous work‑related status now have a somewhat clearer set of choices:

• They may file a compensation claim within one year to preserve potential benefits, recognizing that a finding of compensability may later support an exclusive‑remedy defense against a tort suit.
• They may file a civil tort suit without first going through the Division, but risk that:
  • the employer will successfully prove the injury was work‑related, thereby invoking the exclusive‑remedy bar; and
  • if they also fail to timely file a compensation claim, they will be left with no remedy at all.

In other words, Oteka does not give plaintiffs a free “two‑track” option—it preserves the court forum for non‑benefit disputes but leaves intact the filing deadlines and good‑cause limits that constrain strategic delay.

2. For Employers and Carriers

Employers and carriers can no longer rely on a blanket argument that any course‑and‑scope dispute must go to the Division first. Instead:

• They must litigate the exclusive‑remedy defense on the merits in district court where no compensation claim exists and the plaintiff is not seeking benefits.
• They may still invoke the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction—and seek dismissal or abatement—when a plaintiff’s claim is effectively an end‑run around or attack on benefit entitlement or claim handling (for example, bad‑faith denial of benefits without a prior Division determination that benefits were owed).

Governmental units (like UTRGV) that purchase or self‑insure for workers’ compensation and rely on Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.028 (extending workers’ compensation privileges to them) will now need to be prepared to litigate exclusive‑remedy and course‑and‑scope issues in district court rather than attempting to force them into the administrative arena via pleas to the jurisdiction.

3. For Trial Courts

Trial courts can treat course‑and‑scope questions raised as part of an exclusive‑remedy defense—without pending benefit claims—as within their ordinary fact‑finding and legal‑decision‑making role. At the same time, courts retain discretion to:

• recognize and enforce the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction where benefit entitlement or claim handling is directly at issue; and
• consider abatement when parallel administrative proceedings addressing the same injury and course‑and‑scope issue are pending.

C. Administrative Law Doctrine: Reinforcing a Text‑Focused, Narrow View of Exclusive Jurisdiction

On the administrative law side, Oteka continues and strengthens a trend in the Court’s jurisprudence:

• Exclusive jurisdiction is exceptional, not presumed.
• Courts must look for clear textual or structural evidence that the Legislature intended to oust district‑court jurisdiction over a given category of disputes.
• The mere presence of an issue within an agency’s general regulatory ambit (here, “course and scope” within workers’ compensation) does not mean that every dispute touching that issue belongs to the agency.

This case will likely be cited broadly for the proposition that courts should resist expansive, atextual constructions of “exclusive jurisdiction” that effectively allow agencies to decide for themselves how far their authority reaches.

VIII. Conclusion

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka is a significant clarification of the respective roles of Texas district courts and the Division of Workers’ Compensation. The Court firmly holds that:

The Division’s exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to determining whether an injury was work‑related when that issue is raised solely by the employer’s exclusive‑remedy defense and the employee’s lawsuit does not hinge on entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

The decision:

• resolves a long‑standing split among the courts of appeals;
• confirms that course‑and‑scope issues used defensively in tort suits can be decided by trial courts;
• preserves the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction over benefit entitlement and claim‑handling disputes; and
• reaffirms the presumption in favor of district‑court jurisdiction unless the Legislature speaks clearly to the contrary.

At the same time, the Court recognizes the continued importance of the exclusive‑remedy bar to the viability of the workers’ compensation system, and points to statutory deadlines and prudential abatement as tools to prevent abuse. The opinion thus both protects the structural integrity of Texas’s administrative scheme and preserves meaningful access to the courts for disputes that fall outside the Division’s core mission.