Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Contract treatment and strict construction of CC&Rs.

• Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003); Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 923 P.2d 434 (1996); Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 144 Idaho 813, 172 P.3d 1088 (2007).
• These cases frame CC&Rs as contracts, enforceable according to their unambiguous text. If unambiguous, the court applies the plain meaning and will not extend restrictions by implication.
• Berezowski v. Schuman, 141 Idaho 532, 112 P.3d 820 (2005); Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 350 P.2d 348 (1960).
• Both reinforce the rule that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of land, and doubts resolve against restrictions.

Private enforcement vs. governmental approvals.

• Out-of-state persuasive authorities: View Condominium Owners Ass’n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 127 P.3d 697 (Utah 2005); Hawkins View Architectural Control Comm. v. Cooper, 250 P.3d 380 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); Brazinski v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Teton County, 546 P.3d 545 (Wyo. 2024).
• Collectively, these cases support that county-level land use decisions (e.g., plat amendments, zoning changes) do not erase or supersede private covenants, which remain enforceable as servitudes running with the land.

Availability of declaratory relief to “enforce” CC&Rs.

• Fletcher v. Lone Mountain Road Ass’n, 165 Idaho 780, 452 P.3d 802 (2019).
• Fletcher recognizes that an action seeking declaratory relief to clarify rights under CC&Rs in order to ensure compliance is, in substance, an “enforcement” action contemplated by CC&R enforcement clauses.

Injunctions enforcing CC&Rs and irreparable harm.

• Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242, 254 P.3d 1238 (2011).
• When enforcing restrictive covenants, the covenantee need not show irreparable harm; the breach itself justifies injunctive relief.
• Hood v. Poorman, 171 Idaho 176, 519 P.3d 769 (2022), cited by Powers, is distinguished: Hood’s irreparable-injury requirement does not displace Jacklin in the CC&R-enforcement context.

Specificity in injunctions.

• Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game Dep’t, 153 Idaho 630, 289 P.3d 32 (2012); Snap! Mobile, Inc. v. Vertical Raise, LLC, 173 Idaho 499, 544 P.3d 714 (2024).
• Rule 65(d) requires that an enjoined party can discern from the “four corners” of the order the precise conduct prohibited or required. Referring vaguely to other documents or unspecified “procedures” is insufficient.

Mootness in declaratory actions.

• Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 253 P.3d 700 (2011); Bliss v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 167 Idaho 141, 468 P.3d 271 (2020); Bettwieser v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 297 P.3d 1134 (2013); Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005).
• Courts avoid advisory or abstract declarations; if a ruling would have no practical effect, it is moot.

Procedural standards and other authorities.

• Summary judgment: Rose v. Martino, ___ Idaho ___, 562 P.3d 972 (2025); Tiller White, LLC v. Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC, 160 Idaho 417, 374 P.3d 580 (2016); Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004).
• Injunctive discretion: Gem State Roofing, Inc. v. United Components, Inc., 168 Idaho 820, 488 P.3d 488 (2021); Fischer v. Bd. of Trs. of Meridian Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 131 Idaho 856, 965 P.2d 1292 (1998); Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018).
• Prevailing party/fees: Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 204 P.3d 1114 (2009); Hurtado v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 278 P.3d 415 (2012).

Legal Reasoning

1) Jordan could seek declaratory relief as “enforcement.” Article X, section 1 of the CC&Rs authorizes “any owner” to enforce the CC&Rs “by any proceeding at law or in equity.” Under Fletcher, a declaratory claim clarifying scope and compliance is an enforcement action where it serves to ensure adherence going forward. Jordan’s declaratory requests were integral to his injunction claim.

2) CC&Rs run with land described in the original plat—county changes do not unencumber. The CC&Rs state they burden and benefit “the properties described,” which are explicitly defined as the real property “known as Sorensen Creek, in accordance with the [1984] Plat … and such additions thereto” later brought under HOA jurisdiction. Because the Sixty-Foot Strip was part of Lot 1 on the 1984 Plat, the CC&Rs continued to run with that land despite a later county boundary adjustment and amended plat. The Court refused to accept the theory that a county action can unilaterally divest private servitudes—an approach consistent with persuasive out-of-state authority.

3) No categorical CC&R ban on roads; restrictions are strictly construed. The district court relied on provisions dealing with building design, tree removal, residential-use limitations, and general nuisance clauses. The Supreme Court held:

• Provisions tied to “residential” lots do not apply where the record does not show the lot is classified as residential. The 1984 Plat did not classify Lot 1 as residential, and Jordan’s counsel conceded this point.
• General nuisance clauses cannot be stretched to categorically bar a road without clear text. Idaho law does not extend restrictions by implication; doubts are resolved in favor of free use.

4) Design Committee approval is a prerequisite to construction of a road. Article VII, section 2 requires Design Committee approval for any “building, structure, sign, fence, refinishing or improvement of any kind” and for work altering a lot from its existing state. Powers conceded a road is an “improvement.” The Court rejected his argument that the absence of specific standards rendered the approval regime unenforceable, particularly because the CC&Rs authorize the Committee to promulgate rules and the record did not show Powers submitted any application for approval.

5) The “lot split” declaration was moot. Whether the county-approved boundary line adjustment violated the CC&Rs would not change the key outcome: the CC&Rs apply regardless because they run with the land described in the 1984 Plat. A declaration on the “lot split” question would be advisory and produce no practical effect; it was thus error to grant such a declaration.

6) Injunction: no irreparable harm needed, but specificity is. The district court converted a vague temporary restraining order into a permanent injunction that prohibited construction “unless and until” the CC&Rs were amended “and/or” their “procedures” were followed. Two refinements were required:

• Irreparable harm. In CC&R enforcement, the breach itself supports an injunction; no separate irreparable-injury finding is necessary (Jacklin).
• Specificity under Rule 65(d). The order must state reasons, specify terms, and describe the restrained or required acts without generic references to “procedures.” A compliant injunction here could, for example, prohibit construction “without written approval from the HOA Design Committee under Article VII, section 2.”

7) Fees. Because the judgment was vacated and the relief meaningfully altered, the fee award under Idaho Code § 12-121 was vacated for reconsideration. On appeal, both sides partially prevailed; no fees were awarded.

Impact and Practical Implications

For developers and landowners:

• Boundary maneuvers will not defeat CC&Rs. County-approved boundary line adjustments and amended plats cannot be used to sidestep existing CC&Rs. Private servitudes endure unless released or amended as permitted by the covenants themselves.
• Plan for Design Committee approval early. Any improvement—roads included—on CC&R-burdened land will typically require HOA Design Committee approval. Engage the HOA, request the Committee’s rules, and submit a formal application; document the process.
• Classification matters. Whether a lot is “residential” or otherwise can determine which restrictions apply. Do not assume; verify classifications on the governing plat and within the declaration’s definitions.

For HOAs and drafters:

• Text controls. To prohibit certain improvements (e.g., new ingress/egress roads), the CC&Rs should say so expressly. General nuisance or aesthetic clauses will not be read as categorical bans.
• Promulgate and publish Design Committee rules. The CC&Rs here authorize rules; ensure they exist, are clear, and are readily available to owners. Establish intake processes and timelines, and maintain records of decisions and estoppel certificates.
• Consider express access policies. If external-access roads or cross-subdivision conduits are a concern, adopt specific standards addressing location, design, traffic, safety, screening, emergency access, and conditions for approval or denial.

For counties and local governments:

• Separate spheres. County approvals do not override private covenants. Applicants and staff should anticipate that private CC&R compliance remains a separate and independent requirement.
• Notice to applicants. While not legally required to police private covenants, development approvals can include advisory notes encouraging applicants to verify and comply with CC&Rs.

For trial courts:

• Injunction drafting. When enforcing CC&Rs, no irreparable-harm finding is necessary, but orders must meet Rule 65(d): spell out the restrained or required acts with precision, avoiding references to non-specified “procedures.”
• Justiciability discipline. Avoid advisory declarations (e.g., on “lot splits”) where the determination would not change the parties’ rights or provide a basis for further relief.

Longer-term effects: Expect more rigorous due diligence around CC&Rs in boundary line adjustments and development planning; tighter CC&R drafting that addresses access roads expressly; and better administrative infrastructure within HOAs (clear Design Committee rules, application pathways, and documented approvals/denials). Litigation will likely focus less on county approval strategy and more on the covenants’ text, plat cross-references, and committee process compliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CC&Rs “run with the land.” Once recorded, CC&Rs bind the property itself, not just the original owner. Later owners take subject to those restrictions unless they are properly amended or released under the declaration.
• Plat vs. amended plat. A “plat” is a recorded map of the subdivision. An “amended plat” changes lot lines or other features as approved by the county. But changing the map does not erase private covenants that already burden the land.
• Boundary line adjustment. A county process to shift a property boundary. It can change lot sizes and configurations but does not remove CC&Rs binding the affected land.
• Design Committee approval. Many CC&Rs require a committee’s prior written approval for any “improvement.” A road is typically an “improvement,” so pre-approval is mandatory.
• Strict construction of covenants. Courts read CC&Rs narrowly. If a restriction (like a ban on roads) is not clearly stated, courts will not infer it. Ambiguity is resolved in favor of the property owner’s free use.
• Injunction specificity (Rule 65(d)). An injunction must tell the restrained party exactly what they cannot do or must do, within the four corners of the order, without vague references to external “procedures.”
• Mootness. Courts issue decisions that have real-world effects. If a requested declaration would not change the parties’ legal position or afford meaningful relief, the issue is “moot,” and courts will not decide it.
• Irreparable harm in CC&R cases. Unlike many injunctions, enforcing CC&Rs does not require proving irreparable harm; the breach itself justifies injunctive relief.