County Charter Ordinances as “Law” Authorizing Independent Counsel & the Trigger of the 60-Day UBAA Suit Period: An In-Depth Commentary on Macomb County Prosecutor v. Macomb County Executive (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2025)

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Michigan Supreme Court’s June 16 2025 order in Macomb County Prosecutor v. Macomb County Executive, SC 167415, which left intact a published Court of Appeals opinion upholding the Macomb County Board of Commissioners’ appropriation of $42,500 for the County Prosecutor to hire outside legal counsel. Although the Supreme Court denied leave, Justice Welch’s separate concurrence clarifies two critical points:

County charter ordinances constitute “law” under § 6.6.5 of the Macomb County Home Rule Charter, thereby permitting expenditure of public funds for independent counsel when such funds are properly appropriated; and
The 60-day limitations period in the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act (UBAA), MCL 141.438(7), begins to run from the county executive’s impoundment action that obstructs enforcement of an appropriation, not necessarily from adoption of the general appropriations ordinance itself.

The dispute pitted the elected Prosecutor (plaintiff-appellee) against the County Executive and the County itself (defendants-appellants) over separation-of-powers-like budgetary control within county government. The commentary below unpacks the judgment, its reasoning, and its broader ramifications.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, implicitly affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision.
• Justice Welch concurred, agreeing with the lower court’s outcome but offering two refinements: (1) the correct accrual date for a UBAA enforcement action was the County Executive’s January 29 2024 memo refusing to release funds, and (2) while § 6.6.5 permits funding for independent counsel, its second sentence may cabin such authorization to litigation (injunctive, mandamus, declaratory relief) rather than advice-only representation.
• No justice dissented; Justice Hood took no part.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents & Authorities Cited

Macomb Co. Prosecutor v. Macomb Co. Executive, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) – the Court of Appeals opinion that was allowed to stand.
Hackel v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm’rs, ___ Mich ___ (June 16 2025) – same-day Supreme Court decision interpreting “by law” broadly to include charter ordinances, relied upon by Justice Welch.
Wood v. State Administrative Board, 255 Mich 220 (1931) – classic authority on veto effects and budget enactment, referenced regarding the line-item veto override.
Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act (UBAA), MCL 141.421 et seq. – central statutory frame for standing, jurisdiction, and timelines.
Macomb County Home Rule Charter §§ 3.5(a), 4.6, 6.2, 6.6.5, 8.7 – local constitutional provisions allocating powers among county actors.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a) Jurisdiction & Timeliness under UBAA

MCL 141.438(6) confers standing on “an elected official who heads a branch of county government” (here, the Prosecutor) to enforce a general appropriations act. Subsection (7) sets a 60-day filing window triggered by either:

adoption of the general appropriations act [§ 7(a)], or
“an action relating to the enforcement” of that act [§ 7(b)].

Justice Welch emphasized that the County Executive’s January 29 memo—refusing to sign the contracts and effectively impounding funds—was precisely an “action relating to the enforcement” and therefore reset the 60-day clock. The Prosecutor’s March 13 filing was timely whether the Court looked to the County Executive’s memo or the Commission’s January 25 contract-approval resolution.

b) “Permitted by Law” in Charter § 6.6.5

Section 6.6.5’s opening sentence forbids countywide elected officials from spending public money on legal counsel “unless permitted by law.” Citing Hackel, Justice Welch read “law” broadly to cover any validly enacted ordinance—including an annual budget ordinance. Thus, once the Commission enacted Ordinance 2023-04 (and overrode the veto), that line item became “law,” satisfying § 6.6.5’s precondition.

c) Purpose-Based Limit in Sentence Two of § 6.6.5

The concurrence signals doubt about the Court of Appeals’ broad reading. The second sentence authorizes the Commission to hire independent counsel “to seek injunctive, mandamus, or declaratory relief….” Welch suggests this text limits counsel to litigation aimed at clarifying or enforcing official powers—not generalized advice. Because defendants did not press this theory as an independent ground for reversal, the Supreme Court left it for another day.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

Local Government Finance: County executives who wish to block appropriated funds must act quickly; their impoundment will itself create a fresh 60-day window for judicial challenge.
Independent Counsel Requests: Countywide elected officials (sheriffs, clerks, treasurers) may rely on properly enacted budget ordinances as “law” to justify spending public funds on outside lawyers, presuming their board of commissioners approves the appropriation.
Future Litigation Over Purpose Limitation: Welch’s dicta foreshadows battles over whether independent counsel may be retained for advisory or investigative tasks absent litigation.
Statewide Precedent: Because the opinion below is published and the Supreme Court allowed it to stand, Court of Appeals panels statewide must follow its holdings about UBAA accrual and charter interpretation unless overruled.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

General Appropriations Act (GAA): The local equivalent of a budget law; it authorizes spending for the upcoming fiscal year. Under UBAA, county GAAs are enforceable in the Court of Appeals.
Line-Item Veto: An executive’s power to strike specific appropriations without rejecting the entire budget. The legislative body can override by super-majority.
Impoundment: Executive refusal to spend funds validly appropriated; in Michigan counties, this is treated as an “action relating to enforcement” of the GAA.
Mandamus / Injunctive / Declaratory Relief: Court orders respectively compelling a public official to act, preventing unlawful action, or declaring the parties’ rights.
Home Rule Charter: A county “mini-constitution” adopted by voters allocating powers among local officials; it functions as local law subordinate to state law.

5. Conclusion

Macomb County Prosecutor v. Macomb County Executive quietly, yet firmly, establishes two guideposts for Michigan county governance:

A charter-compliant budget ordinance is itself “law” sufficient to authorize expenditures under charter provisions requiring that spending be “permitted by law,” thereby empowering boards of commissioners to fund independent counsel for countywide elected officials.
The UBAA’s strict 60-day filing period does not always start with adoption of the budget; executive impoundment or other enforcement-related actions can reset the clock.

Although the Supreme Court declined plenary review, Justice Welch’s concurrence offers guidance likely to influence future county disputes and appellate interpretation. Counties should anticipate closer scrutiny of executive impoundment decisions and ensure that any appropriations for outside counsel align with the potential litigation-oriented purpose implied in Charter § 6.6.5’s second sentence. Ultimately, the decision reinforces the principle that budget ordinances, once validly enacted, carry the full force of law and cannot be unilaterally nullified by the executive branch.

County Charter Ordinances as “Law” for Independent Counsel & the 60-Day UBAA Clock: Commentary on Macomb County Prosecutor v. Macomb County Executive (2025)