Corroboration as an Independent Ground to Deny Asylum: Commentary on Acan‑Gualancanay v. Bondi (2d Cir. 2025)

Corroboration as an Independent Ground to Deny Asylum: Commentary on Acan‑Gualancanay v. Bondi (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s summary order in Acan‑Gualancanay v. Bondi, No. 23‑8023 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2025) (summary order), in which the court denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection to Ecuadorian nationals.

Although the decision is a summary order and therefore non‑precedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it is still citable and is important because it:

  • Reaffirms the demanding corroboration regime in asylum and withholding cases under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),
  • Illustrates how the Second Circuit applies its leading decisions in Wei Sun v. Sessions and Pinel‑Gomez v. Garland,
  • Shows the level of deference given to the IJ’s evaluation of documentary evidence and reasonable inferences, and
  • Underscores that CAT claims can be deemed waived if not separately argued on petition for review.

The central legal theme is that, even where there is no express adverse credibility finding, an asylum applicant’s failure to provide reasonably available corroborative evidence—once identified by the IJ and not adequately explained—can by itself warrant denial of relief.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Parties and Claims

The petitioners are:

  • Walter German Acan‑Gualancanay (principal applicant),
  • His wife, Mayra Piedad Castro‑Tacuri, and
  • Their minor child,

all natives and citizens of Ecuador. The family sought:

  • Asylum,
  • Withholding of removal, and
  • Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Although the summary order states that the court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts, some key points can be inferred from the decision:

  • The claim involved a dispute over family land in Ecuador.
  • Acan‑Gualancanay alleged that a wealthy landowner was intent on acquiring that land.
  • The family asserted that they faced serious enough that they feared for their lives.
  • Acan‑Gualancanay reportedly suffered injuries severe enough to require hospital treatment, and was assisted by a friend who brought him to the hospital.

The land at issue belonged to his wife’s family, and the wife’s relatives—particularly the mother‑in‑law—remained in Ecuador. This fact becomes important when the court evaluates the evidentiary record, particularly the mother‑in‑law’s affidavit.

B. Administrative Proceedings

The Immigration Judge, sitting in New York City, denied all requested forms of relief on February 9, 2023. The IJ:

  • Did not rest the decision primarily on an adverse credibility finding (the court discusses the case as one where credibility was not the dispositive issue),
  • Instead, relied on a lack of corroborative evidence to support “crucial facts” of the persecution narrative, and
  • Also made alternative findings regarding nexus, i.e., whether any persecution was “on account of” a statutorily protected ground.

On November 17, 2023, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. It agreed that:

  • The IJ had properly identified reasonably available corroborating evidence that was missing,
  • The applicant failed to establish that such evidence was unavailable or unobtainable, and
  • Given that failure, the denial of asylum and withholding was warranted.

The BIA also treated the CAT claim consistently with the IJ’s denial; as the Second Circuit later notes, the CAT claim was not separately advanced before the court of appeals.

C. Petition for Review

The petitioners sought review in the Second Circuit. The case was decided on the Non‑Argument Calendar (NAC), meaning it was resolved without oral argument based on the briefs and record.

The primary issue pressed before the court of appeals was whether the IJ and BIA erred in relying on a lack of corroboration to deny relief. The petitioners also challenged the IJ’s treatment of affidavits from family members, especially the mother‑in‑law, and the negative inferences the IJ drew from omissions in those affidavits.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Disposition

The Second Circuit—Judges Walker, Lohier, and Pérez—denied the petition for review. Applying substantial evidence review, the court held:

  1. The agency properly denied asylum and withholding based on insufficient corroboration, even assuming the testimony was generally credible.
  2. The IJ complied with the three‑step corroboration framework articulated in Wei Sun v. Sessions by:
    • Identifying concrete missing documents (land ownership proof, medical records, photos, police documents, affidavit from the hospital‑friend),
    • Explaining why those items appeared reasonably available, and
    • Giving the applicant an opportunity to explain the failure to produce them.
  3. The IJ reasonably declined to assign significant weight to family members’ affidavits, and the negative inferences drawn from omissions in those affidavits were grounded in record facts and permissible under Siewe v. Gonzales.
  4. Because the corroboration ruling was dispositive of asylum and withholding, the court did not reach the IJ’s alternative nexus findings, invoking INS v. Bagamasbad.
  5. The CAT claim was waived on petition for review, as it was not separately argued, consistent with Debique, 58 F.4th at 684.

Accordingly, the denial of all requested relief—asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection—was upheld.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

1. Burden of Proof for Asylum and Withholding

The court reiterates the familiar statutory and regulatory standards:

  • An asylum applicant must establish either:
    • Past persecution, or
    • A well‑founded fear of future persecution,
    under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).
  • A withholding applicant must demonstrate a clear probability that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).
  • Both forms of relief require proof that the persecution is “on account of” one of the five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
  • For asylum, the protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution. Id.

The court’s analysis, however, does not turn on the specific protected ground asserted (e.g., landownership‑related social group, imputed political opinion, etc.) because it concludes the claim fails at the more basic level of proof of events due to inadequate corroboration.

2. The REAL ID Act Corroboration Provision

The decision leans heavily on 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), which (as amended by the REAL ID Act) provides:

“The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. … Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”

The Second Circuit emphasizes two key ideas from this provision:

  1. Even if an applicant’s testimony is credible, it may still be insufficient if it is not persuasive or specific enough, or if it lacks reasonably available corroboration on crucial points.
  2. An IJ may require corroboration so long as:
    • The IJ identifies the missing evidence,
    • It is shown to be reasonably obtainable, and
    • The applicant is given a chance to explain the absence of such evidence.

The same corroboration principles apply to withholding under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C), which the court cites alongside § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

3. Standard of Review

The court restates the familiar bifurcated standard:

  • Factual findings (including the evaluation of corroboration) are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) providing that such findings are conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
  • Questions of law are reviewed de novo.

This standard is particularly important on corroboration issues: whether corroboration was required, what was reasonably obtainable, and whether the applicant’s explanation was adequate are all treated as highly fact‑bound inquiries subject to deferential review.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005)

These cases define the scope of appellate review when both the IJ and BIA issue relevant opinions. The rule is that the court reviews the IJ’s decision “as supplemented and modified” by the BIA:

  • If the BIA adopts the IJ’s findings and reasoning, the court reviews both decisions.
  • If the BIA adds reasoning or modifies certain findings, the court considers the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA’s explanatory opinion.

In this case, the Second Circuit expressly states that it has “reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the BIA,” signaling that the BIA largely endorsed the IJ’s analysis on corroboration and evidentiary weight.

2. Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2018)

Wei Sun is central. It interprets § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) and sets out a three‑step framework governing when an IJ may deny relief for lack of corroboration, even if the applicant is deemed generally credible:

  1. The IJ must identify specific pieces of missing evidence that would be expected to corroborate crucial aspects of the claim and explain why such evidence appears reasonably available.
  2. The IJ must give the applicant an opportunity to explain the absence of that evidence.
  3. The IJ must assess the explanation and articulate why it does not excuse the failure to provide corroboration.

Wei Sun further underscores that:

  • “[A]n applicant may be generally credible but his testimony may not be sufficient” without corroboration, and
  • Lack of corroboration can be an independent ground for denial, even in the absence of an adverse credibility finding.

The Second Circuit in Acan‑Gualancanay not only quotes Wei Sun, but explicitly applies its structure and uses it to validate the IJ’s handling of corroboration.

3. Pinel‑Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523 (2d Cir. 2022)

Pinel‑Gomez is another recent Second Circuit decision reinforcing the independent significance of corroboration. There, the court:

  • Confirmed that an IJ may demand corroboration even from an otherwise credible applicant, and
  • Held that failure to provide such evidence, when reasonably expected and available, supports denial of relief under the substantial evidence standard.

The Acan‑Gualancanay panel cites Pinel‑Gomez to underscore that the absence of corroboration can be dispositive, even where the agency does not brand the applicant as incredible.

4. Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013)

Y.C. addresses the weight accorded to documentary evidence, especially letters and affidavits from relatives abroad. The Second Circuit there held that it will “generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence,” particularly unsworn letters from interested witnesses not subject to cross‑examination.

In Acan‑Gualancanay, the court relies on Y.C. in affirming the IJ’s decision to give limited weight to family members’ affidavits, which were the only documents submitted to corroborate the alleged past events.

5. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007)

Siewe is a leading case on the line between permissible inference and impermissible “bald speculation” by immigration adjudicators. It holds that:

“The speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience. So long as an inferential leap is tethered to the evidentiary record, we will accord deference to the finding.”

In this case, the IJ noted that the mother‑in‑law’s affidavit:

  • Did not mention what had happened to the land, and
  • Did not recount any subsequent threats or pressure to sell.

Because the land belonged to the wife’s family, the IJ reasoned that if the wealthy landowner were truly so intent on acquiring the land that he posed a continuing threat to the couple’s lives, one would expect some mention of:

  • Ongoing harassment, or
  • Efforts to coerce the sale,

directed at the mother‑in‑law or other remaining family members. The absence of such detail allowed the IJ to reasonably infer that the claimed ongoing threat might be overstated. The Second Circuit, citing Siewe, upheld this inference as properly “tethered to the evidentiary record.”

6. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976)

Bagamasbad stands for the principle that courts and agencies need not reach or decide issues that are unnecessary to the outcome:

“[A]s a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”

The Second Circuit applies this principle in declining to address the BIA’s alternative nexus findings. Because the failure of corroboration already justified denial of asylum and withholding, there was no need to analyze whether any harm was “on account of” a protected ground.

7. Debique, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023)

Though cited only by short form (“Debique, 58 F.4th at 684”), this decision underlines an appellate waiver doctrine:

  • Issues that are not separately and meaningfully argued in an appellate brief are generally treated as waived or abandoned.

In Acan‑Gualancanay, the panel notes that the petitioner “has not separately argued his CAT claim”. Relying on Debique, it therefore treats the CAT claim as waived and does not examine its merits.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Corroboration Deficit

The central reasoning concerns the applicant’s failure to produce—or to explain the absence of—certain corroborating documents. The IJ identified several categories of evidence that could have supported the persecution narrative:

  • Proof of land ownership (e.g., deeds or property records) to substantiate the land dispute and its significance.
  • Medical records documenting treatment for injuries allegedly suffered during attacks or threats.
  • Photographs of injuries that could confirm the severity and timing of harm.
  • Police documents (e.g., complaints or reports) that might show formal reporting of threats or violence.
  • An affidavit from the friend who allegedly brought the applicant to the hospital, corroborating the fact of serious injury and emergency treatment.

Under Wei Sun, the IJ’s first step—identifying specific documents and explaining why they should be reasonably available—was satisfied. These are typical forms of corroboration in asylum cases, especially when the claim involves:

  • Land ownership and economically motivated threats (property records),
  • Physical attacks (medical records, photographs), and
  • Criminal conduct (police reports).

Crucially, the court notes that “at no point” before the agency did Acan‑Gualancanay allege that he even attempted to obtain these documents. There was:

  • No evidence that the records were destroyed, inaccessible, or unsafe to obtain,
  • No testimony that family members were unable or unwilling to assist in gathering such documents, and
  • No showing that the documents did not exist or could not reasonably be located.

Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded that the IJ and BIA reasonably determined that:

  1. The identified corroboration was reasonably available, and
  2. The applicant’s failure to provide it—without explanation—justified an adverse inference concerning the reliability and completeness of his narrative about crucial events.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), the court’s role is limited: it must uphold the agency’s conclusion unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find that the evidence was not reasonably obtainable or that the explanation (if any) was sufficient. Here, given the total absence of any meaningful explanation, the agency’s conclusion easily passes that deferential standard.

2. Treatment of Family Affidavits

The only corroborating documents the petitioners offered were affidavits from family members, including the mother‑in‑law in Ecuador. The IJ gave those affidavits limited weight, and the Second Circuit approved this approach for two main reasons:

  1. Deference to the agency’s weighing of evidence (Y.C. v. Holder):
    • The IJ is best positioned to assess the reliability and probative value of statements from interested relatives, especially when they are unsworn or untested by cross‑examination.
  2. Reasonable negative inferences from omissions (Siewe v. Gonzales):
    • The mother‑in‑law’s affidavit did not mention what had ultimately happened to the disputed land.
    • It did not describe any further threats or coercive conduct by the wealthy landowner towards the wife’s family, despite the claim that the landowner was determined enough to endanger lives.
    • Given that the land belonged to the wife’s family, the mother‑in‑law was a natural primary target for any ongoing pressure related to the land. The absence of such mention undermined the claim of persistent, life‑threatening pressure.

The applicant argued that the IJ impermissibly drew a negative inference from the affidavit’s silence about the land situation and subsequent threats. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the IJ’s inferential reasoning:

  • Was grounded in concrete facts (ownership of the land by the wife’s family, the mother‑in‑law’s continued presence in Ecuador, and the nature of the claimed threats), and
  • Reflected common sense and ordinary experience, as described in Siewe.

Thus, the IJ was entitled to treat the family affidavits as insufficient corroboration, especially in the absence of more objective documentary evidence that the IJ had specifically requested.

3. Independent Dispositive Effect of Corroboration

The court explicitly states that “the corroboration finding is dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal.” This means:

  • Regardless of how one might ultimately resolve questions of nexus or exact motivation for the harm,
  • The applicant simply did not carry the threshold burden of proving the basic historical facts of the persecution narrative with the degree of reliability that the REAL ID Act and Second Circuit precedent require.

Because of that, under Bagamasbad, the court declined to review the alternative nexus findings, adhering to the view that legal and factual issues need not be addressed when another ground already justifies the result.

4. Waiver of the CAT Claim

Finally, the court notes:

“Acan‑Gualancanay has not separately argued his CAT claim. See Debique, 58 F.4th at 684.”

Under Debique and related appellate practice principles:

  • Merely mentioning a CAT claim in a caption or a passing reference is not enough.
  • The petitioner must present distinct, developed arguments targeting the CAT analysis (e.g., challenging the agency’s findings about likelihood of torture, government acquiescence, country conditions, etc.).

By failing to do so, the petitioner effectively abandoned the CAT issue on appeal, and the Second Circuit accordingly did not analyze it further.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Substantial Evidence” Standard

The “substantial evidence” standard is a deferential standard of review applied to the agency’s factual findings. In practice, it means:

  • The court does not re‑weigh the evidence or decide the case as if it were starting from scratch.
  • Instead, it asks whether a “reasonable adjudicator” could have reached the same conclusion based on the record.
  • The court must uphold the agency’s factual findings unless the evidence is so strong in the opposite direction that any reasonable fact‑finder would be compelled to disagree.

This is a very high hurdle for petitioners, particularly on corroboration and credibility issues.

2. Corroboration vs. Credibility

In asylum cases, two distinct but related questions arise:

  1. Credibility: Is the applicant believable? Are there inconsistencies or implausibilities that lead the IJ to think the applicant is lying or exaggerating?
  2. Corroboration: Even if the applicant is not found to be lying, has he or she produced supporting evidence where one would reasonably expect such evidence to exist?

The REAL ID Act allows an IJ to say:

“I do not find you incredible, but I still find your testimony insufficient without corroboration. I expect to see certain documents or statements; since you have not produced them and have not persuasively explained why, you have not met your burden of proof.”

That is precisely what happened in Acan‑Gualancanay.

3. “Nexus” and “One Central Reason”

To win asylum or withholding, it is not enough to show serious harm. The applicant must also show why the harm occurred. This is the nexus requirement:

  • The harm must be on account of the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
  • For asylum, this protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution—i.e., not just incidental or tangential.

In this case, the IJ made alternative nexus findings (presumably regarding whether the land dispute was persecutory on a covered ground), but the Second Circuit never reached those issues because the claim failed for lack of corroboration.

4. Negative Inferences from Omissions in Affidavits

Immigration adjudicators often look not only at what affidavits say, but also at what they do not say. If a close relative’s statement omits events that:

  • Are central to the asylum claim, and
  • One would expect that person to know and mention,

the IJ may reasonably infer that either:

  • The events did not occur as described, or
  • The ongoing danger is less severe than claimed.

Under Siewe, such inference must be anchored in record facts and common sense. In Acan‑Gualancanay, it was reasonable to expect the mother‑in‑law—who owned the land and allegedly remained vulnerable to the same threats—to mention continuing pressure from the wealthy landowner if it truly existed. Her silence allowed the IJ to doubt the asserted, ongoing deadly interest in the property.

5. Waiver of Issues on Appeal

In appellate practice, a legal issue is typically deemed waived (or abandoned) if:

  • The party fails to develop argumentation about it in the brief, or
  • Makes only passing or conclusory reference without citation or analysis.

For CAT claims, this means that to preserve the issue, the petitioner must:

  • Identify the specific errors in the agency’s CAT analysis (e.g., misapplication of the standard for “torture,” ignoring country conditions, misreading evidence of government acquiescence), and
  • Support those contentions with legal argument and citations to the record.

Because Acan‑Gualancanay did not do so, the Second Circuit treated the CAT claim as waived, following Debique.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Precedential Status vs. Practical Significance

Formally, this is a summary order and thus has no precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, even though it is citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. Nevertheless, it has substantial practical importance:

  • It shows how the Second Circuit continues to apply Wei Sun and Pinel‑Gomez in the post‑REAL ID landscape.
  • It provides guidance to IJs, attorneys, and asylum seekers on the kinds of corroboration expected in land‑dispute and violence‑based claims.
  • It reinforces the judiciary’s willingness to uphold adverse or neutral evidentiary assessments when applicants do not substantively engage with corroboration demands.

B. Lessons for Practitioners and Applicants

  1. Anticipate and Gather Corroboration Early
    Where the claim involves:
    • Property disputes,
    • Physical injuries,
    • Interactions with police,
    counsel should aggressively pursue:
    • Property records (titles, deeds, municipal records),
    • Medical records and photographs,
    • Police reports or sworn explanations for their absence,
    • Third‑party statements (e.g., from friends who witnessed or responded to incidents).
    If such evidence cannot be obtained, the record should clearly document:
    • What was requested, from whom, when, and how, and
    • Why those efforts failed or posed unreasonable risk.
  2. Do Not Rely Solely on Family Affidavits
    While family affidavits are common and useful, they:
    • Are often seen as less objective, and
    • Can undermine a claim if they omit expected details.
    Where family members remain in the home country, it is important that:
    • Their statements describe both historical events and the current situation, including ongoing threats or lack thereof.
    • Omissions that may be misinterpreted are proactively explained.
  3. Respond Substantively When IJ Requests Corroboration
    After Wei Sun, once an IJ identifies types of corroboration and suggests they are reasonably available:
    • The applicant must either produce them or
    • Provide a detailed explanation of why they are unattainable or unsafe to obtain.
    Silence or general statements like “I could not get them” are rarely sufficient.
  4. CAT Claims Must Be Argued Separately on Appeal
    If a CAT claim was raised below, appellate counsel must:
    • Devote a distinct section of the brief to CAT, and
    • Engage with the specific elements of CAT protection (likelihood of torture, government involvement or acquiescence, etc.).
    Failure to do so will likely result in waiver, as occurred here.
  5. Importance of a Coherent Record Across Affidavits and Testimony
    Discrepancies or omissions between an applicant’s testimony and relatives’ affidavits can be damaging. Practitioners should:
    • Review and harmonize narratives where possible,
    • Preemptively address apparent inconsistencies or lacunae, and
    • Recognize that silence on critical points may be used, reasonably, to infer a weaker threat picture.

C. Doctrinal Continuity: No New Rule, But Strong Reinforcement

Substantively, Acan‑Gualancanay does not announce a brand‑new legal rule. Rather, it:

  • Reaffirms that corroboration can be independently dispositive, and
  • Demonstrates how the Second Circuit expects IJs to implement the corroboration provisions of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(C) in routine cases.

In that sense, it is an example of doctrinal consolidation rather than innovation, but one with real practical effects for the many asylum seekers whose claims turn not on disputed law but on the adequacy of their supporting evidence.

VII. Conclusion

Acan‑Gualancanay v. Bondi is a non‑precedential but instructive Second Circuit decision that underscores the following key points in U.S. asylum and withholding practice:

  • Corroboration matters. Even in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility finding, an applicant’s failure to provide reasonably available corroboration—after the IJ has properly identified what is missing and given an opportunity to explain—can by itself justify denial of relief.
  • Family affidavits are not enough. The IJ and BIA are entitled to accord limited weight to interested‑party statements, especially when they omit facts that should naturally be described, and the Second Circuit will generally defer to that evidentiary assessment.
  • Reasonable inferences from omissions are permissible. Under Siewe, IJs may draw negative inferences from the absence of expected details, as long as those inferences are grounded in record facts and common sense.
  • Issues not argued are waived. CAT claims, like other issues, must be substantively argued on petition for review or they will be treated as abandoned.
  • Courts avoid unnecessary questions. Once the claim failed for lack of corroboration, there was no need for the Second Circuit to examine alternative nexus findings, consistent with Bagamasbad.

In the broader legal context, the case highlights the central role of evidentiary rigor in asylum adjudication under the REAL ID Act. For applicants and practitioners, it reinforces a critical practical lesson: credible testimony is often not enough; claims succeed or fail on the quality, availability, and explanation of corroborative evidence.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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