Coronado v. City of Boise: Exclusive Employee Control Over Applications for Hearings on Workers’ Compensation Benefits

I. Introduction

In Coronado v. City of Boise, the Idaho Supreme Court issued a significant workers’ compensation decision refining the procedural architecture of the Idaho Workers’ Compensation Law (“WCL”). While the case arose from a dispute about an attempted suspension of benefits after an injured police officer allegedly failed to attend an independent medical examination (“IME”), the Court’s key holding concerns who may invoke the Idaho Industrial Commission’s adjudicatory power to decide core benefit disputes.

The Court addresses two primary issues:

1. Whether the claimant, Sherri Sue Coronado, was entitled to retroactive relief under Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc. concerning the employer’s unilateral attempt to suspend benefits under Idaho Code section 72‑434.
2. Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission has authority to accept and adjudicate an employer-filed “complaint” (application for hearing) that seeks to litigate an injured worker’s right to compensation and income benefits under Idaho Code section 72‑706.

The Court ultimately:

• Affirms the Commission’s denial of Coronado’s first petition for declaratory ruling as non-justiciable (moot), because no actual suspension of benefits ever occurred.
• Sets aside the Commission’s denial of Coronado’s second petition, holding that the Commission exceeded its powers by allowing the employer to file and prosecute a “complaint” regarding Coronado’s entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

The central doctrinal development is clear and consequential: when the subject of a hearing concerns the compensatory rights identified in Idaho Code section 72‑706 (unpaid or discontinued compensation or income benefits), only the injured employee (the “claimant”) may “make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing.” Employers and sureties cannot initiate such compensation disputes by filing their own complaints.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Industrial Accident and Initial Benefits

Coronado, a Boise police officer, sustained multiple injuries in May 2019 during a traffic stop when she was dragged and thrown from a moving vehicle. The City of Boise, as a self‑insured employer, accepted liability for a right hip injury and began voluntary payments, while also continuing to pay Coronado her full salary under Idaho Code section 72‑1104(1)(c) (full base salary for injured peace officers).

In November 2019, Coronado underwent a right total hip arthroplasty performed by her treating physician, Dr. Colin Poole. The employer paid medical benefits relating to this surgery.

B. Emergence of Left Hip Issues and Conflicting Medical Opinions

In May 2020, Coronado began experiencing left hip pain. Dr. Poole initially indicated he could not relate the left hip condition to the industrial accident and stated that an MRI of the left hip was “unrelated” to the work injury, and that Coronado was medically stable as to the right hip.

After the MRI revealed degenerative changes and a labral tear in the left hip, Dr. Poole later reversed course in a response to Coronado’s counsel, opining that the left hip condition and need for left hip arthroplasty were caused by the industrial accident on a more‑probable‑than‑not basis.

Coronado sent the new MRI and Dr. Poole’s causation opinion to the claims examiner on June 1, 2020, and asked the employer to accept and authorize the left hip MRI and planned left total hip arthroplasty. The claims examiner, citing the earlier contrary report, refused authorization and insisted on proceeding with a previously scheduled June 10 IME to determine impairment.

C. IME Disputes and Alleged Suspension Under Idaho Code § 72‑434

Coronado, through counsel, objected to the IME’s timing and coordination, indicated she would not attend the June 10 examination because of pre‑surgical obligations, and required that future IMEs be coordinated through counsel and be reasonable in time and place.

The claims examiner:

• Warned that failure to attend the IME would affect Coronado’s benefits.
• Invoked Idaho Code section 72‑434 after Coronado did not appear, sending a letter stating her benefits would be suspended for failure to attend the IME.

Idaho Code section 72‑434 authorizes suspension of a claimant’s “right to take or prosecute any proceedings under this law” and nonpayment of compensation during periods when the employee “unreasonably fails to submit to” or “obstructs” a medical examination.

However, the Commission later found, as a matter of fact, that no actual suspension of compensation or rights was ever implemented: Coronado continued to receive her full salary, medical benefits had been paid for the right hip (approximately $49,660.60), and the employer later obtained an impairment rating and issued permanent partial impairment (PPI) checks (which Coronado returned).

Meanwhile, Coronado proceeded with a left total hip arthroplasty on July 1, 2020, paid through her private health insurance.

D. Later IME Efforts, Expert Opinion, and PPI Payments

Over the following year, employer’s counsel made repeated attempts to obtain updated medical records and to schedule an IME addressing both hips. Coronado’s counsel did not engage. The employer unilaterally scheduled an IME in May 2021 with Dr. Timothy Doerr.

Although Coronado did not attend, Dr. Doerr reviewed the records and concluded:

• The left hip degenerative joint disease was not caused or permanently aggravated by the 2019 industrial accident.
• The right hip reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) in May 2020.
• Coronado had a 10% whole person impairment, translated into a 25% lower extremity PPI, half attributed to preexisting disease, half to the industrial accident.

The claims examiner issued PPI checks totaling $10,806.50, which Coronado and her counsel returned, also objecting to direct contact with her.

E. The Intervening Decision in Arreola v. Scentsy and Coronado’s First Petition

In June 2023, the Idaho Supreme Court decided Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc., overruling Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab and holding that only the Commission—not employers or sureties—may:

1. Resolve IME disputes under Idaho Code section 72‑433; and
2. Order suspension of benefits under section 72‑434.

Arreola expressly stated that its overruling of Brewer applied only prospectively.

After Arreola, Coronado’s counsel demanded “Arreola compliance,” claiming that the employer’s earlier unilateral “suspension” was unlawful, and demanding back benefits and other relief. The employer refused, emphasizing both:

• Arreola’s prospective-only language; and
• Dr. Doerr’s opinion that the left hip condition was unrelated to the industrial accident.

Coronado then filed a First Petition for declaratory ruling (November 2023) seeking:

• A ruling that Arreola applied to her and similarly situated workers;
• An order requiring the employer to file a petition to address IME issues; and
• Sanctions.

F. Employer’s “Defendant’s Workers’ Compensation Complaint” and Coronado’s Second Petition

Shortly after the First Petition, the employer filed its own “Defendant’s Workers’ Compensation Complaint,” modifying the claimant’s complaint form to do so. It sought Commission adjudication of:

• Medical stability date;
• Causation and compensability of the left hip condition and surgery;
• Entitlement to medical benefits, TTD/TPD or full salary under section 72‑1104;
• Entitlement to PPI and PPD and possible estoppel or credit issues; and
• Whether Coronado had unreasonably refused IMEs, and employer’s entitlement to sanctions.

The form also warned that Coronado’s failure to answer could result in a default.

When the referee quickly denied Coronado’s motion to strike that complaint and required her to answer, Coronado instead filed a Second Petition for declaratory ruling (January 2024), contending:

• The WCL and, in particular, Idaho Code section 72‑706, do not permit an employer or surety to “make and file” an application (complaint) to litigate a worker’s right to compensation.
• Allowing employer-filed complaints effectively deprives injured workers of their statutory statute-of-limitations rights and contravenes the WCL’s structure and policy.

G. Commission’s Rulings and the Appeal

The Commission stayed the employer’s complaint proceedings and addressed both petitions together:

• First Petition – Denied. The Commission:
  • Declined declaratory relief under JRP 15(F)(4)(e) because the dispute should be resolved in a workers’ compensation complaint proceeding.
  • Found no actual controversy or direct interest in the application of Arreola because no benefits were actually suspended under section 72‑434.
  • Held Arreola was prospective and did not authorize affirmative relief for Coronado.
• Second Petition – Denied on merits. The Commission held:
  • It had “jurisdiction” under section 72‑707 to adjudicate an employer complaint.
  • JRP 1(A) (any party may apply for relief) and prior Commission practices permitted employer or surety complaints.
  • Section 72‑706 is only a statute of limitations and “does not purport to govern who may file a complaint.”

Coronado appealed both denials. While the appeal was pending, she filed her own workers’ compensation complaint, and the employer moved to dismiss its complaint. The referee stayed further proceedings on that motion, pending this appeal. Those facts set the stage for the Supreme Court’s opinion.

III. Summary of the Opinion

1. First Petition – Mootness / Non-Justiciability. The Court does not reach the retroactivity of Arreola. It holds that Coronado’s challenge to the employer’s purported suspension under section 72‑434 is non-justiciable: no actual suspension was implemented, no benefits were lost, and Coronado’s access to Commission processes remained intact. The aspect of the IME dispute concerning June 10, 2020, is “no longer a live” controversy and has become a “paper tiger.” The Commission’s denial of the First Petition is therefore affirmed on mootness grounds.
2. Second Petition – Employer Complaints Barred in Compensation/Income-Benefit Disputes. The Court holds that when a dispute concerns unpaid or discontinued “compensation” or “income benefits” as described in Idaho Code section 72‑706, only the injured worker (“claimant”) may “make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing” (i.e., a complaint under JRP 3). The Commission exceeded its powers by allowing the employer to file a complaint to adjudicate Coronado’s benefits under that statute.
3. Relationship Between Statutes and JRPs. Judicial Rule of Practice and Procedure (JRP) 1(A)—stating that “[a]ny party to a controversy may apply to the Commission for relief”—cannot be read in isolation to allow employer-filed complaints that conflict with section 72‑706. The Commission’s rulemaking authority under section 72‑508 is constrained by the WCL; it may not adopt or apply rules that override the statute’s allocation of procedural rights to employees.
4. Interaction of Sections 72‑706, 72‑707, and 72‑712.
   • Section 72‑707 (Commission determines “all questions arising under this law”) confers broad subject-matter jurisdiction, but does not specify who may initiate proceedings.
   • Section 72‑712 (any party may apply for a hearing) is a general provision.
   • Section 72‑706 is a more specific provision governing hearings about unpaid or discontinued compensation and income benefits: in those disputes, only the claimant-employee, not the employer, may request a hearing.
5. Lockard’s Diminished Force. The Court notes that its pre‑1971 decision in Lockard v. St. Maries Lumber Co., which permitted employer-initiated proceedings to determine a worker’s entitlement to compensation, lost its force after the legislature enacted section 72‑706 in 1971. Section 72‑706’s specific hearing procedure supersedes Lockard’s equitable rationale for employer complaints in core compensation disputes.
6. Attorney Fees. Coronado is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 72‑804 because she filed her official claim for compensation only after the notice of appeal, and the employer has made or attempted to make all payments for which its liability was established. The employer’s request for sanctions and fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 is also denied; Coronado’s appeal was not frivolous.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

1. Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc. (2023)

Arreola is the most recent and closely related workers’ compensation case cited. There, the Court:

• Overruled Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab, which had allowed employers to unilaterally suspend benefits under section 72‑434 in certain IME non‑compliance situations.
• Held that only the Commission may:
  • Resolve IME disputes under section 72‑433(1); and
  • Order suspension of benefits under section 72‑434.
• Directed the Commission on remand to establish procedures for addressing IME disputes and enforcement under sections 72‑433 and 72‑434.
• Explicitly limited its overruling of Brewer to prospective effect.

In Coronado, the Court references Arreola primarily in two contexts:

1. Mootness of “Arreola relief”. Coronado argued she deserved retroactive relief because the employer lacked authority to suspend benefits unilaterally. The Court sidesteps the retroactivity issue, holding the dispute non-justiciable: there was no actual, implemented suspension for the Commission or the Court to remedy.
2. Scope of Commission jurisdiction vs. procedure. The Court distinguishes Arreola (and other precedents) as addressing what questions the Commission can decide (subject-matter jurisdiction), not who may initiate complaints or how procedural devices under the WCL must be structured.

Thus, Arreola remains good law on IME disputes and Commission-only suspensions, but Coronado clarifies that its retroactive application depends on a live controversy about an actual suspension, which Coronado lacked.

2. Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab (2003)

Brewer interpreted section 72‑434 to permit employers to unilaterally suspend benefits when a claimant unreasonably refused an IME. This was the legal backdrop in 2020 when the claims examiner sent Coronado a “suspension” letter.

Although Arreola later overruled Brewer, the question in Coronado became whether Coronado could retroactively invoke Arreola to invalidate the 2020 “suspension” attempt. The Court finds that issue moot because:

• No actual suspension occurred (benefits continued; PPI checks were issued).
• Coronado maintained access to Commission processes.

Therefore, whatever doctrinal transformation Arreola brought to section 72‑434 does not result in relief to Coronado on these facts.

3. Brooks v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. (1990)

Brooks involved a dispute between sureties (not an injured worker versus employer) over reimbursement and contribution obligations. The Court in Brooks confirmed the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over “all actions and claims which involve issues relating to a worker’s injury” under Idaho Code section 72‑201.

In Coronado, this precedent is cited by the Commission to justify its broad jurisdiction and acceptance of employer complaints. The Supreme Court differentiates:

• Brooks deals with the Commission’s subject-matter jurisdiction; it does not address who may file an application for hearing on an employee’s unpaid or discontinued benefits.
• The Commission’s power to decide “all questions arising under this law” (72‑707) does not automatically authorize employer-initiated complaints concerning an employee’s entitlement to compensation or income benefits.

4. Basin Land Irrigation Co. v. Hat Butte Canal Co. (1988)

Basin Land concerned whether an employer–employee relationship existed, a threshold “jurisdictional” question under the WCL. Like Brooks, it is cited to demonstrate the breadth of the Commission’s jurisdiction over questions “arising under this law.”

Again, the Court in Coronado distinguishes between:

• What types of questions fall within Commission jurisdiction; and
• Who may initiate proceedings and in what procedural posture, especially when core compensation rights under section 72‑706 are at stake.

5. Monroe v. Chapman (1983)

In Monroe, the Court upheld the Commission’s authority under section 72‑508 to adopt a rule allowing class actions in workers’ compensation proceedings, provided the rule was “reasonable” and effected the WCL’s purposes.

Coronado uses Monroe in two ways:

• To acknowledge that the Commission can design procedural rules (like the JRPs) under section 72‑508; but
• To emphasize that such rules cannot conflict with the WCL’s text and purposes—especially where the statute, like section 72‑706, clearly allocates a procedural right exclusively to employees.

Thus, while JRP 1(A) appears broad (“any party may apply”), Monroe underscores that Commission rules must harmonize with statutory directives, not replace them.

6. Flock v. J.C. Palumbo Fruit Co. (1941) & Liberal Construction

Flock articulates a foundational interpretive principle: the WCL must be liberally construed in favor of the employee to effect its “humane purposes,” including rehabilitation and proper treatment of injured workers.

This principle is expressly cited in Coronado and drives the Court’s reading of section 72‑706 against employer complaints in compensation disputes. Liberal construction favors an interpretation that:

• Preserves employee control over workers’ compensation claims;
• Promotes “sure and certain relief” to injured workers (Idaho Code section 72‑201); and
• Prevents procedural maneuvers that convert an employee’s affirmative claim into a defensive posture initiated by the employer.

7. Lockard v. St. Maries Lumber Co. (1954)

Lockard is the most directly relevant older precedent on who may initiate proceedings. Under the pre‑1971 WCL, and interpreting the predecessor statutes to sections 72‑712 and 72‑708, the Court held that an employer and its surety could file an application to obtain a determination of an employee’s right to compensation even when the employee had not filed a claim.

Lockard relied on:

• The then-version of section 72‑603 (predecessor to 72‑712), allowing “any party to the proceedings” to seek a hearing; and
• The equity-based language of section 72‑601 (predecessor to 72‑708), which contemplated broad equity-style proceedings.

In Coronado, the Court effectively confines Lockard to the pre‑1971 statutory regime:

• It notes that after the 1971 enactment of section 72‑706, the rationale of Lockard must yield to the new, specific statutory scheme.
• Section 72‑706 now explicitly gives the claimant-employee the right to “make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing” when the employer or surety fails or discontinues compensation or income benefits.

The Court does not use the term “overruled,” but its reasoning substantially displaces Lockard for modern WCL purposes in core compensation disputes.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Justiciability and Mootness of the First Petition

The Court establishes a firm threshold requirement: it will only decide live controversies where parties have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.

Drawing on Harris v. Cassia County, Frantz v. Osborn, and Fenn v. Noah, the Court restates that a case is moot when:

• Issues are “no longer live”; or
• Parties no longer have a real stake in the outcome.

Applying that standard, the Court recounts:

• Coronado initially objected to the unilateral IME scheduling and invoked section 72‑433’s “reasonableness” requirement.
• The employer threatened and then purported to suspend benefits under section 72‑434.
• However, the Commission found— and the record supports—that:
  • Coronado remained on full salary;
  • PPI payments were issued (though refused); and
  • The employer subsequently processed her claim (at least as to the right hip) instead of maintaining any suspension.

Thus, any suspension letter had no operative effect. The alleged suspension, in the Court’s word, was a “paper tiger.” Coronado neither:

• Lost benefits; nor
• Lost access to the Commission’s dispute-resolution process.

Without a real deprivation, there is no concrete controversy over which Arreola can operate retroactively. Accordingly, the Court affirms denial of the First Petition, not on the Commission’s reasoning about prospective application, but on constitutional justiciability grounds.

2. Statutory Construction: Who May File an Application for Hearing? (Second Petition)

The core of the opinion is a careful statutory construction of Idaho Code sections 72‑706, 72‑707, 72‑712, and the interplay with Commission rules (JRP 1 and 3).

a. The Framework: Liberal Construction and Contextual Reading

The Court explicitly reaffirms:

• WCL provisions must be liberally construed in favor of the employee (citing Flock and Clark v. Shari’s Management Corp.); and
• Individual sections must be read in the context of the entire WCL (citing Van Tine and Arreola).

This interpretive lens is applied to the relevant statutes and rules.

b. Section 72‑706: The Specific Hearing Right in Compensation/Income-Benefit Disputes

Section 72‑706 is styled as a statute of limitations but also contains positive procedural language. It provides that when:

• The employer or surety does not pay compensation (subsection (1)); or
• Compensation has been discontinued (subsection (2)); or
• Income benefits have been discontinued (subsection (3));

the “claimant shall have” a specified period of time (one to five years, depending on subsection) to “make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing”.

Key interpretive steps:

1. “Claimant” refers to the injured employee. The Court reasons that “compensation” and “income benefits” are defined in Idaho Code section 72‑102(6) and (15) exclusively in terms of benefits to the injured employee or dependents. Thus, in section 72‑706, the only person who logically can be the “claimant” is the injured worker (or dependents), not the employer.
2. “Make and file an application requesting a hearing” is the statutory equivalent of the JRP 3 “complaint.” JRP 3(A)(1) confirms that what the statute calls an “application for hearing” is now denominated a “complaint.”
3. Therefore, only the employee has the right to initiate Commission adjudication of unpaid or discontinued compensation or income benefits.

The Commission had dismissed the textual force of this provision, calling section 72‑706 “only” a statute of limitations that “does not authorize anyone, even a worker, to file a complaint.” The Court is blunt in rejecting this:

• It is “at a loss” to understand how that reading can be squared with the statute’s “plain language.”
• Section 72‑706 does more than fix deadlines; it confers an exclusive procedural right on claimants to invoke the Commission’s hearing process on certain benefit disputes.

c. Sections 72‑707 and 72‑712: Broad Jurisdiction vs. Specific Procedure

The employer and the Commission had relied heavily on:

• Section 72‑707: “All questions arising under this law … shall be determined by the [C]ommission.”
• Section 72‑712: “Upon application of any party to the proceeding,” a hearing shall be held when issues cannot otherwise be resolved.

The Court’s key distinctions:

• Section 72‑707 confers subject-matter jurisdiction, not procedural authority. It describes the universe of questions the Commission may decide but “says nothing about the propriety of the employer initiating those claims as a procedural matter.” Subject-matter jurisdiction does not dictate particular procedural devices (citing Monroe and Allen v. Campbell).
• Section 72‑712 is a general procedural provision; section 72‑706 is a specific one. Applying standard canons of construction:
  • 72‑712: any party may seek a hearing “to determin[e] the issues” generally;
  • 72‑706: in the specific subset of disputes about unpaid or discontinued compensation or income benefits, the claimant-employee alone may apply for a hearing;
  • Specific provisions trump conflicting general provisions. Thus, 72‑706 operates as an exception to 72‑712’s “any party” rule in that domain.

Employer and Amicus’s attempt to allow employer complaints under 72‑712 would “let the general provision … swallow the more specific rule in section 72‑706,” which the Court rejects as incompatible with both text and the WCL’s purpose.

d. JRP 1(A) and 3: Rulemaking Limits Under Section 72‑508

The Commission and employer also invoked JRP 1(A), which provides:

Any party to a controversy may apply to the Commission for relief, and the Commission shall make such order, ruling or award as it determines is reasonable and just.

And JRP 3, which renames statutory “applications for hearing” as “complaints.”

The Court accepts that the Commission has rulemaking authority over “judicial matters” under section 72‑508, but emphasizes:

• Commission rules must be “reasonable” and “effect the purposes of the [WCL]” (Monroe), and cannot contradict express statutory commands.
• Reading JRP 1(A) to permit an employer to “apply to the Commission for relief” by filing a complaint that seeks to adjudicate an employee’s core compensatory rights would place the rule in direct conflict with section 72‑706.

Accordingly, JRP 1(A) cannot be used to legitimate employer complaints in section 72‑706-type disputes. To the extent the Commission interpreted or applied its rules otherwise, it “acted in excess of its powers” under Idaho Code section 72‑732(2).

e. Policy and Structural Arguments: “Sure and Certain Relief” and Control of the Claim

Beyond textual analysis, the Court grounds its holding in the WCL’s overarching policy: to provide “sure and certain relief for injured” workers (Idaho Code section 72‑201; Page v. McCain Foods).

The Court observes:

• The workers’ compensation claim is a remedy “personal to the injured employee,” and traditionally “proceedings to enforce that right are therefore ordinarily initiated by him” (citing Larson’s treatise).
• If employers could file complaints unilaterally to adjudicate core benefits, they would “usurp control over employees’ compensatory rights.”
• In such a regime, relief under the WCL would no longer be “sure and certain” for employees, but subject to employer-driven litigation timing and framing.

The Court adopts the view that the injured worker is the “master” of her claim and must control “much about her suit,” drawing an analogy to federal civil practice from Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger.

Therefore, employer-filed complaints that:

• Seek determination of medical stability;
• Litigate entitlement to medical, PPI, PPD, or TTD/TPD benefits; or
• Address causation of claimed injuries;

impermissibly invert the WCL’s structure by forcing the employee into a defensive role on her own compensation claim.

f. Scope of the Holding: What Employers Still May Do

The Court is careful to cabin the effect of its ruling. It does not hold that employers are barred from initiating all proceedings before the Commission. Rather:

• Section 72‑706 bars employers from making or filing applications (complaints) when the subject of the hearing is an employee’s claim to unpaid or discontinued compensation or income benefits.
• Other disputes “arising under” the WCL—such as surety contribution, credits, status disputes, subrogation, or potentially some IME-related issues not centered on unpaid benefits—may be initiated by employers or third parties, so long as Commission procedures comply with the WCL and its remedial purpose.
• Sections 72‑508 and 72‑712 continue to give the Commission room to design reasonable procedures for such disputes.

But where the dispute is tethered to the core right to compensation and income benefits under section 72‑706, the injured worker alone can pull the procedural lever to request a hearing.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Reallocation of Procedural Control to Injured Workers

The most important practical effect is a reallocation—and clarification—of procedural control:

• In any dispute about whether compensation or income benefits are owed or have been lawfully discontinued, the injured worker (or dependents) decide if and when to seek Commission adjudication.
• Employers and sureties may no longer:
  • File “defendant complaints” to accelerate or compel resolution of such benefits disputes; or
  • Use Commission procedures to force injured workers into answering a complaint and risk default on their own claims.

This restores consistency with the longstanding understanding that a workers’ compensation claim is the employee’s claim and that the employee, not the employer, decides whether to litigate it.

2. Constraints on Commission Rulemaking and Practice

The decision sends a clear signal to the Industrial Commission:

• Judicial rules must track statutory directives closely; broad “any party” language in JRP 1(A) cannot override explicit statutory structure.
• Prior Commission practice of accepting employer-filed “complaints” that mirror claimant complaints and seek adjudication of entitlement to benefits must be reevaluated and, in section 72‑706 disputes, discontinued.
• The Commission must distinguish between:
  • “Complaints” or “applications for hearing” within section 72‑706’s ambit (employee-only); and
  • Other procedural devices or motions the Commission may design for disputes between employers, sureties, or third parties, consistent with sections 72‑508 and 72‑712.

3. Interaction with Arreola and IME Disputes

While Coronado does not directly expand Arreola, it interacts with it in important ways:

• Arreola centralizes IME disputes and suspensions under Commission authority.
• Coronado clarifies that the path to Commission review of benefit suspensions or nonpayment arising from IME disputes must be initiated by the injured worker under section 72‑706, not by employer complaints.
• Employers must therefore proceed via:
  • Individual case handling, including voluntary payments or denial of claims; and
  • Waiting for the employee to file an application for hearing if the employee disputes nonpayment or suspension of benefits.

This combination further entrenches the principle that while employers may request IMEs and defend claims, neither IME-related sanctions nor compensatory entitlements may be finally adjudicated except under Commission authority and, in compensation disputes, at the employee’s election to seek a hearing.

4. Statute-of-Limitations Strategy and Claimant Autonomy

Coronado argued that employer complaints “effectively deprive” her of her statutory statute-of-limitations rights under section 72‑706. While the Court does not expressly ground its holding in this argument, its statutory construction avoids that outcome:

• By preserving the employee’s exclusive right to trigger Commission proceedings, section 72‑706’s time bars remain under the employee’s control.
• Employers cannot defeat, shorten, or complicate that right by filing their own complaints, compelling claimants into earlier or unplanned litigation.

In practice, this means injured workers retain control over both:

• The timing of formal litigation; and
• The decision whether to litigate at all, so long as they comply with the section 72‑706 limitation periods.

5. Litigation Strategy for Employers and Sureties

After Coronado, employers and sureties must:

• Refrain from filing “complaints” that purport to adjudicate whether a worker is entitled to compensation or income benefits.
• Channel disputes through:
  • Claims administration (accepting/denying claims, adjusting benefits);
  • Responsive pleadings when the claimant files a complaint;
  • Separate employer/surety disputes (e.g., reimbursement, credit, subrogation) that do not fit within section 72‑706’s compensation/income-benefit framework; and
  • Other Commission-approved motions or procedures that do not usurp the employee’s control over her compensation claim.

Employers must also be mindful that overreaching use of Commission procedures may expose their decisions to being set aside under section 72‑732(2) as actions “in excess of [the Commission’s] powers.”

6. Effects on Injured Workers and Claimant Counsel

For claimants and their attorneys, Coronado offers several protections:

• They cannot be forced into Commission litigation by an employer-initiated complaint over core benefits and then threatened with default for failing to answer.
• They maintain strategic control over when, and on what record, to bring disputes over unpaid or discontinued benefits before the Commission.
• They may still face employer motions or proceedings in other types of issues, but the heart of the compensation claim remains theirs to prosecute affirmatively.

D. Clarification of Complex Concepts

1. “Justiciable Controversy” and Mootness

A controversy is “justiciable” if:

• It involves real, adverse legal interests of the parties; and
• The court can grant specific, conclusive relief that will meaningfully affect their rights.

A case becomes moot when:

• The issue is no longer alive (e.g., circumstances have changed so the dispute is resolved or irrelevant); or
• The parties lack a continuing legal interest in the outcome.

In Coronado, although a suspension letter was issued, there was no real loss of benefits or rights. Without a concrete deprivation, there was nothing for the Court to remedy, so the Arreola-based claim was moot.

2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Procedural Authority

Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a tribunal’s power to hear and decide a class of cases. For the Industrial Commission, section 72‑707 gives jurisdiction over “all questions arising under” the WCL.

Procedural authority deals with the mechanisms by which cases get before the tribunal and are litigated—who may file complaints, what deadlines apply, what forms are used, etc.

Key distinction from Coronado:

• The Commission may have jurisdiction over questions raised in an employer’s complaint; but
• It may nonetheless lack authority to accept that complaint if the WCL designates only the employee as the proper initiator of such proceedings.

3. “Compensation” vs. “Income Benefits”

The WCL uses “compensation” as an umbrella term and “income benefits” as a specific category:

• Compensation (section 72‑102(6)) includes:
  • Income benefits; and
  • Medical and related benefits and services.
• Income benefits (section 72‑102(15)) are:
  • Payments to the injured employee (or dependents) due to disability or death;
  • Excluding medical and related benefits.

Section 72‑706 concerns both:

• Situations where compensation (including medical or income benefits) has not been paid or has been discontinued; and
• Situations where income benefits, in particular, have been discontinued.

In such disputes, section 72‑706 gives the “claimant” (injured worker) the right to file an application for hearing within set timeframes.

4. PPI, PPD, TTD, and TPD Benefits

These acronyms describe types of workers’ compensation income benefits:

• PPI – Permanent Partial Impairment: payment for the permanent physical loss or impairment, based on medical ratings.
• PPD – Permanent Partial Disability: payment when an impairment results in a decrease in the worker’s capacity to earn wages.
• TTD – Temporary Total Disability: wage replacement when the worker is completely unable to work for a temporary period due to the injury.
• TPD – Temporary Partial Disability: wage replacement when the worker can perform some work but at a reduced wage level during recovery.

In Coronado, the employer’s complaint sought to have the Commission adjudicate whether, and to what extent, Coronado was entitled to these categories of benefits—precisely the kind of issues section 72‑706 reserves to be raised by the claimant.

5. Dual Enforcement Mechanism of Section 72‑434

Section 72‑434 allows for two linked consequences when a worker unreasonably fails to attend or obstructs an IME:

1. The worker’s right “to take or prosecute any proceedings under this law” may be suspended; and
2. No compensation shall be payable for the period during which the failure or obstruction continues.

Arreola clarified that only the Commission—not self-help by employers—may:

• Decide whether the failure was “unreasonable”; and
• Impose this dual enforcement mechanism.

In Coronado, even though the employer sent a suspension letter, the Commission later found no actual execution of either prong (no procedural suspension; no compensation withheld). Hence the dispute was moot.

V. Conclusion

Coronado v. City of Boise is a structurally important decision in Idaho workers’ compensation law. While it offers no retrospective Arreola relief to Coronado—because no real suspension or deprivation ever materialized—it establishes a clear, durable principle:

When the subject of a hearing before the Industrial Commission is an injured worker’s entitlement to unpaid or discontinued compensation or income benefits under Idaho Code section 72‑706, only the claimant-employee may “make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing.” Employers and sureties may not file such complaints.

This holding:

• Enforces the WCL’s textual allocation of procedural rights in section 72‑706;
• Prevents Commission rules, such as JRP 1(A), from being read to override the statute;
• Confines older precedents like Lockard to the pre‑1971 statutory regime;
• Reaffirms that the injured worker is the “master” of the compensation claim; and
• Aligns procedure with the WCL’s remedial purpose of “sure and certain relief” for injured workers.

For future cases, Coronado will govern how disputes over unpaid or discontinued benefits enter the Commission’s adjudicatory pipeline: only at the initiative of the injured worker or dependents. Employers remain free to litigate other types of disputes before the Commission, but they may not use employer-filed complaints to drive or dominate the adjudication of an employee’s core compensatory rights.