Corley v. State: Delaware Mandates Tier II Classification for Federal § 2252A Offenders and Reaffirms the Civil Nature of Sex‑Offender Registration

Corley v. State: Delaware Mandates Tier II Classification for Federal § 2252A Offenders and Reaffirms the Civil Nature of Sex‑Offender Registration

1. Introduction

The Delaware Supreme Court’s order in Corley v. State (No. 83, 2025, decided November 18, 2025) addresses an increasingly important issue in modern criminal and regulatory law: how a state’s sex‑offender registration scheme treats individuals convicted in other jurisdictions, especially under federal law. The case arises from Delaware’s application of its Sex Offender Registration Statute (“SORS”), codified in 11 Del. C. §§ 4120–4121, to a defendant with prior federal convictions for sex trafficking of minors and possession of child pornography.

The appellant, Royce Corley, was convicted in federal court in 2013 of three counts of sex trafficking a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. After serving his prison term, he relocated to Delaware in 2022 and initially registered as a Tier I sex offender. The State later moved to reclassify him as Tier II. Corley resisted this reclassification, arguing that he was not required to register in New York or under federal law, that he should at most remain a Tier I offender, and that he had a constitutional right to counsel and a jury in the Delaware tier‑designation proceedings.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s brief but dense order resolves several doctrinal questions at the intersection of state regulatory power, federal convictions, and constitutional protections in registration proceedings. It clarifies the automatic effect of certain federal convictions—particularly under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A—on Delaware tier designations, and it reaffirms that Delaware’s SORS is civil and non‑punitive, with important consequences for the availability of counsel and jury rights.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court, per Justice LeGrow, affirms the Superior Court’s judgment upholding Corley’s designation as a Tier II sex offender. The key holdings can be summarized as follows:

  • Automatic Tier II classification for § 2252A convictions: Under 11 Del. C. § 4121(d)(2)(b), any person convicted of the federal crime of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A must be designated a Tier II sex offender in Delaware. This operates independently of how other jurisdictions classify the offender.
  • Out‑of‑state and federal registration status are irrelevant to Delaware’s statutory mandate: Whether New York or federal law requires Corley to register is not controlling. Delaware’s statute itself “unequivocally provides” that a § 2252A conviction triggers Tier II status.
  • Res judicata, collateral estoppel, and Full Faith and Credit do not bar Delaware’s action: A New York trial‑level determination that Corley did not have to register (later reversed on appeal) does not preclude Delaware from classifying him under its own SORS. Delaware was not a party to the New York proceeding, and that proceeding did not adjudicate Corley’s obligations under Delaware law.
  • Underlying constitutional challenges to § 2252A are not cognizable in SORS proceedings: Corley’s argument that his child‑pornography conviction involved constitutionally protected speech does not affect his Delaware registration status. The tier designation turns on the bare fact of conviction, not on any re‑litigation of the constitutionality of the underlying federal statute.
  • SORS proceedings are civil, not criminal; no right to state‑appointed counsel: Relying on Helman v. State, the Court reiterates that Delaware’s registration scheme is civil and regulatory, intended to protect the public. Consequently, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel at state expense in these proceedings.
  • No right to a jury to redetermine facts such as the victims’ ages: Corley already received a criminal jury trial in 2013, at which the federal jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew each victim was under 18. The registration process does not open the door to a second jury determination of those facts.
  • No additional evidentiary hearing is required for tier designation: Echoing Banks v. State and Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the Court emphasizes that Delaware’s registration requirements “turn on an offender’s conviction alone,” so no separate fact‑finding hearing is constitutionally required.

The Court thus solidifies an important rule: a federal conviction under § 2252A triggers automatic Tier II classification in Delaware, with limited room for collateral challenges, and without the procedural apparatus of a criminal trial.

3. Factual and Statutory Background

3.1 Federal Convictions and Prior Proceedings

In 2013, a federal jury convicted Corley of:

  • Three counts of sex trafficking a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591; and
  • One count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.

The victims were three 16‑year‑old girls. He received a sentence of ten years’ incarceration followed by probation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentence.1 Subsequently, the Southern District of New York addressed post‑trial issues; in that proceeding the federal court noted that the jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that Corley knew each victim was under 18.2

After his release, Corley initially resided in New York. At some point, a New York Supreme Court justice determined that Corley was not required to register as a sex offender under New York law. However, that determination was later reversed by the Appellate Division, which held that Corley’s federal conviction for possession of child pornography was a registrable sex offense in New York.3

In 2022, Corley moved to Delaware and registered as a Tier I sex offender under Delaware’s SORS.

3.2 Delaware’s Sex Offender Registration Statute (SORS)

Delaware’s SORS, found in 11 Del. C. §§ 4120–4121, imposes registration obligations and assigns offenders to risk‑assessment tiers based largely on the nature of their convictions:

  • Registration obligation: Section 4120(b) provides that individuals convicted of specified sex offenses must register as sex offenders.
  • Tier assignment: Section 4121(d) establishes a tiered system (Tiers I, II, and III) that reflects the perceived risk and severity of the offense. The higher the tier, the more onerous and lengthy the registration and notification requirements.
  • Out‑of‑state and federal convictions: Section 4120(e)(2) requires that a person convicted in another jurisdiction register in Delaware if (1) that jurisdiction requires registration, or (2) the offense is “the same as, or equivalent to,” an offense enumerated in Delaware’s statute.
  • Enumerated federal offenses mandating Tier II status: Crucially, 11 Del. C. § 4121(d)(2)(b) lists a set of specific federal offenses and mandates that anyone convicted of those offenses be designated a Tier II offender. Among these are federal child‑exploitation offenses, including 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.

Delaware law, in harmony with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, treats SORS as a civil, regulatory regime designed to protect the public, not to impose additional punishment on offenders.

3.3 The Proceedings in Delaware

In September 2024, the State of Delaware moved to reclassify Corley as a Tier II sex offender. The State advanced two theories:

  1. That Corley’s sex‑trafficking convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 were the same as, or equivalent to, Delaware’s offense of sexual servitude; and
  2. That Corley’s federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A was the same as, or equivalent to, Delaware’s possession of child pornography, and that Delaware’s SORS specifically requires Tier II classification for § 2252A convictions.

A Superior Court Commissioner granted the State’s motion, expressly relying on the second, statutory ground: § 4121(d)(2)(b) explicitly requires that a person convicted under § 2252A be designated a Tier II sex offender. A Superior Court judge affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Corley appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1.1 Banks v. State and Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe

The Court cites Banks v. State, 2025 WL 2963817 (Del. Oct. 20, 2025), which in turn quotes Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). The quoted principle is:

“the law’s [registration] requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest.”

In Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected due process challenges to Connecticut’s sex‑offender registration scheme on the ground that the scheme did not deny offenders any procedural right with respect to the fact of their conviction; the conviction itself was obtained through criminal procedures that satisfy due process. Hence, a separate hearing on current dangerousness or other collateral issues is not constitutionally mandated where the registration scheme is triggered by the conviction alone.

Banks, as cited here, appears to adopt that reasoning in the Delaware context: once a conviction has been validly obtained, Delaware may rely on it to impose registration and classification obligations without providing a new evidentiary hearing on the underlying facts.

4.1.2 People v. Corley (N.Y. App. Div. 2025)

In People v. Corley, 225 N.Y.S.3d 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025), the New York Appellate Division reversed a lower‑court determination and held that Corley’s federal conviction for possession of child pornography is a registrable sex offense under New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Delaware Supreme Court uses this case in two ways:

  • Factual correction: It undermines Corley’s premise that he is not required to register in New York. The appellate decision shows that New York does, in fact, treat his child‑pornography conviction as registrable.
  • But ultimately: irrelevance of New York status: The Court emphasizes that even if New York did not require registration, that would not control Delaware’s independent statutory scheme.

4.1.3 Betts v. Townsends, Inc. (Delaware res judicata and collateral estoppel law)

Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531 (Del. 2000), is cited for the basic definitions of res judicata and collateral estoppel:

  • Res judicata bars relitigation of a claim between the same parties or their privies once there has been a final judgment on the merits.
  • Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue of fact actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, again typically between the same parties or their privies.

The Court applies these principles to reject Corley’s assertion that New York’s earlier (reversed) decision precludes Delaware from determining his registration status under Delaware law.

4.1.4 Helman v. State and In re Estate of Hall

Two Delaware cases define the civil character of SORS and the absence of a constitutional right to counsel in civil actions:

  • Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001): Delaware’s SORS is a civil, regulatory scheme. Its purpose is to protect the public, not to punish offenders. This classification underpins the Court’s rejection of arguments based on criminal‑procedure guarantees such as a right to counsel or jury.
  • In re Estate of Hall, 882 A.2d 761, 2005 WL 2473791 (Del. Aug. 26, 2005) (TABLE): There is no general constitutional right to appointed counsel at state expense in civil proceedings. The Court uses this to deny Corley’s claim to court‑appointed counsel in his tier‑designation challenge.

4.1.5 Federal SORNA Provisions (42 U.S.C. §§ 16911, 16913; recodified at 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911, 20913)

The Court cites former 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(1) and 16913(a), which were in effect when Corley committed his offenses (now recodified at 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(1) and 20913(a)). These provisions define “sex offender” broadly as anyone convicted of a “sex offense” and obligate such offenders to register in their jurisdictions of residence, employment, and schooling.

The citation serves to rebut Corley’s argument that a clerical error on the federal sentencing form means he was not, in fact, required to register under federal law. The Court stresses that at the time of his conduct, federal law required any individual convicted of a sex offense to register, independent of clerical oversights.

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 Automatic Tier II Status Based on a § 2252A Conviction

The central statutory holding is straightforward: Delaware’s SORS, by its own terms, commands a Tier II designation for anyone convicted of certain specified federal sex offenses. Section 4121(d)(2)(b) provides that a person convicted of, among others, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A must be classified as a Tier II offender.

The Court emphasizes that this is not an exercise in analogy or “equivalence”:

  • The State initially argued equivalence—i.e., that the federal offenses were the same as or equivalent to certain Delaware offenses.
  • However, the Commissioner and the Superior Court relied on the more direct statutory route: § 4121(d)(2)(b) separately and explicitly names § 2252A itself as a predicate for Tier II.

Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court does not need to, and does not, decide whether federal sex trafficking under § 1591 is equivalent to Delaware’s sexual servitude offense. Instead, the case is resolved on the narrower but clear ground that, regardless of the sex‑trafficking counts, Corley’s § 2252A conviction alone compels Tier II status.

This reflects an important interpretive stance: where the legislature has specifically listed a federal offense as triggering a certain tier, courts are to apply that designation automatically, without engaging in broader or more fact‑intensive equivalence analysis.

4.2.2 Rejection of Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Full Faith and Credit Arguments

Corley argued that Delaware was barred from “relitigating” his sex‑offender status by:

  • Res judicata;
  • Collateral estoppel; and
  • The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The Court disposes of these arguments in several steps:

  1. New York’s decision is not final in Corley’s favor: Any reliance on the New York Supreme Court justice’s initial determination is misplaced because the Appellate Division reversed that ruling and held that Corley was indeed required to register in New York by virtue of his child‑pornography conviction.4
  2. Even if New York had excused registration, Delaware is not bound: Delaware’s SORS “unequivocally” requires Tier II classification for § 2252A convictions. Delaware applies its own statutory scheme to residents within its jurisdiction.
  3. No identity of parties or issues for res judicata/collateral estoppel: Under Betts, res judicata and collateral estoppel apply only where the same parties (or their privies) and the same issues were previously litigated. Delaware was not a party to the New York proceedings, and those proceedings did not address whether Corley must register under Delaware law.
  4. Full Faith and Credit does not require Delaware to adopt New York’s policy choices: While not elaborated in depth, the Court implicitly recognizes that Full Faith and Credit requires respect for other states’ judgments, but does not obligate Delaware to mirror another state’s statutory or regulatory classification schemes. Delaware is free to impose its own public‑safety regulations on residents based on their convictions.

In short, Delaware owes no preclusive or constitutional deference to New York’s earlier, and ultimately reversed, view of Corley’s registration obligations. Delaware’s classification is governed by Delaware law alone.

4.2.3 No Collateral Attack on the Constitutionality of § 2252A in SORS Proceedings

Corley asserted that his possession‑of‑child‑pornography conviction involved “constitutionally protected speech” and that, therefore, only his sex‑trafficking convictions should count for Delaware registration purposes. He argued that those trafficking convictions, if considered alone, would result in at most a Tier I designation under Delaware’s SORS.

The Court rejects this approach on a basic procedural principle: the SORS tier designation turns on the fact of conviction, not the underlying validity or constitutional soundness of the statute of conviction. The Court reasons:

  • Corley had the opportunity in his federal criminal proceedings to challenge § 2252A, either facially or as applied.
  • The federal jury convicted him, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The conviction is legally valid and final unless overturned in the federal system.
  • Delaware’s SORS does not—and need not—revisit the constitutionality of the predicate offense. It simply uses the conviction as a triggering fact.

This aspect of the decision implicitly reinforces the general rule that collateral challenges to the validity of a conviction cannot be pursued in a subsequent regulatory or civil proceeding that uses the conviction as a status determinant. If Corley wishes to contest the constitutional validity of § 2252A, his remedy lies in federal habeas or other federal collateral attack, not in resisting a state regulatory consequence premised on that conviction.

4.2.4 SORS as a Civil Regime: No Right to Counsel or Jury Trial

Corley argued that the proceedings to determine his tier designation were “criminal” in nature, entitling him to state‑appointed counsel and to a jury trial on certain factual issues (notably, the victims’ ages).

The Court’s response proceeds in two steps:

  1. Reaffirmation that SORS is civil, not criminal: Citing Helman v. State, the Court reiterates that Delaware’s SORS is intended to protect the public, not to punish offenders. This civil characterization means that constitutional protections unique to the criminal process—such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and jury trial—do not automatically apply.
  2. No right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings: Citing In re Estate of Hall, the Court states that there is no right to appointment of counsel at state expense in ordinary civil matters. Since SORS is civil, Corley cannot demand appointed counsel as of right.

With respect to the claimed right to a jury trial on the victims’ ages, the Court notes:

  • Corley already had a jury trial in 2013.
  • The federal jury explicitly found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Corley knew each victim was under 18, as recognized in the federal district court’s 2020 decision.5
  • The Delaware SORS proceeding does not relitigate these facts; it merely uses them as determined in the criminal case.

Once again, the Court leans heavily on the “fact of conviction” model: since the relevant facts were already determined with full criminal procedural safeguards, the civil registration proceeding does not trigger a redundant entitlement to jury determination.

4.2.5 No Separate Hearing Requirement: The “Conviction Alone” Principle

By citing Banks and Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, the Court underscores a structural due process principle: where the law’s regulatory burdens are triggered by the bare fact of conviction, and that conviction was obtained through proceedings that themselves satisfy constitutional due process, there is no additional constitutional requirement for a second, separate hearing before the regulatory burdens attach.

In Delaware’s scheme, the tier designation is largely categorical: certain convictions map directly to specified tiers. Therefore:

  • There are no additional factual disputes to adjudicate, beyond the existence and nature of the conviction itself.
  • The offender has “already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest” those underlying facts in the criminal trial.
  • Accordingly, there is no due process violation in assigning a tier without a new evidentiary hearing.

This approach reinforces the view of SORS as an administrative classification mechanism rather than a quasi‑criminal sentencing proceeding.

4.3 Impact and Implications

4.3.1 For Individuals with Federal Child‑Pornography Convictions Moving to Delaware

The most immediate impact of Corley is on individuals with federal convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A who relocate to Delaware:

  • Their classification is largely predetermined by statute: § 2252A = Tier II, as a matter of law.
  • Their classification does not depend on whether the federal court formally checked a “registration required” box on the judgment, nor on whether the originating state requires registration.
  • They cannot use Delaware’s SORS proceeding to re‑argue the constitutionality of § 2252A or other issues that could have been raised in the federal criminal case.

Practitioners advising such clients must be alert to the almost automatic nature of Tier II classification for enumerated federal offenses and should not expect to litigate the issue from scratch in Delaware.

4.3.2 For the Relationship Between State and Federal Registration Regimes

Corley highlights the independence of state registration schemes from:

  • Federal sentencing paperwork or clerical errors; and
  • Other states’ registration requirements or classifications.

While federal law (SORNA) establishes baseline national standards for sex‑offender registration, states remain free to impose more stringent requirements or different tier structures. Delaware’s explicit listing of § 2252A as a Tier II predicate shows legislative intent to go beyond a mere equivalency test; the statute directly integrates specific federal offenses into its state‑law tier framework.

This autonomy means that a person’s registration obligations and tier level can vary significantly from state to state, even though the underlying conviction is the same. Corley underscores that offenders cannot rely on a more lenient classification in one jurisdiction to shield them in another.

4.3.3 For Collateral Attacks on Convictions in Collateral Regulatory Proceedings

The opinion also reinforces a broader procedural norm: civil and regulatory proceedings that use convictions as predicates will not entertain collateral constitutional attacks on those convictions.

This has implications beyond sex‑offender registration, affecting:

  • Professional disciplinary proceedings (bar discipline, medical licensing);
  • Immigration removal proceedings based on criminal convictions; and
  • Other civil disabilities triggered by criminal convictions (e.g., firearms prohibitions, employment restrictions).

In all of these contexts, the logic of Corley supports the proposition that the proper forum for challenging the constitutionality of a criminal statute or the propriety of a conviction is the criminal case itself (on direct appeal or habeas), not the later civil proceeding that uses that conviction as an input.

4.3.4 For the Criminal–Civil Boundary in Sex‑Offender Laws

Finally, Corley strengthens the jurisprudential boundary between criminal punishment and civil regulation in the sex‑offender context. By re‑invoking Helman and rejecting demands for counsel and jury based on criminal‑procedure rights, the Court fortifies the line of authority that treats sex‑offender registries as civil public‑safety tools.

This stance has important consequences:

  • No Sixth Amendment protections: Since SORS is civil, it does not trigger the right to counsel, to confrontation, or to a jury trial in the way a criminal prosecution does.
  • Limited application of Apprendi-type principles: Arguments that registration or tier classification increases “punishment” in a manner requiring jury fact‑finding (such as the age of victim) are weakened; the Court views classification as regulatory, not punitive.
  • Stability of legislative schemes: Treating SORS as civil makes it less vulnerable to Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges and Double Jeopardy arguments, which generally apply to criminal sanctions.

Of course, the civil label is not immune from deeper constitutional scrutiny—other courts and commentators have questioned whether some modern registration schemes are so onerous as to be effectively punitive. But within Delaware, Corley confirms the existing doctrinal approach.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

To make the reasoning in Corley more accessible, the following are plain‑language explanations of key legal concepts used in the opinion.

5.1 Sex‑Offender Registration and Tiers

  • Sex‑offender registration: A system where individuals convicted of certain sex‑related crimes must provide personal information (name, address, employer, etc.) to law enforcement, which may be shared with other agencies and, in some cases, the public.
  • Tier system (Tier I, II, III): A way of categorizing offenders based on perceived risk and the seriousness of the offense. Generally:
    • Tier I = lower‑level offenses, shorter registration period, fewer public‑notification requirements.
    • Tier II = more serious offenses, longer registration, more stringent requirements.
    • Tier III = most serious offenses, often lifetime registration, extensive notification.
    In Delaware, the tier is largely determined by the specific crime of conviction, not by a detailed individualized risk assessment.

5.2 Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

  • Res judicata (claim preclusion): Once a court has finally decided a claim between specific parties, those parties cannot bring the same claim again in a new lawsuit. It prevents “second bites at the apple” on the same cause of action.
  • Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion): Even if the second lawsuit involves a different claim, if a specific issue of fact or law was already actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first case, and the same parties (or their privies) are involved, that issue cannot be re‑litigated.

In Corley, these doctrines did not apply because:

  • Delaware was not a party to the New York proceeding.
  • The New York case did not decide whether Corley must register under Delaware law.

5.3 Full Faith and Credit

The Full Faith and Credit Clause (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1) requires states to respect the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” of other states. In practical terms:

  • States must generally recognize valid final judgments from courts of other states.
  • However, states are not forced to adopt another state’s statutes or regulatory policy choices wholesale.

In Corley, even if New York had concluded that Corley did not need to register under New York law, Delaware was not constitutionally bound to adopt that classification for purposes of Delaware’s own SORS.

5.4 Civil vs. Criminal Proceedings

  • Criminal proceedings involve accusations that a person has violated the criminal law. They can result in imprisonment, fines, or other punishments. The Constitution provides robust protections in criminal cases: right to counsel, right to jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.
  • Civil proceedings involve disputes about rights and obligations between private parties or between the government and individuals, but not as punishment for crime (e.g., contracts, torts, property disputes, regulatory enforcement). The procedural protections are generally less stringent.

Delaware, following U.S. Supreme Court precedent, treats SORS as a civil, regulatory scheme. That classification is crucial to the Court’s holding that:

  • Corley has no constitutional right to state‑appointed counsel in the SORS tier‑designation proceedings.
  • He is not entitled to a jury trial to determine regulatory facts like victim age beyond those already found in the criminal case.

5.5 “Facial” and “As‑Applied” Constitutional Challenges

  • A facial challenge argues that a statute is unconstitutional in all its applications—i.e., the law can never be validly enforced.
  • An as‑applied challenge argues that a law is unconstitutional as applied to the specific facts of a particular case, even if it might be valid in other contexts.

Corley’s argument that § 2252A criminalized constitutionally protected speech is essentially a constitutional challenge to the statute underlying his conviction. The Delaware Supreme Court holds that such challenges must be made in the criminal case itself, not in the subsequent civil registration proceeding.

6. Conclusion

Corley v. State is a compact but significant reaffirmation and clarification of Delaware’s approach to sex‑offender registration. The case establishes, with particular clarity, that:

  • A federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (possession of child pornography) automatically triggers Tier II classification in Delaware by operation of 11 Del. C. § 4121(d)(2)(b), regardless of:
    • How other states classify the offense or the offender; or
    • Any clerical errors or omissions on federal sentencing documents.
  • Efforts to use doctrines like res judicata, collateral estoppel, or Full Faith and Credit to transplant another state’s more lenient registration treatment into Delaware will almost certainly fail, particularly where Delaware was not a party to the other proceeding and its statute expressly governs the classification.
  • Delaware’s SORS remains firmly categorized as a civil, regulatory scheme. As a result:
    • There is no constitutional right to state‑appointed counsel in tier‑designation proceedings.
    • The offender has no right to a jury determination of facts already decided in the underlying criminal trial.
    • Due process does not require a separate evidentiary hearing where classification turns solely on the fact of conviction.
  • Collateral attacks on the constitutionality of the underlying conviction (here, the claim that § 2252A criminalizes protected speech) are not entertainable in SORS proceedings; they must be litigated in the criminal courts that rendered the conviction.

In the broader legal landscape, Corley reinforces a model of sex‑offender registration that is:

  • Conviction‑based: The registry and tier system use the conviction as a fixed, adjudicated fact, without additional fact‑finding on dangerousness or culpability.
  • Jurisdiction‑specific: Each state’s legislature defines its own triggers and tiers. Delaware’s choice to list certain federal statutes—including § 2252A—as automatic Tier II predicates is a policy decision squarely within its authority.
  • Civil in form and effect (at least doctrinally): While the burdens of registration can be severe, Delaware courts treat SORS as a civil measure, limiting the applicability of criminal‑procedure protections.

For practitioners and scholars, Corley serves as a clear statement of Delaware’s view that once a sex‑offense conviction is final—especially one enumerated in § 4121(d)(2)(b)—the path to disputing registration in Delaware is exceedingly narrow. The opinion thus strengthens the predictability and rigidity of Delaware’s SORS regime and illustrates the continuing judicial commitment to a conviction‑driven, civil‑regulatory model of sex‑offender registration.

1 United States v. Corley, 679 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2017).
2 United States v. Corley, 2020 WL 4676650, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2020).
3 People v. Corley, 225 N.Y.S.3d 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025).
4 Id. at 100.
5 Corley, 2020 WL 4676650, at *2.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Judge(s)

LeGrow J.

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