Contractual References to Disability Insurance “Procedures” and Employer Termination Authority: Commentary on Leit v. Aspirus Medical Group, Inc.

Contractual References to Disability Insurance “Procedures” and Employer Termination Authority: Commentary on Leit v. Aspirus Medical Group, Inc.

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential decision in Michael Leit v. Aspirus Medical Group, Inc., No. 23‑1861 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025). Though designated as a “Nonprecedential Disposition” under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, the opinion offers important guidance on how courts interpret employment contract provisions that incorporate the definition and “procedures” of a separate disability insurance policy.

The case involves an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Michael Leit, who became unable to work due to a serious medical condition shortly after joining Aspirus Medical Group in Wisconsin. Aspirus ultimately terminated his employment under a contract clause that allowed termination “upon the determination of being ‘disabled,’” with disability and “the procedures for being determined disabled” defined by a long‑term disability insurance policy issued by Lincoln National Life Insurance Company. Dr. Leit claimed that this clause required Lincoln—the insurer—not Aspirus—to determine that he was disabled before Aspirus could terminate him. Because Lincoln never made such a disability determination (it denied coverage on an eligibility/waiting‑period ground), he argued that the termination breached the contract.

The Seventh Circuit rejected Leit's interpretation and affirmed summary judgment for Aspirus. The central legal contribution of the decision is its treatment of contractual incorporation of insurance policy terms: specifically, that merely referring to the “procedures for being determined disabled” in a disability insurance policy does not transfer ultimate decision‑making authority about disability for employment‑termination purposes to the insurer, absent clear contractual language to that effect.

II. Case Overview

A. Parties and Positions

  • Plaintiff–Appellant: Dr. Michael Leit, an orthopedic surgeon and Regional Program Development Medical Director recruited by Aspirus to practice at Aspirus Langlade Hospital in Antigo, Wisconsin.
  • Defendant–Appellee: Aspirus Medical Group, Inc., a medical group that employed Leit under a written physician employment agreement.

Leit sued Aspirus in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, asserting, among other claims, a Wisconsin-law breach of contract claim. He alleged that Aspirus wrongfully terminated him under the disability-termination provision in his employment agreement.

B. Factual Background

The key facts, which were undisputed at summary judgment, can be summarized as follows:

  • Recruitment and Employment: Aspirus hired Leit in May 2019. He relocated from New York to Wisconsin and began work on October 1, 2019 as an orthopedic surgeon and regional medical director.
  • Pre‑existing Medical Condition: Leit had been diagnosed with a serious health condition earlier in 2019, before or around the time of his hiring.
  • Short‑Term Disability (STD):
    • Aspirus provided a self‑funded, employer‑administered short‑term disability plan.
    • The STD plan defined disability essentially as an inability to perform the essential functions of the employee’s occupation and inability to be accommodated in another job within the company.
    • In August 2020, Leit's condition worsened. His primary care physician instructed him to stop working and return to New York to rest.
    • Aspirus determined, based on information from Leit and his doctor, that he met the STD plan’s definition of disability and approved short‑term disability leave effective August 27, 2020.
    • Aspirus repeatedly extended his STD leave as his condition did not improve.
  • Private Long‑Term Disability (LTD) Policies Purchased by Leit:
    • Leit had independently purchased two long‑term disability policies from other insurers (separate from the Aspirus‑provided plan).
    • Both private insurers determined that Leit was disabled and paid long‑term disability benefits while he was out on Aspirus’s short‑term disability leave.
  • Employer‑Provided Long‑Term Disability (LTDI) Insurance through Lincoln:
    • Aspirus provided employees—including Leit—with access to a long‑term disability insurance policy issued by Lincoln National Life Insurance Company (“Lincoln”).
    • The LTDI policy required a waiting period of 12 months of continuous “Active Work” (full‑time performance of the main duties of the employee’s own occupation) before an employee became eligible for coverage.
    • Because Leit began work on October 1, 2019 and stopped working on August 27, 2020, he did not meet the 12‑month continuous active work requirement.
    • When Leit's STD benefits expired in February 2021, he applied for LTDI benefits from Lincoln. Lincoln denied coverage solely because he had not satisfied the waiting period; it never reached the question of whether he was “disabled” under the policy’s definition.
    • Leit appealed internally, but Lincoln affirmed the denial on the same waiting‑period basis.
  • Termination by Aspirus:
    • By May 5, 2021, Leit had exhausted all available leave and remained unable to work in any capacity.
    • Aspirus terminated his employment on May 5, 2021, invoking a provision in the employment agreement—Section 6.1.3—allowing termination upon a determination that the physician is “disabled.”
    • Section 6.1.3 stated:
      The agreement “shall terminate … [u]pon the Physician’s death or the determination of being ‘disabled.’ ‘Disabled, and the procedures for being determined disabled,’ shall be defined in the disability insurance policy provided by Aspirus hereunder.”
    • It was undisputed that this “disability insurance policy” referred to Lincoln’s LTDI policy.
    • Lincoln’s policy defined “Total Disability”/“Totally Disabled” as:
      1. During the Elimination Period and Own Occupation Period, [Total Disability] means that due to an Injury or Sickness the Insured Employee is unable to perform each of the Main Duties of his or her Own Occupation.

      2. After the Own Occupation Period, it means that due to an Injury or Sickness the Insured Employee is unable to perform each of the Main Duties of any Gainful Occupation.
    • Aspirus, based on information from Leit and his physician, determined that he was “totally disabled” under this LTDI definition and relied on Section 6.1.3 to terminate the contract.

C. The Contractual Dispute

The entire case turns on how to interpret the clause:

“Disabled, and the procedures for being determined disabled, shall be defined in the disability insurance policy provided by Aspirus hereunder.”

The parties advanced competing interpretations:

  • Leit’s interpretation:
    • The clause means that a physician may be terminated for disability only if the disability insurer (Lincoln) itself determines that the physician is disabled under the LTDI policy.
    • Because Lincoln never made a disability determination—it denied coverage purely on eligibility/waiting‑period grounds—Aspirus could not lawfully invoke Section 6.1.3 to terminate the contract.
  • Aspirus’s interpretation:
    • The clause incorporates only the substantive definition of “disabled” (and perhaps a process for evaluating the policy’s criteria), but says nothing about who must make that determination.
    • As long as Aspirus determined, using the LTDI policy’s definition, that Leit was totally disabled—and it did so based on undisputed medical evidence—Section 6.1.3 lawfully permitted termination.

Because the material facts were undisputed, the question reduced to pure contract interpretation under Wisconsin law.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit, in an order authored per curiam by Judges St. Eve, Kirsch, and Lee, affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Aspirus and denial of Leit's cross‑motion.

Key holdings:

  1. Contract Interpretation:
    • Under Wisconsin contract law, the phrase “Disabled, and the procedures for being determined disabled, shall be defined in the disability insurance policy” does not require that Lincoln (the insurer) make a disability determination before Aspirus may terminate the employment agreement.
    • Properly read in context, the clause requires only that any determination of disability be based on the definition in the LTDI policy; it does not designate Lincoln as the exclusive decision‑maker.
  2. Policy Text:
    • The LTDI policy does not, in fact, prescribe “procedures” by which Lincoln is to make disability determinations; it merely sets out claims‑submission requirements (what an employee must do to file a claim), not internal decision‑making protocols.
    • Thus, the contract language, read together with the policy, cannot reasonably be understood as an agreement that Lincoln alone will decide disability status for employment‑termination purposes.
  3. Avoidance of Absurd Results:
    • Leit’s reading would force Aspirus to continue employing—or at least keeping on its books as full‑time employees—individuals who are indisputably unable to work, whenever:
      • Lincoln denies LTDI benefits for reasons unrelated to the employee’s medical condition (e.g., waiting period not met), or
      • No LTDI claim is ever filed, and Aspirus has no way to compel Lincoln to opine on disability.
    • Wisconsin law counsels against interpreting contracts in ways that produce irrational or absurd consequences, and the court rejected Leit's construction on that basis as well.
  4. Rule 50 Argument:
    • Leit's ancillary argument that the district court violated Seventh Circuit Rule 50 by failing to provide adequate reasons for its decision was rejected. The appellate court found that the district court’s order sufficiently explained its reasoning.

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that there was no breach of contract: Aspirus acted within its contractual rights in terminating Leit's employment on the basis of disability, even in the absence of an LTDI disability determination by Lincoln.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Central Interpretive Question

The interpretive issue was narrow but significant: When an employment contract states that disability and “the procedures for being determined disabled” are “defined in” an employer‑provided disability insurance policy, does that language:

  • (a) merely incorporate the policy’s substantive definition of disability (and perhaps some evaluation steps), leaving the employer free to apply that definition itself; or
  • (b) also import the insurer’s role as the exclusive arbiter of disability, such that an actual disability determination by the insurer is a condition precedent to termination?

The Seventh Circuit squarely rejected option (b) and endorsed option (a).

B. Wisconsin Contract Law Principles and Precedents

The court anchored its reasoning in established Wisconsin contract law principles, drawing on several precedents cited in the opinion.

1. Plain Meaning and Context

  • Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 866 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Wis. 2015):
    • “Contract language is construed according to its plain or ordinary meaning, consistent with what a reasonable person would understand the words to mean under the circumstances.”
    • The court emphasized that interpretation must reflect ordinary usage and what a reasonable party in the position of the contracting parties would have understood.
  • Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 330 N.W.2d 201, 206 (Wis. 1983):
    • “It is a cardinal rule of contract construction that the meaning of a particular provision in a contract is to be ascertained with reference to the contract as a whole ….”
    • This reflects the principle that courts must interpret provisions in the context of the entire agreement, not in isolation.

The Seventh Circuit explicitly applied these rules: it did not treat the phrase “procedures for being determined disabled” as a self‑contained promise that the insurer would decide disability, but read it together with:

  • the rest of the employment contract (including its termination clause), and
  • the actual language and structure of the LTDI policy itself.

2. Elements of Breach of Contract under Wisconsin Law

The court cited Loth v. City of Milwaukee, 758 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Wis. 2008), for the basic elements of a breach‑of‑contract claim:

  • Existence of a contract,
  • Terms of the contract, and
  • Breach of a duty arising under the contract.

This framework underscores that the dispute here was purely about the meaning of Section 6.1.3. Once the court adopted Aspirus’s interpretation, there was no breach: Aspirus simply followed the contract’s terms.

3. The Surplusage Canon

Leit argued that if the court adopted Aspirus’s construction, the phrase “procedures for being determined disabled” would become meaningless surplusage.

He invoked the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s instruction in Maryland Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010), that courts should, where possible, avoid interpretations that render any contractual language superfluous or without effect.

The Seventh Circuit, however, concluded that Aspirus’s reading did not render the clause surplusage. Rather, the clause could reasonably be understood to:

  • Require Aspirus to follow the components or criteria of disability set out in the LTDI policy when deciding whether an employee is disabled for purposes of termination, even if the policy does not lay out detailed “procedures” in the sense of a step‑by‑step algorithm.

In other words, the reference to “procedures” still does work: it ties Aspirus’s decision‑making process to the structure and criteria of the LTDI policy—such as focusing on inability to perform the “main duties of [one’s] own occupation”—rather than some ad hoc or different internal standard.

4. Avoiding Absurd or Irrational Results

Crucial to the court’s analysis was the Wisconsin doctrine that contract interpretations leading to absurd or unreasonable outcomes should be avoided.

  • Bethke v. Auto‑Owners Ins. Co., 825 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Wis. 2013):
    • The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected an insurance contract interpretation that “leads to an absurd result.”
  • State ex rel. Sielen v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 499 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Wis. 1993):
    • Court required a construction that “avoid[s] an absurd or unreasonable result.”

The Seventh Circuit used these cases to reinforce its view that Leit’s interpretation was untenable because it compelled irrational consequences:

  • Retaining on “full‑time” status an employee who is undisputedly unable to perform the duties of his or her job, solely because a third‑party insurer—over whom the employer has no control—refused to decide disability on the merits or declined to act at all.

C. Why the Court Rejected Leit’s Interpretation

1. Textual Disconnect: Policy Procedures vs. Insurer Determinations

Leit’s core textual argument was that the reference to “procedures for being determined disabled” in Section 6.1.3 incorporated the LTDI policy’s claims procedures, which in turn contemplated Lincoln making disability determinations. Therefore, he argued, only Lincoln’s disability determination could trigger termination.

The court found a critical flaw: the LTDI policy does not actually contain procedures that describe how Lincoln makes disability determinations. Instead, it contains:

  • Claims procedures specifying what an employee must do to file a disability claim—forms, deadlines, documentation, etc.
  • A substantive definition of “Total Disability” (e.g., inability to perform “each of the main duties” of one’s own occupation during an “Own Occupation” period).

What the policy does not include, according to the court, is any language:

  • Requiring Lincoln to make a disability determination upon demand,
  • Describing Lincoln’s internal decision‑making process, or
  • Obligating Lincoln to adjudicate disability status even where coverage is denied for other reasons (like failure to satisfy the waiting period).

Therefore, reading the contract as if it said “you can only terminate when Lincoln determines you are disabled” finds no support in the actual policy language that Section 6.1.3 supposedly incorporates.

2. Practical Anomalies and Hypotheticals

The Seventh Circuit used two practical scenarios to show the “anomalous” nature of Leit's position.

a. Leit's Own Case

In Leit's actual circumstances:

  • There was no real dispute that he was unable to perform the duties of his occupation due to his medical condition.
  • Two private, independently purchased LTD insurers had found him disabled.
  • Aspirus’s own STD plan had previously recognized him as disabled and repeatedly extended his leave.

However, Lincoln never made a disability determination because it denied his LTDI claim on a threshold eligibility ground—failure to meet the 12‑month active‑work waiting period. It never evaluated his health status.

Under Leit's reading, Aspirus would be compelled to maintain him as a full‑time employee indefinitely because:

  • Lincoln's refusal to consider disability on the merits would prevent any “disability determination” under the contract, and
  • Aspirus had no contractual or legal mechanism to force Lincoln to reach that question.

In effect, the parties would have made their employment relationship contingent not on Leit's actual ability to work, but on a third party’s discretionary decisions and procedural posture, even when unrelated to medical status.

b. Hypothetical Early‑Tenure Employee

The court offered a second hypothetical:

  • An employee becomes disabled one month after beginning work at Aspirus.
  • The employee reasonably concludes that he or she will not meet the LTDI policy's waiting period or other eligibility requirements and thus never files a claim with Lincoln.

Under Leit's theory:

  • No LTDI claim would be pending;
  • Lincoln would have no occasion—and no apparent obligation—to assess disability status;
  • Aspirus would be legally disabled from terminating the employee for disability, despite undisputed inability to work, because there would be no insurer determination.

Again, this would create an “irrational” result: an employer forced to keep a non‑working employee indefinitely, without the contractual ability to terminate for disability, because the insurer has not opined.

These scenarios vividly illustrate why Wisconsin’s anti‑absurdity canon applied. The contract could not reasonably be read to establish such a dysfunctional scheme.

3. No Identified Mechanism for Compelling Insurer Action

The court also noted a practical hurdle: Leit failed to identify any mechanism by which Aspirus could demand or compel Lincoln to:

  • Render a disability determination separate from, or in the absence of, coverage eligibility, or
  • Issue an advisory opinion on disability solely to accommodate an employment‑contract trigger.

Absent such a mechanism in the policy, it is unlikely the parties intended—or a reasonable reader would infer—that their employment contract would make termination power dependent on an action by a third party that might never occur and that the employer cannot force.

D. Why Aspirus’s Interpretation Prevailed

Against this backdrop, Aspirus’s reading was comparatively straightforward:

  • The employment agreement:
    • Allows termination “upon the determination of being ‘disabled.’”
    • States that “Disabled, and the procedures for being determined disabled, shall be defined in the [LTDI] policy.”
  • The LTDI policy:
    • Defines “Total Disability” based on the employee's inability to perform the main duties of his or her own occupation (during the “Own Occupation” period).
  • Thus, the contract requires that:
    • Aspirus must use the LTDI policy’s substantive definition of disability—i.e., focus on inability to perform occupational duties because of sickness or injury—when deciding whether a physician is “disabled” for termination purposes.
    • Aspirus must follow that general evaluative framework (“procedures”) rather than make up its own unrelated standard.

Under this interpretation:

  • Nothing in the contract specifically appoints Lincoln as the ultimate decision‑maker for employment termination decisions.
  • Nothing suggests that a coverage decision (subject to eligibility conditions, waiting periods, etc.) is a prerequisite to terminating employment.
  • It remains entirely consistent to say:
    • Lincoln denies LTDI benefits because Leit did not meet the policy’s waiting‑period condition.
    • Aspirus, independently and for its own contractual purposes, finds Leit “totally disabled” under the policy’s substantive definition.

Importantly, the court emphasized that there was no dispute that Leit was in fact unable to perform the duties of his position when Aspirus terminated him. So, under the LTDI policy's definitional language, he was “totally disabled.” Since the contract simply tied “disabled” to that definition, Aspirus acted within its contractual rights in terminating him.

E. The Nonprecedential Nature of the Disposition

The opinion is explicitly labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” and notes that it is “To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.”

In the Seventh Circuit:

  • Nonprecedential dispositions are not binding precedent on future panels or district courts.
  • However, under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, they may be cited for their persuasive value, subject to circuit rules.

Thus, while Leit v. Aspirus does not formally establish new binding law in the Seventh Circuit, its reasoning can still influence:

  • Wisconsin contract cases in federal court,
  • Employment disputes involving medical groups, physician contracts, or disability insurance incorporation, and
  • Contract drafting practices that incorporate external policy documents.

F. Seventh Circuit Rule 50 Issue

Lastly, Leit argued that the district court failed to comply with Seventh Circuit Rule 50, which requires written decisions explaining the reasons when district courts resolve claims on the merits (including via summary judgment).

The Seventh Circuit summarily rejected this argument:

  • The record showed that the district court’s order “adequately sets out the reasons” for granting Aspirus’s motion and denying Leit's cross‑motion.
  • No further detail was necessary; there was no procedural defect warranting reversal on this ground.

This portion of the opinion reinforces appellate tolerance for relatively concise, but substantively reasoned, district court orders at the summary judgment stage, so long as the basis for decision is clear.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Drafting Physician and Executive Employment Agreements

Although nonprecedential, the decision offers practical lessons for drafters of employment agreements, especially in the healthcare sector where disability and productivity are often explicitly addressed.

  1. Be precise about who decides disability.
    • If the parties intend that an insurer’s determination will be a condition precedent to termination, that intention should be spelled out explicitly, for example:
      “Employer may terminate this Agreement for Disability only upon receipt of a written determination of total disability from the insurer under the Employer’s long‑term disability policy then in effect.”
    • Absent such clarity, courts are likely to read references to insurance policies as incorporating definitions and criteria, not delegating decision‑making power.
  2. Distinguish between disability benefit eligibility and disability status for employment purposes.
    • This case highlights that eligibility for disability benefits (subject to waiting periods, enrollment requirements, etc.) is conceptually distinct from being medically disabled under a policy’s definition.
    • Employers may contractually tie termination rights to the latter (functional inability to work), even if benefits are unavailable for independent reasons.
  3. Clarify the role of short‑term vs. long‑term disability plans.
    • Here, Aspirus had:
      • a self‑funded STD plan (which it administered and which had its own disability definition and leave structure), and
      • a third‑party LTDI policy (with waiting periods, elimination periods, and “own occupation” definitions).
    • Physician contracts should ideally explain how these different benefit structures interact with:
      • employment status,
      • termination triggers, and
      • post‑termination benefits or obligations.

B. For Employees and Their Counsel

From the employee’s perspective, Leit underscores several risks:

  • Do not assume that receiving LTDI benefits is a prerequisite to disability‑based termination.
    • Even if an employee fails to qualify for LTDI benefits because of technical conditions (such as a waiting period), the employer may still have the contractual right to deem the employee disabled and terminate employment.
  • Understand incorporation clauses.
    • Language that “disability shall be defined in the insurer’s policy” is likely to be interpreted as importing substantive definitions, not as giving the insurer the power to determine whether employment continues.
  • Consider negotiating protective language.
    • When feasible, employees (particularly physicians and executives) may seek clauses linking:
      • the timing of termination and
      • the vesting or payment of benefits
      to the outcome of disability benefit claims.
    • For example, parties could stipulate that termination shall not occur before the conclusion of all administrative appeals of an LTDI claim, or provide severance in the interim.

C. For Employers and Plan Administrators

Employers can take several cues from the decision:

  • Independent disability determinations are permissible if the contract allows them.
    • As long as the employment contract does not make insurer approval a condition precedent, the employer may make its own disability assessment by applying the incorporated policy definitions.
  • Document the disability analysis carefully.
    • Employers should document:
      • the medical evidence reviewed,
      • the specific policy language applied (e.g., “unable to perform each of the main duties of his or her own occupation”), and
      • the reasoning used to conclude that the employee meets the policy definition.
    • This record will be important if termination is later challenged as inconsistent with the contract.
  • Coordinate but do not conflate benefit and employment decisions.
    • Benefit determinations (especially under ERISA‑governed LTDI plans) often follow their own timelines and standards.
    • Employment termination decisions may need to be made on a different timeline; employers should ensure:
      • they do not unlawfully discriminate against disabled employees, and
      • they follow the precise terms of their contracts when terminating based on disability.

D. Potential Influence Beyond Wisconsin Law

While grounded in Wisconsin law, the opinion's logic tracks general principles of contract interpretation that many jurisdictions share:

  • Plain meaning controls absent ambiguity;
  • Contracts must be read as a whole, with each clause harmonized where possible;
  • Surplusage should be avoided, but not at the cost of creating absurd consequences;
  • Courts are reluctant to infer that parties intended to give a third party veto power over core employment decisions without clear language.

For that reason, Leit may be persuasive authority in other federal courts—particularly in diversity cases involving physician employment contracts and incorporated disability insurance policies—even though it is not binding precedent.

VI. Explanation of Key Legal and Insurance Concepts

To make the opinion more accessible, it is useful to clarify several technical terms.

1. Diversity Jurisdiction

“Diversity jurisdiction” refers to the power of federal courts to hear civil cases where:

  • The parties are citizens of different states (or a U.S. citizen and a foreign citizen), and
  • The amount in controversy exceeds a statutory threshold.

Here, Leit sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, meaning the dispute was governed by state substantive law (Wisconsin contract law) but heard in a federal forum.

2. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedural mechanism by which a court decides a case—or a particular claim—without a trial when:

  • There is no genuine dispute of material fact, and
  • The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Both Aspirus and Leit moved for summary judgment (Aspirus on liability and damages; Leit on liability only), agreeing there were no material factual disputes—only a legal dispute about contract interpretation.

3. Short‑Term vs. Long‑Term Disability

  • Short‑Term Disability (STD):
    • Typically employer‑funded and administered.
    • Designed to cover relatively brief periods of inability to work.
    • In this case, Aspirus’s STD plan defined disability in terms of inability to perform essential job functions and inability to be accommodated in another company position.
  • Long‑Term Disability Insurance (LTDI):
    • Usually provided through an insurance company and often governed by ERISA.
    • Provides income replacement for prolonged or permanent disabilities.
    • Typically has:
      • a waiting period (eligibility threshold such as months of active work), and
      • an elimination period (a period of time of continuous disability that must elapse before benefits are paid).
    • In this case, Lincoln’s LTDI policy required 12 months of continuous “Active Work” to be eligible to enroll and claim benefits.

4. “Own Occupation” vs. “Any Occupation” Disability Definitions

Many LTDI policies distinguish between:

  • Own Occupation Period:
    • The initial period (sometimes 24 months or similar) during which a person is considered disabled if unable to perform the main duties of their own occupation.
  • Any Occupation Period:
    • After the own‑occupation period, some policies require inability to perform the duties of any gainful occupation for which the individual is reasonably suited by education, training, or experience.

Lincoln’s LTDI policy reflected this structure:

  • During the “Elimination Period” and “Own Occupation Period”: disability = inability to perform each main duty of one’s own occupation.
  • After that: disability = inability to perform each main duty of any gainful occupation.

5. Waiting Period vs. Disability Determination

A crucial distinction in this case:

  • Waiting Period:
    • An eligibility requirement (e.g., 12 months of full‑time active work) that must be satisfied before the insurance coverage is even in force.
    • It is not a judgment on the employee’s health; it is purely a coverage condition.
  • Disability Determination:
    • An assessment of whether the individual’s medical condition and functional limitations meet the policy’s substantive definition of disability.

Lincoln denied Leit's claim because he failed the waiting period, so it never performed a disability determination. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion rests heavily on this distinction: the employment contract did not say that only an approved LTDI benefits claim could trigger termination.

6. Nonprecedential Disposition

A “nonprecedential disposition” is an appellate ruling that:

  • Resolves the particular case,
  • May be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (subject to local rules),
  • But is not binding as precedent for future panels or lower courts in that circuit.

The designation reflects the appellate court’s view that the case does not break new doctrinal ground or warrant publication as a full precedential opinion, even though its reasoning can still be persuasive in similar cases.

VII. Conclusion

Leit v. Aspirus Medical Group, Inc. reflects a straightforward but important application of Wisconsin contract interpretation principles to a modern employment–insurance interface problem. When an employment contract states that “disabled, and the procedures for being determined disabled, shall be defined in the disability insurance policy,” the Seventh Circuit held that:

  • The clause incorporates the policy’s definition of disability and related evaluative criteria, but
  • It does not convert the disability insurer into the exclusive decision‑maker for employment purposes or require an insurer disability determination as a condition precedent to termination.

The court’s rejection of Leit's contrary reading flows from:

  • The absence of any language in the LTDI policy that prescribes insurer decision‑making “procedures” on disability beyond claims submission rules;
  • The need to read the contract as a whole and give effect to all provisions without generating absurdities; and
  • Wisconsin’s established canons against surplusage and irrational outcomes.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores:

  • The importance of careful drafting when tying employment rights (like termination for disability) to external insurance policies;
  • The distinction between being medically disabled under a policy definition and being eligible for disability insurance benefits; and
  • The likelihood that courts will resist interpretations that effectively give insurers unbargained‑for control over core employment decisions, absent clear contract language.

Although nonprecedential, Leit stands as a detailed illustration of how federal courts applying Wisconsin law will approach incorporation clauses and disability‑termination provisions—guidance that is likely to be influential in future contract drafting and litigation involving physicians and other professionals whose employment is closely intertwined with disability coverage.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Judge(s)

PerCuriam

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