Contextual Text Messages as Non‑Hearsay in the Sixth Circuit: A Commentary on United States v. Wise

Contextual Text Messages as Non‑Hearsay in the Sixth Circuit:
A Commentary on United States v. Amber Wise

I. Introduction

In United States v. Amber Wise, No. 24‑5024 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025) (unpublished), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Amber Wise for money laundering and conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl. The appeal centered not on the sufficiency of the drug and financial evidence, but on a focused evidentiary dispute: whether two sets of text messages recovered from the phone of a co‑conspirator were properly admitted at trial.

The decision is significant for two principal reasons:

  1. It clarifies, in expressly textual terms, that “contextualizing” statements—here, a drug customer’s text messages—are non‑hearsay when they are admitted solely to make a witness’s own statements intelligible, and therefore do not operate as a hearsay exception but fall outside Rule 801(c) altogether.
  2. It illustrates how the plain‑error standard of review and the doctrine of co‑conspirator statements (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)) combine to make reversal very unlikely where counsel has not preserved objections and the challenged evidence is marginal or cumulative.

While the opinion is “not recommended for publication,” it is a detailed application of recent Sixth Circuit authority such as United States v. Jaffal and United States v. Rodriguez‑Lopez, and it further solidifies the Circuit’s approach to contextual statements, Rule 403 balancing, and co‑conspirator hearsay.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and Procedural Posture

The United States charged Amber Wise as the supplier in a heroin and fentanyl trafficking conspiracy operating in Knoxville, Tennessee. Her principal co‑conspirators were:

  • Harvey “Mike” Horn – a drug dealer, father of one of Wise’s children, and romantic partner of another co‑conspirator.
  • Breanna (“Bree”) Heatherly – a street‑level dealer and primary target of law enforcement’s controlled buys.
  • Kelli – Heatherly’s mother, a known drug user who also sent wire transfers and occasionally traveled to obtain drugs.

After a four‑day jury trial in the Eastern District of Tennessee, Wise was convicted of:

  • Money laundering, and
  • Conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl.

On appeal, Wise did not challenge every aspect of the government’s case. Instead, she focused on the admission of:

  • Exhibit 36: A text conversation between Heatherly and her mother Kelli concerning drug supply and Kelli’s desire to obtain more drugs (and her offer to “trade” luxury purses “for amber or his girls”).
  • Exhibit 37: A text conversation between Heatherly and an individual identified as “BR,” a customer seeking fentanyl.

Wise argued that admission of these text messages constituted reversible error because they were hearsay, did not meet the standards for co‑conspirator statements, and were unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

B. Factual Context

The factual record underlying the evidentiary issues is important, because the appellate court repeatedly relies on how strong and detailed the government’s other evidence was—independent of the challenged texts.

Law enforcement began a heroin investigation in Knoxville in March 2020, conducting multiple controlled buys from Heatherly and then Horn. After Heatherly and Horn were arrested, Special Agent Neal Baldwin:

  • Obtained cell‑site location data for Horn and Heatherly;
  • Noticed regular visits to a Walmart and a Dollar General, both of which housed wire‑transfer counters;
  • Issued administrative subpoenas to wire transfer companies like MoneyGram; and
  • Uncovered that Wise and her daughter Mychelle had received dozens of wire transfers—$27,865 in total—from Horn, Heatherly, Kelli, and other known drug users between July 2018 and late April 2020.

Heatherly consented to a full forensic extraction of her phone, which revealed over 18,900 text messages, including Exhibits 36 and 37. At trial, Heatherly:

  • Testified at length about Wise’s role as supplier;
  • Explained the Detroit–Knoxville supply chain, including specific drug quantities (300 grams or more of heroin or fentanyl per trip);
  • Described arrangements for pre‑payment via MoneyGram and in‑person exchanges of drugs in fast‑food bags; and
  • Confirmed that she sometimes traveled with Horn or Kelli to meet Wise.

Critically, Heatherly testified to the substance of the conspiracy—including Wise’s role—without relying on the contents of Exhibits 36 or 37. Those exhibits were then used to illustrate and corroborate her testimony.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Judge John K. Bush writing, joined by Judges Moore and Davis) affirmed Wise’s convictions. In broad outline, the Court held:

  1. BR’s text messages (Exhibit 37):
    • Were not hearsay because they were admitted only to provide context for Heatherly’s own admissible statements, not for the truth of anything BR asserted;
    • Therefore did not fall within Rule 801(c) at all and did not require an exception; and
    • Were not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, especially given the district court’s limiting instructions and the comparatively modest risk of bias.
  2. Kelli’s text messages (Exhibit 36):
    • Were admitted under the co‑conspirator provision, Rule 801(d)(2)(E), after the district court made an Enright finding that Wise, Heatherly, and Kelli were in a conspiracy and Kelli’s statements were in furtherance of it.
    • However, because Wise’s counsel withdrew any objection and did not object at trial, review was only for plain error.
    • Even assuming error, Wise could not show that admission of Kelli’s messages affected her substantial rights or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.
  3. Cumulative error failed because the Court discerned no error as to either exhibit.

The decision thereby underscores three doctrinal points:

  • The categorization of context statements as non‑hearsay, not as a hearsay “exception,” in line with the text of Rule 801(c) and cases like Jaffal and Rodriguez‑Lopez;
  • The high threshold for reversal under Rule 403 and the reliance on limiting instructions to manage the risk of unfair prejudice; and
  • The difficulty of prevailing on a plain‑error challenge to co‑conspirator hearsay where the challenged evidence is short, cumulative, or even partially helpful to the defense.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review: Abuse of Discretion vs. Plain Error

The Sixth Circuit’s analysis begins by carefully distinguishing the standards of review applicable to each exhibit, a distinction that in practice is outcome‑determinative.

  • Exhibit 37 (BR’s texts) – Wise preserved her objection at trial. The Court therefore reviewed the district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590, 605 (6th Cir. 2022). The abuse‑of‑discretion standard is deferential; reversal is appropriate only if the decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.
  • Exhibit 36 (Kelli’s texts) – Wise did not object at trial and had previously withdrawn a pretrial objection. The Court thus reviewed admission of these statements for plain error, citing United States v. Johnson, 79 F.4th 684, 703 (6th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085, 1100 (6th Cir. 2022).

Plain error requires the defendant to satisfy four elements, drawn from United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993):

  1. There was error;
  2. The error was plain (clear or obvious under current law);
  3. The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (typically meaning a reasonable probability of a different outcome); and
  4. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The Court underscores that this is a “sparingly” used exception, quoting United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

This rigorous standard for Exhibit 36 gave the government a powerful shield: even if the co‑conspirator analysis were flawed, Wise still had to prove both outcome‑changing prejudice and systemic unfairness—an especially tall order where the challenged statements were brief and only mildly incriminatory.

B. Contextual Text Messages as Non‑Hearsay

1. The Rule 801(c) Framework

The key doctrinal dispute over BR’s messages concerned the nature of “contextual” statements. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as:

“a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”

The structure of the Rules distinguishes:

  • Non‑hearsay – statements that do not meet either definitional element (for example, they’re not offered for their truth), and
  • Hearsay exceptions – statements that are hearsay under Rule 801(c) but are nonetheless admissible under Rules 803 or 804 or 801(d) (e.g., present‑sense impressions, excited utterances, co‑conspirator statements, party‑opponent admissions).

The Sixth Circuit emphasizes this structural point: statements offered solely to provide context do not qualify as hearsay at all because they are not offered for their truth. As the Court puts it, citing United States v. Jaffal, 79 F.4th 582, 598 (6th Cir. 2023):

“Statements offered to provide context do not count as hearsay because the proponent does not offer them for their truth but to place the other statements in context. … These statements are admitted as non-hearsay, not as hearsay that meets an exception.”

Thus, the admissibility of BR’s messages does not depend on any hearsay exception. Instead, it turns on whether the government genuinely used them only to help the jury understand Heatherly’s side of the conversation.

2. Wise’s Proposed “Context Exception” Test and the Court’s Rejection

Wise conceded that some contextual statements may be admitted but proposed a limiting rule: context statements should be admissible only if:

  1. They contextualize a statement made by the defendant, or
  2. The declarant is a known and available individual.

The Court firmly rejected this framing for two reasons:

  1. Textualism: The Court stressed that the operative question under Rule 801(c) is whether the statement is offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Nothing in the Rule’s text supports limiting admissibility to statements contextualizing a defendant’s own remarks or to situations in which the declarant is known and available. The Court invoked Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 44 (2014), noting that terms in the Federal Rules of Evidence must be given their “plain meaning.”
  2. Policy fit: The hearsay rule is aimed at mitigating risks associated with a declarant’s credibility (perception, memory, sincerity). As the Court observed, echoing United States v. Rodriguez‑Lopez, 565 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2009), contextual statements admitted for their effect on the hearer or to explain a conversation “do[] not depend on the [declarant’s] truthfulness, memory, or perception.” Accordingly, they do not implicate the core reliability concerns underlying the hearsay ban.

By declining to adopt Wise’s “context exception” framework, the Court reinforces a straightforward textual approach: where a statement is not offered for its truth, Rule 801(c) is not triggered. The only remaining constraints are relevance and balancing under Rule 403.

3. Application to BR’s Text Messages

In practice, Exhibit 37 was handled at trial in a manner consistent with the context‑only theory:

  • BR did not testify, and his messages themselves were not read in detail to the jury.
  • The district court twice gave a limiting instruction that BR’s statements could be used only to provide context for Heatherly’s statements and not for their truth.
  • Heatherly did not recite BR’s central incriminating messages verbatim; she instead explained, in her own words, that BR “was wanting [her] to give him some of the fentanyl to help him out, and he would give [her] some back the next day.”

Thus, BR’s side of the conversation served only as the background against which Heatherly’s own responses (which were admissible against Wise) could be meaningfully understood.

Importantly, the Court relies on Rodriguez‑Lopez for an additional refinement: a request to buy drugs does not even assert a proposition that can be true or false. As Rodriguez‑Lopez put it:

“[A] request to buy drugs … does not assert a proposition that could be true or false.”

A text saying, in substance, “Can you bring me some fentanyl?” does not assert a factual condition about the world; it simply asks. Whether BR truly wanted drugs or whether he was sincere is irrelevant to its probative value in showing that Heatherly functioned as a drug source. That feature further distances BR’s texts from the core concerns of hearsay doctrine.

C. Rule 403 and the Balancing of Probative Value and Prejudice

1. The Sixth Circuit’s Deferential Stance

Even where evidence is not hearsay, it may still be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which permits exclusion if the probative value is “substantially outweighed” by, inter alia, the danger of unfair prejudice.

The Sixth Circuit emphasizes its very deferential review of Rule 403 decisions:

  • It grants district courts “very broad discretion” (citing United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 667 (6th Cir. 2011)), and
  • It takes a “maximal view of the probative effect of the evidence and a minimal view of its unfairly prejudicial effect” (citing United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 429 (6th Cir. 1999)).

The Court also reiterates that “unfair prejudice” does not encompass the ordinary, legitimate damage evidence does to a defendant’s case. Rather, as Gibbs teaches, unfair prejudice means a tendency “to suggest decision on an improper basis,” such as emotion, stereotype, or propensity.

2. Applying Rule 403 to BR’s Messages

The Court identifies several reasons why BR’s texts did not violate Rule 403:

  1. Probative value – BR’s messages made Heatherly’s responses more “comprehensible to the jury,” citing United States v. Knox, 166 F.3d 1215, 1998 WL 777986, at *4 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). When a one‑sided conversation is presented (only Heatherly’s statements), jurors may not understand precisely what she is responding to. Showing the other half of the exchange elevates the probative value of Heatherly’s own words. Thus, the contextual statements themselves acquire probative force by clarifying the significance of the admissible statements.
  2. Limited prejudice – Wise argued that the texts invited the jury to infer that BR knew “amber” referred to Amber Wise. The Court responds that BR never actually said that, never affirmed knowledge of Wise, and did not discuss her trafficking. He simply indicated he was at home so Heatherly knew where to deliver drugs. Under Wise’s theory, the only way to avoid unfair prejudice would be for BR to affirmatively say he did not know Wise—an artificial and unprecedented requirement.
  3. Comparative analysis – The Court contrasts this case with Gibbs, where the admission of gang‑related T‑shirt photographs was upheld even though they showed the defendant’s gang affiliation and admiration of violence. If such evidence survived Rule 403 scrutiny, the comparatively restrained content of BR’s messages—requests for drugs plus mundane logistical information—falls well within permissible bounds.
  4. Limiting instruction – The district court twice admonished the jury that BR’s statements could be considered only for context. Citing United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1000 (6th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Lawson, 535 F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2008), the Court reiterates that limiting instructions generally suffice to cure or substantially mitigate potential prejudice.

Wise’s key counter‑argument was that the jury must have disregarded the limiting instruction because, otherwise, it could not have known the conversation was about drugs. The Court finds this factually inaccurate and doctrinally unsound:

  • Factually, Heatherly explicitly told the jury that BR was seeking fentanyl and that she was responding to such a request; no reliance on the content of BR’s messages (for their truth) was required.
  • Doctrinally, Rodriguez‑Lopez makes clear that the significance of a request for drugs does not depend on whether the caller truly desired drugs; the value derives from the fact that the defendant (or, here, Heatherly) was a person whom others contacted to obtain drugs.

Finally, the Court dispels the idea that prejudice flowed from the centrality of Exhibit 37 to the government’s case. While Heatherly’s own texts and testimony were indeed critical, BR’s side of the conversation was not heavily emphasized; the government never read his key text aloud in closing, but instead paraphrased the request for drugs.

On balance, the Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of BR’s contextual messages was not “substantially outweighed” by any risk of unfair prejudice.

D. Co‑Conspirator Statements, Enright Findings, and Plain Error

1. The Rule 801(d)(2)(E) Framework

Kelli’s texts were admitted as co‑conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which treats as “not hearsay” a statement offered against an opposing party that:

“was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

Under Sixth Circuit law, most prominently United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 335 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 325 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978)), the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that:

  1. A conspiracy existed;
  2. The defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and
  3. The co‑conspirator made the statements during the course of and in furtherance of that conspiracy.

These preliminary factual determinations are often called an Enright finding, and the district court here made such a finding at the close of the government’s case, expressly including Kelli as a co‑conspirator whose statements furthered the operation.

2. Wise’s Challenge and the Court’s Plain‑Error Approach

On appeal, Wise argued that the Enright finding was erroneous because:

  • There was insufficient evidence that Kelli herself was a member of the conspiracy; and
  • Her texts were not actually “in furtherance” of the conspiracy but reflected personal drug use or family concerns.

However, because Wise did not object to the admission of Exhibit 36 at trial—and indeed withdrew an earlier objection—the Court reviewed the issue for plain error. Rather than resolving whether the Enright finding was right or wrong, the Court assumes arguendo that there might have been error and focuses on whether Wise satisfied the key third and fourth prongs:

  1. Substantial rights – Did the alleged error create a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome, as defined in United States v. Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016))?
  2. Fairness, integrity, or public reputation – Did it seriously undermine confidence in the judicial process (Olano; Atkinson)?

The Court concludes that Wise fails both prongs:

  • Limited role of Kelli’s texts: The most incriminating content in Exhibit 36 came from Heatherly’s statements—e.g., that Wise was coming to town and that Horn could supply drugs after her arrival. Wise did not challenge the admissibility of Heatherly’s portion of the conversation. Thus, excluding Kelli’s lines or treating them only as context would have left the core damaging material untouched.
  • Minimal emphasis: Very few of Kelli’s texts were read aloud. The government spent little time on Exhibit 36, and Wise’s counsel chose not to cross‑examine Heatherly about it. Citing United States v. Stokes, 834 F. App’x 213, 217 (6th Cir. 2020), the Court notes that fleeting or marginal evidence is unlikely to affect a trial’s outcome.
  • Cumulative nature: Kelli’s texts largely conveyed information already in evidence by other means: that she knew Wise, that she knew of Wise’s travel to and from Knoxville, and that she participated in MoneyGram transfers and travel to obtain drugs. The jury already knew, for instance, that Kelli had sent payments to Wise’s daughter and had traveled with Heatherly to meet Wise.
  • Support for the defense theory: One of Kelli’s texts offered to trade “2 coach purses, & a gucci purse, for amber or his girls,” which dovetailed with Wise’s defense that wire transfers from Horn and others were forms of informal child support or family provision, given Horn’s relationship to Wise and her children. The Court notes this may explain why defense counsel did not object, referencing Wright & Miller’s observation that failure to object can be a tactical choice.

On the fourth prong, Wise argued that her inability to cross‑examine Kelli undermined fairness. The Court rejects this argument as undeveloped:

  • Wise did not explain why she could not have called Kelli as a defense witness, if cross‑examination was important.
  • She did not persuasively articulate why Kelli’s texts were “some of the most damaging evidence” against her; the record shows they played only a minor role.

Consequently, the Court held that Wise failed to carry her burden on either substantial‑rights or fairness‑integrity prongs, and thus no plain error justified reversal.

E. Limiting Instructions and the Presumption Jurors Follow Them

A recurring device in the Court’s reasoning is the limiting instruction. The district court specifically instructed the jury:

  • That BR’s texts were admitted only to provide context to Heatherly’s statements, and
  • Not to consider BR’s messages for the truth of any matter asserted.

The Sixth Circuit reiterates the long‑standing presumption that juries follow such instructions, absent concrete evidence to the contrary. Citing Johnson, 79 F.4th at 699, and earlier cases like Talley and Lawson, the Court holds that Wise offered no evidence that the jury disregarded the instructions. Her speculation that the jury must have misused BR’s statements to infer drug trafficking is contradicted by Heatherly’s explicit testimony about the nature of the conversation.

This deference to limiting instructions is doctrinally important: it allows courts to admit contextual or potentially sensitive material for a confined purpose without automatically triggering exclusion under Rule 403, so long as the instructions are “carefully crafted” and trial counsel can rely on jurors to honor them.

F. Tactical Non‑Objections and Appellate Consequences

The Court closes with a noteworthy point: the record suggests that defense counsel’s decision not to object to Exhibit 36 may have been strategic. As the Court notes, quoting Wright & Miller, “a failure to object may arise from legitimate tactical considerations.” Kelli’s text offering purses “for amber or his girls” could reinforce the defense narrative that Horn viewed himself as a provider for Wise’s family, and that money transfers were not drug payments but informal support.

This observation matters because it highlights a structural reality: the American system relies heavily on contemporaneous objections to flag errors. When counsel chooses not to object (for any reason—strategic or otherwise), appellate courts apply plain‑error review, which makes reversal far less likely. Wise thus serves as a cautionary tale: evidentiary rulings not challenged at trial are exceedingly difficult to undo on appeal, especially when the challenged statements are brief, cumulative, or even partly favorable.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

To place Wise in context, it is useful to translate some of the legal doctrines into more accessible terms.

1. Hearsay and Contextual Statements

  • Hearsay is an out‑of‑court statement offered to prove that what it says is actually true. For example, “Amber sold me heroin yesterday” is hearsay if offered to prove that Amber indeed sold heroin yesterday.
  • A contextual statement is introduced not to show that the statement is true but to help the jury understand another statement or action. For example, if Heatherly texts, “I’ll bring it over,” the jury may not know what “it” is unless they also see that BR texted, “Can you bring me some fentanyl?” BR’s text is then admitted to make Heatherly’s text meaningful; the truth of BR’s request is irrelevant.

In Wise, the Court held that BR’s messages were contextual and therefore not hearsay at all.

2. Rule 403: Unfair Prejudice vs. Probative Value

  • Probative value means how much a piece of evidence helps prove something important in the case.
  • Unfair prejudice refers to the risk that the evidence will cause the jury to decide the case for an improper reason—such as inflamed emotion or bias—rather than rational evaluation of the facts.

Rule 403 allows a court to exclude evidence only when unfair prejudice “substantially outweighs” probative value. The bar is high, and appellate review is very deferential.

3. Co‑Conspirator Statements and Enright Findings

  • Ordinarily, hearsay is inadmissible. But under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a statement made by one member of a conspiracy during and in furtherance of the conspiracy can be used against another member as if it were that defendant’s own statement.
  • Before admitting such statements, the judge must make an Enright finding that there was a conspiracy, that the defendant was part of it, and that the statement furthered it.

In Wise, the district court made an Enright finding about Kelli’s texts, but the Court of Appeals ultimately avoided deciding whether that finding was correct because Wise could not meet the plain‑error standard.

4. Plain Error Review

If trial counsel does not object to an error, the appellate court reviews only for plain error. This is much harder for the defendant to win. She must show:

  1. An error that is clear under current law,
  2. That likely changed the outcome, and
  3. That seriously undermines the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.

In Wise, the Court held that—even assuming error—Kelli’s text messages were too limited, cumulative, and even partly favorable to have met this demanding standard.

5. Limiting Instructions

A limiting instruction tells the jury to consider evidence for one purpose but not another. For example: “You may consider BR’s text only to understand Heatherly’s responses, not as proof that BR actually wanted drugs.”

Courts generally presume juries follow such instructions unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. This presumption played a major role in upholding the admission of BR’s texts in Wise.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Solidifying the Non‑Hearsay Status of Contextual Digital Communications

Wise builds on Jaffal and Rodriguez‑Lopez by applying their principles to text messages and by explicitly rejecting a defendant‑friendly recharacterization of context as a special, limited “exception” to hearsay.

For future cases in the Sixth Circuit, Wise reinforces that:

  • Text and electronic messages from non‑testifying third parties that merely provide context to an admissible participant’s statements will generally be treated as non‑hearsay.
  • Defendants cannot insist that contextual evidence be confined to exchanges involving the defendant’s own words or only where the declarant is identified and available.
  • The primary constraints on such contextual evidence will be relevance and Rule 403, not the hearsay rule itself.

B. Evidentiary Strategy in Drug and Conspiracy Prosecutions

In drug and conspiracy prosecutions built around digital communications, Wise clarifies the government’s pathway:

  • The government can present co‑conspirators’ and customers’ texts to illuminate the meaning of the principal witness’s statements, so long as those third‑party messages are genuinely used only for context.
  • Limiting instructions will usually suffice to protect the defendant from misuse of such evidence—and will be presumed effective on appeal.

Defense counsel, in turn, must be prepared to:

  • Make timely and specific objections if they believe contextual evidence is being offered in substance for its truth;
  • Develop a record demonstrating how the risk of misuse outweighs probative value under Rule 403; and
  • Be strategic about whether to contest co‑conspirator status and “in furtherance” requirements at the Enright stage.

C. The Consequences of Non‑Objection and the Power of Plain Error

Perhaps the most practical lesson of Wise is the power of non‑objection. Because Wise’s counsel withdrew objections to Exhibit 36 and did not object during trial, the appellate court’s review was limited to plain error—an extremely defendant‑unfriendly standard.

In effect, the opinion shows:

  • How difficult it is to reverse a conviction on evidentiary grounds when the contested statement is not central to the prosecution’s theory,
  • How the presence of substantial independent evidence of guilt diminishes the likelihood that any single evidentiary ruling affected the verdict, and
  • How even potentially debatable co‑conspirator rulings will generally be insulated from reversal absent a full and timely objection below.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Amber Wise is a focused evidentiary decision with broader implications for hearsay doctrine and trial practice in the Sixth Circuit. It:

  • Reaffirms that contextual statements, including text messages from drug customers, are non‑hearsay when used solely to clarify the meaning of an admissible participant’s statements;
  • Rejects an attempt to repackage “context” as a narrowly confined hearsay exception, instead grounding admissibility in the plain text of Rule 801(c);
  • Demonstrates robust deference to district courts’ Rule 403 balancing, especially where limiting instructions are used and followed; and
  • Illustrates the formidable hurdle defendants face on plain‑error review, particularly regarding co‑conspirator statements that were not objected to at trial and that are cumulative or even partially favorable.

In the broader landscape of evidence law, Wise continues a trend toward treating third‑party communications as admissible context rather than prohibited hearsay, especially in the digital age where conversations are routinely preserved in full. At the same time, it underscores the need for defense counsel to be vigilant in preserving objections and building a record on prejudice if they hope to contest such evidence successfully on appeal.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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