Constructive Notice, Imputed Knowledge, and School Liability for Teacher Sexual Abuse under New York’s Child Victims Act

Commentary on R.L. v. Holland Central School District, 2025 NY Slip Op 07178 (4th Dept)

I. Introduction

The decision in R.L. v. Holland Central School District sits at the intersection of two powerful currents in New York law:

The expansion of civil remedies for survivors of childhood sexual abuse under the Child Victims Act (CPLR 214-g), and
The evolving standards for institutional liability—especially school districts—for sexual abuse committed by employees decades ago.

The plaintiff, R.L., alleges that as a middle school student in the late 1970s and early 1980s, he was sexually abused by a math teacher employed by the Holland Central School District. The abuse allegedly occurred at least three times after school, when the teacher had plaintiff remain on campus, walked him to the boys’ locker room, and then sexually abused him.

Exercising the revival window created by the Child Victims Act (“CVA”), R.L. brought suit asserting various theories of liability. By the time of the appealed order, only two key causes of action remained:

Negligent supervision of the plaintiff while acting in loco parentis (i.e., breach of the school’s duty to supervise students), and
Negligent supervision and retention of the teacher (i.e., the district’s failure to act despite knowledge, or reason to know, of the teacher’s dangerous propensity).

The Supreme Court, Erie County, granted summary judgment to the school district on these remaining claims. On appeal, the Fourth Department unanimously reversed, reinstating both causes of action. The decision is not merely a fact-specific ruling; it consolidates and applies a series of recent and older precedents to clarify:

When a school may be liable for negligent supervision even without prior notice of a teacher’s criminal propensity, and
How constructive knowledge and imputed knowledge operate in negligent supervision and retention claims directed at the employer.

In doing so, R.L. further tightens the doctrinal framework governing institutional liability for historic child sexual abuse in New York, especially in the Fourth Department.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

R.L. commenced this action under the Child Victims Act, which temporarily revived otherwise time-barred claims arising from childhood sexual abuse (see CPLR 214-g). The case progressed in the trial court, where some claims had already been dismissed. The defendant school district moved for summary judgment on the two remaining causes of action:

Negligent supervision of the plaintiff (as a student under the district’s care), and
Negligent supervision and retention of the math teacher alleged to be the abuser.

The Supreme Court granted the district’s motion as to both remaining claims, effectively ending the case at the trial level. The plaintiff appealed, limited to that portion of the order.

B. Holding

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously reversed:

“The order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied in part, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as it asserts claims against defendant for negligent supervision of plaintiff while acting in loco parentis and for negligent supervision and retention of the teacher.”

The court held that the defendant school district’s own submissions in support of its motion raised triable issues of fact on both theories:

Whether the teacher’s sexual abuse of the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the district’s failure to supervise and intervene in the teacher’s boundary-violating conduct with male students; and
Whether the district “should have known” of the teacher’s propensity for sexual abuse—based on facts known to its employees—such that a reasonable employer would not have allowed the teacher to remain in a position to cause harm.

Because the school district failed to meet its initial burden on summary judgment, the court did not even reach the adequacy of the plaintiff’s opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

III. The Court’s Legal Framework

A. Negligent Supervision of Students (In Loco Parentis)

The duty of a school district toward its students is framed by the familiar “reasonably prudent parent” standard. Citing Lisa P. v Attica Cent. School Dist., 27 AD3d 1080 (4th Dept 2006), the court reiterates:

“A school district has the duty to exercise the same degree of care and supervision over [students] under its control as a reasonably prudent parent would exercise under the same circumstances.”

The question of breach is:

“Whether a parent of ordinary prudence placed in an identical situation and armed with the same information would invariably have provided greater supervision.”

Significantly, the court emphasizes that prior knowledge of a particular individual’s criminal propensity is not required to state a claim for negligent supervision of students. Drawing from Murray v Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y., 283 AD2d 995 (4th Dept 2001), and Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 NY2d 944 (1997), the court notes:

Prior knowledge is not required “inasmuch as there are situations in which such conduct ‘may… be a “reasonably foreseeable” consequence of circumstances created by the defendant.’”

And, as summarized through Doe v Fulton School Dist., 35 AD3d 1194 (4th Dept 2006):

“[E]ven without actual or constructive notice of an individual’s criminal propensity, a school district may ‘be held liable for an injury that is the reasonably foreseeable consequence of circumstances it created by its inaction.’”

This is a crucial doctrinal point: for student-supervision claims, liability can attach because the school’s management of the environment—its facilities, supervision practices, tolerance of boundary violations—created a foreseeable risk of harm, even if the particular assailant had no known prior record.

B. Negligent Supervision and Retention of Employees

The second claim is analytically distinct: it is directed at the employer’s decisions about the employee, not at the general supervision of students.

For negligent supervision and retention of an employee, the Fourth Department reiterates the established standard from Shapiro v Syracuse Univ., 208 AD3d 958 (4th Dept 2022):

To establish a claim of negligent supervision and retention of an employee, a plaintiff must show “that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury.”

The negligence lies in placing or retaining the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm:

“The employer’s negligence lies in having placed the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm, harm which would most probably have been spared the injured party had the employer taken reasonable care in making decisions respecting the [supervision] and retention of the employee.”

1. Constructive Knowledge (“Should Have Known”)

The opinion relies on the Court of Appeals’ discussion in Moore Charitable Found. v PJT Partners, Inc., 40 NY3d 150 (2023), and its reiteration in Nellenback v Madison County, 2025 NY Slip Op 02263:

An employer “should know” of an employee’s dangerous propensity if it has reason to know of the facts or events evidencing that propensity, and may be liable if it nonetheless “place[s] the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm.”

Thus, constructive knowledge is not an abstract label—it is grounded in specific facts or events that would lead a reasonable employer to recognize the risk.

2. Imputed Knowledge

A critical component of the negligent retention analysis is imputed knowledge. Citing BL Doe 5 v Fleming, 229 AD3d 1076 (4th Dept 2024), and Harper v Buffalo City Sch. Dist., 242 AD3d 1600 (4th Dept 2025), the court states:

When a person acquires knowledge within the scope of their employment, that “knowledge is imputed to [the employer] and the latter is bound by such knowledge [even if] the information is never actually communicated to [the employer].”

In other words, the institution cannot insulate itself by failing to establish effective reporting channels or by ignoring information held by its own employees. If the knowledge is acquired in the scope of an employee’s duties, the entity is treated as if it knew it.

C. Summary Judgment Standards

The court invokes standard summary judgment principles, citing:

De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 763 (2016) – Evidence on summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, with every reasonable inference drawn in that party’s favor.
Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 (1985) – If the movant fails to meet its initial burden of showing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the motion must be denied “regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers.”

The Fourth Department applies these principles rigorously: it concludes that the district’s own evidentiary submissions created triable issues of fact, so the defendant never cleared the threshold required to shift the burden to the plaintiff.

IV. Application to the Facts of R.L.

A. Evidence of Boundary Violations and “Open and Prevalent” Conduct

The court’s analysis of negligent supervision of the plaintiff centers on the pattern of conduct by the teacher and the failure of the district and its employees to intervene. The defendant’s own submissions showed:

The teacher was “routinely touching other male students inappropriately” while spending time alone with them on school grounds, before or contemporaneously with plaintiff’s abuse.
The teacher was allowed to routinely create situations where he was alone with male students, including plaintiff, by having them stay after school and accompanying them into the boys’ locker room for no legitimate educational or disciplinary reason.

Based on this, the court concluded there was a triable issue of fact whether:

“[T]he teacher’s sexual abuse of plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the failure of defendant and its employees to prevent” such conduct.

The court further found that the teacher’s actions may have been “so open and prevalent” that a reasonable person would have been on notice of the risk. It cites Visiko v Fleming, 229 AD3d 1355 (4th Dept 2024) and Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44 (1994), the latter a leading New York Court of Appeals case on school supervision and notice.

Thus, the foreseeability analysis does not turn on secret, isolated misconduct alone; it focuses on whether the observable pattern of behavior—repeated one-on-one access, inappropriate touching, and lack of legitimate pedagogical justification—would have alerted a reasonably prudent school to intervene.

B. Foreseeability Without Prior Knowledge of Criminal Propensity

On the negligent supervision (in loco parentis) claim, the school district argued, in substance, that there was no evidence it had prior notice of the teacher’s propensity for sexual abuse. The Fourth Department rejects the premise that such notice is necessary for this particular theory of liability.

Relying on Murray and Bell, the court underscores that:

The focus is on whether the abuse was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the circumstances created (or tolerated) by the school’s inaction.
Those circumstances here include the failure to stop a teacher from:
- Routinely isolating male students, including the plaintiff, in a locker room;
- Engaging in inappropriate physical contact with students on school premises; and
- Establishing a pattern of unsupervised contact without legitimate justification.

Under the “reasonably prudent parent” standard, a trier of fact could find that a reasonably careful parent, observing or learning of this pattern, would have forbidden such unsupervised one-on-one encounters—making the continued inaction potentially negligent.

C. Evidence Supporting Negligent Supervision and Retention of the Teacher

On the negligent supervision and retention claim, the court applies a more demanding knowledge standard—whether the district “knew or should have known” of the teacher’s propensity for sexual abuse. Here, the defendant’s submissions contained several key facts:

Locker Room Incident Witnessed by Another Teacher
The district submitted an excerpt from the deposition of another male student. That student testified that:
- He had been sexually abused by the same math teacher.
- Shortly after the abuse, a gym teacher walked into the boys’ locker room and found the math teacher and the student alone in the shower area.
- This incident predated or occurred contemporaneously with R.L.’s alleged abuse.
This is critical: a school employee (the gym teacher), while acting in the scope of employment, observed a highly suspicious scenario—an adult teacher alone with a male student in a secluded shower area immediately after abuse allegedly occurred. Whether the gym teacher recognized the abuse is a factual question, but at minimum, this was a “fact or event” evidencing a dangerous propensity under the Moore Charitable framework.
After-School and Locker Room Practices
The district’s evidence showed that the math teacher:
- Repeatedly had the plaintiff stay after school,
- Then took him into the boys’ locker room for no legitimate reason.
This pattern of unsupervised, unstructured, and unnecessary access is probative of the teacher’s opportunity to abuse and of the district’s awareness (or reason to be aware) of that opportunity.
Out-of-School Contact with Male Students
The defendant’s submissions also showed:
- The teacher frequently drove male students off campus during school hours.
- He babysat at least one male student overnight.
Other school employees were aware of these practices. These facts demonstrate unusual and risky boundary-crossing behavior by a teacher with students. Under Moore Charitable and AB 511 Doe v Lyndonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 229 AD3d 1268 (4th Dept 2024), such facts may constitute “events evidencing [a] propensity” for sexual misconduct, or at minimum, alerting a reasonable employer to significant risk.

Taken together, these facts support the inference that the district should have known of the teacher’s dangerous propensity and yet allowed him continued access to vulnerable students, both on and off campus.

D. Why the Defendant’s Own Submissions Defeated Its Motion

A noteworthy aspect of R.L. is procedural: the school district’s motion for summary judgment was undermined by its own evidence. The Appellate Division explicitly observes:

“[D]efendant’s own submissions raise a triable issue of fact” …

Because the defense’s proof, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, itself supported reasonable inferences of:

Foreseeability of harm (for student-supervision), and
Constructive knowledge and imputed knowledge (for negligent retention),

the district failed to satisfy its initial burden. Under Winegrad, that failure required denial of the motion, without any need to assess the plaintiff’s opposition papers.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Supervision and Foreseeability: Lisa P., Bell, Murray, Mirand, Doe v Fulton, Visiko

Lisa P. v Attica Cent. School Dist., 27 AD3d 1080 (4th Dept 2006)
This case is cited for the foundational duty standard:
- Schools must exercise “the same degree of care and supervision” as a reasonably prudent parent.
- The breach inquiry: whether an ordinary prudent parent with the same information would have provided greater supervision.
In R.L., this standard is applied to a teacher’s open, inappropriate physical contact and creation of one-on-one situations, which a reasonably prudent “parent” (school) would have curtailed.
Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 NY2d 944 (1997) and Murray v Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y., 283 AD2d 995 (4th Dept 2001)
These decisions form the backbone for the idea that prior knowledge of specific criminal propensity is not required where the defendant’s own conduct (or inaction) created a foreseeable risk. In Bell, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the school’s duty is to protect students from foreseeable harm arising from the absence or inadequacy of supervision and security measures.

Murray, quoting Bell, extends this logic and is expressly invoked in R.L. to support the principle that a school’s liability may arise from the circumstances it created or allowed, regardless of whether it had actual notice of the assailant’s prior crimes.
Doe v Fulton School Dist., 35 AD3d 1194 (4th Dept 2006)
In Fulton, the Fourth Department held that an institution may be liable for injuries that are the “reasonably foreseeable consequence of circumstances it created by its inaction.” R.L. quotes this formulation verbatim and applies it in the context of repeated, unsupervised access by a teacher to vulnerable students.
Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44 (1994) and Visiko v Fleming, 229 AD3d 1355 (4th Dept 2024)
Mirand is the Court of Appeals’ leading case on school liability for inadequate supervision in the face of foreseeable risk of harm, particularly peer-on-peer violence. It establishes that schools are liable when they had actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct that was “sufficiently specific and similar to the conduct that caused the injury.”

Visiko, a recent Fourth Department case, applies the notion of risk being “open and prevalent” such that a reasonable person would have been on notice. In R.L., this concept is adapted to teacher sexual misconduct: open and repeated inappropriate contact and one-on-one situations can be “so open and prevalent” as to put the school on constructive notice of the danger.

B. Recent CVA and Institutional Liability Cases: Blanchard, AB 511 Doe, BL Doe 5, Houk, Harper

Blanchard v Moravia Cent. Sch. Dist., 229 AD3d 1098 (4th Dept 2024)
Blanchard is one of a cluster of Fourth Department CVA decisions involving school districts and staff sexual abuse. It is cited in R.L. for multiple propositions:
- Foreseeability of teacher abuse as a consequence of circumstances created by the district’s inaction.
- Use of patterns of boundary-violating conduct (e.g., inappropriate touching, isolating students, unusual social contact) to establish triable issues on negligence and notice.
R.L. closely aligns with Blanchard in approach and reinforces a consistent doctrinal line.
AB 511 Doe v Lyndonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 229 AD3d 1268 (4th Dept 2024)
AB 511 Doe is cited for:
- The principle that student abuse may be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of circumstances created by the school’s inaction.
- The standard that an employer may have constructive knowledge of an employee’s dangerous propensity based on known patterns of behavior.
- The formulation that a plaintiff raises a triable issue of fact whether the employer “had notice of the potential for harm… such that its alleged negligence in supervising and retaining [the employee] placed [the plaintiff] in a position to cause foreseeable harm.”
R.L. expressly quotes this language in concluding that Holland CSD’s own submissions created a triable issue as to notice and foreseeable harm.
BL Doe 5 v Fleming, 229 AD3d 1076 (4th Dept 2024)
This case is central to the doctrine of imputed knowledge. It reiterates that knowledge acquired by an employee within the scope of employment is imputed to the employer even if the information is never communicated up the chain.

In R.L., this principle makes the observed locker room incident—known to the gym teacher—legally chargeable to the school district itself.
Doe v Houk, 224 AD3d 1250 (4th Dept 2024)
Houk is cited for the standard of reviewing evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant on summary judgment. It is another CVA-era decision involving institutional liability for abuse, and its citation helps frame R.L. within this growing body of law.
Harper v Buffalo City Sch. Dist., 242 AD3d 1600 (4th Dept 2025)
Harper builds on BL Doe 5 and others regarding imputed knowledge in the CVA context, reinforcing that employee knowledge is institutional knowledge. R.L. cites Harper to underscore this rule.

C. Employer Negligent Retention: Shapiro, Moore Charitable, Nellenback

Shapiro v Syracuse Univ., 208 AD3d 958 (4th Dept 2022)
Provides the standard that an employer is liable for negligent supervision and retention when it “knew or should have known” of the employee’s propensity for the harmful conduct. R.L. adopts this standard directly and applies it to a K–12 school setting.
Moore Charitable Found. v PJT Partners, Inc., 40 NY3d 150 (2023)
A Court of Appeals decision clarifying that an employer “should know” of an employee’s dangerous propensity when it has reason to know of facts or events evidencing that propensity. It confirms that constructive knowledge is built from concrete information—not speculation.

In R.L., this framework is used to evaluate whether the school had reason to know from:
- The locker-room incident observed by another teacher,
- The repeated after-school locker-room encounters, and
- The out-of-school, boundary-blurring interactions.
Nellenback v Madison County, 2025 NY Slip Op 02263 (NY3d)
This recent Court of Appeals case is referenced alongside Moore Charitable to reaffirm the constructive knowledge standard in negligent retention contexts. While the factual details are not set out in R.L., its citation signals that the Court of Appeals’ articulation of “reason to know” is directly controlling.

D. Summary Judgment Doctrine: De Lourdes Torres and Winegrad

De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742 (2016)
Reaffirmed the principle that courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw every reasonable inference in that party’s favor. In R.L., this means that all inferences from the defendant’s own evidence must be resolved in favor of R.L. when assessing the existence of triable issues of fact.
Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 (1985)
Establishes that a party moving for summary judgment must affirmatively demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and if it fails, the motion must be denied “regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers.”

R.L. applies this rule strictly: because the defendant’s own submissions revealed triable issues of fact, the court did not even consider plaintiff’s opposition.

VI. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. The Child Victims Act and CPLR 214-g

The Child Victims Act (CVA) substantially altered the limitations landscape in New York for childhood sexual abuse claims. CPLR 214-g created a temporary revival period during which previously time-barred claims could be filed, regardless of how long ago the abuse occurred.

In R.L., the alleged abuse occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, far outside ordinary limitation periods. But the CVA allowed R.L. to bring suit decades later, and courts are now grappling with how to apply modern negligence standards to institutions’ conduct long in the past.

B. In Loco Parentis and Negligent Supervision of Students

“In loco parentis” means “in the place of a parent.” When children are entrusted to a school, the school assumes responsibilities akin to those of a parent in relation to supervision and safety.

Negligent supervision of students requires showing that:

The school had a duty to supervise (generally undisputed where the student is under the school’s control),
The school breached that duty by failing to provide the degree of supervision a reasonably prudent parent would provide under the same circumstances, and
The inadequate supervision was a proximate cause of the injury.

In R.L., the focal breach question is whether a reasonably prudent “parent”—armed with knowledge of the teacher’s open and repeated boundary violations—would have allowed the teacher to continue isolating male students in locker rooms and similar spaces.

C. Negligent Supervision and Retention of Employees

This cause of action is different. Rather than focusing on general student supervision, it targets the employer’s decisions concerning the particular employee:

Did the employer know or have reason to know of the employee’s dangerous propensity?
Despite that knowledge or reason to know, did the employer continue to place the employee in a position to cause harm?

Evidence of knowledge (actual or constructive) can include:

Prior complaints,
Witnessed incidents of boundary violations,
Repeated unusual behavior (e.g., unnecessary one-on-one situations, off-campus rides, overnight stays), and
Other “facts or events evidencing [a] propensity” (Moore Charitable).

In R.L., the court concludes that the defendant’s own evidence provided such facts and events, raising a triable issue on whether Holland CSD should have known of the teacher’s dangerous propensity.

D. Foreseeability and Constructive Notice

“Foreseeability” in negligence law asks whether the type of harm that occurred was within the realm of risks that a reasonably prudent person would anticipate as a likely consequence of the defendant’s conduct.

“Constructive notice” means that the defendant should have known of a condition or risk because it was visible, obvious, or persistently present for a sufficient period—so that, exercising reasonable care, the defendant would have discovered and acted on it.

In R.L., the court blends these concepts:

The teacher’s conduct was allegedly “open and prevalent.”
Such conduct, if established, could constitute constructive notice of the risk.
The abuse of the plaintiff could thus be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the district’s inaction.

E. Imputed Knowledge

Imputed knowledge is a principle of agency: what one knows in the course of doing the principal’s business, the principal is deemed to know. For institutions:

If an employee learns something while performing their job, the institution is generally treated as having that knowledge.
The institution cannot escape liability merely because the employee never formally reported up the chain.

In R.L., this is critical: the gym teacher’s knowledge of a highly suspicious locker-room encounter between the math teacher and a student is imputed to the district. Using BL Doe 5 and Harper, the Fourth Department confirms that this sort of knowledge can support constructive notice for negligent retention claims.

F. “Open and Prevalent” Misconduct

The phrase “open and prevalent” (from Visiko and derived from Mirand-style reasoning) describes conduct that is:

Not concealed,
Occurs repeatedly, and
Is observable by those in a position to supervise.

If a teacher frequently touches students inappropriately in public or semi-public settings, or is repeatedly seen isolating students in locations like locker rooms without justification, a jury may find that the school was on constructive notice—even without a prior formal complaint.

G. Summary Judgment in Negligence and Abuse Cases

Summary judgment is a pre-trial mechanism to dispose of claims where there is no genuine dispute of material fact. For the moving party (here, the school district), it must:

Submit evidence demonstrating that, even if the facts are viewed favorably to the nonmovant, no reasonable jury could find liability; and
Eliminate any triable questions of fact regarding key elements (duty, breach, causation, notice, etc.).

In CVA cases, summary judgment can be difficult for institutional defendants where:

Evidence is decades old, and
Patterns of misconduct and institutional knowledge are pieced together from multiple depositions and circumstantial facts.

R.L. illustrates that where the defendant’s own evidence reveals a longstanding pattern of suspicious conduct, summary judgment will be inappropriate.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Implications for School Districts and Educational Institutions

R.L. reinforces and extends a line of cases making it more difficult for school districts to obtain dismissal at the summary judgment stage in CVA-era sexual abuse cases. Key implications include:

Pervasive boundary violations create risk and potential liability
Even absent a formal complaint or confirmed prior abuse, open and repeated violations of professional boundaries (unnecessary one-on-one contact, inappropriate touching, out-of-school socializing) can establish:
- Foreseeability of abuse (student-supervision claims), and
- Constructive knowledge of dangerous propensity (retention claims).
Internal knowledge cannot be siloed
Under the imputed knowledge doctrine, what any staff member observes in the course of their duties (e.g., a gym teacher walking in on a suspicious situation) is treated as known to the district. Institutions cannot defend on the basis that “no one in central administration knew.”
Risk management and policy
The decision underscores the need for:
- Clear policies restricting staff-student one-on-one access in secluded areas,
- Mandatory reporting and training on recognizing grooming and boundary violations, and
- Systematic monitoring of staff who frequently take students off campus or engage in unusual social relationships.

B. Implications for Plaintiffs in CVA and Similar Cases

For plaintiffs, R.L. highlights the evidentiary avenues that can be particularly powerful:

Other students’ testimony regarding similar abuse or suspicious encounters.
Testimony from staff who observed questionable behavior (e.g., being alone in locker rooms, off-campus rides, overnight stays).
Patterns and routines of the abuser—repeated conduct rather than isolated incidents—supporting the “open and prevalent” standard.

It also confirms that plaintiffs can survive summary judgment on:

Negligent supervision (student-focused) without needing to show prior notice of the abuser’s criminal history, and
Negligent retention (employee-focused) by relying on constructive and imputed knowledge drawn from institutional witnesses and patterns of conduct.

C. Implications for Litigators: Evidence Strategy and Motion Practice

For defense counsel, R.L. is a cautionary tale about moving for summary judgment in the face of unfavorable evidentiary records:

Careful evaluation is needed before submitting deposition excerpts and internal evidence that, when viewed favorably to the plaintiff, establish patterns of suspicious behavior.
Where the record shows repeated unsupervised access, locker-room encounters, and staff awareness of off-campus contact, courts are likely to find triable issues of foreseeability and notice.

For plaintiffs’ counsel, the decision underscores the importance of:

Thorough discovery aimed at:
- Finding other victims,
- Identifying staff members who observed concerning conduct, and
- Documenting the regularity and openness of the alleged boundary violations.
Framing the case under both:
- Negligent supervision of students (where prior notice of propensity is not required), and
- Negligent supervision/retention of the employee (where constructive and imputed knowledge are key).

D. Place within Statewide CVA Jurisprudence

Doctrinally, R.L. is part of a broader trend in New York appellate courts—especially in the Fourth Department—toward:

Robust enforcement of school districts’ duty to protect students from sexual abuse by staff,
Full application of agency principles (imputed knowledge) and constructive notice in historical abuse cases, and
Reluctance to cut off CVA claims at the summary judgment stage where there is substantial evidence of patterns of misconduct and institutional awareness.

While not introducing entirely new legal doctrines, R.L. refines, synthesizes, and applies existing principles to create a clear, CVA-era template for analyzing school liability in teacher sexual abuse cases.

VIII. Conclusion

R.L. v. Holland Central School District is a significant addition to New York’s developing body of law on institutional liability for historical child sexual abuse, particularly in the education context under the Child Victims Act. The decision reinforces several key principles:

A school’s duty of supervision is measured by the conduct of a reasonably prudent parent, and liability for negligent supervision of students does not require prior notice of the assailant’s criminal propensity where the harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of circumstances created by the school’s inaction.
For negligent supervision and retention of an employee, the employer’s liability turns on whether it knew or should have known of the employee’s dangerous propensity, with “should have known” grounded in specific facts and events evidencing that propensity.
Knowledge acquired by any employee within the scope of their employment is imputed to the employer, even if not formally reported, thereby preventing institutions from evading responsibility through internal information failures.
Where a teacher’s boundary-violating conduct is “open and prevalent” and staff observe suspicious incidents (such as being alone with students in secluded locker rooms, off-campus trips, or overnight stays), courts are likely to find triable issues of foreseeability and constructive notice.
At the summary judgment stage, defendants must ensure that their own evidentiary submissions do not themselves create material factual disputes; if they do, courts will deny the motion under Winegrad without needing to assess the plaintiff’s opposition.

In sum, R.L. crystallizes and applies a robust framework of foreseeability, constructive notice, and imputed knowledge to the problem of school-based sexual abuse. It signals that, especially in CVA-era litigation, New York courts will closely scrutinize institutional inaction in the face of open and recurrent boundary violations and will be slow to foreclose such claims as a matter of law where a reasonable jury could find that the abuse was a foreseeable—and preventable—consequence of the school’s failure to act.

Constructive Notice, Imputed Knowledge, and School Liability for Teacher Sexual Abuse under New York’s Child Victims Act: Commentary on R.L. v. Holland Central School District