Conspiracy, Relevant Conduct, and Supervised Release: The Fourth Circuit’s Framework for International Firearms Trafficking in United States v. Nji

I. Introduction

In this consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of three Cameroonian–American defendants— Wilson Nuyila Tita, Eric Fru Nji, and Wilson Che Fonguh—arising from a covert effort to ship firearms and ammunition from Maryland to Anglophone separatist fighters in Cameroon.

The case arises out of the so‑called “Peanut Project,” a small, tightly organized group that operated from a residential basement “lab” outside Baltimore. The group purchased, assembled, refurbished, and concealed firearms and ammunition in vehicles and compressor tanks destined for shipment in a container from the Port of Baltimore to West Africa. When U.S. authorities, acting on a tip, recovered over 35,000 rounds of ammunition, 39 firearms (most altered or “ghost” guns), and related military matériel from a container bound for Nigeria, they traced the shipment back to the conspirators.

A grand jury charged the defendants with:

Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371;
Unlicensed export of defense articles under the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778;
Unlicensed export of controlled items under the Export Control Reform Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4819;
Transportation of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); and
Smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 554(a).

After a ten‑day jury trial, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy, transporting firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and smuggling, but acquitted on the Arms Export Control Act and Export Control Reform Act counts. Each received a 63‑month sentence (bottom of the Guideline range) plus two years’ supervised release.

On appeal, the defendants mounted a multi‑front challenge, attacking:

The sufficiency of the evidence, especially as to their knowledge that firearm serial numbers had been obliterated;
Several evidentiary decisions (exclusion of a Cameroon‑conflict expert; refusal to compel or admit statements of a co‑conspirator who asserted the Fifth Amendment);
Jury instructions on Pinkerton vicarious liability, willful blindness, and knowledge; and
Sentencing enhancements for the number of firearms and trafficking, as well as the pronouncement of supervised release conditions under the Fourth Circuit’s Rogers line of cases.

Judge Niemeyer, writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Gregory and Harris joining), rejected all arguments and affirmed. The opinion is doctrinally important in three principal respects:

It illustrates how circumstantial evidence and Pinkerton liability can sustain § 922(k) convictions in a clandestine group operation where not every member personally performs the illegal act (here, grinding serial numbers).
It clarifies the relationship between conspiracy liability and relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines, particularly for firearm‑number and trafficking enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.
It further refines the Fourth Circuit’s requirements under United States v. Rogers for orally pronouncing supervised release conditions, holding that express incorporation of standard conditions plus brief in‑court summaries satisfies Rogers.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holdings

The Fourth Circuit held:

Sufficiency of the evidence: There was ample evidence that the defendants knew serial numbers were being obliterated from the firearms, and that the weapons were “firearms” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). The convictions under § 922(k), § 554(a), and § 371 are supported by the record.
Exclusion of defense expert: The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony about the Cameroon conflict and alleged abuses by the Francophone government. While such context might be relevant to motive or state of mind, the trial court reasonably concluded that the testimony risked a distracting mini‑trial and implied justification for the charged conduct. Defendants were allowed to present the basic conflict context and their fear through lay testimony.
Co‑conspirator proffer and Fifth Amendment:
- The district court properly allowed co‑conspirator Tse Bangarie—who had pled guilty but not yet been sentenced—to invoke the Fifth Amendment and decline to testify about his prior proffer suggesting he was misled into believing the scheme was legitimate.
- The court also properly refused to admit his proffer statement under the residual hearsay exception in Fed. R. Evid. 807, finding insufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and less probative value than live testimony would have had.
Jury instructions:
- The Pinkerton vicarious liability instruction was supported by the evidence and correctly stated the law.
- A willful blindness instruction was warranted given the defendants’ claimed ignorance and the strong circumstantial evidence that they either knew about or deliberately avoided confirming the obliteration of serial numbers.
- The court’s explanation that knowledge could be inferred from circumstantial evidence was legally unobjectionable.
Guidelines enhancements:
- The 6‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) for an offense involving 25–99 firearms was properly applied. The conspiracy involved 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 made all defendants accountable.
- The 4‑level enhancement under former § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2021) for engaging in “trafficking of firearms” was also properly imposed, as the defendants at least aided and abetted the trafficking of two or more firearms.
Supervised release conditions and Rogers:
- The district court complied with United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), by expressly incorporating by reference the standard conditions of supervised release adopted in a standing order, then summarizing some of those conditions orally.

Accordingly, the panel “fully considered” and rejected the defendants’ challenges and affirmed the judgments in full.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Knowledge of Obliteration and “Firearm” Status

1. The appellate standard

The court began by emphasizing the high bar for sufficiency challenges. Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), the question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government. The opinion cites:

United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161, 184 (4th Cir. 2024) (defendants face a “heavy burden” in sufficiency challenges);
United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292, 308 (4th Cir. 2024) (reversal is reserved for the “rare case where the prosecution’s failure is clear,” with courts drawing all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor and assuming the jury resolved contradictions favorably to the prosecution); and
United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 2011), reiterating similar principles.

This framing is significant: it signals that the panel’s role is narrow and deferential on factual questions, particularly credibility and reasonable inference.

2. Knowledge that serial numbers were obliterated

To convict under § 922(k), the government had to prove that the defendants knowingly transported firearms with obliterated serial numbers. The defense argued that while serial‑number grinding occurred, there was insufficient proof that these three defendants personally knew about it.

The court found the record easily sufficient, relying heavily on circumstantial evidence:

Structure and secrecy of the Peanut Project: A small, tightly knit group met frequently (up to three days a week) in a very small basement “lab” devoted to firearms work and concealment. The bylaws (drafted by Tita) emphasized secrecy and “concealment methods.” This supported an inference that members were familiar with all core aspects of the operation.
Prior traceability incident: The group knew the Cameroonian government had previously traced a firearm to the United States via its serial number. This incident made obliteration of serial numbers a “fundamental element” of the mission, central to avoiding detection.
Physical circumstances of obliteration:
- Grinding occurred in the small basement lab, using noisy tools, with obvious sparks and activity.
- Witness Alambi Muma testified that he ground serial numbers wearing gloves and goggles, using a loud grinder in a ~3‑meter square space where everyone could see and hear each other.
- He testified that he was assigned this grinding task by St. Michael in the presence of Nji and Fonguh, who could hear the instructions.
- Grinding left visible, coarse defacing marks, which would be evident to anyone handling or packaging the firearms.
Roles of the defendants: Muma testified that
- Nji took notes, handled inventory, prepared ammunition, and helped load and package shipments;
- Fonguh helped prepare ammunition and package arms; and
- Tita supervised and directed the others.
This made it implausible that they could work intensively in this small space without awareness of serial‑number grinding.
Testimony about concealment and illegality:
- Witness Roger Akem testified that the group’s “understanding” was that concealment was essential because “there was no way you could send [the weapons] out without concealing” them from authorities in the U.S. and Nigeria.
- Muma testified that “all of us that came together” decided to keep the activities secret because they understood that if discovered, authorities would stop them and “it’s illegal.”
Physical evidence at trial: The government introduced the actual firearms or photographs of them, showing highly visible grind marks where serial numbers had been obliterated. The jury could see for itself how obvious the defacing was.

The court held that from this evidence, a rational juror could easily infer that each defendant knew firearms they helped ship had obliterated serial numbers—and thus possessed the requisite mens rea under § 922(k).

In addition, even assuming some doubt about actual knowledge, the panel invoked Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), to support vicarious liability: obliteration of serial numbers was at least reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Citing United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 142–43 (4th Cir. 2010), the court reiterated that under Pinkerton, co‑conspirators are liable for substantive offenses committed by others when those offenses are reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

3. Were the weapons “firearms”?

The defendants also argued that the government failed to prove that the seized items were “firearms” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (i.e., weapons that will, are designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive).

The court deemed this argument meritless, pointing to:

Physical introduction of many of the guns at trial, with photos of all;
Identification of each gun by manufacturer, make, and model by law enforcement witnesses;
Discovery of ammunition packaged with the guns; and
The overarching purpose of the conspiracy: to send working firearms and ammunition to fighters engaged in armed conflict.

On this record, the jury could “clearly” conclude that the weapons were indeed firearms.

B. Exclusion of Expert Testimony on the Cameroon Conflict

The defense sought to present expert testimony from Efi Walters Tembon, a Cameroonian from the Anglophone region who had fled alleged government abuses. The proffered testimony would describe:

The conflict between the Francophone central government and Anglophone separatists; and
Alleged retaliation, abuses, and threats by the Cameroonian government, even against non‑violent dissenters.

The defense theory: this evidence would show that secrecy was motivated not by consciousness of U.S. illegality, but by fear of Cameroonian retaliation against relatives and associates.

1. The district court’s ruling

The district court excluded the expert testimony, reasoning that:

An expert cannot testify directly about the defendants’ mental state (Fed. R. Evid. 704(b));
Extended exposition on the Cameroon conflict had, at best, indirect relevance to the defendants’ knowledge of U.S. law; and
There was a serious risk the jury would infer moral or political justification for the defendants’ conduct, creating prejudice and confusion and leading to a collateral “mini‑trial” about the conflict.

However, the court explicitly allowed defendants to introduce lay testimony about the conflict and their fear of the Cameroonian government, which they in fact did.

2. Appellate analysis: expert state‑of‑mind evidence after Diaz

On appeal, the defendants argued that the exclusion violated their right to present a complete defense, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s then‑recent decision in Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024). In Diaz, the Court held that experts may offer general background about how certain criminal enterprises operate (e.g., what drug couriers typically know) so long as they do not opine directly on the particular defendant’s mental state, consistent with Rule 704(b).

The panel acknowledged that Diaz permits context‑setting expert testimony that helps jurors infer mental state. But the key question here was not simply admissibility under Rule 704(b), but also whether the trial court abused its broad discretion under Rules 401–403 to manage relevance, prejudice, and confusion.

Judge Niemeyer concluded there was no abuse of discretion:

The district court recognized that the expert had a particular “point of view” about the conflict that “may very well be valid,” but also recognized the risk that jurors would see the testimony as justifying or excusing the defendants’ illegal conduct.
The proposed testimony was, at most, tangential to the key issue: whether defendants knew it was illegal under U.S. law to export concealed weapons and obliterated‑serial‑number guns.
Most importantly, the court did not prevent the defense from presenting its core theory—fear of Cameroonian retaliation—through direct testimony from the defendants and other lay witnesses. Thus, the right to present a defense was not impaired.

In short, the panel treated the ruling as a classic evidentiary balancing decision under Rule 403 and found no abuse. This application of Diaz signals that while contextual expert testimony is doctrinally permitted, district courts retain wide discretion to cabin such testimony where it threatens to overshadow or distort the issues actually in dispute.

C. Co‑Conspirator’s Proffer, Fifth Amendment, and Hearsay

The next evidentiary dispute involved co‑conspirator Tse Bangarie. Before pleading guilty, Bangarie gave a proffer to the government in which he stated that:

He had warned organizer Tamufor St. Michael about illegality;
St. Michael claimed to have military training and a “badge” and suggested his superiors knew about the plan; and
This allegedly led Bangarie to believe there was “no need for concern.”

The defense sought to use this statement to suggest that participants, including possibly the defendants, relied on St. Michael’s assurances of legitimacy.

1. Fifth Amendment invocation and scope

Defendants subpoenaed Bangarie, who appeared at trial with counsel and indicated he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege if questioned. He had pled guilty but had not yet been sentenced. The government made clear it did not accept the proffer as truthful, and the proffer did not lead to a cooperation agreement.

The district court conducted the required “particularized inquiry” into the legitimacy and scope of the privileged assertion, as mandated by Fourth Circuit precedent such as:

Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 1990); and
United States v. Oliver, 133 F.4th 329, 335–37 (4th Cir. 2025) (reaffirming that a witness may be fully excused if the court finds he could legitimately refuse to answer any and all relevant questions).

The trial judge acknowledged that:

Bangarie had not been sentenced and his conviction was therefore not “final”;
He could still move to withdraw his plea; and
The proffer statement was arguably inconsistent with the court‑accepted factual basis for his plea, where he swore under oath that he knew the shipments were illegal.

In these circumstances, the panel agreed that compelling testimony on the proffer risked self‑incrimination in at least two ways:

It could expose him to renewed or additional prosecution if his plea were vacated or modified; and
It could expose him to adverse sentencing consequences or perjury exposure by highlighting inconsistency between his proffer and plea allocution.

The court cited Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999), which recognized that defendants who plead guilty but are unsentenced “may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from further testimony.”

Because the only subject defendants wished to question him on was the proffered, potentially inconsistent statement, the court reasonably concluded that he could legitimately refuse to answer “any and all relevant questions” on that subject. Under Oliver, this justified fully excusing him from testifying, without the need for a question‑by‑question assertion of privilege from the witness stand.

2. Residual hearsay under Rule 807

As an alternative, defendants sought admission of the proffer statement under Fed. R. Evid. 807, the residual hearsay exception, which allows admission of hearsay if:

It is “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness”; and
It is “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.”

The district court found both requirements unsatisfied, and the Fourth Circuit agreed:

Trustworthiness: The statement was made in a non‑sworn proffer, rejected by the government as unreliable, inconsistent with the sworn plea facts, and not part of a cooperation agreement. That combination significantly undercut its reliability.
Probative necessity: St. Michael himself testified and denied making the “badge and superiors” representation. Defendants also testified about their understanding of legality and could present their own narrative. Given this, the proffer was not “more probative” than reasonably available evidence—namely, live testimony subject to cross‑examination.

The panel thus held that the district court did not abuse its discretion either in honoring the witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege or in rejecting the proffer under Rule 807.

D. Jury Instructions: Pinkerton, Willful Blindness, and Inferring Knowledge

1. Pinkerton vicarious liability

The trial court instructed the jury on Pinkerton liability: that a conspirator may be held liable for substantive offenses committed by co‑conspirators if those offenses were (1) committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and (2) reasonably foreseeable.

On appeal, defendants did not challenge the legal accuracy of the instruction, but claimed there was an insufficient factual foundation to justify giving it—specifically regarding foreseeability of serial‑number obliteration.

The panel disagreed, relying on:

The group’s core mission of covertly arming Anglophone fighters;
The prior incident showing the danger of traceable serial numbers;
The bylaws emphasizing “concealment methods”; and
The small, prolonged, highly integrated group operation in the “lab.”

The court held that in these circumstances, it was plainly foreseeable to every member that others would obliterate serial numbers to avoid tracing, making Pinkerton liability appropriate.

The defendants also argued that the case was too “complex” for Pinkerton, pointing to United States v. Serrano‑Delgado, 29 F.4th 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2022), where the First Circuit cautioned that in certain multi‑layered conspiracies, a Pinkerton instruction might confuse juries attempting to infer a single overarching conspiracy from disparate acts. The panel distinguished Serrano‑Delgado, noting that the Peanut Project was not a diffuse or sprawling conspiracy: it was a small, highly coordinated group engaged in a single, coherent course of conduct.

2. Willful blindness instruction

The trial court also delivered a willful blindness (or “deliberate ignorance”) instruction. Fourth Circuit cases such as United States v. Hale, 857 F.3d 158, 168 (4th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2012), caution that such instructions must be used carefully, because of the risk that juries may convict on mere negligence or recklessness rather than knowledge.

However, a willful blindness instruction is appropriate when:

The defendant claims lack of knowledge; and
Evidence supports an inference that the defendant strongly suspected a critical fact and took deliberate steps to avoid confirming it.

The court, echoing the Supreme Court’s test in Global‑Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011), identified both prongs here:

Subjective awareness of high probability: Given the secrecy, mission, and visible grinding and defacing in the small lab, the defendants at least strongly suspected that serial numbers were being obliterated.
Deliberate avoidance: If the jury were to credit their claim that they never saw the obliterations because they only moved already wrapped packages, the jury could infer that this limited contact reflected deliberate avoidance of actually handling or inspecting the firearms, despite being deeply involved in the shipping process.

Because there was “ample” evidence of actual knowledge and sufficient evidence of deliberate ignorance, the instruction was upheld as properly supported by the record and not misleading.

3. Instruction on inferring knowledge

Defendants challenged a portion of the conspiracy instruction in which the court stated that “the defendant’s knowledge, again, it’s a matter of inference. It’s a matter you may infer from the facts that have been proved.”

The panel rejected the challenge as insubstantial. The instruction did not reduce the burden of proof; it merely conveyed the uncontroversial principle that juries are permitted—but not required—to draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. The word “may” preserved the jury’s discretion. No misstatement of law was identified.

E. Sentencing Enhancements: Number of Firearms and Trafficking

At sentencing, the district court applied two key enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1:

A 6‑level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C), for an offense involving 25–99 firearms (here, 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers); and
A 4‑level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2021 Guidelines), for engaging in the trafficking of firearms.

Defendants argued that the court improperly blended Pinkerton principles with the narrower “jointly undertaken criminal activity” standard of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, in contravention of United States v. Evans, 90 F.4th 257 (4th Cir. 2024), which cautioned against importing Pinkerton’s broad conspiracy liability wholesale into relevant‑conduct determinations.

1. Number‑of‑firearms enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)

The presentence reports (PSRs) for all three defendants recommended a 6‑level enhancement because “the offense involved 28 firearms.” Nji and Fonguh objected that:

The jury was permitted to convict on a Pinkerton theory for § 922(k);
The jury made no specific finding on how many obliterated‑serial‑number firearms each defendant personally knew about; and
Relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 requires a more individualized assessment.

Tita did not object to this enhancement below, so his challenge was reviewed only for plain error.

At sentencing, the district court overruled the objections, explaining that:

Defendants were convicted of a single conspiracy to transport and smuggle firearms with obliterated serial numbers;
“The evidence was that there were 28 weapons involved” in that conspiracy; and
As conspirators, they were accountable under § 1B1.3 for jointly undertaken criminal activity within the scope of, in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with that conspiracy.

Crucially, the panel held that the district court did not rely on Pinkerton in its relevant‑conduct analysis. Pinkerton was not mentioned in the sentencing colloquy. Instead, the court applied § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), which provides that a defendant is accountable for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,” where those acts fall within the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake.

The panel emphasized that § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) asks whether “the offense involved” a certain number of firearms; it does not require proof that each defendant personally knew the exact count. In a conspiracy context, if the jointly undertaken offense involved at least 25 firearms and that scope and foreseeability criteria are met, each conspirator is accountable for that firearm count at sentencing.

The court also noted that the factual finding that 28 firearms were involved was undisputed: the government introduced each firearm into evidence (physically or via photo), the PSR so stated, and defendants never contested the number, only attribution. The finding was therefore not clearly erroneous.

2. Trafficking of firearms enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5)

At the time of sentencing, § 2K2.1(b)(5) provided for a 4‑level enhancement if “the defendant engaged in the trafficking of firearms.” The commentary clarified that “defendant,” consistent with § 1B1.3, limits accountability to the defendant’s own conduct or conduct he aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused. See § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(B).

The panel agreed with the defendants that this enhancement cannot be applied on a pure Pinkerton theory; it requires proof that the particular defendant personally trafficked or at least aided and abetted the trafficking of two or more firearms to others. But the panel concluded that this standard was satisfied on the trial evidence:

Each defendant personally participated in acquiring, preparing, and packaging multiple firearms for shipment overseas; or, at minimum,
They aided and abetted those acts by supervising, inventorying, or otherwise directly facilitating shipment.

Because defendants did not seriously contest that they participated in or aided the trafficking of at least two firearms, the panel upheld application of § 2K2.1(b)(5).

In doing so, the court implicitly draws a clean distinction:

For firearm‑number enhancements (“offense involved”), Pinkerton‑like aggregation via § 1B1.3 is permissible where scope and foreseeability are satisfied.
For trafficking enhancements keyed to “the defendant,” there must be evidence of that individual’s personal or aided conduct—but this can readily be inferred from active participation in a small, unified trafficking operation.

F. Supervised Release Conditions and Rogers

Finally, the panel addressed an increasingly litigated issue in the Fourth Circuit: whether discretionary supervised release conditions are validly imposed when not fully read aloud at sentencing.

1. The Rogers framework

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), courts must impose certain mandatory conditions and may impose discretionary conditions linked to sentencing goals. Section 3583(f) requires that defendants receive a written statement of the imposed conditions.

In United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit held:

Mandatory conditions (those lawful in every supervised‑release sentence) need not be orally pronounced; defendants are deemed on notice of them.
Discretionary conditions must be announced at the sentencing hearing, either:
- Individually and orally; or
- By clear incorporation of a specific, identified set of conditions, such as those in a PSR or a standing order.
Where the written judgment adds, modifies, or conflicts with the conditions announced orally, the oral pronouncement controls and the discrepancy can warrant vacatur and remand. See also United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Lassiter, 96 F.4th 629, 639–40 (4th Cir. 2024).

2. What the district court did here

The District of Maryland has a standing order (Standing Order 2020‑13) that adopts 13 “standard conditions” of supervised release that closely track U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). These include, among others:

Standard Condition 6: Allowing probation officers to visit at any time and to seize prohibited items in plain view; and
Standard Condition 7: Requiring full‑time lawful employment (or diligent efforts to secure it) and advance notice to probation of job changes.

These standard conditions were listed in full in the PSR’s sentencing recommendations, which each defendant reviewed before sentencing.

At each sentencing, the court:

Explicitly stated that it was imposing both the mandatory and “standard” conditions of supervised release; and
Explicitly referenced that it was incorporating the adopted “mandatory and standard conditions” by that characterization.

The court then chose to “summarize” several conditions it thought especially important, including:

For Condition 6: telling each defendant he must allow probation officers to visit him “at any time” at his home or residence; and
For Condition 7: telling Tita and Nji they “must work full time at a lawful type of employment” and telling Fonguh that he must make “every effort to work full-time, at least 30 hours per week.”

In the written judgments, the court reproduced the full text of standard conditions 6 and 7.

3. Appellate resolution: incorporation plus summary is permissible

Defendants argued that the written judgments contained more detailed conditions than were orally imposed, citing Rogers and requesting plenary resentencing.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed, relying in part on United States v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511, 519–20 (4th Cir. 2024), where the court approved:

Incorporation of standard conditions via reference to the PSR; and
Minor variations in oral description that did not materially alter the substance of those conditions.

Here, the panel concluded:

The district court clearly and expressly incorporated the standard conditions by reference at the sentencing hearings. That alone satisfies Rogers, since the conditions appear in the PSR and standing order and the defendants were on notice.
The court’s subsequent in‑court “summaries” of certain conditions did not purport to replace or narrow the incorporated conditions; they were explicitly labeled summaries and omitted certain details for brevity.
There was no contradiction between the oral and written conditions, unlike the problematic scenarios in Singletary and Lassiter, where conditions appeared only in the written judgment or conflicted with the oral pronouncement. Nor did the summaries create the ambiguity observed in United States v. Bullis, 122 F.4th 107, 119 (4th Cir. 2024).

The controlling conditions are therefore the standard conditions as incorporated by reference, and the written judgments merely memorialized those conditions verbatim. No Rogers error occurred, and resentencing was unwarranted.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability vs. Relevant Conduct

Pinkerton (trial stage): If you knowingly join a conspiracy, you can be convicted of substantive crimes committed by other members, so long as those crimes were done in furtherance of the conspiracy and were reasonably foreseeable. This can broaden trial liability significantly.
Relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 (sentencing stage): At sentencing, the court looks at the scope of the specific criminal activity you agreed to jointly undertake, and whether others’ acts were in furtherance of and reasonably foreseeable within that agreed scope. It is not necessarily as broad as Pinkerton’s “all acts of the conspiracy.”
In this case: The court was careful to apply § 1B1.3, not Pinkerton, to attribute the 28 firearms to each defendant. The Peanut Project was a unified operation, and the evidence showed all three knowingly participated in the core activity of preparing and shipping firearms with obliterated serial numbers. That made the 28 firearms relevant conduct.

B. Willful Blindness

Willful blindness applies where:
1. A person strongly suspects a key fact (e.g., that serial numbers are being obliterated); and
2. He deliberately avoids confirming that fact (e.g., by never looking at the guns closely), precisely so he can later claim ignorance.
This is treated as equivalent to knowledge. But it cannot be used to punish mere carelessness or failure to investigate; there must be deliberate avoidance.

C. Residual Hearsay Under Rule 807

Rule 807 is a “safety valve” allowing hearsay when no standard exception fits, but only if:
- The statement is highly reliable (e.g., sworn, consistent, against interest, corroborated); and
- No better evidence can reasonably be obtained (e.g., the witness is truly unavailable).
Courts apply it sparingly. In this case, an unsworn, inconsistent proffer rejected by the government lacked sufficient reliability and was not more probative than live testimony from others about what they were told.

D. Expert Testimony and Mental State After Diaz

Rule 704(b) bars an expert from saying “the defendant did have intent” or “the defendant did not know X.”
Under Diaz, an expert may describe typical operations of criminal enterprises or general patterns (e.g., “most drug couriers know they carry drugs”), leaving it to the jury to apply that context to the defendant.
Even when Rule 704(b) is satisfied, the trial judge can exclude such testimony under Rule 403 if its risks (e.g., prejudice, confusion, delay) outweigh its probative value. That’s what happened here with the Cameroon‑conflict expert.

E. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Supervised Release Conditions

Mandatory conditions: Required by statute in every case involving supervised release (e.g., don’t commit new crimes, cooperate in DNA collection). The court need not read them aloud.
Discretionary conditions: Optional and tailored to the case (e.g., employment, drug testing, curfews, travel restrictions). The court must either:
- Orally announce them at sentencing; or
- Clearly incorporate a specific, known list (PSR or standing order) by reference.
The written judgment should match what was orally imposed or incorporated. If it adds or changes conditions, that can require resentencing under Rogers and Singletary.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Firearms Trafficking and Conspiracy Prosecutions

This decision strengthens the government’s hand in prosecuting illegal export conspiracies involving firearms by:

Confirming that a tightly knit, small‑scale operation with a clear mission and robust secrecy can support inferences of knowledge about every core feature of the scheme, including serial‑number obliteration.
Reinforcing that Pinkerton and willful blindness instructions are appropriate where defendants claim ignorance but the physical and organizational realities of the scheme make that claim implausible.
Making clear that juries can rely heavily on circumstantial evidence and co‑conspirator testimony to infer both knowledge and foreseeability.

In future prosecutions, particularly those involving “ghost guns” or obliterated serial numbers in trafficking schemes, Nji will be a persuasive authority for upholding convictions where defendants attempt to distance themselves from specific aspects of the operation while still being deeply enmeshed in the enterprise.

B. Sentencing Law in the Fourth Circuit

On sentencing, the opinion:

Clarifies the use of relevant conduct in conspiracies: It endorses attributing aggregate firearm counts to each conspirator when the conspiracy is narrow, cohesive, and oriented around a single trafficking scheme. Courts may consider the entire conspiratorial course of conduct, not just what each defendant personally handled, so long as the joint undertaking and foreseeability requirements of § 1B1.3 are observed.
Distinguishes Pinkerton from § 1B1.3: By emphasizing that Pinkerton was not applied at sentencing, the panel implicitly reaffirms Evans’ warning against conflating the two standards, while still allowing robust relevant‑conduct attribution in unified conspiracies.
Affirms personal‑conduct limitation for trafficking enhancements: While the enhancement for “trafficking of firearms” is tied to the defendant’s own or aided conduct, participation in a cohesive trafficking project will generally suffice to meet that standard. Defense counsel should be prepared to contest the exact nature and extent of a client’s involvement if they hope to defeat this enhancement.

C. Evidentiary Practice and the Right to Present a Defense

The opinion illustrates how courts in the Fourth Circuit are likely to handle:

Expert context evidence for state of mind: Post‑Diaz, experts may provide context, but trial judges retain broad discretion to limit such testimony where it risks turning the trial into a referendum on foreign policy or the morality of the defendant’s cause. Defense counsel should be prepared to tailor such testimony tightly to specific mental‑state issues and to show that probative value outweighs risks of prejudice and confusion.
Co‑conspirator proffers and Fifth Amendment: Where a co‑conspirator has pled but not yet been sentenced, and his prior unsworn statements conflict with plea admissions, courts will often permit a blanket Fifth Amendment invocation. Defense strategies that depend on such witnesses should anticipate this and seek alternative evidentiary routes.

D. Supervised Release Procedure in the Fourth Circuit

Finally, Nji significantly develops the Rogers line by:

Confirming that explicit incorporation of a standing order’s standard conditions, especially when mirrored in the PSR and reviewed by the defendant, is sufficient oral pronouncement.
Approving the practice of judges offering brief “summaries” or paraphrases of some conditions during sentencing, as long as they do not purport to replace or narrow the incorporated text and do not introduce ambiguity.

This guidance is important for district judges, who must balance the need to comply with Rogers against the practical difficulty of reading lengthy condition lists in every case. It also informs defense counsel as to when a Rogers challenge is likely to succeed (e.g., unannounced special conditions in the written judgment) and when it will fail (as here, where incorporation was clear and summaries were additive, not contradictory).

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Nji is a comprehensive affirmation of both the convictions and sentences in a sophisticated, politically motivated firearms trafficking conspiracy. Doctrinally, the case:

Reinforces the power of circumstantial evidence, Pinkerton vicarious liability, and willful blindness to sustain knowledge‑based offenses in closely knit conspiracies;
Clarifies how relevant conduct operates in conspiracy‑driven firearms cases, particularly for firearm‑quantity and trafficking enhancements under § 2K2.1; and
Consolidates and extends the Fourth Circuit’s supervised release jurisprudence, confirming that express incorporation of standard conditions plus targeted summaries aligns with Rogers.

The decision underscores that participants in clandestine arms‑export schemes cannot insulate themselves from liability or sentencing exposure by compartmentalizing tasks or avoiding direct contact with the most obviously illegal aspects of the operation. At the same time, it preserves trial courts’ discretion to manage complex evidentiary issues and supervised release procedures within the flexible but structured frameworks provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Sentencing Guidelines, and the Fourth Circuit’s own precedents.