Considering Anti‑Government and Sovereign‑Citizen Beliefs at Sentencing: Commentary on United States v. Bentley III (6th Cir.)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Michael Bentley III, No. 24‑5433 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025) (not recommended for publication). Although designated as non‑precedential, the opinion is a detailed and instructive application of established sentencing principles to a recurring modern problem: how far a sentencing court may rely on a defendant’s anti‑government or “sovereign citizen” style beliefs when crafting a sentence.

Bentley was convicted by a jury of:

• Conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A);
• Attempt to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, under the same provisions; and
• Using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).

At sentencing, Bentley repeatedly asserted that:

• He was not subject to federal criminal jurisdiction;
• The district court was supposedly an Article I tribunal with only commercial/admiralty authority;
• There was no “common law” crime because no “sworn injured party” testified; and
• He followed “God’s law” rather than federal law.

The district court characterized these views as “sovereign citizen‑type” arguments, warned Bentley that such theories never succeed, and then, after a detailed discussion of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, imposed a substantial but below‑Guidelines sentence: 200 months on the drug counts (concurrent) and a mandatory consecutive 84 months on the § 924(c) count, for a total of 284 months, below the advisory range of 294–346 months.

On appeal, Bentley did not contest the Guidelines calculation. Instead, he argued that the sentence was:

• Procedurally unreasonable, because the court supposedly committed legal error by considering and heavily weighing his “political beliefs”; and
• Substantively unreasonable, because, in his view, too much weight was placed on those beliefs and on the need to promote respect for the law.

The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed. The opinion is especially significant for its explicit treatment of:

• How First Amendment‑implicated beliefs and speech may be used at sentencing;
• The treatment of “sovereign citizen”‑style jurisdictional objections as sentencing-relevant information; and
• The deference owed to district courts in weighting § 3553(a) factors, particularly respect for the law and public protection, when such beliefs suggest a high risk of recidivism.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Federal agents investigating a drug trafficking organization intercepted a package from California addressed to Bentley’s grandparents’ home in eastern Tennessee. Inside was nearly a kilogram of highly pure methamphetamine. Agents replaced the drugs with sham material and conducted a controlled delivery.

When Bentley appeared at the home and took control of the package, agents attempted to arrest him. He fled, drew a firearm from his waistband, and—according to agents—held it in their direction; a shot was fired, and the agents returned fire while continuing to observe him running with the gun pointed their way. Bentley was eventually apprehended and admitted trafficking methamphetamine, although he disputed intentionally pointing the weapon at officers.

Throughout pretrial and sentencing proceedings, Bentley filed numerous materials asserting that:

• He was not subject to United States criminal laws or to the jurisdiction of federal courts;
• Common law was “the supreme law of the land”; and
• The district court had only commercial/admiralty jurisdiction dependent on contractual consent.

The district court warned him that such “sovereign citizen” theories would be summarily rejected. A jury convicted him on all counts.

At sentencing, the court calculated:

• Guidelines imprisonment range of 210–262 months on each drug count (with a 10‑year statutory minimum);
• Statutory range of 7 years to life on the § 924(c) count, to run consecutively; and
• Combined advisory range of 294–346 months.

The court then conducted a lengthy § 3553(a) analysis, emphasizing:

• The large quantity of highly pure methamphetamine;
• The serious and growing harms of methamphetamine in the region;
• Bentley’s flight, brandishing, and discharge of a firearm toward uniformed officers;
• His persistent hostility to and rejection of lawful authority as evidence of a lack of respect for the law and heightened risk to the public; and
• His traumatic childhood, immaturity, addiction, and efforts to cooperate, which supported some leniency.

Balancing those factors, the court varied slightly downward and imposed 284 months total.

B. Issues on Appeal

Bentley raised two principal challenges:

1. Procedural reasonableness (plain error review): he contended the district court committed legal error by “considering and placing so much weight on his political beliefs,” which he implicitly framed as First Amendment‑protected.
2. Substantive reasonableness (abuse of discretion review): he argued that, even if the court could consider his beliefs, it assigned them excessive weight, particularly with respect to the § 3553(a)(2)(A) “respect for the law” factor.

Because Bentley did not object at sentencing on procedural grounds, plain error review applied to the procedural‑reasonableness claim. The substantive‑reasonableness challenge received ordinary abuse‑of‑discretion review.

C. Holding

The Sixth Circuit affirmed:

• No procedural error: The court held that a sentencing judge may consider a defendant’s anti‑government or sovereign‑citizen‑style beliefs, even if those are otherwise protected by the First Amendment, so long as they are used to illuminate legitimate § 3553(a) sentencing factors—such as respect for the law, deterrence, and danger to the public—and not as punishment for “abstract beliefs.” The district court acted within this permissible framework.
• No substantive unreasonableness: The panel held that Bentley failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded to his below‑Guidelines sentence. The district court reasonably emphasized seriousness of the offense, public protection, deterrence, and Bentley’s attitudes toward the law; it did not give impermissibly disproportionate weight to his beliefs.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit clarified that courts may treat a defendant’s expressed rejection of legal authority as probative of recidivism, respect for the law, and public danger, and may give that information substantial weight in sentencing decisions, consistent with the First Amendment and existing sentencing doctrine.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Reasonableness and First Amendment‑Adjacent Speech

1. The procedural‑reasonableness framework

Procedural reasonableness examines how the sentence was reached, not how long it is. The court, relying on Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022), United States v. Adkins, 729 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012), reaffirmed that procedural error may include:

• Failure to properly calculate the Guidelines range;
• Treating the Guidelines as mandatory;
• Failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors;
• Relying on clearly erroneous facts; or
• Relying on impermissible factors.

A factor is “impermissible” if it is “neither enumerated in nor consistent with” the Guidelines or § 3553(a). United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801, 808 (6th Cir. 2016).

Plain error review, taken from United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and applied in Cabrera, requires the defendant to show:

1. An error;
2. That is clear or obvious under current law;
3. That affects substantial rights (usually, a reasonable probability of a different outcome); and
4. That seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The panel held Bentley could not satisfy even the first step, because considering his beliefs was not erroneous at all.

2. The breadth of information a sentencing court may consider

Citing United States v. Graham‑Wright, 715 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), the court emphasized the broad scope of information admissible at sentencing. A judge may consider virtually any reliable information “as to the kind of information” presented, not limited to the offense conduct or even to illegal behavior. United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 735 (6th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 2009), confirm that such information is acceptable so long as it relates to one or more § 3553(a) factors.

The Supreme Court in Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011), and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), further underlined that a defendant’s “life and characteristics” are “highly relevant” to sentencing. This is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3661: “No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense.”

Bentley’s anti‑government and jurisdictional assertions clearly fall within “background, character, and conduct,” and are therefore within the category of facts the sentencing court may consider—provided they are used for permissible purposes.

3. First Amendment limits: abstract beliefs vs. sentencing‑relevant evidence

The doctrinal fulcrum is the line between:

• Impermissibly punishing a defendant for “abstract beliefs, however obnoxious,” and
• Permissibly considering beliefs as evidence of danger, lack of remorse, or likely recidivism.

The opinion relies heavily on two Supreme Court cases:

• Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992): The Court vacated a death sentence where the prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood without any connection to the crime or any sentencing factor. Dawson holds there is no “per se barrier” to using beliefs or associations at sentencing, but they must be relevant to a legitimate sentencing concern.
• Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993): The Court upheld enhanced penalties for bias‑motivated assaults, explaining that abstract beliefs may not be punished, but conduct and motive may be. Mitchell reinforces that beliefs can be considered if they inform an assessment of dangerousness, motivation, or harm.

Applying these principles, the Sixth Circuit framed the test as follows: a sentencing judge may consider otherwise protected speech or beliefs if they:

• Relate to a § 3553(a) factor (e.g., respect for the law, deterrence, protection of the public, likelihood of rehabilitation); and
• Are not used simply to punish the defendant for holding unpopular political or religious views.

The court emphasized that nothing in the sentencing transcript suggested that Bentley was punished for “abstract beliefs.” Instead, his statements were used to:

• Gauge his respect for the law;
• Evaluate the risk he would reoffend; and
• Assess how much deterrence (specific and general) was needed.

In other words, they were classic sentencing‑relevant evidence under Dawson and Mitchell.

4. Inter‑circuit support: use of protected speech in sentencing assessments

The panel bolstered its analysis with a survey of other circuits, all endorsing similar principles:

• First Circuit – United States v. Brown, 26 F.4th 48 (1st Cir. 2022): Upheld a sentencing court’s consideration of defendant’s beliefs about governmental authority as relevant to promoting respect for the law, deterrence, and protecting the public.
• Eleventh Circuit – United States v. Serrapio, 754 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014): Distinguished between punishing speech and using speech as evidence of sentencing factors.
• Second Circuit – United States v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2012): Approved consideration of public statements trivializing the defendant’s sentence as evidence of lack of remorse.
• Tenth Circuit – United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2012): Held that a defendant’s statement that it was “fine to break the law” and that he would “continue to fight” was highly relevant to sentencing factors, especially deterrence and danger to the public.
• Fifth Circuit – United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2005): Approved reliance on a tax protestor’s belief that tax laws were invalid as evidence of likely recidivism.
• Ninth Circuit – United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2005): Upheld consideration of defendant’s view that the district court lacked jurisdiction, as this showed lack of remorse and a continuing threat to the public.
• Seventh Circuit – Kapadia v. Tally, 229 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2000): Approved consideration of anti‑Semitic statements as relevant to rehabilitation prospects and community danger in an arson/burglary of a Jewish community center.
• Seventh Circuit – United States v. Schmidt, 930 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2019): Upheld reliance on white supremacist beliefs as relevant to danger and recidivism risk.

Collectively, these decisions reflect an emerging consensus: courts may consider extremist, anti‑government, or otherwise deeply objectionable beliefs at sentencing insofar as they illuminate how dangerous the defendant is, how likely they are to obey the law, and how much deterrence is required.

5. Distinguishing United States v. Bakker

Bentley invoked United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991), misattributed in his briefing to the Eleventh Circuit. In Bakker, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence of televangelist Jim Bakker where the district judge made comments suggesting he was punishing Bakker, in part, for tarnishing religion and for defrauding “those of us who do have a religion.”

The Sixth Circuit found Bakker inapposite and unpersuasive in Bentley’s circumstances. In Bakker, the sentencing judge appeared to inject personal religious sentiment—using his own religious sensibilities as a benchmark. In contrast, Bentley’s judge:

• Expressed no personal ideological or religious grievance;
• Explicitly framed Bentley’s views as relevant to statutory sentencing purposes, especially respect for the law and deterrence; and
• Did not treat the beliefs themselves as crimes, but as evidence bearing on how to protect the public and reduce recidivism.

Thus, even if Bakker were binding (it is not in the Sixth Circuit), Bentley’s case comfortably fits within the permissible use of beliefs recognized by Dawson, Mitchell, and the circuit cases cited.

6. Application to Bentley: no procedural error

The Sixth Circuit concluded that:

• The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range.
• It methodically walked through key § 3553(a) factors—seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, deterrence, protection of the public, nature and circumstances of the offense, and history and characteristics of the defendant.
• Its references to Bentley’s “sovereign citizen‑type” views were not factual errors. Indeed, by academic and law‑enforcement accounts, a core tenet of the sovereign citizen movement is that modern governments lack jurisdiction over “non‑consenting” individuals, a view Bentley repeatedly espoused.
• The court did not rely on the “sovereign citizen” label per se; it addressed the content of his arguments—their implication that he is above the law and not accountable to courts—and used those to evaluate legitimate sentencing goals.

Accordingly, the panel held there was no error, let alone “clear or obvious” error, in the court’s reliance on his anti‑government assertions. This disposed of the procedural challenge at step one of the plain‑error test.

B. Substantive Reasonableness and Deference to Below‑Guidelines Sentences

1. Substantive reasonableness and the presumption in favor of Guidelines

Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence length is “greater than necessary” to advance § 3553(a)’s purposes. United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 2006). A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court:

• Selects a sentence arbitrarily;
• Gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor; or
• Fails to consider relevant factors altogether.

The panel again cited Adkins, 729 F.3d at 571, and United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018), which, following Gall, instruct appellate courts to:

• Review the “totality of the circumstances”; and
• Give “due deference” to the district court’s judgment that the § 3553(a) factors justify the chosen sentence, especially when the court has meaningfully considered all relevant factors.

The Sixth Circuit affords a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the Guidelines range. See Adkins, 729 F.3d at 570–71; Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 808 (citing United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2007)). The panel extended this logic: a sentence below the Guidelines range is presumed not unreasonably long—“a fortiori” a defendant faces an “especially heavy” burden to prove substantive unreasonableness. See United States v. Fields, 763 F.3d 443, 455 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Taylor, 557 F. App’x 475 (6th Cir. 2014).

Bentley’s 284‑month sentence fell below the 294–346‑month advisory range and thus enjoyed that presumption.

2. Weighting of § 3553(a) factors is primarily for the district court

The panel emphasized a recurring theme in Sixth Circuit law: the relative weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is largely a matter for the sentencing judge, not the court of appeals.

• United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022), quoting United States v. Bridgewater, 479 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209 (6th Cir. 2018), notes that “not all” § 3553(a) factors are important in every case, and a defendant’s disagreement with the relative weighting does not establish abuse of discretion.
• Adkins, 729 F.3d at 571–72 (citing Zobel, 696 F.3d at 571–72) and United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2008), holds that the balancing of § 3553(a) factors is “beyond the scope” of appellate review when the court has considered and weighed all relevant factors.
• Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442, repeats that sentencing is “a matter of reasoned discretion, not math.”
• United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 478 (6th Cir. 2022), citing United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859 (6th Cir. 2020), underscores that a court does not commit reversible error “simply by attaching great weight to a single factor” where circumstances warrant it.

Once a district court has “considered and weighed all pertinent factors, a defendant clearly bears a much greater burden in arguing that the court has given an unreasonable amount of weight to any particular one.” Adkins, 729 F.3d at 571 (quoting United States v. Thomas, 437 F. App’x 456 (6th Cir. 2011)).

3. Applying these principles to Bentley

The panel rejected Bentley’s claim that the district court put “too much” emphasis on his beliefs or on the need to promote respect for the law. The sentencing transcript showed a robust discussion of:

• Seriousness of the offense: The large quantity of highly pure methamphetamine, the “methamphetamine epidemic” in the region, and the devastating impact of the drug on individuals, families, and communities.
• Firearm conduct: Fleeing arrest while drawing, pointing (or at least sweeping), and discharging a firearm in the direction of uniformed agents, and the psychological impact on the officer involved.
• Public protection and deterrence: The need both to deter Bentley specifically—given his insistence that he had committed no crime and that the government lacked authority over him—and to deter others from similar conduct.
• History and characteristics: Bentley’s “horrific” childhood, immaturity and vulnerability, the apparent influence of his mother’s anti‑government views, his young daughter, his addiction, and his attempted cooperation.

The district court explicitly noted there was no demonstrated causal link between his traumatic background and the commission of these offenses, but still granted him “the full benefit of the doubt” and varied downward.

The appellate court concluded:

• The district court did not disproportionately focus on his beliefs to the exclusion of other factors; rather, it discussed all relevant considerations at length.
• Even if the court had weighed respect for the law and Bentley’s beliefs more heavily than other factors, that would have been within its discretion, particularly given that he:
  • Engaged in serious drug trafficking and gun crime;
  • Attempted to escape with a loaded weapon; and
  • Persistently disavowed the authority of the court and the criminal law, suggesting a high risk of recidivism.

The panel noted, in particular, that the district court’s admonition that Bentley should not “pass on to [his] daughter” his “meritless” views did not transform the sentencing into a punishment for ideology. Rather, it reflected concern that his continuing refusal to acknowledge legal authority and his tendency to “minimize and blame others” posed long‑term risks for both him and those around him. The focus remained on legitimate § 3553(a) goals: respect for the law, prevention, and rehabilitation.

In short, Bentley’s argument reduced to the assertion that the district court should have balanced the factors differently. Under Sexton, Sherrill, and similar cases, such disagreement is insufficient to show abuse of discretion—particularly given the below‑Guidelines outcome.

C. Precedents and Doctrinal Structure

1. Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit sentencing principles

The opinion synthesizes several strands of sentencing doctrine:

• Broad information‑gathering power at sentencing – Tucker, Williams, § 3661:
  Courts may consider any reliable information about a defendant’s background, character, and conduct unless a specific constitutional or statutory limit applies.
• Guidelines are advisory; § 3553(a) governs – Gall, Booker (implicitly), Gardner:
  Sentences must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to achieve punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, while reflecting seriousness, promoting respect for the law, and avoiding unwarranted disparities.
• Appellate review separated into procedural and substantive reasonableness – Gall, Vonner, Adkins, Zobel.
• Presumption of reasonableness (and, a fortiori, for below‑Guidelines sentences) – Adkins, Cabrera, Liou, Fields, Taylor.
• Heavy deference to district court’s weighing of factors – Bridgewater, Robinson, Sexton, Gates, Dunnican, Thomas.

Bentley does not alter these standards; instead, it applies them in a context where First Amendment values intersect with sentencing discretion.

2. First Amendment and beliefs at sentencing

The key doctrinal foundation comes from Dawson and Mitchell: there is no categorical First Amendment bar against using beliefs at sentencing. The prohibition is against:

• Enhancing punishment solely based on protected beliefs unrelated to any sentencing consideration; or
• Penalizing the abstract holding of views in a manner detached from conduct, motivation, or risk.

The line is crossed when the sentencing judge’s comments indicate personal disagreement with the beliefs as such (as arguably in Bakker), rather than concern with how those beliefs affect the defendant’s behavior, culpability, or future risk.

Bentley, like the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit cases cited, confirms that courts may:

• Treat expressed beliefs as evidence of likely future conduct (e.g., someone who insists that tax or criminal laws are illegitimate is more likely to violate them again);
• Use speech to gauge remorse, respect for law, and rehabilitative potential;
• Weigh that evidence when deciding the necessary amount of specific deterrence and incapacitation; and
• Consider the broader message for general deterrence—e.g., whether a lenient sentence would embolden others who share such views to disregard the law.

D. Application to Sovereign‑Citizen and Anti‑Government Defendants

Although the panel carefully avoided over‑labeling Bentley, it recognized that his filings and oral statements tracked widely recognized “sovereign citizen” themes: denial of governmental jurisdiction, invocation of “common law” and “admiralty/maritime” concepts, and insistence that only an injured, sworn party can sustain a criminal prosecution.

The opinion thus functions as a practical guide for handling similar defendants:

• Label vs. substance: Courts should focus on the content of a defendant’s beliefs and arguments, not on the pejorative label “sovereign citizen.” The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the label was factually apt, but emphasized that the sentencing judge relied on the substance—Bentley’s insistence that he was beyond the reach of the law.
• Beliefs as aggravating factors: Rejection of all legal authority—especially in combination with violent or dangerous conduct—may reasonably be treated as aggravating, because it:
  • Signals a high likelihood of recidivism;
  • Undermines chances of rehabilitation;
  • Raises concerns about how the person will respond to law enforcement in the future; and
  • May encourage others holding similar views if not met with adequate sanction.
• First Amendment boundaries: Courts must take care not to appear to punish the defendant for mere membership in a movement or abstract opposition to government. The opinion underscores that the judge’s remarks must be tied back to statutory purposes, not ideological condemnation.

As such, Bentley will likely be cited in future cases involving:

• Tax protestors denying the validity of tax laws;
• Sovereign citizen adherents refusing to recognize court jurisdiction;
• Extremist defendants whose speeches or manifestos indicate intent to continue unlawful conduct; and
• Defendants who publicly trivialize their offenses or sentences.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness

• Procedural reasonableness: Did the judge follow the correct process? That includes:
  • Correctly calculating the Guidelines;
  • Recognizing the Guidelines are advisory;
  • Considering all relevant § 3553(a) factors;
  • Relying on accurate facts; and
  • Avoiding impermissible considerations (e.g., race, religion as such).
• Substantive reasonableness: Is the length of the sentence reasonable in light of the facts and statutory goals? Even if the process was perfect, a sentence can still be too long or too short.

2. Plain error review

Because Bentley didn’t object at sentencing that considering his beliefs was impermissible, the appellate court applied “plain error” review, which is much harder for defendants to satisfy. He had to show:

1. The court made a legal error;
2. The error was clear or obvious;
3. The error affected the outcome; and
4. The error seriously affected the fairness or reputation of the proceedings.

The Sixth Circuit found no error at all, so the claim failed at the first step.

3. § 3553(a) factors

Section 3553(a) sets out the main considerations for sentencing, including:

• Nature and circumstances of the offense;
• History and characteristics of the defendant;
• The need for the sentence to:
  • Reflect seriousness of the offense;
  • Promote respect for the law;
  • Provide just punishment;
  • Afford adequate deterrence (specific and general);
  • Protect the public from further crimes; and
  • Provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or treatment.
• The kinds of sentences available and the Guidelines range;
• Policy statements and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.

The court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve these goals.

4. Guidelines range and below‑Guidelines sentences

The Sentencing Guidelines produce an advisory range based on offense level and criminal history. Here, Bentley’s range was 294–346 months total (including the mandatory consecutive minimum of 84 months on the § 924(c) count).

A below‑Guidelines sentence (like Bentley’s 284 months) is typically easier to defend on appeal because:

• The Guidelines are designed to embody Congress’s broad sentencing policies;
• Deviating downward already reflects leniency based on individualized factors; and
• Appellate courts presume such sentences are not excessively long unless the defendant shows otherwise.

5. Sovereign citizen ideology

The opinion briefly alludes to scholarship describing “sovereign citizens” as individuals who:

• Deny the legitimacy of current governmental and judicial authority;
• Assert that only “common law” or “God’s law” applies to them;
• Claim that courts have jurisdiction only by contract or via admiralty/maritime law; and
• Often attempt to “opt out” of criminal and tax laws through pseudo‑legal arguments.

Bentley’s contentions neatly match these themes. The Sixth Circuit used this context only to explain why the district court’s characterization was reasonable, not as an independent basis to aggravate his sentence.

IV. Impact and Future Significance

A. For district courts

Bentley provides clear guidance to sentencing judges in the Sixth Circuit (and, persuasively, elsewhere):

• They may consider anti‑government or sovereign citizen‑style statements when those statements are tied to statutory sentencing purposes, particularly respect for law, deterrence, and public protection.
• They should build a robust record explaining:
  • How those beliefs inform their assessment of risk and recidivism;
  • Why the beliefs show a lack (or presence) of remorse or rehabilitation potential; and
  • How the sentence addresses those concerns.
• They should avoid suggesting that they are punishing the defendant merely for holding disfavored views or that a different ideology would have reduced the sentence.

B. For prosecutors

Prosecutors can use Bentley to:

• Argue that a defendant’s persistent denial of jurisdiction or legal authority evidences a high risk of reoffending, warranting a stronger emphasis on deterrence and public safety.
• Introduce evidence of the defendant’s post‑offense statements (e.g., jail calls, filings, social‑media posts) to show lack of remorse or continuing dangerousness, subject to relevance and reliability.
• Reassure courts that they may rely on such evidence without running afoul of the First Amendment, provided it is tethered to § 3553(a) factors.

C. For defense counsel

Defense attorneys can draw several lessons:

• Preservation matters: Failure to object at sentencing forces a defendant into the narrow “plain error” lane.
• Counsel should address problematic beliefs: If a client holds or expresses sovereign‑citizen or similarly extreme views, counsel should:
  • Explain to the court whether these are deeply held, transient, or the product of misunderstanding;
  • Highlight any evidence of change, remorse, or willingness to comply with supervision; and
  • Frame them as bluster or confusion rather than as settled ideology, where supportable.
• Mitigation strategy: Emphasize positive aspects of character, supportive family, or treatment prospects to counterbalance any aggravating inferences from the client’s statements.

D. Doctrinally: strengthening an inter‑circuit consensus

Even though Bentley is “not recommended for publication” and therefore not binding precedent under Sixth Circuit rules, it:

• Aligns the Sixth Circuit with a broad inter‑circuit consensus that beliefs and speech can be used at sentencing when tied to statutory purposes;
• Clarifies, within this circuit, that sovereign‑citizen style challenges to jurisdiction can and will be used by sentencing courts as evidence of lack of respect for the law and recidivism risk; and
• Signals that heavy emphasis on respect for the law and deterrence in such cases is well within the bounds of discretion, especially when the sentence remains within or below the Advisory range.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Bentley III reaffirms core sentencing principles while addressing a contemporary problem: defendants who reject the legitimacy of the justice system itself. The Sixth Circuit holds that a district court may:

• Consider a defendant’s anti‑government or sovereign‑citizen beliefs at sentencing;
• Use those beliefs to assess respect for the law, likelihood of recidivism, and the need for deterrence and public protection; and
• Give them substantial weight, so long as the judge is not punishing the defendant for abstract ideology.

Applying well‑established doctrines on procedural and substantive reasonableness, the court found no error in a below‑Guidelines sentence that carefully balanced the seriousness of large‑scale methamphetamine trafficking, a dangerous firearm incident, the defendant’s history and personal traumas, and his persistent disavowal of legal authority.

While not precedential, the opinion supplies a clear and practical template for sentencing courts confronted with sovereign‑citizen or anti‑government defendants. It underscores that the First Amendment does not immunize statements that reveal concrete sentencing‑relevant characteristics and that a carefully reasoned, well‑documented reliance on such statements is fully compatible with constitutional protections and the statutory structure of federal sentencing.