Consent‐Based Home Entries and Probable Cause in §1983 Arrest Claims

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Dept. (No. 24-630-cv, Apr. 10, 2025), affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants in a §1983 action alleging false arrest, unlawful entry, due process violations, and municipal liability. The plaintiff, Kelly Glover, was briefly detained after law enforcement officers, acting on surveillance and counterfeit‐bill evidence, entered her home, placed her under arrest without a warrant, and then released her when new evidence emerged.

Key issues:

• Whether officers had probable cause to arrest Glover for criminal possession of a forged instrument.
• Whether her consent to a warrantless home entry and subsequent request to leave defeated her Fourth Amendment claim under Payton v. New York.
• Whether due process required a prompt arraignment under New York Criminal Procedure Law §140.20.
• Whether municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. could attach when the plaintiff suffered no lasting injury.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a non-precedential summary order, held:

1. Deputy Albanese possessed probable cause to arrest Glover. Surveillance footage, physical inspection of bills (lack of watermark), and Glover’s admission provided “reasonably trustworthy information.”
2. Glover voluntarily consented to the officer’s entry into her home and did not ask him to leave until after he announced her arrest. Thus Payton did not forbid the warrantless entry.
3. Her four-and-a-half-hour detention, ended without formal charges, did not violate due process by failing to arraign her under §140.20.
4. No private right of action existed under §140.20 independent of the Constitution, and no “actual injury” warranted municipal liability under §1983.
5. Procedural rulings denying additional discovery and deeming defendants’ summary judgment motion unopposed were not abuses of discretion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Payton v. New York (445 U.S. 573, 1980): Bars warrantless, nonconsensual home entries for arrest. The panel stressed that consensual entries are outside its scope.
• County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (500 U.S. 44, 1991): Requires “prompt” probable‐cause determination—generally within 48 hours. Here, Glover was released within hours.
• Weyant v. Okst (101 F.3d 845, 1996) and Jaegly v. Couch (439 F.3d 149, 2006): Define probable cause as “reasonably trustworthy information.” Confirm that an innocent explanation does not vitiate probable cause.
• Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. (436 U.S. 658, 1978): Establishes municipal liability prerequisites—policy or custom causing a constitutional violation and actual injury to the plaintiff.
• First City, Texas‐Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank (150 F.3d 172, 1998) and Lue v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (768 F. App’x 7, 2019): Standards for reviewing discovery rulings and summary judgment procedures for abuse of discretion.

Legal Reasoning

Probable Cause & False Arrest: Under N.Y. Penal Law §170.30, a first‐degree forged instrument charge requires knowledge of forgery and intent to defraud. The court held that an officer need not have direct proof of the suspect’s subjective intent at the arrest stage. Surveillance footage showing Glover tendering counterfeit bills, coupled with her admission of being the purchaser, met the probable cause threshold.

Consent Exception to Warrant Requirement: Glover’s own deposition confirmed she invited Deputy Albanese into her home. Her later request for him to leave—after he announced an arrest—did not retroactively negate her earlier consent. Thus, Payton was inapplicable.

Due Process & Prompt Arraignment: The court analogized federal and New York law, finding no constitutional violation when an arrestee is held only briefly and released without charges. No independent §140.20 private cause of action arises absent a parallel constitutional deprivation.

Municipal Liability: Even if the Waiver of Claims form suggested a County practice, Glover suffered no ongoing harm or extended detention because of it. Without “actual injury,” a §1983 Monell claim fails.

Discovery & Summary Judgment Procedure: Magistrate Judge Baxter offered Rule 56(d) relief and a spoliation cross‐motion path. Glover declined timely action and filed discovery motions after briefing closed. The district court permissibly deemed the summary judgment unopposed when no response or Rule 56(d) showing appeared.

Impact

• Probable Cause Clarity: Reinforces that officers need only reasonably trustworthy evidence—not full proof of criminal intent—before effecting an arrest.
• Consent & Home Arrests: Emphasizes the durability of consent to enter, even if withdrawal occurs mid‐interaction, provided the withdrawal follows the arrest announcement.
• Professional Responsibility in Discovery: Warns practitioners that failing to timely invoke Rule 56(d) or pursue spoliation cross‐motions can forfeit key defenses at the summary judgment stage.
• Monell Thresholds: Confirms that municipal liability demands a plaintiff show not only a policy/custom but also a concrete injury resulting from it.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on facts, that a crime occurred. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or direct evidence of someone’s intent.
• Consent Exception: If you invite police into your home, they may make an arrest there without a warrant. Withdrawing consent matters only if done before the arrest action begins.
• Rule 56(d): Allows a party to request more time or discovery to oppose summary judgment, but must be invoked before the summary judgment deadline and show specific facts are missing.
• Monell Liability: A local government can be sued under §1983 only if a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional violation and the plaintiff suffers a tangible injury because of it.

Conclusion

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Dept. affirms key Fourth Amendment principles: officers may rely on “reasonably trustworthy” evidence to establish probable cause, and consent to enter a home validates a warrantless entry even if later revoked post‐arrest announcement. The judgment also underscores procedural imperatives—prompt invocation of Rule 56(d) and timely discovery motions—to preserve defenses at summary judgment. Finally, it clarifies that brief, no‐charge detentions do not evoke Monell liability absent a concrete injury. This decision, though non-precedential, offers persuasive guidance on the interplay of consent, probable cause, and municipal‐liability thresholds in §1983 litigation.