Connecticut Supreme Court Clarifies: No Post‑Procurement Common‑Law Duty for Insurance Agents To Warn of Impending Cancellation/Nonrenewal; Dissent Proposes a Continuing Duty To Inform

Note: This commentary is based on the dissenting opinion of McDONALD, J. (joined by ECKER, J.), in Deer v. National General Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Connecticut (September 9, 2025). The majority opinion is not reproduced here; its holding is described as it appears within the dissent.

Introduction

This case sits at the intersection of old agency rules and the modern realities of the insurance marketplace. Plaintiffs Lee and Keleen Deer challenged summary judgment entered against them in a dispute arising from the nonrenewal of their homeowners policy and the devastating loss of their home to fire shortly after the policy expired. The central legal issue is whether an insurance agent’s common‑law duty to the insured ends once the agent procures the requested policy—or whether, in circumstances where the agent receives information from the insurer that jeopardizes the continuation of the existing policy, the agent owes an ongoing duty to inform the insured.

The dissent by Justice McDonald (joined by Justice Ecker) makes two core points:

First, the common‑law duty of an insurance agent to exercise reasonable skill, care, and diligence does not always end at procurement; when an agent learns of material information from the insurer that threatens the effectiveness or continuation of the policy the agent placed, the agent has a duty to notify the insured.
Second, Connecticut’s “centuries‑old” agency rule—ending the agent’s relationship and duties at procurement—no longer fits contemporary insurance practices and should be reexamined to reflect the professionalized role of insurance agents and modern agency principles.

The majority, according to the dissent, reaffirmed the traditional rule: absent special circumstances or a separate undertaking (e.g., to obtain renewal), an insurance agent has no duty to notify an insured that the policy is at risk of cancellation or nonrenewal once the initial policy has been procured.

Case Background and Parties

Key actors and facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs (as required at the summary‑judgment stage):

Plaintiffs: Lee and Keleen Deer.
Agent/Defendant: The Trahan Agency, Inc. (a captive Allstate agent authorized, under an Allstate “expanded insurance program,” to place homeowners policies underwritten by insurers selected by Allstate, including Century‑National).
Underwriter: Century‑National Insurance Company (it underwrote the Deers’ 2019–2020 homeowners policy placed by Trahan).
Prior history: The Deers had longstanding dealings with Allstate dating to 2001 and 15 renewals of an Allstate homeowners policy. Allstate had ceased underwriting homeowners in Connecticut, but captive agents could place policies with designated third‑party underwriters.

Key events:

June 27, 2019: Century‑National homeowners policy incepted (through June 27, 2020).
Post‑placement inspection: Century‑National’s vendor inspected the property. Century‑National emailed Trahan’s office manager, instructing the agency to tell the Deers that repairs to missing siding were “required as a condition of continued coverage,” and to obtain proof of repairs by March 27, 2020.
March 2020: No proof received; Century‑National emailed the agency that the policy had been “set to nonrenew,” while indicating renewal could still occur if proof of repairs was submitted by expiration.
Agent’s communication: The Deers say Trahan never told them any of this. Trahan contends it did. The dissent assumes, for summary‑judgment purposes, that the Deers received no notice from the agent.
Insurer’s statutory notice: Due to a mailbox oddity, the Deers did not receive Century‑National’s nonrenewal notice (General Statutes § 38a‑323(a)(1) requires insurers to notify insureds at least 60 days before nonrenewal).
June 27, 2020: Policy expired without renewal.
Shortly after: A fire destroyed the Deers’ home. Believing coverage had automatically renewed—as in their prior Allstate renewals—Mr. Deer called Allstate to claim, only to learn there was no active policy.

Procedural posture:

The Appellate Court upheld summary judgment for the agency (and others). Deer v. National General Ins. Co., 225 Conn. App. 656, 317 A.3d 19 (2024).
The Supreme Court majority (not provided here) affirmed, adopting the view that the agent’s duty ended at procurement absent special circumstances.
The dissent would reverse as to the agency and remand for trial, recognizing an ongoing duty to inform of insurer communications that jeopardize continuation of the existing policy.

Summary of the Judgment

As described in the dissent:

Majority holding: Connecticut adheres to the longstanding “end‑of‑procurement” rule. Once a broker or agent successfully procures the insured’s requested policy, the agency relationship—and thus the agent’s common‑law duties—ordinarily cease. Absent “special circumstances” or a separate undertaking (e.g., to obtain renewal), an insurance agent has no common‑law duty to notify the insured that the insurer may cancel or nonrenew the policy.
Dissent’s conclusion: The agent’s duty of reasonable care does not end at procurement in every case. When an agent receives material information from the insurer that threatens the continuation or purpose of the existing policy (such as inspection‑based conditions for continued coverage and notices of impending cancellation/nonrenewal), the agent has a duty to seasonably inform the insured. On the summary‑judgment record, a triable fact dispute exists over whether Trahan provided the required notice; the case should be remanded for trial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Cheshire Brass Co. v. Wilson, 86 Conn. 551 (1913)

Source of the “general rule” that an insurance broker’s agency ends when the broker procures the requested policy. Historically, this bright‑line rule has curtailed post‑procurement duties unless special circumstances exist. The majority leans on Cheshire Brass to reaffirm that baseline.

The dissent, while recognizing the case’s longevity, argues that its categorical application is anachronistic. It contends that Cheshire Brass addressed a different question—whether the agent’s project (procurement) is complete—not whether post‑procurement information that defeats the purpose of the policy triggers a duty to inform.

Ursini v. Goldman, 118 Conn. 554 (1934)

Establishes the foundational duty: an agent must exercise reasonable skill, care, and diligence in “effecting” the insurance, and is liable for negligence that defeats the insurance the agent undertook to secure. The dissent uses Ursini as the doctrinal anchor to argue that an agent’s obligations include preventing the policy the agent placed from being defeated by known insurer conditions or actions—through timely notice to the insured.

Lewis v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co., 154 Conn. 660 (1967)

Commonly cited to limit agents’ ongoing duties: once the requested policy is in place, the agent has no continuing obligation to recommend additional coverage or to advise about future insurance needs. The dissent emphasizes that Lewis addresses the “duty to advise” about further or different coverage—distinct from the “duty to inform” about threats to the effectiveness or continuation of the existing policy the agent procured.

Precision Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J. Pfund Associates, Inc., 109 Conn. App. 560 (2008), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 940 (2008)

A pivotal Appellate Court decision recognizing that an agent bears an “obligation to seek continuation of an insurance policy,” including a “duty to notify the [insured] if the insurer declines to continue [to insure] the risk,” thereby avoiding prejudice while the insured seeks protection elsewhere. The opinion also states: “An agent or broker cannot sit idly with a cancellation notice or information, but must seasonably inform the insured client.”

The majority, as characterized by the dissent, reads Precision Mechanical as fact‑bound to a particular undertaking to seek renewal. The dissent disagrees, treating it as a broader articulation of the duty to inform about continuation threats when the agent is aware of them.

Other authorities from Connecticut and beyond

Shoreline Shellfish, LLC v. Branford, 336 Conn. 403 (2020): Cited for summary‑judgment standards (triable issues exist when reasonable factfinders could disagree).
General Statutes § 38a‑323(a)(1): Requires insurers to give at least 60 days’ notice of nonrenewal. The dissent underscores that statutory insurer obligations do not negate an agent’s independent common‑law duty to inform when the agent receives material information from the insurer.
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.11 (2006): Modern agency principles recognize a duty to provide the principal with facts the agent knows and that are material to the agent’s duties, and suggest some duties may survive formal termination of the agency in appropriate circumstances. The dissent invokes these to support a more contextual approach than the century‑old bright line.
Comparative cases: The dissent canvasses decisions (e.g., Baldwin Crane & Equipment Corp. v. Riley & Rielly Ins. Agency, Inc., 44 Mass. App. 29 (1997); Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Bear, LLC, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (S.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 796 F. App’x 372 (9th Cir. 2019); AGA Fishing Group Ltd. v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 533 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2008); Farm Credit Midsouth, PCA v. Bollinger, 548 S.W.3d 164 (Ark. App. 2018); Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of New York v. Wittmeyer, 211 A.D.3d 1564 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)) to show the widespread acceptance of the general no‑duty rule post‑procurement, but highlights how many jurisdictions qualify that rule in “special circumstances” or where the agent undertakes renewal or receives cancellation information.

Legal Reasoning

How the majority’s rule functions (as described in the dissent)

The agent’s agency ends when the requested policy is procured; duties generally terminate at that point.
Renewal is a new procurement. Without a specific undertaking to procure renewal or special circumstances, the agent has no duty to secure renewal or to warn about the risk of nonrenewal.
The statutory framework assigns nonrenewal notice duties to insurers (e.g., § 38a‑323(a)(1)); that framework, together with the end‑of‑procurement rule, limits expanding common‑law agent duties.

The dissent’s countervailing analysis

Duty to inform about threats to the existing policy: The dissent distinguishes between the (non‑existing) common‑law “duty to advise” about additional or future coverage, and a (necessary) “duty to inform” about material information concerning the insured’s current policy that the agent placed. When the insurer communicates to the agent that continued coverage is conditioned on specific repairs by a date certain—and threatens cancellation or nonrenewal—the agent’s duty of reasonable care encompasses seasonably informing the insured.
No meaningful cancellation/nonrenewal distinction here: The dissent rejects the majority’s bright‑line distinction between “cancellation” (mid‑term termination) and “nonrenewal” (no new term). In this case, both the initial email (“repairs are required as a condition of continued coverage”) and the subsequent “set to nonrenew” email concerned the viability and continuation of the policy the agent had procured. The agent’s knowledge created a duty to convey that information regardless of label.
Modern expectations and professionalization: Insurance agents are professionally licensed and heavily regulated (General Statutes § 38a‑702a et seq.). Insureds reasonably expect agents—particularly those involved in placing the policy and receiving communications about it—to transmit material information affecting coverage continuation. The dissent notes that everyone involved (agent, insurer representatives, expert testimony) appeared to share this expectation in practice.
Restatement (Third) of Agency and evolving doctrine: Modern agency law emphasizes context and recognizes an agent’s continuing duty to supply information material to the principal’s interests and to the agent’s undertaken task. The dissent argues Connecticut’s rigid, early‑20th‑century approach should evolve accordingly.
Summary‑judgment posture: On these facts, whether Trahan seasonably warned the Deers is disputed. Because the dissent would recognize a duty to inform on these facts, the case should proceed to trial.

Impact and Policy Implications

Immediate doctrinal effect (majority rule):

For insureds: Insureds in Connecticut cannot generally rely on their agents to warn them of cancellation/nonrenewal risks after the initial policy is placed—unless they can show “special circumstances,” a specific undertaking to procure renewal, or another recognized exception. The primary statutory protection is the insurer’s nonrenewal notice (which may be imperfect in practice if not actually received).
For agents and brokers: The decision narrows negligence exposure for post‑procurement omissions. Nonetheless, best practices—and E&O risk management—still strongly favor timely transmission of any cancellation/nonrenewal communications received from insurers.
For litigants: Plaintiffs challenging post‑procurement omissions will need to plead and prove special circumstances (e.g., a long‑standing advisory relationship, a paid consulting role, or a specific undertaking to monitor or renew) or frame claims around negligence in the original procurement, misrepresentations, or contractually assumed obligations.

Prospective evolution (if the dissent’s view gains traction):

Recognition of a continuing duty to inform when an insurer communicates conditions or actions that threaten the continuation of the policy the agent placed.
Less rigidity in the cancellation/nonrenewal distinction when both contexts concern the viability of the existing coverage.
Doctrinal alignment with modern agency principles (Restatement (Third) of Agency) recognizing duties to provide material information and the possibility of some post‑termination obligations.

Legislative and regulatory considerations:

In light of practical gaps revealed here (e.g., insureds not receiving the insurer’s nonrenewal notice), the legislature could consider clarifying statutory duties for agents to relay cancellation or nonrenewal‑related communications received from insurers, or to adopt mandated multi‑channel notices.
Regulators could issue guidance framing agent best practices consistent with professional standards (e.g., documenting transmission of insurer notices, proactive follow‑up when continuation is conditioned).

Business practice takeaways for agents:

Promptly forward any insurer communications that condition “continued coverage” or signal cancellation/nonrenewal risk; document delivery and follow‑up.
Use standardized workflows and reminders for inspection‑related conditions with deadlines (e.g., proof of repairs), including escalation protocols.
Clarify in writing the scope of services at inception and renewal (are you undertaking to monitor, to advise, to renew?), to manage expectations and liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Captive agent: A producer authorized to sell policies for a single parent insurer (here, Allstate), though the parent may allow placement with designated third‑party underwriters under certain programs (as with Century‑National).
Cancellation vs. nonrenewal:
- Cancellation ends a policy before the end of its term.
- Nonrenewal means the policy ends at expiration without a new term. In practice, both can raise the same practical risk: a gap in coverage unless the insured acts.
Duty to advise vs. duty to inform:
- Duty to advise involves recommending additional or different coverages beyond what the insured requested; most courts do not impose this absent special circumstances.
- Duty to inform involves passing along material information the agent has about the existing policy’s effectiveness or continuation (e.g., conditional coverage, inspection findings, deadlines). The dissent argues this duty should be recognized even if the duty to advise is not.
“Special circumstances” exception: A fact‑sensitive doctrine expanding agent duties where, for example, the agent holds itself out as a specialist advisor, charges a separate fee for consulting, has a longstanding relationship of reliance, or expressly undertakes to obtain renewal or monitor conditions.
Modern agency law (Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.11): Emphasizes an agent’s duty to use reasonable efforts to provide the principal with facts the agent knows that are material to the agent’s tasks; some duties may persist even after formal termination of the agency if fairness and the nature of the undertaking require it.
Summary judgment: A case is decided without trial when there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The dissent would find a triable fact issue (did the agent notify?) if the duty is recognized.

Conclusion

Deer v. National General Ins. Co. confirms, as a matter of Connecticut common law, that insurance agents generally owe no post‑procurement duty to warn insureds about impending cancellation or nonrenewal unless special circumstances apply or the agent undertakes that responsibility. The dissent urges a recalibration: when an agent receives insurer communications that condition “continued coverage” or indicate cancellation/nonrenewal, the agent should have a duty to seasonably inform the insured—both as a matter of reasonable care in “effecting” the policy and under modern agency principles.

Key takeaways:

The majority’s reaffirmation of the end‑of‑procurement rule narrows negligence claims against agents for post‑placement omissions in Connecticut.
The dissent provides a detailed blueprint for a contemporary “duty to inform” doctrine that would better align with professionalized insurance practice and the Restatement (Third) of Agency.
Practical gaps in notice—especially when insurer mailings fail—suggest potential areas for legislative or regulatory clarification to protect consumers and harmonize agent practices with public expectations.

Whether Connecticut ultimately gravitates toward the dissent’s modernized approach will depend on future cases, legislative developments, and evolving professional standards. For now, Deer underscores the importance for insureds to monitor insurer communications about inspections and conditions for continued coverage—and for agents, as a matter of best practice if not common‑law duty, to promptly and clearly pass along any such information they receive.