Congressional Authorization of Double-Counting for Drug Premises Offenses: The Sixth Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Willis

I. Introduction

In United States v. Joe'Veon Penson Willis, No. 25‑3038 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed three important issues in federal sentencing:

Whether applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ two-level enhancement for “maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance” (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12)) to a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (maintaining a drug premises) constitutes impermissible “double-counting.”
Whether a below-Guidelines sentence for a drug and firearm offender was substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Whether an unpreserved error—imposing 135-month concurrent sentences on counts whose statutory maximum was 120 months—required remand when the error did not lengthen the defendant’s time in custody.

The court, in a published opinion authored by Judge Nalbandian and joined by Judges Davis and Hermandorfer, affirmed the sentence in full. The decision is particularly significant for its explicit holding that Congress and the Sentencing Commission have authorized what looks like “double-counting” in drug-premises cases, and for its application of the concurrent-sentence doctrine and plain-error principles to decline correction of a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum on some counts.

Because the opinion is “Recommended for Publication,” it constitutes binding precedent within the Sixth Circuit and aligns that circuit with several others on the treatment of the drug-premises enhancement.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

On Christmas Day 2021, Joe'Veon Penson Willis and his half-brother, John Penson, livestreamed from their living room on Facebook, openly describing their drug business while loud music played. This broadcast attracted the attention of federal law enforcement—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

A few days later, agents executed a search warrant at the brothers’ residence. They focused on three areas:

Willis’s bedroom: 425 grams of methamphetamine; 25 grams of a fentanyl mixture; one gram of fentanyl; a digital scale; a loaded Glock magazine; and loose ammunition.
Half-brother’s bedroom: a loaded Glock 19 pistol with a large-capacity magazine; eight grams of a fentanyl mixture; 13 methamphetamine pills (six grams); and a blender with suspected drug residue.
Common/shared areas (living room, sunroom, kitchen, hallway closet): an RF-15 (AR-15-type) pistol; two large-capacity magazines; a 12‑gauge shotgun; a gun box; 100 methamphetamine pills (44 grams); digital scales (one with drug residue, one clean); and loose ammunition.

The investigation revealed that neither Willis nor his half-brother lawfully purchased the Glock 19 or the RF‑15. ATF traced purchase records and discovered that Willis used a “straw purchaser” (a fraudulent buyer) to acquire the firearms on his behalf. Social media posts showed Willis holding pistols matching the seized Glock 19 and RF‑15, reinforcing his connection to the weapons.

B. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing

The government charged Willis with:

Maintaining a drug premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); and
Two counts of aiding and abetting false statements in the purchase of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2).

Willis pled guilty to all counts without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, he raised two objections:

Double-counting objection: He argued that applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for “maintaining a premises” constituted improper double-counting, because the underlying statute of conviction (21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)) already criminalizes that same conduct.
Drug-quantity attribution objection: He accepted responsibility for most items in his bedroom but claimed that the methamphetamine and fentanyl mixture found there did not belong to him, and that the meth pills found in the common areas also should not be attributed to him.

The district court rejected both objections, adopted the Presentence Report (PSR) in full, and calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 168–210 months. The court then varied downward and imposed three concurrent sentences of 135 months’ imprisonment and 36 months’ supervised release—one sentence on each count.

C. Appeal and Issues Presented

On appeal, Willis argued:

The application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) to his § 856(a)(1) conviction constituted unlawful double-counting.
His 135‑month below-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to accomplish the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and because too many drugs were attributed to him.

The government, for its part, raised a separate issue that Willis had not: the two firearm counts carried statutory maximum sentences of 120 months under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), but the district court had imposed 135 months on each of those counts. The government invited the Sixth Circuit to issue a limited remand to correct this error, although the sentences ran concurrently and did not increase Willis’s overall incarceration.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit:

Rejected the double-counting argument and held that applying the two-level drug-premises enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) to a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) is permissible because Congress expressly directed the Sentencing Commission to add such an enhancement in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. This reflects congressional intent to impose an “additional increase” for maintaining a drug premises, even when the underlying offense already punishes that conduct.
Upheld the substantive reasonableness of Willis’s below-Guidelines sentence. The court emphasized the strong presumption of reasonableness for below-Guidelines sentences and deferred to the district court’s fact-finding regarding drug attribution and its application of § 3553(a) factors.
Found a sentencing error in that the two firearm counts exceeded the 120-month statutory maximum, but declined to correct it. Applying plain-error principles and the concurrent-sentence doctrine, the court concluded that the error did not affect Willis’s substantial rights because his overall time in custody (135 months) would remain the same and there were no collateral consequences that would justify correction.

Accordingly, the court affirmed Willis’s sentence in its entirety.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Double-Counting and the Drug-Premises Enhancement

1. The Legal Framework for Double-Counting

Drawing on United States v. Hensley, 110 F.4th 900 (6th Cir. 2024), the court applied a two-step framework for evaluating alleged “double-counting” under the Sentencing Guidelines:

Same aspect of conduct: Determine whether the two provisions at issue (the statute of conviction and the enhancement, or two Guideline provisions) address “precisely the same aspect” of the defendant’s conduct.
Legislative or Commission intent: Even if they do cover the same aspect of conduct, double-counting is permissible if Congress or the Sentencing Commission intended that result, as evidenced by the relevant text.

The court emphasized that congressional and Commission intent is gleaned primarily “by looking to the relevant text.” Thus, the analysis is strongly text-driven: if a statute or Guidelines provision shows that the legislature or Commission wanted an additional increase, courts may not deem that increase impermissible double-counting.

2. Statutory and Guideline Background: From § 856 to the Fair Sentencing Act

The legal architecture behind Willis’s double-counting argument involves several layers:

21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (enacted in 1986) makes it a crime to “knowingly . . . maintain any place . . . for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.” Willis pled guilty to this offense.
The Sentencing Guidelines historically supplied a base offense level for drug-premises conduct (see earlier versions of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8 (1987)) and now tie the offense level for such drug crimes largely to drug quantity under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5).
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 explicitly directed the Sentencing Commission to add an additional enhancement for maintaining a drug establishment:
Congress instructed the Commission to “ensure an additional increase of at least 2 offense levels if . . . the defendant maintained an establishment for the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance, as generally described in [21 U.S.C. § 856].” Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111‑220 § 6(2), 124 Stat. 2372, 2373 (2010) (emphasis added).
The Commission implemented this directive through U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), which instructs courts to “increase by 2 levels” “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.”

Thus, the statutory and Guideline scheme specifically singles out “maintaining a premises” for an additional two-level penalty, over and above whatever base offense level is determined by drug type and quantity.

3. The Court’s Application to Willis and Its Resolution of the Double-Counting Claim

Willis claimed that using § 2D1.1(b)(12) on top of a § 856(a)(1) conviction punished the same “drug premises” conduct twice. The panel noted that:

The government argued that the first step of the double-counting test failed because the underlying offense and the enhancement do not actually punish the same “aspect” of conduct—the statute punishes maintaining a premises, while the Guidelines base offense level is driven by drug quantity.
The court expressed skepticism of this position, observing that one provision can punish a certain aspect of conduct while using a different aspect (e.g., quantity) to calculate the punishment. In other words, even if drug quantity drives the numerical offense level, the offense itself still targets maintaining a drug premises.

Significantly, however, the court did not resolve the case on that first step. Instead, it assumed for the sake of argument that both the offense and the enhancement target the same aspect of conduct—maintaining a drug premises—and moved directly to the second step: congressional intent.

On that second step, the court found the governing text definitive. Congress expressly required “an additional increase of at least 2 offense levels” for maintaining a drug establishment “as generally described in [§ 856].” The Commission followed that mandate in § 2D1.1(b)(12). The opinion concludes:

Congress first criminalized maintaining a drug premises.
Later, Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to add an additional two-level enhancement for the same conduct.
This leaves “no ambiguity” that Congress intended a second penalty for the same behavior.

While the court acknowledges that applying a “drug premises” enhancement to a “drug premises” offense might seem odd, it holds that Congress’s clear directive must control. As the court put it, Congress “wrapped its intent in plain text,” and the court is bound to give effect to that text.

4. Alignment with Other Circuits

The Sixth Circuit explicitly aligns with the:

Fifth Circuit: United States v. Moon, 853 F. App’x 996 (5th Cir. 2021);
Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Anderson, 816 F. App’x 318 (11th Cir. 2020); and
Fourth Circuit: United States v. Cline, 740 F. App’x 792 (4th Cir. 2018).

Each of these cases rejected similar double-counting challenges and permitted application of the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement to § 856(a)(1) convictions. By citing and following these decisions, the Sixth Circuit contributes to an emerging uniformity among the circuits on this specific issue.

5. Key Precedents and Their Role

Beyond Hensley, the opinion references several earlier decisions to delineate standards of review:

United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Burke, 345 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2003), United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2003): These decisions clarify that interpretation of the Guidelines and statutes is reviewed de novo, factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and application of enhancements to facts receives “due deference.”
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018): Cited for the principle that courts must interpret statutes “as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another.” The panel uses this to reject Willis’s attempt to pit the § 3553(a) “parsimony principle” (no greater than necessary) against Congress’s explicit command to add a two-level enhancement.

In essence, the court treats congressional instruction as controlling in the double-counting context: when Congress explicitly orders an additional increase for conduct “as generally described in § 856,” arguments rooted in general sentencing principles (like § 3553(a)) cannot override that command.

6. Impact of the Double-Counting Holding

The double-counting holding has clear and immediate consequences in the Sixth Circuit:

Defendants convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) can no longer argue that the two-level premises enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) is impermissible double-counting when the facts support the enhancement. That argument is now foreclosed as a matter of law in the Sixth Circuit.
Defense strategy shifts from legal to factual challenges. Counsel must focus on contesting whether the premises was in fact “maintained . . . for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing” drugs (for example, arguing that drug activity was incidental or occasional, or that the defendant did not exercise sufficient control over the premises).
Prosecutorial charging decisions may be influenced. Prosecutors who charge § 856(a)(1) offenses in the Sixth Circuit effectively assure a two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) where factual support exists, strengthening the government’s bargaining leverage and raising Guidelines ranges.
Sentencing uniformity is enhanced across the circuits that have addressed this question, reducing disparities and uncertainty in drug-premises prosecutions.

B. Substantive Reasonableness and Drug-Quantity Attribution

1. Standards of Review and Presumptions

Challenges to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence are reviewed under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. The Sixth Circuit cited:

United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th 569 (6th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2014): for the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing reasonableness of a sentence.
United States v. Wells, 55 F.4th 1086 (6th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Drake, 126 F.4th 1242 (6th Cir. 2025): for the presumption of reasonableness given to within-Guidelines sentences—and, notably, the “even stronger” presumption afforded to below-Guidelines sentences, like Willis’s.

Thus, Willis faced an uphill battle: not only did he have to show an abuse of discretion, but he also had to overcome the strong presumption that his downward-variant sentence was reasonable.

2. Willis’s Substantive Reasonableness Arguments

Willis advanced two main substantive arguments:

The premises enhancement yielded a sentence “greater than necessary” under § 3553(a): He argued that applying the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement inflated his sentence beyond what was needed to further the purposes of sentencing (punishment, deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation) set forth in § 3553(a).
The drug quantities attributed to him were excessive: He contended that:
- The methamphetamine and fentanyl mixture in his own bedroom were not his, and
- The meth pills found in common areas should not be attributed to him but rather to his half-brother.
He relied on testimony presented at the sentencing hearing to support these assertions.

3. The Court’s Response: Legislative Commands and Deference to Fact-Finding

On the first point, the panel relied heavily on the interplay between Congress’s explicit directions and the general principles of § 3553(a). Citing Epic Systems, the court stated that federal statutes must be interpreted harmoniously, not “at war with one another.” The reasoning is:

Congress has mandated an “additional increase” for maintaining a drug premises, implemented through § 2D1.1(b)(12).
The district court followed that mandate and still imposed a below-Guidelines sentence.
It is therefore unsustainable to argue that following federal law itself necessarily produces a sentence “greater than necessary” under § 3553(a).

On the second point, regarding drug attribution, the court emphasized the limited role of an appellate court in revisiting factual determinations. The district court:

Heard testimony,
Viewed the physical evidence,
Considered the total circumstances—including Willis’s control over the residence and the drugs and firearms throughout the house,
And ultimately decided to hold Willis responsible for the drugs found in the home.

The Sixth Circuit found “ample evidence and sound logic” to support that decision and declined to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the district court.

4. Practical Implications for Drug Cases and Sentencing Appeals

The court’s handling of substantive reasonableness reinforces several points:

Substantive challenges to below-Guidelines sentences are exceptionally difficult in the Sixth Circuit. The “even stronger” presumption of reasonableness for such sentences means that, absent a clear and significant misapplication of the § 3553(a) factors, affirmance is likely.
Attribution of drugs found in a shared residence can reach all occupants, especially when one is tied to the operation of the location as a drug premises and there is physical, testimonial, and circumstantial evidence connecting him to the contraband.
Sentencing advocacy must be front-loaded: defense counsel should aggressively litigate Guideline calculations and factual issues at the district court level; appellate courts are loath to disturb factual findings supported by the record.

C. The Statutory Maximum Error, Plain Error, and the Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine

1. The Sentencing Error Identified

The panel agreed with the government that the district court had erred by sentencing Willis to 135 months’ imprisonment on each of the two firearm counts. Those counts were governed by 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which carries a statutory maximum of 120 months (10 years).

Thus, as to the firearm counts, the 135-month sentences exceeded the statutory maximum by 15 months. However, those two sentences were imposed concurrently with:

A 135-month sentence on the drug-premises count, which itself did not exceed the relevant statutory maximum.

The question, therefore, was whether this error—unpreserved by Willis—required correction on appeal.

2. Plain-Error Review under Rule 52(b)

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the court has “sound discretion” to correct a forfeited error only if:

There is an error.
The error is plain (clear or obvious).
The error affects the defendant’s substantial rights (usually meaning it affected the outcome of the proceeding, such as the length of imprisonment).
Even then, the court should exercise its discretion only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Related cases include:

United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936): Plain-error correction is reserved for “exceptional circumstances.”
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): Erroneous Guidelines calculations that cause a defendant to spend more time in prison often do warrant correction because they usually affect substantial rights and the fairness of the proceeding.

In Willis’s case, the first two prongs were easily satisfied: there was a clear error (a sentence above the statutory maximum) and it was plain. The crucial question was whether the error affected substantial rights and warranted the extraordinary step of correction under Rule 52(b).

3. No Effect on Substantial Rights: Concurrent Sentences and No Collateral Consequences

The court concluded that Willis’s substantial rights were not affected:

All three sentences—135 months for the drug count and 135 months for each firearm count—were ordered to run concurrently.
Reducing the firearm sentences to the correct 120 months would not change the total time Willis would spend in prison, which is dictated by the longest sentence (the 135 months on the drug-premises count).
Similarly, his term of supervised release (36 months) and the existence of the firearm convictions themselves would remain unaffected.

The court also reasoned that there were no collateral consequences from leaving the formal error in place. Relying on United States v. Maze, 468 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1972), aff’d, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), the panel observed that defendants sometimes have an interest in clearing their records altogether, but here the firearm convictions and their concurrent nature meant that correcting the length of those particular sentences would have no real-world impact.

4. The Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine and Its Application

The court then invoked the concurrent-sentence doctrine, as articulated in:

Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2018): Courts may decline to consider a challenge to one conviction (or sentence) when:
- The sentence runs concurrently with an equal or longer sentence on another valid count;
- The defendant will suffer no collateral consequence from the challenged conviction or sentence; and
- The issue does not involve a significant legal question.
United States v. Wright, No. 23‑3008, 2024 WL 5482507 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1955 (2025): Applying the concurrent-sentence doctrine even where the challenged sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

The panel stressed that this doctrine would apply “even if the challenged sentence exceeds the statutory maximum,” confirming a strong deference to judicial economy and a focus on practical outcomes rather than formalistic error-correction when no additional incarceration or collateral consequences are at stake.

The court went so far as to say that even if Willis had raised this error himself, it would not have been considered under the concurrent-sentence doctrine, because:

He is already serving an equal or longer valid sentence (135 months on the drug-premises count);
There are no meaningful collateral consequences identifiable from the overlong firearm sentences; and
The issue, as framed, does not raise a “significant question” requiring resolution.

As a result, the panel declined to exercise its Rule 52(b) discretion, and the error was left uncorrected.

5. Implications of the Plain-Error and Concurrent-Sentence Rulings

The handling of the statutory maximum error in Willis has important implications:

Importance of timely objections: Defense counsel should be vigilant at sentencing to ensure that no term of imprisonment exceeds a statutory maximum. Once unpreserved, such errors may go uncorrected if the longest valid sentence is unaffected.
Focus on practical consequences: The Sixth Circuit’s application of weak-form concurrent-sentence doctrine underscores that appellate relief is focused on actual harm (extra time in prison or concrete collateral consequences), not merely technical non-compliance with statutory maximums.
Potential tension with rule-of-law values: Some may view the refusal to correct a sentence that facially exceeds the statutory maximum as in tension with strict adherence to statutory limits. But the court’s approach is anchored in long-standing doctrines emphasizing practicality and judicial economy, and aligned with its prior decision in Wright.
Guidance for future litigants: Where concurrent sentences are imposed and one sentence is longer but valid, defendants must show either:
- Extra time served (or to be served) as a result of the error; or
- Concrete collateral consequences (e.g., impact on parole eligibility, immigration status, recidivist enhancements) attributable specifically to the challenged count or sentence.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

To make the opinion more accessible, it is helpful to unpack several technical concepts.

1. Double-Counting

“Double-counting” occurs when the same aspect of a defendant’s conduct is used twice to increase his punishment—once in setting the base offense level and again through an enhancement. It is:

Not automatically forbidden.
Permissible if Congress or the Sentencing Commission clearly intended it.

In Willis, Congress explicitly required an “additional increase” of at least two levels for maintaining a drug premises. This is a textbook example of authorized double-counting.

2. Sentencing Guidelines and Enhancements

The federal Sentencing Guidelines:

Start with a base offense level (often driven by the type and quantity of drugs).
Then apply enhancements (e.g., for weapons, leadership role, maintaining a premises) or reductions (e.g., acceptance of responsibility).
Convert the final offense level and the defendant’s criminal history into an advisory sentencing range.

Section 2D1.1(b)(12) is such an enhancement, adding 2 levels if the defendant maintained a drug premises.

3. Substantive Reasonableness

Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence’s length is reasonable in light of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as:

The seriousness of the offense;
Deterrence;
Protection of the public;
The defendant’s history and characteristics.

A sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is “greater than necessary” to serve those goals. Appellate courts:

Give substantial deference to the district court;
Presume that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable; and
Apply an even stronger presumption for below-Guidelines sentences.

4. Statutory Maximum

A statutory maximum is the longest sentence allowed by the statute defining the crime. For the firearm false-statement offenses in Willis, § 924(a)(2) capped punishment at 120 months. Any sentence above that is illegal; however, whether an appellate court will correct it depends on the doctrine of plain error and concurrent sentences, as discussed above.

5. Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine

Under the concurrent-sentence doctrine, an appellate court can decline to review or correct an error relating to one count when:

The defendant is already serving a concurrent sentence on another count that is equal or longer and valid;
Correcting the error would not shorten the overall time in custody or meaningfully change the legal consequences; and
No important legal question is presented.

The doctrine is grounded in efficiency: there is little sense in expending judicial resources on a claim that cannot benefit the defendant in any practical way.

VI. Broader Significance and Future Implications

1. Drug-Premises Prosecutions and Sentencing

The Willis decision solidifies a clear rule in the Sixth Circuit: the two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) can and should be applied to § 856(a)(1) convictions where supported by the facts, even though both address “maintaining a premises” for drug activity.

For practitioners:

Prosecutors may rely on this case to justify higher Guidelines ranges in drug-premises prosecutions and to respond to defense objections at sentencing.
Defense attorneys must pivot from arguing that the enhancement is legally improper to challenging whether the factual predicate for the enhancement is satisfied (e.g., degree of control over the premises, nature and extent of drug-related use).

2. Sentencing Appeals and the Difficulty of Substantive Challenges

Willis also reaffirms that substantive reasonableness challenges to below-Guidelines sentences are rarely successful. Even when a defendant argues that some Guidelines adjustments lead to a harsh sentence, appellate courts will:

Defer heavily to the district court’s application of § 3553(a); and
Uphold sentences that follow statutory and Guideline instructions, especially when the judge has already varied downward.

This emphasizes the importance of comprehensive, evidence-based sentencing advocacy at the district court level, rather than reliance on appellate relief.

3. Plain Error, Statutory Maximums, and Judicial Economy

The panel’s refusal to correct the statutory maximum error underlines a pragmatic approach to appellate review:

Errors that do not change the total time to be served and do not have identifiable collateral consequences may be left uncorrected.
Even technically illegal sentences on some counts (e.g., above a statutory maximum) may stand when concurrent-sentence doctrine applies and the defendant’s overall exposure does not change.

This stance may generate debate among scholars and practitioners about the balance between strict legality and practical effect, but for now it is firmly embedded in Sixth Circuit law via Raines, Wright, and now Willis.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Willis is a significant published decision for federal sentencing law in the Sixth Circuit. It establishes that:

Congress explicitly authorized additional punishment for maintaining a drug premises, so applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) to a § 856(a)(1) conviction is permissible and not impermissible double-counting.
Below-Guidelines sentences enjoy an especially strong presumption of substantive reasonableness, and appellate courts will defer heavily to district courts’ factual findings and application of § 3553(a).
Even when a sentencing error causes some counts to exceed statutory maximums, the Sixth Circuit may decline to correct that error under plain-error and concurrent-sentence doctrines if the overall time in prison and collateral consequences remain unchanged.

Taken together, these holdings reinforce a textual, Congress-focused approach to sentencing enhancements, a deferential posture toward district-court sentencing decisions, and a pragmatic, consequence-driven view of plain-error correction. For practitioners, Willis is now a key reference point in litigating drug-premises enhancements, substantive reasonableness challenges, and the handling of concurrent-sentence errors in the Sixth Circuit.