Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine Shields Guideline Miscalculations in Supervised-Release Revocations – A Commentary on United States v. Lawrence Braswell, Jr. (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Lawrence Braswell, Jr., the Eleventh Circuit confronted a familiar yet unsettled cluster of issues arising from supervised-release revocation proceedings: the admission of hearsay, guideline miscalculations, and the parameters of substantive reasonableness. Importantly, the panel clarified two matters of first impression in the Circuit after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States (2025):

How the concurrent-sentence doctrine operates in plain-error review when only one of multiple concurrent revocation sentences is infected by a guideline error; and
Why a district court’s passing reference to “punishment” for the violation does not, absent controlling precedent, constitute plain error under Esteras.

The appeal arose after Lawrence Van Braswell, Jr. received concurrent revocation sentences of 36 months (Count I) and 60 months (Count VII). Although the district court misclassified Count I as a class-A felony, inflating its advisory range, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any miscalculation was harmless because the correct 60-month sentence on Count VII independently controlled the actual time Braswell will serve.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Jordan, Lagoa, and Wilson, JJ., per curiam) affirmed both the revocation and the 60-month sentence, rejecting four principal arguments:

Due-process/hearsay. Any failure to perform an on-the-record Frazier balancing test before admitting testimonial hearsay was harmless; the defendant bears the burden of showing unreliability, and Braswell failed to meet it.
Guideline miscalculation. Misclassifying Count I’s felony class constituted error, but not “plain” error affecting substantial rights because the concurrently imposed 60-month (correct) sentence on Count VII governed his custody exposure.
Improper sentencing factor. Esteras precludes retribution for the underlying crime, but whether “punishment” for the revocation violation is impermissible remains unsettled; without precedent, no plain error occurred.
Substantive reasonableness. The district court did not clearly err in weighing mitigating factors; the within-guideline sentence falls within the universe of reasonable dispositions.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994)
Established the two-step test for admitting hearsay at revocation hearings: (1) compare the defendant’s confrontation interest with the government’s proffered justification; (2) ensure reliability. The panel treated the district court’s silence on this test as harmless in light of overwhelming non-hearsay evidence.
United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1991)
Places the burden on the defendant to show that unreliable information actually formed the basis of the sentence. Taylor, as the earlier precedent, controls over any arguably inconsistent readings of Frazier, under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-precedent rule.
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016)
Recited for the general proposition that reliance on an incorrect guideline range usually affects substantial rights, yet acknowledged “unusual circumstances” where the record shows the sentence would have been the same. The panel found such circumstances present.
Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025)
Held that § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive goals may not be considered in a revocation proceeding with respect to the original offense. The Eleventh Circuit read Esteras narrowly, leaving unresolved whether retribution for the violation itself is barred.
Campa, Bradley, and other concurrent-sentence cases
Historic cases authorizing appellate courts to decline relief when another valid, concurrent sentence moots the practical impact of any error.

B. Legal Reasoning

Hearsay & Due Process. The Court emphasized that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern revocation proceedings. Although the district court omitted an explicit Frazier analysis, the panel demanded more from Braswell: proof that the lab-test hearsay was unreliable and outcome-determinative. Finding neither, the error was deemed harmless.
Guideline Error & Plain-Error Prong Three. The misclassification of Count I was “obvious,” satisfying prongs one and two of plain-error review, but not prong three. Because the concurrent 60-month sentence would remain untouched, Braswell could not show a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome.
Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine as a Filter under Prong Three. By merging the doctrine with the plain-error “substantial rights” inquiry, the Court effectively announced a new Eleventh Circuit rule: where the appellate attack concerns only one of several truly concurrent revocation sentences, relief will be denied unless the challenged error affects the aggregate period of incarceration.
Post-Esteras Ambiguity. The Court identified a doctrinal gap: whether retribution for the breach of trust (the violation) is itself prohibited. In the absence of Supreme Court or Circuit authority, the panel declined to find plain error from the district court’s stray “punishment” remark.

C. Impact on Future Cases

Guideline Litigation Strategy. Defense counsel must now demonstrate a concrete impact on custodial exposure when challenging one of several concurrent revocation sentences. Merely identifying a guideline miscalculation will not suffice.
Evolution of Esteras. The decision leaves open whether punishment for the violation itself is barred. Future litigants may press the argument, but at least in the Eleventh Circuit it will not be plain error unless and until higher authority speaks.
Burden in Hearsay Disputes. Reinforces that defendants, not the government, shoulder the burden on appeal to prove unreliability and reliance when hearsay surfaces at revocation hearings.
Sentencing Package Doctrine vs. Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine. Although the Circuit sometimes remands under a “package” rationale, the panel drew a firm line: where a concurrent sentence alone governs prison exposure, package resentencing is unnecessary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release: A period of community supervision imposed in addition to—or in lieu of— further imprisonment. Violations can trigger revocation and additional custody.
Revocation Hearing: A proceeding to determine whether a defendant violated supervised-release conditions and, if so, the appropriate sanction. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply, but basic due-process safeguards do.
Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine: An appellate principle allowing a court to decline review of errors affecting only one of multiple concurrent sentences when another valid sentence of equal or greater length renders the contested error practically irrelevant.
Plain-Error Review (Four Prongs): For unpreserved issues: (1) error; (2) obviousness; (3) effect on substantial rights (i.e., reasonable probability of a different outcome); and (4) effect on the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) Factors: The trio of sentencing goals—“seriousness of the offense,” “respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—collectively dubbed “retribution.” Post-Esteras, these may not be considered when deciding whether to revoke supervised release for conduct occurring during supervision.

Conclusion

United States v. Braswell offers two key takeaways. First, the Eleventh Circuit tightened the defendant’s burden on appeal when hearsay is admitted without explicit balancing, requiring proof of both unreliability and prejudicial reliance. Second—and most significantly—the Court integrated the concurrent-sentence doctrine into plain-error analysis, holding that a guideline miscalculation on a shorter concurrent count does not affect substantial rights if a longer, accurate sentence remains.

While Braswell stops short of resolving all post-Esteras questions about retributive aims in the revocation context, it sends a clear message: absent controlling authority, fleeting references to “punishment” will not, by themselves, upend a revocation sentence. Practitioners should prepare for an uphill battle when attacking errors that leave the practical term of imprisonment untouched; meanwhile, district courts should remember to articulate their balancing of confrontation rights to avoid unnecessary appellate litigation.