Concrete Plans and Overlapping Bans: Tenth Circuit Clarifies Standing for Pre‑Enforcement Second Amendment “Sensitive Places” Challenges

Introduction

In Springer v. Grisham, Nos. 23‑2192 & 23‑2194 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2025), the Tenth Circuit resolved cross-appeals arising from a challenge to a New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH) public health order that, with limited exceptions, prohibited possession of firearms in public parks and playgrounds in the City of Albuquerque and Bernalillo County. James Springer, a resident of nearby Torrance County, alleged violations of the Second Amendment, First Amendment, and substantive due process.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the parks restriction but denied relief against the playgrounds restriction for lack of standing. State officials appealed; Springer cross-appealed. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the Bruen merits. Instead, it held Springer lacked Article III standing for two independent reasons and directed dissolution of the injunction.

This commentary unpacks the decision’s core holding: in pre-enforcement challenges to place-based firearm restrictions, plaintiffs must (1) allege concrete, imminent plans to carry in a specific regulated location, and (2) show that relief would redress their injury notwithstanding separate, overlapping, unchallenged prohibitions. The court also acknowledged, but did not rely on, the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025), limiting universal injunctions.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Hartz, Eid, and Federico, JJ.; opinion by Judge Eid) affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to dissolve the injunction. The court held:

• Springer lacked standing to challenge both the parks and playgrounds bans.
• Injury-in-fact was absent because Springer failed to allege concrete plans to visit any specific park or playground with a firearm; “some day” intentions are insufficient.
• Redressability was also absent because separate, overlapping state and local laws independently prohibit firearms in the same parks and playgrounds; an injunction against the NMDOH order would not allow Springer to carry there unless he alleged willingness to violate those other laws (which he did not).
• The case was not moot despite expiration of the order, under the voluntary cessation doctrine; the State did not show it was “absolutely clear” the conduct would not recur.
• The court noted that CASA calls into question earlier reasoning that other courts’ universal injunctions mooted similar requests, but it did not need to rely on that point here.

Disposition: The court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief as to playgrounds, reversed the preliminary injunction as to parks, and remanded for dissolution of the injunction and further proceedings consistent with the order.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The court’s reasoning was anchored in classic Article III standing doctrine and several recent standing decisions:

• Core standing elements:
  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021) and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016): A plaintiff must show injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.
  • Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53 (2020): The plaintiff bears the burden to establish standing.
  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): Injury-in-fact must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; “some day” intentions do not suffice.
• Pre-enforcement challenges:
  • Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers): Injury-in-fact may be established by intending to engage in arguably protected conduct proscribed by law, coupled with a credible threat of enforcement.
  • Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009): Plaintiffs must identify concrete plans to visit a particular site; vague desires are insufficient.
  • Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024) and Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008): At the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs must make a “clear showing” that they are likely to establish standing.
• Redressability and overlapping enactments:
  • Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991): Overlapping enactments may preclude redressability.
  • Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014): No redressability where an unchallenged legal obstacle remains enforceable.
  • O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974): Courts presume litigants will obey the law; without willingness to violate other laws, relief against one law does not redress the injury.
  • We the Patriots, Inc. v. Grisham, 119 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2024): Earlier litigation over the same NMDOH order; the Tenth Circuit found no standing regarding playgrounds due to overlapping local restrictions and treated parks claims as moot in light of a then-existing universal injunction (a rationale the panel signals may be undermined by CASA).
• Record and enforcement presumptions:
  • Regan‑Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 2008) and Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884): Standing facts must appear in the record; courts cannot rely on extra-record media reports.
  • Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2016): Presumption that government will enforce laws as written absent evidence to the contrary in the record.
• Advisory opinions and effect of judgments:
  • California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659 (2021): Federal courts do not operate on legal rules in the abstract.
  • Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring): Judicial power is the power to render judgments in individual cases.
  • Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023) and Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring): It is the judgment, not the opinion’s persuasive force, that must redress the injury.
• Mootness and voluntary cessation:
  • Robert v. Austin, 72 F.4th 1160 (10th Cir. 2023) and Prison Legal News v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2019): Defendants bear a “formidable burden” to show challenged conduct will not recur.
• Nationwide/universal injunctions:
  • Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025): Federal courts lack statutory authority to issue universal injunctions; suggests prior mootness reasoning based on other courts’ universal injunctions is suspect. The panel noted CASA but did not decide its effect here.
• Additional persuasive support:
  • Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024): Speculative plans are insufficient for imminence.
  • LaFave v. County of Fairfax, 149 F.4th 476 (4th Cir. 2025): Lack of specific event or locale defeats standing in sensitive places challenges.
  • Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 2016): Appellate courts consider only adequately briefed standing arguments.

Legal Reasoning

1) Injury in Fact: No “Concrete Plans,” No Imminence

Springer’s filings did not identify a single specific park or playground he intended to visit with a firearm, nor any date or concrete plan to do so. His declaration referenced past attendance at parks in September and October and a wish to visit parks during Albuquerque’s balloon fiesta, but the court emphasized that past visits “are relevant only for their predictive value” and, without specifics connecting past to future visits, do not establish imminence (citing Murthy and Lujan).

The court underscored that general statements—such as having “planned to organize and attend a rally” at Civic Plaza while openly carrying—were insufficient absent details like timing or confirmation Civic Plaza is covered by the order. “Some day” intentions and “vague desires” do not meet Article III’s standards (Lujan; Summers). The district court’s contrary view on parks standing was thus error.

On playgrounds, the district court had already found no standing because Springer never asserted he had carried, or intended to carry, in playgrounds. The Tenth Circuit agreed, rejecting an undeveloped argument that playgrounds are “internal features” of parks Springer frequents; the mere possibility that a park contains a playground does not establish a concrete plan to enter the playground area.

2) Redressability: Overlapping, Unchallenged Laws Block Relief

Even if Springer had concrete plans, relief against the NMDOH order would not redress his injury because separate, unchallenged laws independently forbid carrying firearms in the same parks and playgrounds:

• Bernalillo County Ordinance § 58‑12(b)(27): Prohibits firearms in “recreation facilities,” which include playgrounds, and generally in “any park.”
• Albuquerque Code of Ordinances § 5‑8‑6(G): Prohibits firearms on “Open Space Lands.”
• New Mexico Statutes §§ 30‑7‑2.1 and 30‑7‑2.4: Prohibit firearm carry on school and university grounds, including other public buildings or grounds where school- or university-related activities are performed, which the City applies to numerous playgrounds through administrative instructions.

Citing Renne, Bishop, and We the Patriots, the court held that where overlapping enactments independently cause the same injury, enjoining one does not redress the harm unless the plaintiff either (a) also challenges the others or (b) plausibly alleges a willingness to violate them (overcoming O’Shea’s presumption that litigants will obey the law). Springer described himself as “law-abiding” and did not challenge the other restrictions; thus, redressability failed.

3) Non‑Enforcement Statements Do Not Cure Redressability—and Undermine Injury

Springer invoked media reports that the Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office and Albuquerque Police would not enforce the bans. The court refused to consider extra-record news accounts and, in any event, presumed enforcement of law absent record evidence to the contrary (Regan‑Touhy; Cayuga Nation). Moreover, to the extent these statements addressed the NMDOH order, they undercut rather than support standing by negating a credible threat of prosecution, thereby undermining injury-in-fact. And as to overlapping local restrictions, the cited statements did not show a categorical non-enforcement policy in the record.

4) No “Advisory Opinion” Redressability

Springer suggested that a favorable Tenth Circuit ruling would aid parallel state litigation invalidating overlapping restrictions. The court rejected this as inconsistent with Article III: it is the court’s judgment, not the persuasive effect of its opinion, that must redress the plaintiff’s injury (Haaland; Franklin; California v. Texas). A decision enjoining the NMDOH order could not disable distinct state and local enactments not before the court.

5) Mootness and Universal Injunctions

Although the public health order expired on October 13, 2024, the case was not moot under the voluntary cessation doctrine; the State did not show it was “absolutely clear” the conduct would not recur. The panel also noted that its earlier decision in We the Patriots had treated a different court’s universal injunction as mooting similar relief but observed that the Supreme Court’s recent holding in CASA disavows universal injunctions. The panel therefore flagged that the existence of injunctions in other cases no longer moots a plaintiff’s request for relief—though it ultimately resolved this appeal on standing.

Impact

Springer is a significant standing decision for Second Amendment and constitutional pre-enforcement litigation, especially in “sensitive places” cases:

• Heightened specificity requirement:
  • Plaintiffs must identify the specific regulated location(s) they plan to visit, when, and how, and show a credible threat of enforcement. Generalized statements about visiting parks or organizing a rally somewhere “some day” will not suffice.
• Overlapping enactments as a redressability bar:
  • Where state and local laws independently forbid the same conduct, plaintiffs should either challenge those laws in the same suit (and join proper defendants) or demonstrate a willingness to violate them. Otherwise, relief against one law does not redress the injury.
• Record discipline:
  • Non-enforcement claims must be supported by the record. Reliance on press reports risks both exclusion and undermining injury by negating a credible threat.
• Practical litigation effects:
  • Government defendants may point to layered regulatory schemes to defeat redressability. Plaintiffs should map the full legal landscape (state statutes, county ordinances, municipal codes, administrative instructions) and craft comprehensive challenges.
• Remedies post-CASA:
  • Given the Supreme Court’s curtailment of universal injunctions, litigants should not assume that relief obtained by others moots their claims or that their own relief will extend beyond the parties. Standing and party-specific redress will matter even more.
• Substantive merits left open:
  • The Tenth Circuit did not reach whether parks or playgrounds are “sensitive places” under Bruen. The district court’s contrary merits dicta (suggesting playgrounds are analogous sensitive places; parks ban likely unconstitutional) remains unreviewed. Future, properly postured suits may squarely address those merits issues.
• Persuasive, not binding:
  • The panel issued an “Order and Judgment,” noting it is not binding precedent (except for law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel) but may be cited for persuasive value. Nonetheless, its detailed standing analysis will likely be influential within and beyond the Tenth Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III standing:
  • Injury in fact: You must be concretely and personally harmed, or face a real and immediate risk of harm.
  • Traceability: The harm must be caused by the defendant you’re suing.
  • Redressability: A court order in your favor must actually fix your harm.
• Pre-enforcement challenge:
  • Suing before you violate the law. To do so, you must plan to engage in the conduct, the law must prohibit it, and you must face a credible threat of enforcement.
• “Concrete plans” vs. “some day” intentions:
  • Concrete plans: “I will carry at Roosevelt Park on November 12 at 3 p.m.”
  • Vague intention: “I plan to attend parks this fall.” Only the former shows imminence.
• Overlapping enactments:
  • If multiple different laws separately ban the same conduct, striking down one law won’t help you unless you also deal with the others. Courts won’t assume you’ll break the remaining laws.
• Voluntary cessation:
  • If the government stops the challenged conduct after you sue, your case isn’t automatically moot unless it’s absolutely clear the conduct won’t recur.
• Universal injunctions after CASA:
  • Courts may not issue injunctions that bar enforcement against everyone, everywhere. Relief is typically limited to the parties. As a result, other cases’ injunctions usually won’t moot your request for relief, and your own relief won’t automatically protect nonparties.

Conclusion

Springer v. Grisham makes clear that, before federal courts will adjudicate the Second Amendment merits of location-based firearm restrictions, plaintiffs must clear a rigorous standing threshold. They must show concrete, imminent plans to carry at specific regulated sites and demonstrate that judicial relief will allow the intended conduct despite any separate, overlapping prohibitions. Attempts to rely on extra-record non-enforcement assurances are unavailing and may undercut injury-in-fact. And in the wake of CASA, party-specific remedies and record-grounded standing showings assume even greater importance.

By vacating the preliminary injunction and declining to reach Bruen, the Tenth Circuit leaves the substantive “sensitive places” questions for future cases that properly present them. For litigants, Springer is both a roadmap and a caution: build the record with specificity, confront all overlapping legal barriers, and ensure that the requested relief will truly redress the alleged constitutional injury.