Complaints About Workplace Relationships and HR Confidentiality as Non‑Protected Activity Under Title VII: A Commentary on Chriswell v. Americold

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in Erica M. Chriswell v. Americold Acquisitions & Americold Logistics, No. 25‑11070 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025), an appeal from the Northern District of Georgia involving pro se allegations of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” (and thus not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit), the opinion provides a clear and instructive application of several recurring doctrines in employment discrimination litigation:

• What does and does not qualify as “protected activity” under Title VII’s anti‑retaliation provision;
• How temporal proximity interacts with the requirement that decisionmakers know of the protected activity;
• The continuing role of the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework and the “convincing mosaic” approach to circumstantial evidence;
• The interaction between strict local summary‑judgment rules and the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants.

At its core, the Eleventh Circuit holds that:

• Complaints about a consensual workplace romantic relationship and alleged HR confidentiality breaches do not, without more, constitute Title VII “protected activity”;
• Later attempts to recharacterize such complaints as sexual harassment, when they occur after the termination decision has already been made, cannot retroactively establish causation;
• District courts may not treat the McDonnell Douglas prima facie framework as the exclusive path to survive summary judgment; they must also consider whether the plaintiff has offered any “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent.

The court ultimately affirms summary judgment for Americold, both on abandonment grounds for the § 1981 claim and on the merits for the Title VII retaliation claim, while gently correcting the district court’s over‑reliance on McDonnell Douglas.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Erica Chriswell, a former Americold employee, alleged that she was fired in retaliation for complaining to Human Resources about:

1. A supposed romantic relationship between her supervisor, Brock Merridith, and HR Generalist Michelle Baillie, and associated confidentiality issues (March 2021); and
2. A verbal altercation with coworker Allen Burrell (May 4, 2021), which she later framed as retaliation linked to her earlier complaints about a “highly sexual” workplace and prior “sexual harassment.”

The district court:

• Deemed Americold’s Statement of Material Facts admitted because Chriswell, proceeding pro se, did not properly respond under Northern District of Georgia Local Rule 56.1;
• Nonetheless read her submissions liberally and treated some of her narrative as attempted factual disputes;
• Granted summary judgment to Americold and denied Chriswell’s own summary judgment motion, holding:
  • Her § 1981 claim failed for lack of any evidence of race‑based discrimination;
  • Her Title VII retaliation claim failed because she did not engage in protected activity, could not establish causation, and could not show pretext.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

• Holds that Chriswell abandoned her § 1981 claim by not addressing it in her opening brief;
• Applies the Title VII retaliation framework:
  • Concludes that her March 2021 HR complaint was not protected activity under Title VII, because it focused on a consensual coworker relationship and HR confidentiality—not on unlawful discrimination;
  • Accepts that her May 4, 2021 in‑person conversation and 10:32 p.m. email might constitute protected activity, but finds they occurred after the decision to terminate her had already been made;
  • Therefore finds no causal link between any protected activity and her termination.
• Clarifies that the district court erred in treating McDonnell Douglas as dispositive, but that error is harmless because—even outside McDonnell Douglas—Chriswell failed to present a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer retaliatory intent.
• Affirms the district court’s judgment.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Workplace Dynamics and the Alleged Harassment

The opinion sketches a workplace marked by interpersonal tensions and a somewhat informal culture, including:

• November 2019 – October 2020: Chriswell and her supervisor, Brock Merridith, engaged in mutual “sexually suggestive” Facebook messages. Chriswell later claimed she only participated because she believed Merridith had the power to get her fired. In October 2020, she told Merridith she wanted the flirting to stop, and he complied—but she says he began excluding her from the workday and reassigning her responsibilities.
• Early 2021 performance concerns: Operations Manager Tracy Price observed issues with Chriswell’s performance and demeanor, citing at least one instance of dishonesty and one of insubordination.

B. March 2021 HR Complaint: Romantic Relationship and Confidentiality Concerns

In March 2021, Chriswell reported to General Manager Sam Metcalf that she believed her supervisor, Merridith, and HR Generalist Michelle Baillie were romantically involved. HR Manager Arnold Smith investigated and met with her. In a follow‑up email, she:

• Described the relationship as “improper” and unprofessional;
• Complained that it interfered with “fairness and confidentiality,” alleging Baillie shared HR reports and employee salary information with Merridith;
• Described the environment as “hostile” and “highly sexual,” but later testified that she did not make a complaint of sexual harassment in that meeting.

That admission—that she did not then consider her complaint to be about sexual harassment—turns out to be crucial to the court’s “protected activity” analysis.

C. May 4, 2021 Altercation and Subsequent Reports

On May 4, 2021, events unfolded rapidly:

1. The altercation: Chriswell attempted to join a conversation between Burrell and another person. Burrell called her “nosey.” Chriswell allegedly responded “Fuck you.” One witness says Burrell then noted that if he spoke to her that way, she would report him to HR; another says he called her a “hood rat.”
2. 11:29 a.m. – First HR email: Chriswell emailed Arnold Smith describing the altercation and asserting this confirmed that Baillie had leaked her earlier HR complaint.
3. 3:04–3:12 p.m. – Internal consultation among supervisors:
   • Smith forwarded witness statements and asked supervisory staff (Price, Merridith, Baillie, and Metcalf) for a recommendation;
   • At 3:06 p.m., Price wrote: “I think it’s time we cut ties. This individual does not work well with others.”;
   • Merridith and Metcalf agreed at 3:09 p.m. and 3:12 p.m., respectively.
4. Around 3:00 p.m. – In‑person meeting with HR: Around the same time those emails were being exchanged, Smith met with Chriswell. She:
   • Reiterated that she believed Baillie and Merridith had leaked her prior HR report;
   • Complained that the office was “sexually charged” and that female coworkers were “harassing her”;
   • Admitted she “may have” said “fuck you” to Burrell and added that he was “lucky he didn’t get more.”
5. 10:32 p.m. – Second, more detailed email: Later that night, Chriswell sent Smith a long email in which she:
   • Asserted that Burrell’s conduct was “in direct retaliation for his boss and friend Brock Merridith”;
   • Reframed her March 2021 report as a complaint about Merridith flirting with her and other women;
   • Explicitly referred to the “sexual harassment [she’d] undergone” and claimed to be “experiencing retaliation.”

D. Termination and Litigation

On May 5, 2021, HR Manager Smith compiled:

• His conversations with Chriswell;
• Witness statements;
• His internal investigative report;
• His conclusion supporting management’s decision to terminate.

Americold terminated Chriswell that day. She later sued, alleging that her termination was retaliatory in violation of Title VII and § 1981.

E. District Court: Summary Judgment and Local Rule 56.1

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Northern District of Georgia has a detailed local rule (LR 56.1) requiring:

• The movant to file a separate, numbered statement of undisputed material facts; and
• The respondent to file correspondingly numbered responses, supported by specific citations to the record, with a warning that facts not properly disputed will be deemed admitted.

Chriswell, proceeding without counsel, did not file a compliant response. As a result, the district court deemed Americold’s Statement of Material Facts admitted. Nonetheless, consistent with Erickson v. Pardus, the court gave her filings a liberal reading and treated any attempted factual counter‑statements as disputes where possible.

The district court:

• Rejected her own summary judgment motion as premature and unsupported;
• Granted Americold’s motion for summary judgment on both the § 1981 and Title VII retaliation claims.

F. Appeal and Scope of Review

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

• Reviewed summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Chriswell;
• Treated the district court’s reliance on McDonnell Douglas as partially mistaken, but non‑prejudicial;
• Affirmed the result based on a combination of:
  • Abandonment of the § 1981 claim;
  • Failure to establish protected activity and causation under Title VII;
  • Lack of a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Pro Se Pleadings and Summary Judgment

1. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)

Erickson stands for the principle that courts must hold a pro se litigant’s pleadings to a “less stringent standard” than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and must construe them liberally. The Eleventh Circuit invokes Erickson to approve the district court’s approach:

• Local Rule 56.1 allowed the court to deem Americold’s facts admitted when Chriswell failed to respond properly;
• But, in light of Erickson, the district court appropriately construed her non‑compliant filings as attempting to dispute some of those facts, thereby softening the harshness of the local rule.

The opinion thus illustrates that while procedural rules apply to pro se parties, courts still strive to avoid outcome‑determinative technicalities where possible.

B. Abandonment of Issues on Appeal

2. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022)

The Eleventh Circuit cites Campbell for the proposition that an appellant forfeits an issue by failing to raise it in the initial brief. Chriswell did not mention her § 1981 claim on appeal, so the court deemed it abandoned and declined to analyze it further. This is a strict rule of appellate practice: even meritorious claims can be lost if not properly briefed.

C. Summary Judgment Standards

3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Quigg v. Thomas County School District, 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016)

Rule 56(a) sets the basic standard: summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Quigg adds that a “genuine issue” exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.

The court applies these principles conventionally: even under a pro‑plaintiff reading of the record, no reasonable jury could find that Americold fired Chriswell because of Title VII‑protected activity, so summary judgment is proper.

4. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023)

Berry is cited repeatedly and serves two critical roles:

• Standard of review: It reaffirms that summary judgment decisions are reviewed de novo, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant.
• Substantive employment law: It reiterates that:
  • McDonnell Douglas is just one “tool” for analyzing circumstantial evidence of retaliation;
  • A plaintiff may prevail by producing a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence, including suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, better treatment of comparators, or evidence that the employer’s justification is pretextual.

The court explicitly leans on Berry to correct the district court’s overreliance on McDonnell Douglas and to justify reviewing Chriswell’s case under a broader circumstantial‑evidence lens.

D. Title VII Framework and Protected Activity

5. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)

McDonnell Douglas established the familiar three‑step burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence. In the retaliation context:

1. The employee must establish a prima facie case: protected activity, adverse employment action, and a causal relationship;
2. The employer then must articulate a legitimate, non‑retaliatory reason for the adverse action;
3. The employee must then show that the proffered reason is pretext for retaliation.

The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes that McDonnell Douglas is not an “inflexible rule” and “never was intended to be the sine qua non” of surviving summary judgment. This echoes Smith v. Lockheed‑Martin and Berry, reinforcing that courts must not mechanically dismiss claims merely because the plaintiff cannot satisfy each McDonnell Douglas step, so long as the totality of circumstantial evidence could support a jury finding of unlawful intent.

6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑2, § 2000e‑3; Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broadcasting Service, Inc., 234 F.3d 501 (11th Cir. 2000)

The court cites Title VII’s substantive and anti‑retaliation provisions:

• § 2000e‑2 – makes it unlawful to discriminate in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “because of” sex, among other protected characteristics;
• § 2000e‑3 – makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee:
  • because she opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII (“opposition clause”), or
  • because she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in a Title VII proceeding (“participation clause”).

Johnson is cited to confirm that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes—important groundwork, because Chriswell’s allegations revolve around a “sexually charged” environment and prior flirtation with her supervisor.

The key move of the Eleventh Circuit is then to ask: did Chriswell’s complaints amount to opposition to an unlawful employment practice, i.e., discrimination or harassment based on sex?

7. Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998); Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Division, 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997)

These cases articulate the “good faith, objectively reasonable belief” standard for Title VII protected activity:

• The employee must have actually believed that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice; and
• That belief must be objectively reasonable in light of existing substantive law.

The court uses this dual standard to hold that:

• Chriswell’s March 2021 report about a romantic relationship and HR confidentiality did not qualify as protected activity:
  • She admitted she was not complaining of sexual harassment;
  • Title VII does not prohibit consensual coworker relationships or mandate particular HR confidentiality protocols; thus, no reasonable person would think such conduct, standing alone, is unlawful under Title VII.

This application underscores that not every workplace grievance is protected by Title VII; the complaint must be tied to conduct that is actually, or at least reasonably believed to be, discriminatory or harassing on a protected basis.

E. Temporal Proximity and Decisionmaker Knowledge

8. Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2000)

Brungart provides two important principles:

• Temporal proximity: Close timing between protected activity and an adverse action can be enough to create an inference of causation;
• Decisionmaker knowledge exception: Temporal proximity alone is insufficient when “there is unrebutted evidence that the decisionmaker did not have knowledge that the employee engaged in protected conduct.”

The Eleventh Circuit leans heavily on this “knowledge” requirement:

• The putative protected activities on May 4, 2021—the in‑person meeting around 3 p.m. and the 10:32 p.m. email—occurred either simultaneously with or after the supervisors had already agreed (by 3:12 p.m.) that it was “time we cut ties.”
• No evidence showed that those decisionmakers knew of any Title VII‑based complaint before they decided to terminate her.
• Therefore, temporal proximity could not support causation; a decision cannot be retaliation for something the decisionmakers did not yet know about.

F. Convincing Mosaic of Circumstantial Evidence

9. Smith v. Lockheed‑Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011)

Smith is the seminal Eleventh Circuit case emphasizing that McDonnell Douglas is not the exclusive analytical tool in employment discrimination cases:

• A plaintiff can survive summary judgment by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer prohibited intent.

The court quotes Smith to criticize the district court for stopping its analysis once it found no prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, without asking whether the evidence, taken as a whole, would permit a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent.

However, after applying the “convincing mosaic” concept itself, the appellate panel concludes that Chriswell’s evidence still falls short.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Abandonment of the § 1981 Retaliation Claim

The court swiftly disposes of the § 1981 aspect of the appeal. Section 1981 prohibits race‑based discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts; it does not cover sex discrimination. The district court had already found no race‑based theory in the record. On appeal, Chriswell explicitly limited her arguments to Title VII retaliation and made no argument regarding § 1981.

Applying Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit treats this silence as forfeiture. This reiterates a key appellate practice lesson: claims not addressed in the opening brief are lost, even for pro se litigants.

B. Title VII Retaliation Under McDonnell Douglas

Although the court ultimately moves beyond McDonnell Douglas, it first addresses Chriswell’s own reliance on that framework.

1. Prima Facie Case: Protected Activity

Title VII’s anti‑retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑3, protects employees who:

• Oppose unlawful employment practices (opposition clause), or
• Participate in a Title VII investigation or proceeding (participation clause).

Chriswell’s case implicates only the opposition clause. The court’s logic:

1. March 2021 complaint (romantic relationship and confidentiality).
   • Content: She reported an “improper relationship” between her supervisor and an HR generalist, complained about confidentiality concerns, “lack of professionalism,” and a “highly sexual” culture.
   • Her own testimony: She conceded that she “didn’t make a complaint about sexual harassment” and confirmed her concern was not a sexual harassment complaint.
   • Substantive law: Title VII does not:
     • Ban consensual romantic relationships between coworkers;
     • Regulate HR confidentiality in the abstract, absent a discriminatory context.
   • Result: She failed both prongs of the “good faith, objectively reasonable belief” test:
     • No evidence of subjective belief that she was reporting unlawful discrimination; and
     • Any such belief would not be objectively reasonable, since the conduct complained of is not unlawful under Title VII.
2. May 4, 2021 11:29 a.m. email (altercation and confidentiality).
   • Content: She reported the argument with Burrell and alleged confidentiality breaches again.
   • Analysis: Profanity and rude remarks unconnected to a protected characteristic, and HR confidentiality grievances, are not Title VII issues.
   • Result: Not protected activity.
3. May 4, 2021 in‑person meeting and 10:32 p.m. email.
   • Content: She portrayed the Burrell incident as retaliation for her prior complaint about Merridith; she invoked “sexual harassment [she’d] undergone” and asserted she was experiencing retaliation.
   • Analysis: The court assumes these later statements could be viewed as opposition to unlawful sexual harassment or retaliation—that is, as potentially protected activity.
   • Crucial limitation: The timing (discussed below) means they cannot establish causation.

2. Prima Facie Case: Causation and Timing

The causal prong requires proof that the protected activity and the adverse action (termination) are linked. Temporal proximity can be enough—but only if the decisionmakers knew about the protected activity.

The evidence shows:

• By 3:06–3:12 p.m. on May 4, 2021, the supervisors (Price, Merridith, and Metcalf) had agreed that Chriswell should be terminated;
• Her meeting with Smith occurred “around 3pm or a little after,” and none of those supervisors were present;
• Her detailed 10:32 p.m. email, explicitly referencing “sexual harassment,” came after the decision had already been made.

Under Brungart, temporal proximity alone is insufficient where there is unrebutted evidence that the decisionmakers lacked knowledge of the protected activity at the time of the decision. Here:

• Any arguable protected activity took place after or concurrently with the decision to terminate, without evidence that the decisionmakers were aware of it;
• Therefore, Chriswell cannot show causation as a matter of law.

Because she cannot establish protected activity plus causation, she fails at step one of McDonnell Douglas, and the burden never shifts to Americold to articulate and defend its non‑retaliatory rationale.

C. Beyond McDonnell Douglas: The “Convincing Mosaic” Analysis

The court criticizes the district court for ending its analysis with the failure of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie showing. Under Smith and Berry, courts must also consider whether, taken as a whole, the circumstantial evidence forms a “convincing mosaic” from which a jury could infer retaliatory intent.

Potential “mosaic” elements might have included:

• Suspicious timing between HR complaints and termination;
• A pattern of deteriorating treatment after HR reports;
• Inconsistent or shifting justifications by the employer;
• Better treatment of similarly situated employees who had not complained.

However, in Chriswell’s case, the court finds:

• Her timing arguments are neutralized by the fact that any arguable protected activity occurred after the decision to terminate;
• There is no evidence of similarly situated comparators or systemic patterns of retaliatory treatment;
• The employer’s explanation—performance issues, insubordination, and the May 4 altercation—is not shown to be pretextual through inconsistencies, contradictions, or implausibilities;
• No ambiguous statements or other circumstantial clues suggest animus toward protected activity rather than toward her behavior more generally.

Thus, even liberally construed, the record does not display the “convincing mosaic” needed to survive summary judgment outside the confines of McDonnell Douglas. The court therefore affirms.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Protected Activity” Under Title VII

Not all complaints at work are legally “protected.” Protected activity under Title VII means:

1. You are protesting or opposing something that is illegal under Title VII (e.g., discrimination or harassment because of race, sex, religion, etc.); and
2. You honestly believe it is illegal, and that belief is reasonable based on what the law actually prohibits.

Examples of protected activity:

• Complaining to HR that your supervisor is sexually harassing you;
• Telling management that a promotion was denied because of your race;
• Filing an EEOC charge alleging discrimination.

Examples of not protected activity (unless tied to a protected category):

• Complaining that your supervisor is rude, plays favorites, or is unprofessional;
• Objecting to a consensual office romance;
• Complaining that HR mishandles confidentiality or fails to follow internal policy, without any link to discrimination.

In Chriswell, her complaints about a coworker romance and confidentiality fell into the second category—they were workplace grievances, but not about unlawful discrimination.

B. “Good Faith, Objectively Reasonable Belief”

Courts do not require employees to be legal experts, but they do require:

• Good faith: You genuinely believe what you are complaining about is illegal discrimination or harassment;
• Objective reasonableness: A typical, informed person, aware of the law, would think the same behavior is illegal under Title VII.

If you complain that HR is unfair or that people are gossiping about you, but you never tie that to race, sex, or another protected characteristic, the law usually will not treat that as protected activity, even if you are very upset and sincere.

C. Temporal Proximity and Decisionmaker Knowledge

It often looks suspicious when someone is fired soon after complaining to HR. Courts recognize that:

• Close timing between a protected complaint and a firing can support an inference of retaliation;
• But timing alone is not enough if the people who decided to fire you did not know about your protected complaint when they made the decision.

Think of it this way: An employer cannot retaliate against a complaint it doesn’t know exists. In Chriswell, the decision to terminate was made by 3:12 p.m., while her only arguably protected statements came during or after a private HR meeting in which the decisionmakers did not participate, and a late‑night email after the fact. The timing therefore could not reasonably support a retaliation theory.

D. The McDonnell Douglas Framework vs. “Convincing Mosaic”

There are two main ways to prove retaliation or discrimination with circumstantial evidence:

1. Using McDonnell Douglas: Follow the structured three‑step burden‑shifting process—prima facie case, employer’s reason, proof of pretext.
2. Using a “convincing mosaic” theory: Even if you do not fit perfectly into the McDonnell Douglas boxes, you can still win if all of the evidence together (timing, statements, treatment of others, inconsistencies) would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination or retaliation occurred.

This case teaches that:

• Courts must consider both paths; they cannot end the analysis simply because a plaintiff fails the prima facie stage;
• However, if the plaintiff’s evidence, taken as a whole, still does not support a reasonable inference of unlawful motive, summary judgment remains appropriate.

E. Local Rule 56.1 and Pro Se Litigants

Local Rule 56.1 in the Northern District of Georgia requires very specific responses to a summary judgment movant’s statement of material facts. Failure to respond correctly means those facts are deemed admitted.

For pro se litigants, this can be a trap. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion shows:

• The rule is enforced, and admitted facts can be outcome‑determinative;
• But courts may mitigate harshness by reading a pro se litigant’s filings liberally and treating some narrative as factual disputes, when possible.

Nevertheless, liberal construction cannot supply missing legal elements such as protected activity or causation.

VII. Doctrinal and Practical Impact

A. Clarifying the Limits of Title VII Protected Activity

The most significant doctrinal takeaway is the court’s clear articulation that complaints about:

• A consensual workplace romantic relationship; and
• Alleged HR confidentiality breaches or unprofessionalism;

are not protected activity under Title VII when unconnected to unlawful discrimination or harassment.

This has several implications:

• Employees must be explicit enough when complaining that it is reasonably clear they are opposing discrimination or harassment, not generalized unfairness or policy disputes;
• Later attempts to re‑label earlier, non‑discrimination‑based complaints as “sexual harassment” may not succeed—particularly where deposition testimony confirms the original complaint was not framed that way;
• Employers may rely on this distinction to argue that not every HR complaint triggers Title VII’s anti‑retaliation protections.

B. Emphasis on Decisionmaker Knowledge and Chronology

The case underscores the importance of:

• Precisely identifying who made the termination decision; and
• Establishing the timeline of when those decisionmakers formed their intent relative to any protected complaint.

For employers:

• Documenting who recommended and approved a termination, and when, can be a powerful defense against retaliation claims;
• Separating HR fact‑gathering (which may include protected complaints) from the ultimate decisionmakers can limit “cat’s paw” liability, so long as the decisionmakers act independently.

For plaintiffs:

• They must develop evidence that decisionmakers knew about the protected activity—or that someone with retaliatory animus manipulated the decisionmakers (a theory not pressed here);
• They must marshal emails, meeting notes, and testimony to show that protected complaints preceded and influenced the adverse decision.

C. Reaffirming the Non‑Exclusivity of McDonnell Douglas

The Eleventh Circuit again reminds district courts that:

• McDonnell Douglas is a heuristic, not a jurisdictional gateway;
• Courts must examine whether a reasonable jury could infer unlawful motive from the totality of the evidence, even if the plaintiff stumbles at some McDonnell Douglas step.

This reinforces a more flexible, evidence‑focused approach to summary judgment in discrimination and retaliation cases, consistent with recent Eleventh Circuit precedent.

D. Lessons for Pro Se Employment Plaintiffs

The opinion also illustrates, albeit implicitly, best practices for pro se litigants:

• Comply with procedural rules. Local rules can effectively decide which facts the court will consider undisputed;
• Be clear about discrimination. If you believe you are facing unlawful harassment or discrimination, say so in those terms when you complain, and connect it to your protected trait (e.g., sex, race);
• Preserve all claims on appeal. If you do not mention a claim (like § 1981) in your opening brief, the appellate court will likely deem it abandoned.

E. HR and Employer Policy Considerations

From a compliance and risk‑management perspective, Chriswell suggests that:

• Employers should still treat all internal complaints seriously and investigate thoroughly, even if they do not appear to implicate Title VII;
• However, not every HR complaint transforms the employee into a “protected” actor for retaliation purposes, particularly when the complaint is about personal conflicts, professionalism, or general policy concerns;
• HR personnel should be trained to document:
  • What the employee said;
  • Whether the employee tied the complaint to discrimination or harassment based on protected characteristics;
  • When the complaint was made and who learned about it.

VIII. Conclusion

Chriswell v. Americold provides a compact but instructive illustration of several core principles in retaliation litigation under Title VII:

• Protected activity is limited. Complaints about consensual office relationships and HR confidentiality, without more, are not protected under Title VII, even if they reference a “sexual” or “hostile” environment.
• Timing is not everything. Temporal proximity cannot support an inference of retaliation if the decisionmakers did not know about the protected activity—or if the activity occurred after the decision was already made.
• McDonnell Douglas is a tool, not a gate. Courts must also consider whether a plaintiff’s evidence, viewed holistically, creates a “convincing mosaic” of retaliatory intent. Here, even under that broader lens, the evidence failed to raise a triable issue.
• Pro se status has limits. While courts construe pro se filings liberally and may rescue some factual disputes from procedural missteps, they cannot manufacture protected activity, causation, or evidence of pretext where the record does not support it.

In affirming summary judgment for Americold, the Eleventh Circuit reinforces a disciplined approach to Title VII retaliation claims: plaintiffs must tether their internal complaints to unlawful discriminatory conduct, and they must marshal evidence that decisionmakers knew of and responded adversely to those complaints. Absent such a showing—whether under McDonnell Douglas or a “convincing mosaic” theory—employers remain entitled to judgment as a matter of law.