Common Carrier Duty Now Embraces “Reasonably Accessible Crosswalks” – A Commentary on Lans v. Farnam (2025)

1. Introduction

In Lans v. Farnam, the Appellate Division, Third Department, confronted a familiar yet unresolved tension in New York tort law: how far does a common carrier’s duty to passengers extend once they step off the vehicle? A 12–year-old passenger (Faige M. Lans) was struck by a motorist after alighting from a Capital District Transportation Authority (CDTA) bus and attempting to cross Delaware Avenue, approximately 350 feet from the nearest marked crosswalk. The trial court denied CDTA’s motion for summary judgment on ordinary-negligence and proximate-cause grounds, and the carrier appealed. The appellate court affirmed, crafting a sharpened rule: a carrier’s duty is not satisfied merely by providing a physically safe place to step down; it must also ensure a reasonably accessible, objectively safe route for the passenger to leave the area—which commonly includes a crosswalk within practical reach.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Third Department affirmed Supreme Court’s order that denied CDTA summary judgment on negligence and proximate-cause claims while dismissing a separate “special duty” theory based on the passenger’s disability.
The panel held there were triable issues of fact concerning:
- Whether the bus stop’s mid-block placement, 350 feet from the nearest marked crosswalk and lacking a defined sidewalk edge, breached CDTA’s duty of care.
- Whether the passenger’s decision to cross mid-block and the driver’s waving gesture were foreseeable, thus not superseding causes that broke the causal chain.
Consequently, the matter proceeds to trial, and carriers statewide must heed the expanded contours of their duty.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning is anchored in a line of New York Court of Appeals and Appellate Division cases that progressively shape common-carrier obligations:

Miller v. Fernan, 73 N.Y.2d 844 (1988) – Established that carriers must stop where passengers “may safely disembark and leave the area.”
Connolly v. Rogers, 195 A.D.2d 649 (3d Dept 1993) – Summary judgment is inappropriate if there is factual dispute “over whether there was any safe alternative route.”
Lockhart v. Adirondack T. Lines, 289 A.D.2d 686 (3d Dept 2001); Kearns v. Adirondack Trailways, 59 A.D.3d 774 (3d Dept 2009) – Reiterated that breach is typically jury-decided.
Hain v. Jamison, 28 N.Y.3d 524 (2016) & Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980) – Modern touchstones for proximate cause and foreseeability of intervening acts.
Bynum v. Camp Bisco, LLC, 198 A.D.3d 1164 (3d Dept 2021) – Clarified when proximate cause is jury versus court question.

These cases collectively guided the court to emphasize jury fact-finding where reasonable minds could differ.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Prima facie Showing by CDTA. CDTA’s expert (Reilly) asserted the stop was “properly placed” with two crosswalk options (117 ft unmarked, 350 ft marked). This satisfied its initial burden that a safe route existed.
Rebuttal by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ expert (Silver) criticized the “haphazard” placement, absence of curb delineation, heavy traffic, and requirement to negotiate Becker Terrace without a crosswalk en route to the marked crossing. The court found these points raised genuine issues as to (a) safety of the stop and (b) accessibility of the supposed safe route.
Proximate Cause Analysis. Whether the child’s mid-block crossing and the second driver’s hand signal were superseding causes is a factual inquiry. Under Derdiarian and Hain, only extraordinary or unforeseeable acts break causation as a matter of law. A child crossing mid-block when forced to walk hundreds of feet amid heavy traffic was deemed “foreseeable.”

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Expanded Duty Standard. Carriers must now evaluate not only the curb space but the practical pedestrian pathway to a crosswalk. Distance matters; 350 feet may be excessive under certain traffic conditions.
Operational Policies. Transit agencies may need formal site-selection protocols, periodic audits, and signage clarifying safe-crossing expectations.
Litigation Strategy. Summary-judgment motions will face steeper hurdles where expert dueling over “reasonable accessibility” arises.
Municipal Planning. Placement of mid-block stops without nearby protected crossings may invite liability, prompting coordination between carriers and local traffic engineers.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Common Carrier: A company (e.g., bus line) that offers transportation services to the general public and thus owes passengers a heightened duty of care.
Summary Judgment: A procedural device allowing a court to decide a claim without trial when no genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Prima facie Showing: The initial evidentiary burden to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law; the burden then shifts to the opponent.
Marked vs. Unmarked Crosswalk: Marked crosswalks are painted or signed crossings; unmarked exist legally at most intersections but are often less visible and less protective.
Proximate Cause & Superseding Cause: Proximate cause links the defendant’s negligence to the injury. A superseding (intervening) cause breaks that link only if unforeseeable and extraordinary.

5. Conclusion

Lans v. Farnam cements an important evolution in carrier liability: the duty of providing a “safe place to alight” now logically extends to providing a reasonably accessible, safe pathway for continued travel. Distance to crosswalks, pedestrian-traffic interface, and sidewalk design are no longer peripheral—they sit at the heart of breach analysis. Moreover, the decision underscores New York’s strong preference to entrust questions of negligence and causation to the jury whenever factual nuance or expert disagreement exists. For practitioners, transit authorities, and municipal planners, the case is a clarion call: pedestrian-oriented risk assessments must move beyond the bus’s doors and consider the full pedestrian journey immediately thereafter.