Common‑Area Visibility as the “Additional Nexus” for Proving Knowledge of Firearms in Joint‑Occupancy § 924(c) Cases

United States v. Aaric Murray and Richard Kirkland Johnson, No. 23‑4328 & 23‑4331 (4th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (unpublished; not binding precedent)

Introduction

This consolidated Fourth Circuit appeal addresses a recurring evidentiary problem in firearm-in-drug cases: what kinds of circumstantial proof allow a jury to find that a defendant knew about firearms located in a jointly occupied home for purposes of aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Aaric Murray and Richard Johnson lived together in a Morgantown, West Virginia mobile home. A false 911 hostage report brought deputies to their residence, where officers saw drug-distribution paraphernalia in plain view and later found two firearms—a Glock pistol and a Rossi revolver—inside a green cloth bag sitting atop a cabinet in the home’s front room. A jury convicted both men of multiple drug offenses and of aiding and abetting the possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c).

On appeal, Murray and Johnson challenged only the § 924(c) count, arguing that the government failed to prove they knew the guns were present. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the jury could reasonably infer knowledge from circumstantial evidence, including the defendants’ status as occupants, the visibility and location of the bag containing the firearms in a common area, the presence of a holster in plain view near a drug “packaging station,” and evidence that both defendants frequented that room in connection with drug trafficking.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Harris emphasized the demanding standard of review on sufficiency claims and the permissibility of relying entirely on circumstantial evidence. The court held:

To aid and abet a § 924(c) offense, the government must prove the defendant knew of the firearm; knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence alone (citing Rosemond v. United States and United States v. Benson).
Where contraband is found in a defendant’s home, an inference of constructive possession—and thus knowledge—is ordinarily permitted (citing United States v. Shorter; United States v. Hicks; and United States v. Kimbrough).
In joint-occupancy settings, an “additional nexus” is required; here, that nexus was satisfied by evidence that the front room was a common area used for drug packaging, a holster was in plain view on the table, and the green bag holding the guns was visible in body-camera footage.
Even though there was no direct evidence (e.g., fingerprints, DNA, ownership records, or admissions) and the bag and holster were not preserved as exhibits, the circumstantial record was sufficient.
Alternative theories—such as that a prior resident left the guns—did not undermine the verdict because circumstantial evidence need not exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence (citing United States v. Jackson).

The court affirmed the denial of Rule 29 motions and upheld each defendant’s mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence on Count Six, reaffirming how common-area visibility, holster evidence, and residency-based inferences can collectively prove the knowledge element in § 924(c) aiding-and-abetting prosecutions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014): Rosemond holds that an aider and abettor of a § 924(c) offense must have “advance knowledge” that a confederate would use or carry a firearm, so the accomplice can choose whether to continue participating. The Fourth Circuit leveraged Rosemond for the bedrock proposition that knowledge of the firearm is essential. In a possession-in-furtherance case, the “advance” requirement can be satisfied if the defendant knows of the firearm while continuing to assist the ongoing trafficking/possession. Here, the appellants did not contest the “in furtherance” link; they challenged only knowledge of presence, which the court analyzed through constructive possession principles.
United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2010): Establishes that constructive possession requires knowledge of the contraband’s presence plus dominion or control. The court borrowed this framework to isolate the knowledge component, reasoning that proof sufficient for constructive possession also suffices to show the knowledge element defendants challenged.
United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Hicks, 64 F.4th 546 (4th Cir. 2023): These cases permit an inference of constructive possession (and thus knowledge) when contraband is found in a defendant’s home. Importantly, Shorter cautions that inference may fail if the home is “so large” or the item “so well hidden” that a resident could be unaware. The Fourth Circuit held this case was the opposite: the green bag was visible in body-camera footage in a small front room.
United States v. Kimbrough, 477 F.3d 144, 147 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007): Recognizes that a fact-finder may infer possession from the location of a gun in a defendant’s living space, supporting the home-based inference used here.
United States v. Blue, 808 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2015): Clarifies that joint tenancy alone does not automatically attribute possession; the government must show an “additional nexus” linking the defendant to the contraband. The court found that nexus via (a) the front room’s character as a common living area, (b) evidence both men frequented the room to package drugs, and (c) the holster in plain view near the visible bag that contained the guns.
United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2017): Emphasizes the limits of inference in joint-occupancy when contraband is locked away or otherwise inaccessible (e.g., locked bedroom without proof of a key). The panel used Hall as a contrast: here, the guns were not locked away and the room was accessible to both men.
United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992): Holds that mere proximity is insufficient where a passenger in a car is linked to a gun hidden under a seat with no other evidence of knowledge or control. The panel distinguished that scenario from contraband in a defendant’s residence and from the additional indicia of knowledge present here.
United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2020): Confirms that knowledge for § 924(c) can be proven by circumstantial evidence. The panel cited Benson to reject the defendants’ focus on the absence of direct proof.
United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Lawing, 703 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2012): These decisions set the sufficiency-of-the-evidence framework: de novo appellate review, the substantial evidence threshold, the obligation to credit reasonable inferences for the government, and reversal only when failure of proof is clear.
United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1989): Establishes that circumstantial evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This directly addressed the defense theory that former occupants might have left the guns.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in three steps: the standard of review and governing elements, defendant-specific inferences, and the treatment of alternative explanations.

Elements and standard: The government had to prove (1) knowing possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime by at least one principal (proven on a constructive possession theory), and (2) that each defendant knowingly aided and abetted that possession in furtherance (see Rosemond). The appellants challenged only the knowledge-of-presence component. Applying de novo review to the Rule 29 denial, the Fourth Circuit reminded that defendants face a “heavy burden” and that both direct and circumstantial evidence count, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Murray: The court found a robust circumstantial mosaic. Murray lived in the home as a “primary occupant” for one to two months. Under Shorter and related cases, contraband in one’s home permits an inference of knowledge. Although joint occupancy tempers that inference, the government offered the “additional nexus”: Murray’s personal items were in the front room; the table there served as a drug-packaging station (consistent with his drug convictions); a firearm holster lay in plain view on that table; and the green bag containing the guns was visible in body-camera footage atop a nearby cabinet. The room was neither large nor the guns hidden; visibility was specifically highlighted for the jury. The court emphasized that while the jury was not compelled to draw these inferences, it was entitled to do so.
Johnson: Johnson conceded he was a month-long “temporary occupant.” The court held that occupancy still supports the home-based inference of knowledge. For the “additional nexus,” the record showed the front room functioned as a common living area (a deputy described it as such; photos showed a couch and food/drink items; no bed). Given Johnson’s drug-trafficking convictions, the jury could reasonably find he frequented the front room to package drugs, making it likely he saw the holster and the visible green bag. Even without direct evidence placing Johnson in that room at a specific time, these circumstantial links sufficed under the substantial evidence standard.
Alternative explanations and missing direct proof: The defense suggested the guns might belong to prior occupants, pointing to body-cam footage of children’s items and letters addressed to others, and even elicited that an officer could not rule out that hypothesis. The court held that the government need not negate every innocent explanation; circumstantial evidence need not exclude all hypotheses (Jackson). Moreover, even if the guns were once owned by someone else, that would not negate Murray’s and Johnson’s knowledge of their presence while living there. Similarly, the absence of fingerprints, DNA, ownership records, or preserved exhibits (the bag and holster) did not defeat the case in light of the holistic circumstantial showing (Benson; Moody).

Impact

Although unpublished and nonprecedential, the opinion is instructive and likely persuasive in the Fourth Circuit on several practical points:

Common-area visibility can satisfy the “additional nexus” for joint occupancy. When a firearm is stored in a visible container in a shared space—especially adjacent to overt drug-packaging paraphernalia—courts are receptive to inferring knowledge for § 924(c) purposes.
Holster or ammunition in plain view matters. The panel reaffirms that accessories in plain sight near where a firearm is discovered bolster an inference that occupants knew a gun was present.
“Temporary” or short-term occupancy still supports the home-based inference. Length of residence goes to weight, not a categorical bar, when visibility, access, and drug activity link a defendant to the space.
Body-camera footage can be decisive. Video showing the visibility and location of containers, as well as the character of a room (living/common area versus private or locked), can fill gaps left by the absence of direct forensic evidence. Prosecutors should highlight such footage; defense counsel should scrutinize it to contest visibility and access.
Alternative ownership theories carry limited force on appeal. Because sufficiency review credits reasonable inferences for the verdict and does not require exclusion of every hypothesis, “prior occupant” narratives seldom upend a well-supported circumstantial case.
The stakes remain high. The decision underscores how circumstantial proof can sustain the mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A), even when the government lacks fingerprints, admissions, or ownership records.

For defense practitioners, the opinion suggests that the most promising lines of attack are factual: demonstrate that the firearms were locked away or “so well hidden” as to be genuinely inaccessible, that the room was not a shared or commonly used space, or that the defendant lacked any connection to the room’s activities. Legal arguments are unlikely to succeed if visibility and common-area usage can be shown.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i): Criminalizes possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. It carries a mandatory minimum 5-year consecutive sentence.
Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): Holds an accomplice liable as a principal if they intentionally assist the commission of a crime knowing the essential elements—including, after Rosemond, knowing about the firearm in time to withdraw from the venture.
Constructive possession: A legal fiction that treats someone as possessing an item if they know it is present and have the power and intention to exercise control over it, even without physical custody. In homes, courts may infer constructive possession from presence in a residence, subject to joint-occupancy nuances.
“Additional nexus” in joint occupancy: When multiple people live together, the government must link a specific occupant to the contraband beyond mere co-residence—e.g., access to the room, use of the space for illicit activity, or items in plain view connecting the occupant to the contraband.
“In furtherance”: The firearm must advance, promote, or facilitate the drug trafficking crime—e.g., protecting drugs or proceeds, deterring theft. Here, the appellants did not challenge this element on appeal.
Substantial evidence standard: On appeal, the court asks whether, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The verdict stands unless the failure of proof is clear.
Protective sweep and plain view: Police may conduct a quick search for safety (sweep) and may seize evidence seen from a lawful vantage (plain view). Here, plain-view drug paraphernalia led to a search warrant; the Fourth Amendment issues were not contested on appeal.
Visibility versus concealment: If a gun is in a visible container in a common area, knowledge is easier to infer. By contrast, a locked bedroom or a hidden compartment with no access evidence cuts against inference.

Conclusion

United States v. Murray and Johnson reinforces a pragmatic evidentiary principle: in § 924(c) aiding-and-abetting prosecutions arising from residences, knowledge of a firearm can be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence when the government shows (1) occupancy of the home, (2) a shared common area where drug distribution occurs, (3) firearm-related accessories in plain view, and (4) the visible presence of the container holding the guns. The opinion carefully distinguishes car-passenger proximity cases and locked-room scenarios and underscores that appellate courts will not second-guess reasonable inferential chains credited by jurors.

While unpublished and not binding, the decision will likely be cited for the proposition that “common-area visibility” may supply the “additional nexus” needed in joint-occupancy constructive-possession cases, aligning with Rosemond’s knowledge requirement in the § 924(c) context. The takeaways are clear: visibility, access, and the functional character of the space matter; holsters and similar accessories carry real evidentiary weight; and circumstantial mosaics can sustain the heavy consequences of § 924(c), even when traditional direct evidence is absent.