Commissioner’s Authority Under Agriculture and Markets Law §305-a Remains Intact Despite Pine Barrens Act Constraints

Introduction

In Matter of Town of Brookhaven v. Ball (2025 NYSlipOp 01686), the Third Department of the Appellate Division addressed the tension between two New York statutes: the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML) article 25-AA, which protects farm operations in agricultural districts, and the Long Island Pine Barrens Maritime Reserve Act (the Pine Barrens Act), which regulates land use in an environmentally sensitive portion of Suffolk County.

The dispute arose after Delea Sod Farms, Inc. (“Delea Farms”), operating within both an agricultural district and the Central Pine Barrens, stored and sold compost and mulch alongside its primary sod‐growing business. The Town of Brookhaven (“Town”) sought to enjoin these mulching activities under local zoning rules and a prior environmental discharge order. Delea Farms asked the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets (“Commissioner”) to determine whether the Town’s enforcement “unreasonably restrict[ed] or regulate[d] farm operations” in violation of AML §305-a. After an informal opinion, an interim decision, and a formal determination all in favor of Delea Farms, the Town and the Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commission (“Pine Barrens Commission”) challenged the Commissioner’s authority and findings in a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the article 78 petition. Key holdings included:

The Pine Barrens Act does not expressly limit the Commissioner’s longstanding authority under AML §305-a to adjudicate claims that local zoning unlawfully restricts farm operations in an agricultural district.
Neither the Pine Barrens Act’s land‐use plan nor the Town’s local code amendments implementing that plan can override or preempt AML §305-a without clear legislative intent.
The Commissioner’s factual finding—that Delea Farms’ compost and mulch storage and sales were “incidental agricultural uses” to sod production and comprised less than 5% of total farm revenue—rested on a rational basis and substantial record evidence (site inspections, photographs, affidavits).
No public health or safety threat was demonstrated that could justify the Town’s zoning enforcement under the narrow exception in AML §305-a for health‐and‐safety protections.

Accordingly, the Court held that the Commissioner validly ordered the Town to cease its enforcement and the Pine Barrens Commission had standing to appeal its defeat on the jurisdictional question.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Long Island Pine Barrens Socy. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brookhaven (80 NY2d 500 [1992]) – Established the environmental sensitivity of the Pine Barrens and the legislative commitment “at all levels” to its protection.
Town of Lysander v. Hafner (96 NY2d 558 [2001]) and Matter of Ball v. Town of Ballston (173 AD3d 1304 [3d Dept 2019]) – Interpreted AML article 25-AA’s policy to bar local regulations that unreasonably restrict farm operations.
Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Department of Environmental Conservation (71 NY2d 186 [1988]) – Held that a later‐enacted, specialized statute does not impliedly repeal a general statute absent express legislative intent.
Matter of Dolomite Prods. Co. v. Town of Ballston (151 AD3d 1328 [3d Dept 2017]) – Clarified who is an “aggrieved” party with standing to appeal.
National Org. for Women v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (131 AD2d 356 [1st Dept 1987]) – Applied the expressio unius canon: when a statute enumerates specific items, omissions are presumed intentional.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s statutory analysis proceeded in two stages:

Scope of AML §305-a. Article 25-AA, enacted in 1971, embodies a strong statewide policy—rooted in the New York Constitution’s Article XIV, §4—to protect agricultural lands from “local land use regulations inhibiting farming.” AML §305-a(1)(a) prohibits local governments from “unreasonably restrict[ing] or regulat[ing] farm operations within agricultural districts” unless justified by public health or safety. Section 305-a(1)(b) empowers the Commissioner to issue advisory and binding opinions on restrictions, and §305-a(1)(c) authorizes enforcement.
Interaction with the Pine Barrens Act. The Pine Barrens Act (1993) created a regional land‐use plan and a commission to oversee development “within the Central Pine Barrens.” Its definition of “development” expressly excludes “use of any land for the purpose of agriculture or horticulture” (ECL 57-0107[13][v]). Section 57-0123(3)(a) bars state or local approvals for structures or land disturbance unless they conform to the Pine Barrens plan.
Applying the expressio unius and anti‐implied repeal canons, the Court found:
- No textual or legislative‐history indication that the Pine Barrens Act was meant to curtail the Commissioner’s preexisting AML §305-a authority.
- The Pine Barrens Act’s approval bar targets “development” (e.g., new construction, disturbance), not review of zoning enforcement actions addressing existing farm operations.
- Because the Commissioner neither granted permits nor authorized land disturbance, his §305-a determinations sit outside ECL 57-0123(3)(a)’s scope.

On the merits, the record—site inspection reports, photographs, affidavits—demonstrated a rational basis for concluding that the compost and mulch were incidental to sod production, composed a de minimis portion of farm revenues, and posed no threat to health or safety. Under CPLR article 78 standards, such findings are sustained absent arbitrariness or caprice.

3. Potential Impact

The decision reinforces several enduring principles in New York land‐use law:

State Preeminence. AML §305-a’s farm‐operation protections cannot be implicitly eroded by subsequent environmental statutes unless the legislature clearly so intends.
Scope of “Development.” Environmental land‐use regimes that exclude “agricultural” uses from their definitions will not ensnare routine farm activities or zoning enforcement determinations affecting them.
Deference to Agency Expertise. Factual and technical findings by the Department of Agriculture and Markets—when supported by inspections and evidence—will survive arbitrary‐and‐capricious challenges.

Going forward, municipal officials and regional planning bodies should scrutinize any attempt to curb farm operations in agricultural districts by invoking environmental‐plan provisions, lest they conflict with AML §305-a and trigger state intervention.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CPLR Article 78. A special proceeding to challenge administrative determinations on grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, arbitrariness, or failure to follow statutory procedure.
Arbitrary and Capricious. A standard of review which asks whether an agency’s action has a rational basis in the record, not whether it is the best or only possible decision.
Expressio Unius. A rule of statutory interpretation: listing certain items implies the exclusion of others not listed.
Implied Repeal. The presumption that a newer statute does not automatically override an older one covering similar ground unless the legislature clearly expresses that intent.
Agricultural District & Farm Operation. A zone designated under state law to protect working farms, where “farm operations” include land, buildings, machinery, and practices—like composting or mulching—necessary to produce crops as a commercial enterprise.

Conclusion

Matter of Town of Brookhaven v. Ball cements the principle that state agricultural policy—embodied in AML §305-a—retains priority over subsequent regional environmental statutes unless the legislature unambiguously intends otherwise. Municipal or regional attempts to restrict bona fide farming activities within agricultural districts must surmount a high bar, showing specific health or safety threats. This decision thus reaffirms New York’s constitutional commitment to encourage and protect its agricultural lands in the face of competing land‐use regimes.