United States v. Amir Golestan & Micfo, LLC – IP Addresses as “Property,” Ciminelli’s Limits, and the Scope of Rule 11 Immigration Warnings

Introduction

United States v. Golestan is the Fourth Circuit’s first published decision to test the Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling in Ciminelli v. United States and to address the 2013 amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(O) in the context of a naturalized defendant. In affirming the convictions of Amir Golestan and his company Micfo, LLC, the Court:

• Re-affirms that the “right to assign and use IPv4 addresses” is “property” for federal wire-fraud purposes.
• Holds that Ciminelli’s rejection of the “right-to-control” theory does not disturb a traditional property-deprivation prosecution.
• Clarifies that district courts must still recite the Rule 11(b)(1)(O) immigration advisory, even to naturalized citizens, but finds failure to do so harmless where citizenship was undisputed.
• Sets practical limits on post-plea withdrawal motions based on newly decided precedent and alleged lack of corporate authority.

The ruling therefore supplies fresh guidance on three discrete yet recurring issues: (1) what intangible interests qualify as “property,” (2) how Ciminelli reshapes federal fraud prosecutions outside the Second Circuit, and (3) when an omitted Rule 11 immigration warning mandates plea withdrawal.

Summary of the Judgment

Amir Golestan, founder of Micfo, orchestrated a scheme to obtain 1.3 million scarce IPv4 addresses from the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) by creating fictitious “channel partners.” Both he and Micfo were indicted on twenty counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. After a bench trial began and eight government witnesses testified, the defendants changed their pleas to guilty. Seventeen months later—after the Supreme Court decided Ciminelli—they moved to withdraw their pleas, arguing:

1. That Ciminelli invalidated the “theory of prosecution” since the scheme targeted ARIN’s alleged intangible interests;
2. That the district court violated Rule 11(b)(1)(O) by failing to warn Golestan of possible immigration consequences (namely denaturalization);
3. That defense counsel was ineffective for the same omission; and
4. (For Micfo) that Golestan lacked authority to bind the company.

The district court denied withdrawal and imposed sentences (60 months for Golestan, 30 days’ probation for Micfo), forfeiture of $3.3 million, and restitution. On appeal, Judge Berner (joined by Chief Judge Diaz and Judge Harris) affirmed in full.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306 (2023) – Limited federal fraud to traditional property interests, rejecting the “right-to-control” theory. The Fourth Circuit distinguished the instant prosecution as a “traditional property” case.
• Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) – Established Sixth-Amendment duty of counsel to warn non-citizens of deportation risk. Forms the backdrop for Rule 11(b)(1)(O).
• McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) – Supreme Court trilogy defining the scope of “property” under federal fraud statutes. The Fourth Circuit invoked them to hold that IP addresses are an assignable asset.
• United States v. Adler, 186 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 1999) – Fourth Circuit precedent adopting a broad, market-oriented definition of property (“anything that can be assigned, traded, bought”).
• Farhane v. United States, 121 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2024) (en banc) – Recognized ineffective assistance for failure to warn naturalized citizens of denaturalization risk. The panel cites but declines to reach the question.
• Kousisis v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1382 (2025) – (Decided while the appeal was pending) Upholds “fraudulent-inducement” theory post-Ciminelli; the panel notes consistency.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Property Status of IPv4 Addresses

The Court leaned on Adler’s market-oriented approach. Unlike an unissued license in Cleveland, an IPv4 block is:

1. Scarce (global exhaustion of free supply since 2011);
2. Transferable for consideration (robust secondary market); and
3. Accompanied by concrete, contract-based rights (ARIN’s Registration Services Agreement).

Hence the “right to assign, administer, monitor, and regulate” an address block is a traditional property interest whose deprivation fits §1343.

2. Inapplicability of Ciminelli

The panel notes that Ciminelli forbids prosecutions premised solely on withholding “potentially valuable economic information.” Here, the indictment alleged— and the defendants admitted—the physical re-routing of address blocks to “channel partners,” followed by lucrative resale. No right-to-control construct was necessary.

3. Rule 11(b)(1)(O) Violation and Harmless-Error Analysis

Rule 11(b)(1)(O) requires courts to always give the immigration advisory; the Advisory Note discourages “citizenship screening” for efficiency. The district court erred by omitting it. Nonetheless, the error was harmless because:

• Golestan is a U.S. citizen (naturalized), so the exact text of Rule 11 references non-citizens;
• No evidence suggests he would have insisted on trial had he heard the advisory—the plea followed overwhelming proof and collapse of the intended defense;
• The burden on the government to show harmlessness was therefore met.

4. Plea Withdrawal Factors (Moore test)

Applying the six-factor Moore framework, the Court emphasized:

1. No credible evidence the plea was unknowing/ involuntary;
2. No credible claim of legal innocence—Ciminelli does not apply;
3. 17-month delay before seeking withdrawal weighed heavily against defendants;
4. Defendants conceded they had competent counsel.

Because the first four factors were adverse, the Court declined to examine government prejudice and courtroom inconvenience.

5. Ineffective Assistance & Corporate Authority

The Court sidestepped the Padilla/ Farhane denaturalization question, ruling the record was insufficient for IAC analysis on direct appeal (preserving it for §2255). As to Micfo, the plea was valid because (a) counsel appeared, satisfying Criminal Rule 43(b)(1), and (b) Golestan had represented—without contradiction—that bankruptcy proceedings still left him as manager with authority to plead.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Property definition bolstered: Other circuits often look to the Fourth for guidance on tech-centric assets. Prosecutors now have a clear green light to treat IP addresses as “property.”
2. Post-Ciminelli map clarified: The opinion draws a bright line: fraudulent inducement to part with marketable assets remains chargeable; only informational-harm theories without such deprivation are barred.
3. Rule 11 compliance tightened: District judges must recite the advisory even to citizens; omission might still be harmless, but the opinion cues bench and bar to avoid the risk.
4. Corporate plea mechanics: Confirms that in the Fourth Circuit, a corporation need not appear through an “officer” if counsel is present and authority is facially established.
5. IAC and denaturalization: By declining to resolve, the Court signals the issue is open for collateral litigation—inviting strategic motions in future Padilla contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• IPv4 vs. IPv6: Two addressing protocols; IPv4 (e.g., 192.168.0.1) has only ~4.3 billion unique addresses, making them scarce and valuable. IPv6 (e.g., 2001:0db8::) is plentiful.
• Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343): Requires (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) intent, (3) use of interstate wires, and (4) object to obtain money or property.
• Right-to-Control Theory: A now-rejected Second Circuit doctrine that treated deprivation of “potentially valuable economic information” as property.
• Rule 11(b)(1)(O): Part of the criminal plea colloquy; judge must warn that conviction may cause removal, future inadmissibility, or denial of citizenship.
• Denaturalization: Civil process under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) to revoke citizenship obtained by concealment or fraud. Can lead to deportation.
• Moore Factors: Six criteria courts weigh when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Golestan cements three doctrinal guideposts:

1. Scarce, transferable IPv4 addresses constitute “property” for the federal fraud statutes, aligning cyber-reality with traditional property notions.
2. Ciminelli curtails prosecutions about intangible “control,” but leaves undisturbed the classic deprivation-of-assets paradigm, which continues to encompass digital resources.
3. Rule 11(b)(1)(O) warnings are mandatory for all defendants; nevertheless, where omission would not plausibly have altered a citizen-defendant’s plea, the error is harmless.

Practitioners litigating cyber-fraud, plea withdrawals, or Padilla-style collateral issues should study Golestan closely. It illustrates both the boundaries of new Supreme Court fraud doctrine and the procedural rigor demanded in federal plea practice.