Colorado Supreme Court Adopts a “Likelihood” Burden for CGIA Waivers and Requires Negligent Causation of a “Dangerous Condition” — Jefferson County v. Dozier (2025 CO 36)

Introduction

In Jefferson County, Colorado v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, the Colorado Supreme Court delivered a significant CGIA ruling that clarifies both procedure and substance in immunity challenges. The case arose after Krista Dozier slipped on an unmarked puddle in the Jefferson County courthouse. Dozier sued under premises liability and negligence theories; Jefferson County asserted immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), arguing that the water did not qualify as a “dangerous condition” of a public building. The procedural crux centered on a Trinity hearing under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), where the district court found the County’s response time reasonable and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the district court improperly conflated immunity with merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals, reinstating the dismissal.

The opinion sets two critical precedents:

• When disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must meet a “likelihood” standard to establish facts necessary to waive CGIA immunity at a Rule 12(b)(1) Trinity hearing.
• To invoke the “dangerous condition of a public building” waiver, a plaintiff must show the condition was proximately caused by the public entity’s negligent act or omission; mere notice of the condition is not enough, and the reasonableness of the entity’s response is relevant to this causation inquiry.

Summary of the Opinion

Justice Hood, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the district court’s dismissal. The Court held:

• Burden and standard: In CGIA cases, where jurisdictional facts are disputed and inextricably intertwined with merits, the plaintiff must establish a likelihood that the facts supporting a waiver of immunity exist. This standard falls between a mere prima facie showing and a preponderance of the evidence.
• Substantive requirement for waiver: The “dangerous condition” exception (§ 24-10-106(1)(c)) requires proof that the condition was proximately caused by the public entity’s negligent act or omission in constructing or maintaining the facility (§ 24-10-103(1.3)). Thus, negligence concepts, including the reasonableness of the public entity’s response, are embedded in the jurisdictional analysis.
• Application: The district court found that only a few minutes passed between the County’s knowledge of the spill and Dozier’s fall. That finding was supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. As a matter of law, a few minutes is not a reasonable time to discover and remediate, so the County’s omission was not negligent and did not proximately cause the condition. Dozier therefore failed to establish the likelihood of the facts necessary to waive immunity.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993).
  The Court reaffirmed the use of Trinity hearings for factual disputes concerning subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The district court may take evidence and make factual findings that inform jurisdiction.
• Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001); City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007); Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10.
  These cases underpin the procedural framework: plaintiffs bear the burden to prove jurisdictional facts; district courts may hold evidentiary hearings and make findings; appellate review defers to factual findings unless clearly erroneous, with de novo review of the legal immunity determination.
• City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37.
  Dennis confirms Rule 12(b)(1) as the correct posture for CGIA immunity and stresses strict construction of immunity, broad construction of waivers, and giving sensible effect to the statute’s parts. It also cautions courts to avoid adjudicating merits at the jurisdictional stage where facts overlap.
• Tidwell ex rel. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
  The court of appeals relied on Tidwell’s “minimal causal connection” language. The Supreme Court limits Tidwell’s reach: that phrasing interprets the “resulting from” requirement in § 24-10-106(1) generally, not the definitional elements of “dangerous condition” in § 24-10-103(1.3). Before asking whether injuries “resulted from” a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must first establish that a dangerous condition, as defined, existed—which includes negligent, proximate causation by the public entity.
• Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998); St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54.
  These decisions articulate the four-factor test for a “dangerous condition” under § 24-10-103(1.3). The Court applies that framework here and focuses on the fourth factor: proximate cause by negligent act or omission.
• Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530 (Colo. 1993); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983); Miller v. Crown Mart, Inc., 425 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1967).
  These cases supply negligence principles—especially the centrality of reasonableness and the requirement that premises owners be afforded a reasonable time to discover and correct hazards. Miller supports the conclusion that “something less than five minutes” is insufficient, as a matter of law, to impose a duty to have discovered and remedied the hazard.
• Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005); Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2010); Ferrel v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 179 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007); Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003).
  These cases delineate the spectrum of proof burdens at pretrial jurisdictional hearings (prima facie vs. preponderance) and warn against final merits determinations when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with merits. The Court draws on this line to adopt a middle-ground “likelihood” burden.
• Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 1995); Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992); CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2008).
  Federal authorities that endorse a relaxed, probabilistic factfinding standard when jurisdictional facts are bound up with merits—used here as persuasive guidance to adopt the “likelihood” standard for CGIA.
• Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000); Hice v. Giron, 2024 CO 9; McBride v. People, 2022 CO 30; Allen v. People, 485 P.2d 886 (Colo. 1971).
  Statutory-interpretation principles: effectuate legislative intent, plain meaning controls, read provisions harmoniously, and use common-law concepts to give content to statutory terms not otherwise defined.
• Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010); Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982).
  The Court analogizes the “likelihood” burden to the “likelihood of success” element in preliminary injunction doctrine—probability, not preponderance.
• Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2004).
  Reinforces that, on the merits of a premises liability claim, the plaintiff must prove the landowner failed to exercise reasonable care—showing the tight overlap between the jurisdictional negligence inquiry and the merits.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory text controls the waiver.
   The CGIA immunizes public entities but includes enumerated waivers. One such waiver is for injuries resulting from “[a] dangerous condition of any public building” (§ 24-10-106(1)(c)). The definition of “dangerous condition” (§ 24-10-103(1.3)) requires four elements: (1) a physical condition or use of the facility; (2) presenting an unreasonable risk to health or safety; (3) known or constructively known; and (4) “proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity or public employee” in constructing or maintaining the facility. The Court emphasizes that the last element explicitly imports negligence and proximate cause into the waiver analysis.
2. The reasonableness of the public entity’s response is jurisdictionally relevant.
   Because negligent causation is embedded in the dangerous-condition definition, assessing whether the public entity acted reasonably (e.g., whether it had a reasonable opportunity to warn or clean up) is not a merits-only inquiry; it is a jurisdictional fact necessary to determine the waiver. The court of appeals erred in deeming reasonableness irrelevant at this stage.
3. The “likelihood” standard governs when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with merits.
   The Court canvasses three possible burdens: (a) prima facie showing (too light where factfinding is necessary), (b) preponderance (too heavy when facts overlap with merits and threatens jury-trial rights), and (c) likelihood (a middle ground enabling limited, probabilistic factfinding without preclusive effect). Borrowing persuasive federal practice, the Court adopts the “likelihood” standard for CGIA waiver determinations when facts are inextricably intertwined with merits.
4. Tidwell’s “minimal causal connection” is limited.
   The Court carefully cabins Tidwell, clarifying that its “minimal causal connection” language interprets the phrase “resulting from” in § 24-10-106(1) and does not dilute the separate definitional requirement that a dangerous condition must be proximately caused by the entity’s negligent act or omission. Plaintiffs must first establish a qualifying “dangerous condition” before causation between that condition and the injury is considered under § 24-10-106(1).
5. Absurd results and legislative purpose.
   Excluding reasonableness from the waiver analysis would permit suits to proceed to trial even if an injury occurred seconds after the entity learned of a hazard, contrary to the CGIA’s purpose to protect taxpayers from excessive fiscal burdens due to unlimited liability (§ 24-10-102).
6. Application to Dozier.
   The district court found that only a few minutes elapsed between the County’s knowledge of the spill and Dozier’s fall. That finding was supported by record evidence (timed communications and observation). As a matter of law, a window of “something less than five minutes” is not a reasonable time to discover and correct the hazard (Miller v. Crown Mart). Therefore, Dozier did not establish the likelihood that the County’s negligent omission proximately caused the condition. Without negligent causation, the spill is not a statutory “dangerous condition,” and immunity is not waived.

Practical and Doctrinal Impact

• Clarified burden at Trinity hearings:
  Trial courts now apply a “likelihood” standard—requiring plaintiffs to show a reasonable probability that facts establishing a CGIA waiver exist—when jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with merits. Courts may weigh evidence and make limited, probabilistic findings without finally adjudicating merits.
• Embedded negligence analysis in the waiver:
  The decision confirms that the dangerous-condition waiver demands proof that the public entity’s negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition. Mere notice of the hazard does not suffice; reasonableness and timing matter. This is a substantive tightening relative to arguments that notice alone establishes waiver.
• Litigation strategy and early dismissal:
  Public entities can more effectively use Rule 12(b)(1) to seek early dismissal where evidence shows a prompt response that did not allow a reasonable time to warn or remediate. Plaintiffs must be prepared, even pre-discovery, to marshal timing and response evidence that makes negligence likely.
• Evidentiary focus on timing and response protocols:
  Documented timelines (calls, emails, dispatch logs), response policies, and placement of warning signage will be pivotal. Entities should maintain auditable records of incident response; plaintiffs should develop evidence on when the entity knew or reasonably should have known of the hazard and whether its response was unreasonable in context.
• Doctrinal harmonization:
  The decision aligns CGIA practice with common-law negligence concepts and with persuasive federal approaches to jurisdictional factfinding when intertwined with merits. It limits Tidwell’s “minimal causal connection” to its statutory context.
• Premises liability interface:
  Because reasonableness is central both to the jurisdictional waiver and the merits of premises liability (§ 13-21-115 and Vigil), trial courts must carefully cabin their Trinity findings to “probable outcomes,” avoiding preclusive determinations while ensuring only cases with a likely waiver proceed.
• Potential ripple effects:
  Expect similar analyses in cases involving transient hazards (spills, snow/ice, windblown debris) inside public buildings. The opinion also signals that courts should resist reading waivers so broadly that instantaneously arising hazards automatically defeat immunity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CGIA:
  The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act generally shields public entities from tort suits but lists specific exceptions (“waivers”) where suits are allowed.
• Dangerous condition of a public building:
  A physical condition of a public facility that poses an unreasonable risk, that the entity knew or should have known about, and that was proximately caused by the entity’s negligent act or omission in constructing or maintaining the facility (§ 24-10-103(1.3)).
• Proximate cause and negligent omission:
  Proximate cause asks whether the negligent conduct is sufficiently connected to the condition/injury. A negligent omission here means the entity failed to do what a reasonable entity would have done in time—like promptly warn or clean up—given what it knew and when it knew it.
• Trinity hearing:
  A pretrial evidentiary hearing under Rule 12(b)(1) to decide whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction in CGIA cases. The judge can take evidence and make preliminary findings.
• Inextricably intertwined:
  When facts necessary to decide jurisdiction (immunity) substantially overlap with the facts necessary to decide liability on the merits.
• Burden standards:
  Prima facie: light, assumes allegations true; not used when factfinding is needed.
  Preponderance: more likely than not; typically too heavy at the jurisdiction stage when facts overlap with merits.
  Likelihood (this case): a reasonable probability standard allowing limited factfinding to decide if a waiver likely exists.
• Reasonable time to act:
  A landowner/public entity must have a reasonable opportunity to discover and correct a hazard. If only a few minutes elapse, courts may find no negligence as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Jefferson County v. Dozier clarifies Colorado law in two pivotal ways. Procedurally, it installs a “likelihood” burden at Trinity hearings when jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, allowing courts to make limited, probabilistic findings without precluding merits determinations. Substantively, it confirms that the CGIA’s dangerous-condition waiver requires negligent, proximate causation of the condition by the public entity—making the reasonableness of the entity’s response, including the time to warn or remedy, a jurisdictional fact. On the record presented, with only a few minutes between knowledge of the spill and the fall, negligence was not likely and immunity was not waived.

The decision recalibrates CGIA litigation by elevating the importance of concrete timing and response evidence at the jurisdictional stage, tempering expansive readings of waiver based on notice alone, and aligning waiver analysis with core negligence principles and legislative purposes. Plaintiffs must now meet a meaningful, though not trial-level, evidentiary threshold to proceed; public entities have a clearer pathway to early resolution when they act promptly and reasonably upon learning of transient hazards.