Introduction

In Jefferson County, Colorado v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, 570 P.3d 482, the Colorado Supreme Court issued a significant opinion refining two core aspects of litigation under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA): (1) the plaintiff’s burden at a Trinity hearing when jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits; and (2) what a plaintiff must prove to invoke the dangerous-condition exception to CGIA immunity for injuries in a public building. The case arose from a commonplace but legally consequential scenario—a slip-and-fall on an unmarked puddle inside a county courthouse.

Respondent Krista Dozier sued Jefferson County after slipping on water in a courthouse hallway. The County moved to dismiss, invoking CGIA immunity. The district court held a Trinity hearing and found the County’s response time—only a few minutes from notice to injury—was reasonable, concluding there was no “dangerous condition” and dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A division of the court of appeals reversed, holding the district court improperly considered negligence/causation issues at the jurisdictional stage and that the County’s immunity was waived. The Supreme Court, in an en banc opinion by Justice Hood, reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the dismissal.

The Court’s decision articulates a new, intermediate “likelihood” standard governing a plaintiff’s proof burden at Trinity hearings when jurisdictional facts overlap with the merits. It also clarifies that the CGIA dangerous-condition exception requires proof that a public entity’s negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition, and that the reasonableness of the entity’s response is relevant to that analysis.

Summary of the Opinion

• Burden at Trinity hearings: When jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood (a reasonable probability) of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. This is a middle ground between a prima facie showing and a preponderance standard.
• Dangerous-condition exception: To invoke the CGIA waiver for a dangerous condition of a public building, a plaintiff must show that the condition was proximately caused by the public entity’s negligent act or omission in constructing or maintaining the facility. Mere notice is not enough; reasonableness of the entity’s response is relevant to whether there was a negligent omission.
• Application: The district court’s finding that only a few minutes elapsed between the County’s notice of the spill and Dozier’s fall was supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. As a matter of law, that short interval was an insufficient time to render the County’s failure to warn or clean negligent. Dozier therefore failed to establish a likely negligent omission proximately causing the condition, so immunity was not waived and dismissal was proper.

In-Depth Analysis

CGIA Framework and Interpretive Principles

The CGIA grants broad immunity to public entities from tort liability unless a statutory waiver applies. Because the Act derogates the common law, grants of immunity are strictly construed and waivers are construed broadly—but courts must hew to the legislature’s text and may not add or subtract words. See City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 12; Tidwell ex rel. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2003).

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Ruling

• Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993): Authorizes evidentiary hearings (Trinity hearings) to resolve factual disputes bearing on subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). The district court may take evidence and make factual findings.
• Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001); City & County of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2007); Dennis, 2018 CO 37: Confirm that jurisdictional issues under the CGIA are decided under Rule 12(b)(1); plaintiffs bear the burden of proving jurisdictional facts; courts give plaintiffs reasonable inferences.
• Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005); Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2010): Discuss proof burdens in jurisdictional settings and caution against finally deciding merits-infused jurisdictional facts by a preponderance when that would jeopardize jury-trial rights or create preclusive effects.
• Federal guidance: Foster–Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 1995); Boit v. Gar–Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992); CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2008). These cases endorse a “likelihood” or similarly relaxed burden when jurisdictional facts are bound up with the merits, particularly in FTCA contexts, to avoid premature merits adjudication at the jurisdictional stage.
• Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998); St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland ex rel. Loveland, 2017 CO 54: Articulate the four-factor framework embedded in the CGIA’s definition of a “dangerous condition” under § 24-10-103(1.3).
• Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 86: Interprets “resulting from” in § 24-10-106(1) to require a minimal causal connection. The Supreme Court clarified that Tidwell’s “minimal causal connection” standard addresses the “resulting from” clause, not the definition of “dangerous condition” in § 103(1.3); it does not eliminate the separate requirement that the condition be proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of the public entity.
• Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530 (Colo. 1993): Sets out negligence elements and the centrality of reasonableness—incorporated here to assess whether the public entity’s omission was negligent.
• Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983); Miller v. Crown Mart, Inc., 425 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1967): Support that a defendant must have a reasonable time to discover and correct a hazard; “something less than five minutes” was deemed insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability for failing to discover popcorn kernels in Miller.
• Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000): Supports the statutory construction approach and clarifies that waivers focus on a public entity’s position to discover and correct conditions; but the definition in § 103(1.3) still demands proximate cause by negligent act or omission.
• Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2004) and § 13-21-115(4)(c)(I): The premises liability framework reinforces that the merits will also turn on whether the County exercised reasonable care—underscoring the overlap with the CGIA jurisdictional analysis here.

Legal Reasoning

1) The new proof standard at Trinity hearings: “Likelihood” when facts are intertwined with merits

The Court surveyed three options: a prima facie showing (too light once an evidentiary hearing is held), a preponderance of the evidence (too heavy when facts overlap with the merits and could prejudice jury-trial rights), and an intermediate “likelihood” standard recognized in federal practice. The Court adopted the middle course:

• When a public entity raises CGIA immunity and jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, the plaintiff must show a likelihood—i.e., a reasonable probability—of the facts necessary to establish the waiver of immunity.
• Trial courts at Trinity hearings make factual findings limited to probable outcomes, not definitive findings that would preclude the merits. This allows courts to “weed out unfounded claims” while avoiding premature merits adjudication.

2) The dangerous-condition exception demands proximate cause by a negligent act or omission

The CGIA defines “dangerous condition” as a physical condition or use of a facility that: (a) poses an unreasonable risk to public health or safety; (b) is known or should be known; and (c) is “proximately caused by the negligent act or omission” of the public entity or employee in constructing or maintaining the facility. § 24-10-103(1.3). The Court reaffirmed the four-part Walton/St. Vrain test and focused on the fourth element—proximate cause by negligence.

The Court held that the plaintiff must do more than show the entity had notice of the hazard. Notice goes to knowledge but not to whether the entity’s negligent omission proximately caused the condition. The statute’s explicit admonition that the “mere existence of wind, water, snow, ice or temperature shall not, by itself, constitute a dangerous condition” reinforces that a plaintiff must connect the condition to a negligent act or omission.

The reasonableness of the public entity’s response is therefore squarely relevant to this fourth element. If the entity lacked a reasonable time under the circumstances to warn or to remedy the hazard, its omission is not negligent—and the condition is not a statutory “dangerous condition.”

3) Rejecting the court of appeals’ reliance on Tidwell’s “minimal causal connection”

The court of appeals applied Tidwell to focus on a minimal causal connection between the injuries and the County’s failure to warn or clean up. The Supreme Court clarified that Tidwell interpreted the “resulting from” clause of § 24-10-106(1); it did not modify the definitional prerequisites of a “dangerous condition” in § 24-10-103(1.3). A court must first find a qualifying dangerous condition—which includes proximate cause by a negligent act or omission—before considering whether the injury “resulted from” it.

4) Application to the record

The district court found that only a few minutes elapsed between the County’s notice of the spill and Dozier’s fall (anchored by a 12:12 p.m. facilities email and the 12:15 p.m. observation of Dozier on the floor). The Supreme Court held that finding was supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. Given that brief interval, the County did not have a reasonable time to warn or clean the hazard as a matter of law, echoing Miller’s conclusion that “something less than five minutes” is insufficient to impose negligence for failure to discover and correct. Because Dozier could not establish a likely negligent omission that proximately caused the condition, she did not meet the newly articulated “likelihood” burden for waiver at the Trinity hearing.

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Proof burden clarified: Plaintiffs facing CGIA immunity who must proceed through a Trinity hearing now have a defined, intermediate burden—show a likelihood of the facts establishing waiver when jurisdictional and merits facts overlap. This will shape how parties marshal evidence and the scope of pre-hearing discovery tailored to jurisdictional facts.
• Substance of “dangerous condition”: The decision elevates the importance of the fourth factor—proximate cause via negligence. Plaintiffs cannot rely on notice alone or the presence of a hazard; they must show that the public entity’s negligent maintenance or response likely created or allowed the condition to persist unreasonably.
• Reasonableness and time-to-respond: Trial courts may consider short intervals between notice and injury as defeating negligence at the jurisdictional stage. Expect intensified factual contests about timelines, response protocols, and foreseeability in slip-and-fall and similar cases.
• Alignment with FTCA-informed practice: Colorado remains committed to resolving CGIA immunity under Rule 12(b)(1) (Dennis), but now employs a federal-style, merits-sensitive evidentiary threshold to protect both taxpayer interests (by filtering unfounded claims early) and plaintiffs’ jury-trial rights (by avoiding preclusive, merits-like findings).
• Practical effects for public entities: Agencies should maintain robust incident-reporting systems, time-stamped communications, and rapid-response procedures. Documentation of response times and steps taken will be pivotal at Trinity hearings.
• Litigant strategy: Plaintiffs should secure evidence on duration of the hazard, earlier notice sources, video surveillance, work-order logs, and witness testimony. Defendants should highlight prompt notice-to-action timelines and reasonableness measures to defeat the negligence component of a dangerous-condition claim at the jurisdictional stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CGIA immunity: Colorado’s default rule that public entities are immune from tort suits unless a statutory waiver applies. The dangerous-condition waiver is one such exception.
• Trinity hearing: A pretrial evidentiary hearing where the court resolves factual disputes that determine subject matter jurisdiction (for example, whether an immunity waiver applies).
• “Inextricably intertwined” facts: Jurisdictional facts that are the same as, or substantially overlap with, facts the jury would consider on the merits (e.g., reasonableness of conduct, proximate cause). When this occurs, Colorado now applies a “likelihood” burden rather than a preponderance standard at the Trinity hearing.
• Dangerous condition of a public building: A physical condition or use of the facility that unreasonably endangers the public, that the entity knew or should have known about, and that exists because of the entity’s negligent act or omission in construction or maintenance. The mere presence of water, snow, ice, wind, or temperature does not automatically qualify.
• Proximate cause by negligent act or omission: The plaintiff must link the condition to the public entity’s negligence in constructing or maintaining the facility—such as failing to warn or remedy within a reasonable time after notice. Reasonableness is the touchstone.
• Minimal causal connection vs. proximate cause: Tidwell’s “minimal causal connection” addresses whether an injury “resulted from” a qualifying condition or conduct, not whether the condition itself meets the definition requiring negligence-based proximate cause. The latter is a threshold that must be satisfied first.

Conclusion

Jefferson County v. Dozier establishes two important statewide rules. Procedurally, the Court adopts a “likelihood” standard at Trinity hearings when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with merits, striking a balance between early immunity determinations and preservation of jury-trial rights. Substantively, the Court clarifies that the CGIA dangerous-condition waiver requires proof that the condition was proximately caused by the public entity’s negligent act or omission, making the reasonableness of the entity’s response a relevant jurisdictional fact.

Applying those principles, the Court held that a brief interval of only a few minutes between notice of the spill and Dozier’s fall could not establish a likely negligent omission by the County. Without a likely negligent act or omission proximately causing the condition, no dangerous condition existed for purposes of the CGIA waiver. The Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the district court’s dismissal.

In the broader CGIA landscape, the decision provides clearer guidance to courts and litigants alike: plaintiffs must marshal concrete, timeline-driven evidence showing that governmental negligence likely created or allowed the hazard to persist; public entities should document and execute prompt responses. The opinion advances the CGIA’s dual purposes—preserving legitimate avenues for redress while protecting taxpayers from the burdens of unfounded tort liability.