Cole v. Toledo Refining Co., LLC
Sixth Circuit Clarifies: Where Injuries Are Internally Complex or “Subjective,” All Derivative Harms Also Demand Qualified Expert Proof

1. Introduction

Keith Cole, a homeowner living near Toledo Refining Company’s oil facility, alleged that an explosion at the refinery threw him around his house, damaged his chimney, and left him with neck pain, muscle spasms, anxiety, and other physical and psychological ailments. He sued in Ohio state court for negligence, seeking broad compensatory damages. The defendant removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds and ultimately obtained summary judgment. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit faced two main issues:

• Jurisdiction: Did the federal courts properly exercise diversity jurisdiction when Ohio pleading rules prevented the plaintiff from stating a specific dollar amount?
• Merits: Under Ohio negligence law, must a plaintiff provide expert testimony to prove causation for the kinds of injuries Cole alleged, and if so, did Cole meet that burden?

Although the jurisdictional question required a nuanced look at removal statutes, the heart of the decision—and its lasting precedential value—lies in the court’s robust reaffirmation that any claim involving non-observable, internally-complex, or “down-stream” derivative injuries (e.g., pain and suffering, medical expenses, interference with activities) demands competent expert evidence on causation. Because Cole offered only his own statements as filtered through medical records, the court held he failed to create a triable issue of fact and affirmed summary judgment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit (Chief Judge Sutton, Judge Clay, and opinion author Judge Thapar) affirmed the Northern District of Ohio’s grant of summary judgment to Toledo Refining Co. on Cole’s negligence claim. The court:

1. Confirmed federal diversity jurisdiction because the defendant plausibly alleged an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000 and the plaintiff neither objected nor offered contrary evidence, satisfying 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and Dart Cherokee.
2. Held that, under Ohio law, expert testimony is indispensable to establish causation where the injuries are internal, subjective, or not readily observable by lay jurors.
3. Determined that Cole submitted no admissible expert evidence—only medical records recounting his own narrative—and therefore could not meet his burden at summary judgment.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) – Establishes that the amount alleged by the plaintiff in good faith controls unless shown to a legal certainty otherwise. The court referenced it as a baseline for amount-in-controversy analysis.
• Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) – Central to removal practice: a defendant’s plausible allegation of the jurisdictional amount is accepted absent challenge. Here it allowed the refinery to invoke federal jurisdiction.
• Terry v. Caputo, 875 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 2007) – Ohio Supreme Court case requiring expert testimony when determining causation is beyond the ken of laypersons. Forms the backbone of the Sixth Circuit’s merits analysis.
• Rieger v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 138 N.E.3d 1121 (Ohio 2019) – Restates Ohio negligence elements (duty, breach, proximate cause). Guides framework for evaluating Cole’s claim.
• Numerous Ohio appellate cases (Wood v. Estate of Batta, Rogers v. Armstrong, Clough v. Watkins, etc.) – These collectively illustrate Ohio’s consistent insistence on expert evidence for injuries such as neck pain, stress-related ailments, sleep disorders, and other subjective complaints.

By synthesizing these authorities, the Sixth Circuit demonstrated that Ohio courts draw a bright line: injuries hidden from ordinary view or involving specialized medical inference require expert causation testimony. The decision in Cole thus becomes an authoritative federal articulation of that Ohio rule.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdictional Analysis
   The court explained the interplay between § 1332 (diversity) and § 1446 (removal). Because Ohio Civil Rule 8 forbids plaintiffs from pleading a specific figure when damages exceed $25,000, defendants may state their own estimate in the notice of removal. Under Dart Cherokee, that statement stands unless contested. Cole remained silent; the court therefore accepted the refinery’s plausible $75,000+ valuation, giving the district court power to adjudicate the case.
2. Merits – Negligence and Causation
   a. Ohio requires expert proof when a lay jury could not infer, using common sense, that a given act caused a particular medical condition. The court surveyed Ohio precedent and classified each of Cole’s alleged harms—neck spasms, numbness, anxiety, sleep problems, pain and suffering, medical bills, interference with pleasurable activities, and permanent disability—as either internal or derivative of internal injuries.
   
   b. Because every claimed harm was tethered to an internal, subjective injury, expert testimony was necessary across the board. The court rejected any suggestion that “pain and suffering” or “inability to enjoy activities” could stand on their own where the underlying physical cause had not been medically linked to the defendant’s conduct.
   
   c. Cole’s only evidence was two medical records repeating his self-reports. The documents contained no independent opinion that the explosion caused the conditions. Under Celotex and Sixth Circuit precedent, speculation or hearsay narratives do not create a genuine fact dispute. Consequently, summary judgment was mandatory.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

• Clarifies “Derivative Injury” Doctrine – The opinion makes explicit that not just the primary internal injury, but every down-stream damage category (emotional distress, medical expenses, loss-of-enjoyment, purported disability) inherits the expert-testimony requirement.
• Practical Effects on Plaintiffs’ Strategy – Ohio plaintiffs alleging refinery explosions, toxic torts, or similar events must budget early for expert engagement. Simply producing medical charts or lay affidavits will be insufficient to reach a jury.
• Removal Practice Reinforced – Defense counsel in states with low pleading caps (e.g., Ohio’s $25k rule) can confidently rely on § 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii) to remove high-stakes personal-injury suits, provided the notice plausibly itemizes damages and the plaintiff does not promptly contest.
• Guidance for Federal Judges Applying State Law – The opinion is a reminder that Erie doctrine may require application of state expert thresholds in federal diversity cases. Though the panel sidestepped a formal Erie analysis, district courts in the Sixth Circuit will likely treat Ohio’s requirement as substantive going forward.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Diversity Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) – Allows federal courts to hear cases between citizens of different states when the amount at stake exceeds $75,000.
• Amount in Controversy – The total value of a plaintiff’s claims; must cross $75k for diversity. If state law bars pleading an exact number, defendants may state one in the removal notice.
• Summary Judgment (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56) – A mechanism for ending a case pre-trial when no real dispute of material fact exists and the movant deserves judgment as a matter of law.
• Expert Testimony – Opinion evidence from a qualified specialist (doctor, engineer, etc.) necessary when lay jurors lack the expertise to infer causation.
• Subjective vs. Objective Injuries – “Objective” injuries (e.g., obvious fractures) are visible to anyone; “subjective” injuries (e.g., chronic back pain, anxiety) rely on the plaintiff’s description and medical insight, hence the need for experts.
• Derivative Damages – Secondary harms flowing from a primary injury (e.g., medical bills, loss of enjoyment). If the primary injury requires expert proof, so do its derivatives.

5. Conclusion

In Cole v. Toledo Refining Co., the Sixth Circuit delivered a double lesson. Procedurally, it illustrated how defendants may secure federal forums even when state pleading rules obscure the monetary stakes. Substantively, it cemented a stringent application of Ohio’s expert-testimony rule: whenever the alleged harm is internal, subjective, or medically complex, a plaintiff must marshal qualified expert opinion not only for the primary injury but also for every claimed ripple effect. The case thus serves as a cautionary tale for litigants who hope lay testimony alone can bridge the causation gap—and a roadmap for courts confronting similar expert-evidence questions in diversity actions.