Coded Language and Interlocking Contacts Suffice to Prove Knowing Participation Beyond a Buyer–Seller Relationship in Drug Conspiracies

Case: United States v. Damarquecio Tate, No. 24-5687 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025) — Not Recommended for Publication

Panel: Clay, Bush, and Bloomekatz, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge John K. Bush.

Introduction

This appeal from the Western District of Tennessee concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support a drug conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict against Damarquecio Tate, a Phoenix-based participant linked to a Memphis-area methamphetamine distribution network headed by Demarcus Williams.

The central issue was classic and often litigated in drug-conspiracy appeals: whether the government’s evidence crossed the line from a mere buyer–seller relationship to proof that the defendant knew of, intended to join, and participated in a broader conspiracy. The government’s case relied on wiretapped calls using coded drug language, discussions of quantity, quality, and packaging, coordination through couriers (including a brother alleged to be acting as a courier), and significant cross-contacts with another identified supplier. Although unpublished, the decision reinforces what kinds of circumstantial evidence can satisfy the “knowing participation” element and push a case beyond the buyer–seller rubric.

Summary of the Opinion

The court applied de novo review to Tate’s sufficiency challenge, while affording the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.
It held that the government need not prove an express agreement; a tacit or implied agreement may be established through circumstantial evidence.
While acknowledging that a mere buyer–seller relationship is insufficient to prove conspiracy, the court found the evidence here showed more: coded drug talks about “waters” (methamphetamine), discussions of quantity and product quality, package preparation (vacuum sealing), short-delivery remediation through a courier, and tight interconnections among Tate, the ringleader (Williams), another supplier (Olajuwon Myers), and couriers (including Tate’s brother, Rodney).
Given this record, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tate knew of and joined the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The conviction was affirmed.
The court also denied, without prejudice, Tate’s motion to substitute counsel.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979): The governing sufficiency standard asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The panel repeatedly invoked Jackson’s deferential posture toward jury factfinding and inference drawing.
United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2015): Confirms de novo review for sufficiency challenges, ensuring correct application of Jackson while not reweighing evidence.
United States v. Chaney, 921 F.3d 572, 589 (6th Cir. 2019): Emphasizes that a defendant mounting a sufficiency challenge bears a “very heavy burden,” further reinforcing Jackson’s deference.
United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 460 (6th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999): Appellate courts neither weigh evidence nor assess witness credibility on sufficiency review.
United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2021): Highlights that reversal is warranted only when a verdict is unsupported by substantial and competent evidence; recognizes that a tacit or implied agreement can suffice. Also reiterates that both direct and circumstantial evidence can sustain a conviction.
United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 710 (6th Cir. 2007): Sets out the elements of a § 846 drug conspiracy: (1) agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge of and intent to join; and (3) participation.
United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 567 (6th Cir. 1999): The government may meet its burden through circumstantial evidence, crucial in conspiracy prosecutions where illicit agreements are rarely explicit.
United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2009): The buyer–seller rule: mere sales do not prove the existence of a conspiratorial agreement. Yet Deitz also contains the frequently cited principle that once a conspiracy is shown, a defendant’s connection “need only be slight.”
United States v. Sadler, 24 F.4th 515, 539 (6th Cir. 2022): Reaffirmed that the buyer–seller relationship alone does not show agreement to participate in the broader conspiracy.
United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 1991): A defendant must voluntarily associate with the enterprise to further its objectives—language the panel uses to frame what “knowing participation” entails.
United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1984): Supports the proposition that substantial evidence can be direct or circumstantial, a foundational rule for sufficiency analysis.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in structured steps that tracked Gardner’s elements and Jackson’s lens:

1) An existing conspiracy was not contested. Tate did not dispute the presence of an extensive drug trafficking conspiracy operating in the Memphis area. The government’s broader proof—controlled buys from Williams and his cousin, pole camera surveillance, and evidence of a Memphis stash house operated by Williams’s brother—established the conspiracy’s contours.

2) Knowledge and intent to join were shown by circumstantial evidence that went well beyond mere sales. The court emphasized several points from the wiretapped calls and agent testimony:

Coded language: Williams asked Tate for a “load of waters.” A task force officer testified that “waters” was a known code for methamphetamine; the jury heard the recorded calls and was entitled to credit this interpretation.
Quantity and shortage reconciliation: The men discussed receiving roughly 448 grams (about a pound) and that the delivery was short by ~100 grams. Williams’s brother was weighing the drugs during the call, and Tate stated that he had vacuum-sealed them. This is the sort of transaction-level detail that shows knowledge of and stake in distribution, not a casual, one-off sale.
Quality control and customer complaints: Williams reported that customers found the meth “hard to smoke.” Tate responded that it was “mostly crystal,” a description consistent with crystal meth shards purchased by agents in controlled buys. Discussions about customer satisfaction, product form, and remediation reflect cooperative efforts to maintain the distribution enterprise.
Courier coordination and proceeds collection: Williams told Tate to have Tate’s brother, Rodney, collect drug proceeds and to meet to “make it right” regarding the shorted amount. The use of a courier connected to Tate, and the effort to remedy shortages, are markers of continuing conspiratorial cooperation rather than isolated trade.

3) Participation was corroborated through network connections beyond Williams. The opinion underscores interlocking contacts:

Tate’s relationship with another Phoenix supplier, Olajuwon Myers, established through more than 1,000 calls and texts during 2023, and Tate’s arrest at Myers’s address.
Extensive communications between Myers and Rodney Tate (over 750 in the same period), knitting together the Arizona sources (Myers and Tate), the Memphis distributor (Williams), and couriers (Rodney; and Williams’s brother, Earnest, who operated a target stash house). The communication lattice permitted the jury to infer a jointly undertaken distribution venture.

4) Distinguishing buyer–seller. The opinion acknowledges the buyer–seller doctrine (Deitz; Sadler). But by highlighting collaborative conduct—coordinating couriers, addressing shortages, engaging in product-quality discussions tied to end users, and preparing/packaging product (vacuum-sealing)—the court found that the government proved a tacit agreement to further the conspiracy’s objectives, exceeding mere isolated sales.

5) Slight connection principle once conspiracy is shown. Citing Deitz, the panel noted that once the existence of the conspiracy is established beyond a reasonable doubt, the required proof to connect a defendant is “slight.” Here, the cumulative circumstantial evidence readily cleared that bar.

6) Appellate deference on sufficiency. Reiterating Jackson and related circuit precedent, the court did not reweigh evidence or revisit credibility determinations. Instead, it asked only whether a rational juror could find knowledge and participation beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the totality of the wiretaps, agent testimony, and the communications web, the answer was yes.

Impact and Practical Implications

Though unpublished and thus nonprecedential, the decision provides persuasive guidance in the Sixth Circuit about the kinds of proof that will carry the government beyond a buyer–seller relationship in drug-conspiracy cases, especially when the defendant is geographically remote from the distribution hub. Key implications include:

Coded communications can be probative: The court endorsed the jury’s reliance on law-enforcement interpretation of coded terms like “waters,” especially when corroborated by context (e.g., quantities discussed, quality complaints, packaging statements) and consistent with physical purchases (crystal shards in controlled buys).
Remedial actions indicate joint venture: Evidence that the defendant coordinated a courier to collect proceeds or “make right” a shorted delivery strongly suggests an ongoing, cooperative role in achieving the conspiracy’s objectives—beyond a simple sales transaction.
Packaging and preparation as participation: Remarks about vacuum sealing and other preparations can serve as participation markers, showing the defendant’s role within the distribution chain.
Network proof is enough even without physical co-location: The panel rejected the argument that the absence of pole camera footage or local surveillance tying Tate to Memphis scenes undercut the case. Repeated, high-volume communications with the ringleader and with another identified supplier, alongside courier coordination, were sufficient.
Slight-connection threshold post-establishment: Once the conspiracy is established, only a slight connection is necessary to tie a defendant to it. Appellants arguing a buyer–seller theory must grapple with any evidence showing coordinated efforts to sustain distribution, especially quality control, coordinated collections, or supply remediation.

For prosecutors, Tate illustrates how to marshal a circumstantial case against remote suppliers through wiretaps, communication records, and interlocking contact patterns. For defense counsel, it underscores the need to separate a client’s conduct from the central distribution enterprise and to rebut inferences drawn from coded communications and courier coordination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sufficiency of the Evidence: On appeal, courts do not retry the case. They ask whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the answer is yes, the conviction stands, even if other inferences were possible.
Drug Conspiracy (§ 846): The government must prove (1) an agreement to violate the drug laws; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that agreement and intent to join; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. Agreements can be tacit or implied; few conspirators sign contracts.
Buyer–Seller Rule: Simply buying from or selling to someone—even repeatedly—does not, by itself, prove a conspiracy. There must be additional evidence of an agreement to jointly further distribution, such as coordinating couriers, addressing shortages, engaging in quality control for downstream customers, or otherwise acting in concert.
Coded Language: Traffickers often use innocuous terms (“waters”) to reference drugs. Courts permit agents to explain code usage, and juries may accept those interpretations, especially when corroborated by context.
Circumstantial Evidence: Direct evidence (e.g., eyewitness testimony) is not required. A mosaic of facts—phones records, intercepted calls, coded language, courier activity—can be sufficient to prove conspiracy.
“Slight Connection”: Once the government has proved a conspiracy exists, it need only show a slight connection between the defendant and the conspiracy—still beyond a reasonable doubt, but acknowledging that conspiracies are proved by cumulation and inference.
“Cleaned up” in citations: A parenthetical used in legal writing indicating that internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations have been omitted for readability.

Conclusion

United States v. Tate reinforces a practical rule for conspiracy prosecutions in the Sixth Circuit: when wiretapped calls and other circumstantial evidence show coded drug talk, discussions of quantity and quality tied to end users, remedial action on shorted deliveries, packaging details, and the orchestration of couriers and proceeds collection—especially intertwined with another identified supplier—those facts, taken together, will generally suffice to prove that a defendant knowingly joined and participated in a drug distribution conspiracy. The opinion is a clear illustration of how courts distinguish mere buyer–seller relationships from conspiratorial agreements, and it exemplifies the deferential Jackson standard on appeal.

Although not precedential, Tate provides a roadmap for how prosecutors can build, and how defendants must counter, a circumstantial case connecting a remote supplier to a local distribution ring. The Sixth Circuit’s affirmance, coupled with its denial (without prejudice) of the motion to substitute counsel, leaves intact a 162-month sentence anchored in a record the court deemed ample and competent to support the jury’s verdict.