Closed A‑Frame Ladder Use, Speculative Lighting Claims, and Recurring Water: The Second Department’s Clarification of §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200 in Araujo v. Monadnock Construction, Inc.

Introduction

This commentary examines the Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Araujo v. Monadnock Construction, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04533 (Aug. 6, 2025). The case arises from a construction accident in a confined basement workspace, where the plaintiff, a concrete worker employed by a subcontractor, fell from an A‑frame/platform-type ladder he used in the closed position, allegedly because the area was too tight to open it and because two to three inches of standing water made the floor slippery. The owner (East Harlem MEC Parcel B West, LLC) and general contractor (Monadnock Construction, Inc.) moved for summary judgment; the plaintiff sought summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1).

The decision affirms a balanced trial-court order: it denies summary judgment to both sides on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim due to triable issues about ladder misuse and sole proximate cause; it dismisses the § 241(6) illumination-based claim (12 NYCRR 23‑1.30) for lack of non-speculative proximate cause; it preserves § 241(6) claims grounded in slippery-surface and ladder-condition regulations (12 NYCRR 23‑1.7[d] and 23‑1.21[b][3]); and it keeps alive common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims on a premises-condition theory based on potential constructive notice of recurring water.

Summary of the Judgment

Labor Law § 240(1): Plaintiff established a prima facie case; defendants, however, raised triable issues as to whether plaintiff misused the ladder and whether such misuse was the sole proximate cause. Result: both plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 240(1) claim were properly denied.
Labor Law § 241(6) – 12 NYCRR 23‑1.30 (illumination): Dismissed. The court held insufficient lighting was not a proximate cause; plaintiff’s claim that better light would have allowed him to “catch” a post was speculative.
Labor Law § 241(6) – 12 NYCRR 23‑1.7(d) (slippery surfaces) and 23‑1.21(b)(3) (ladder condition): Survive. Defendants did not eliminate triable issues that a wet/slippery floor and/or a defective or improperly maintained ladder proximately caused the accident.
Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence: Survive under a premises-condition theory. Defendants failed to show lack of actual or constructive notice of the wet, slippery condition; evidence of an ongoing and recurring condition can supply constructive notice.
Disposition: Order affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from.

Factual and Procedural Background

East Harlem MEC owned premises undergoing new building construction; Monadnock was the GC; Highbury Concrete, Inc. (plaintiff’s employer) was a subcontractor. Plaintiff alleged he was working in a tight basement space and had to use an A‑frame or platform-type ladder in the closed position. He claimed the ladder wobbled rightward and he fell backward, striking his head and losing consciousness. The floor had two to three inches of standing water and was slippery.

Plaintiff sued for common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6), predicated on several Industrial Code provisions. After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court, Kings County, issued a mixed order; the Appellate Division affirmed.

Issues Presented

Does closed-position use of an A‑frame ladder in a confined space support summary judgment for a § 240(1) violation, or do issues of misuse and sole proximate cause preclude summary relief?
When will an illumination claim under 12 NYCRR 23‑1.30 survive, and what is required to show proximate cause without speculation?
Do wet floors and ladder-condition regulations (12 NYCRR 23‑1.7[d]; 23‑1.21[b][3]) present triable issues of proximate cause under § 241(6)?
Under § 200/common-law negligence, can recurrent water in a basement amount to constructive notice sufficient to defeat summary judgment?

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Matter

Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259: The Court of Appeals’ anchor for § 240(1). Not every fall is a § 240(1) case; liability requires a gravity-related risk and failure to provide an enumerated safety device. Araujo follows this gatekeeping.
Andrade v Bergen Beach 26, LLC, 215 AD3d 722; Joseph v 210 W. 18th, LLC, 189 AD3d 1384; Ramones v 425 County Rd., LLC, 217 AD3d 977: Reiterate § 240(1)’s nondelegable duty and that liability turns on the inadequacy/failure of safety devices. These cases frame the court’s baseline.
Lopes v County of Suffolk, 236 AD3d 883: Articulates summary judgment burdens in § 240(1) ladder cases and the narrow path for defendants to defeat a plaintiff’s prima facie showing via a “plausible view” of no statutory violation and sole proximate cause. The court mirrors this burden-shifting.
Wright v Pennings, 233 AD3d 827: Confirms liability when ladders are inadequately secured and ties constructive notice standards to premises claims. Araujo uses it (i) to confirm that unsecured ladders can trigger § 240(1), and (ii) on constructive notice under § 200.
Sisalima v Thorne Constr., Inc., 237 AD3d 1126; Nalvarte v Long Is. Univ., 153 AD3d 712: Define the sole proximate cause defense—misuse of a proper device, selection of an inadequate device when adequate ones were readily available, or failure to use any available device. Araujo relies on these to deny summary judgment to both sides on § 240(1).
Gillet v City of New York, 165 AD3d 1064; Zholanji v 52 Wooster Holdings, LLC, 188 AD3d 1300: Emphasize that using an A‑frame ladder closed is not per se sole proximate cause; context matters. Araujo deploys these to avoid categorical rulings and to send the ladder-use question to a jury.
Kosinski v Brendan Moran Custom Carpentry, Inc., 138 AD3d 935; Daley v 250 Park Ave., LLC, 126 AD3d 747: Examples where defendants raised triable issues regarding misuse or sole proximate cause in ladder cases, supporting denial of plaintiff’s § 240(1) summary judgment.
Wittenberg v Long Is. Power Auth., 225 AD3d 730; Bittrolff v City of New York, 237 AD3d 1024; Fonck v City of New York, 198 AD3d 874: Outline § 241(6)’s nondelegable duty and the requirement to identify a specific, concrete Industrial Code provision and proximate cause. Araujo applies this rigor to each predicate regulation.
Murphy v 80 Pine, LLC, 208 AD3d 492: Clarifies 12 NYCRR 23‑1.30’s illumination standards (10 foot-candles in work areas; 5 in passageways). Araujo uses this to define the rule but then focuses on proximate cause proof.
Macdonald v Palace Entertainment, LLC, 234 AD3d 749: Speculative causation is insufficient. Araujo directly invokes this to reject the lighting theory grounded in conjecture.
Pisculli v Tew, 238 AD3d 919; Titov v V & M Chelsea Prop., LLC, 230 AD3d 614; Graham v New York City Hous. Auth., 229 AD3d 605: Distinguish § 200 categories (means and methods vs. premises conditions) and explain constructive notice, including the “ongoing and recurring condition” doctrine. Araujo uses this framework to preserve § 200 claims.
Seem v Premier Camp Co., LLC, 200 AD3d 921; Derise v Jaak 773, Inc., 127 AD3d 1011: Support the proposition that defendants failed to establish lack of notice of wet conditions and that proximate cause issues remain.
Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851: A party must prima facie eliminate all triable issues to obtain summary judgment; failure ends the inquiry. Araujo invokes Winegrad to affirm denial of defense summary judgment on § 200/common-law negligence.

Legal Reasoning by Claim

Labor Law § 240(1) (Scaffold Law) – Ladder Accident

Principle applied: Owners and GCs have a nondelegable duty to furnish adequate safety devices for elevation-related risks. In ladder cases, if the ladder is inadequately secured or otherwise fails to protect against gravity-related hazards, § 240(1) can impose liability.

The plaintiff’s prima facie case was established: he fell when the closed-position A‑frame/platform ladder wobbled in a confined, water-laden area. That showing shifted the burden to defendants. Defendants, however, raised a triable issue that the plaintiff may have misused the ladder—by choosing to use an A‑frame in the closed position—and that such misuse could be the sole proximate cause if proper devices were available and he disregarded them. The Second Department emphasizes two critical, coexisting points:

Using an A‑frame ladder closed is not automatically sole proximate cause. Contextual facts matter, including space constraints and availability of safer alternatives (Gillet; Zholanji).
Nonetheless, where the record permits a “plausible view” that misuse was the only cause, a jury question exists (Lopes; Kosinski; Daley).

Result: Neither side obtains summary judgment on § 240(1). The trier of fact must resolve whether there was a statutory violation and whether any misuse was the sole proximate cause.

Labor Law § 241(6) – Industrial Code Predicates

12 NYCRR 23‑1.30 (illumination): The court accepts the illumination standard (10 foot-candles in work areas; 5 in passageways) but focuses on causation. Plaintiff’s theory—that with better lighting he could have “caught himself on a post”—was deemed speculative under Macdonald. Absent non-speculative evidence that insufficient light played a causal role, the claim fails as a matter of law. The court therefore affirms dismissal of the § 241(6) claim to the extent it relies on 23‑1.30.
12 NYCRR 23‑1.7(d) (slipping hazards): This rule requires employers to keep passageways and work areas free from slippery substances. Given the plaintiff’s testimony about two to three inches of standing water and a slippery floor, defendants did not eliminate triable questions whether the condition violated 1.7(d) and was a proximate cause. That predicate survives.
12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(b)(3) (ladder maintenance/condition): This provision broadly requires ladders to be maintained in good condition and free of defects (including conditions that make rungs or steps slippery). The record left fact issues about the ladder’s condition and its role in the fall, preserving this predicate as well.

Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence – Premises Condition Theory

This is treated as a premises-condition case (not means-and-methods). The test: did defendants create the dangerous condition or have actual or constructive notice? Constructive notice exists if the defect is visible and apparent and existed for a sufficient time for remediation, and it can be shown by evidence of an ongoing and recurring condition in the accident area that was routinely unaddressed (Titov; Graham; Wright v Pennings).

Defendants failed to establish they lacked actual or constructive notice of the wet, slippery basement floor. The record suggested a recurring water condition, making summary judgment inappropriate. Because defendants did not carry their prima facie burden, Winegrad foreclosed their motion; the § 200 and negligence claims remain for trial.

Why the Court Reached These Results

Balanced application of burden shifting: Plaintiff met his initial § 240(1) burden, but defense proof plausibly suggested sole proximate cause by misuse, creating a quintessential jury issue.
Strict causation requirement for § 241(6) illumination claims: Even if illumination is below code, a plaintiff must connect it to the fall with non-speculative evidence. Conjecture about catching a post if lighting were better is insufficient.
Fact-sensitive Industrial Code predicates: Water and ladder-condition violations are highly factual; deposition testimony and physical conditions often preclude summary resolution.
Premises-liability rigor under § 200: Recurring water in a basement—if visible, apparent, and ongoing—can constitute constructive notice, preserving claims for a jury’s assessment.

Impact and Implications

For Future § 240(1) Ladder Cases

No per se bar where an A‑frame is used closed. Plaintiffs can still make out a prima facie case if wobble and fall evidence indicates inadequate protection. But defendants can defeat summary judgment by raising a “plausible view” of sole proximate cause premised on misuse or bypassing available safer devices.
Constrained spaces matter. The justification for using a ladder in closed configuration due to tight quarters is a fact question that can defeat a sole proximate cause defense.

For § 241(6) Illumination Claims

Proof of code noncompliance is not enough; proximate cause must be supported by concrete, non-speculative evidence (e.g., light measurements, testimony showing impaired visibility directly caused the misstep). Otherwise, the claim is vulnerable on summary judgment.
Expect more rigorous scrutiny of causation in lighting cases, with courts citing Macdonald/Murphy and Araujo to dismiss speculative theories.

For § 241(6) Slippery-Surface and Ladder-Condition Claims

Standing water and slippery floors in work areas, especially basements, present durable predicates under 23‑1.7(d). Fact disputes about water depth, duration, and periodicity will often reach juries.
Ladder maintenance and condition under 23‑1.21(b)(3) remain fertile ground: worn feet, slippery rungs, missing or loose components, or contaminated steps can each support liability if causally linked.

For § 200/Common-Law Negligence

Recurring water equals potential constructive notice. Owners and GCs should document inspection and remediation protocols, especially in water-prone basements. Failure to address recurring wet conditions can defeat summary judgment.
Premises claims are distinct from means-and-methods cases. Where the hazard is the condition of the place (e.g., standing water), notice—not supervisory control over the work—drives liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Labor Law § 240(1): The “Scaffold Law.” Imposes a nondelegable duty on owners/GCs to furnish safety devices protecting workers from elevation-related risks (e.g., falls from ladders/scaffolds). A complete defense is “sole proximate cause,” meaning the worker’s own misuse of otherwise adequate, available safety devices is the only cause of the accident.
Sole Proximate Cause (in this context): Typically requires proof that (1) an adequate safety device was available; (2) the worker knew he should use it; (3) he misused or failed to use it; and (4) that misuse/failure was the only cause. It is rarely established as a matter of law where environmental hazards (like water) might also have contributed.
Labor Law § 241(6): Imposes a nondelegable duty to adhere to specific Industrial Code rules. A plaintiff must identify a concrete, specific regulation and show it was violated and proximately caused the injury.
12 NYCRR 23‑1.30 (illumination): Requires minimum lighting levels—10 foot-candles in work areas, 5 foot-candles in passageways. A “foot-candle” is a measure of light intensity (one lumen per square foot). Proof must link insufficient light to the accident without speculation.
12 NYCRR 23‑1.7(d): Requires that work areas and passageways be kept free from slippery substances such as water, ice, snow, or grease.
12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(b)(3): Requires that ladders be kept in good condition and free from structural defects or conditions (including slippery contamination) that compromise safe use.
Labor Law § 200: Codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace. For premises conditions, the owner/GC is liable if it created the hazard or had actual or constructive notice. Constructive notice can stem from hazards that are visible, apparent, and persist long enough to be discovered and corrected—or from ongoing recurring conditions that are routinely unaddressed.
Summary Judgment: A pretrial procedure to resolve cases without a trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. The moving party must eliminate all triable issues. If it fails to do so, the motion must be denied without regard to the strength of the opponent’s papers (Winegrad).
Proximate Cause vs. Speculation: Proximate cause requires a non-speculative causal connection between the violation and the injury. Hypothetical assertions (e.g., “I might have grabbed a post if it were brighter”) are insufficient.

Practice Guidance

For plaintiffs: In ladder cases, document the ladder’s configuration, footing, and the environmental conditions (water, debris, slope), and identify whether safer devices were available or practicable in confined spaces. For illumination claims, secure lighting measurements, photographs contemporaneous with the incident, and testimony that ties visibility to the fall mechanism.
For owners/GCs: Anticipate “recurring condition” constructive notice by instituting and documenting regular inspections and remediation (especially for water intrusion). On § 240(1), assemble proof of available proper devices, instructions, and training to support a sole proximate cause defense where warranted.
For insurers and risk managers: Araujo underscores that water-related and ladder-condition predicates often survive summary judgment. Reserving for trial may be common; early factual development on lighting levels and alternate-device availability can narrow exposure.
For trial courts and juries: Expect fact-intensive disputes about whether a closed A‑frame was a necessary adaptation to a confined space or an unjustified misuse, and whether water and ladder condition combined with that use proximately caused the fall.

Conclusion

Araujo v. Monadnock Construction, Inc. refines three important strands of New York construction law:

Under Labor Law § 240(1), use of an A‑frame ladder in the closed position is not a per se bar to recovery nor a per se path to liability; whether that choice was misuse, and whether such misuse was the sole proximate cause, are fact questions when the record permits competing inferences.
Under § 241(6), illumination claims under 12 NYCRR 23‑1.30 require non-speculative proof of proximate cause; mere conjecture will not suffice. By contrast, slippery-surface (23‑1.7[d]) and ladder-condition (23‑1.21[b][3]) predicates often present jury questions tied to the physical scene and equipment condition.
Under § 200/common-law negligence, recurring water conditions in a work area can furnish constructive notice, preserving premises-condition claims for trial where defendants cannot affirmatively negate notice.

The decision strengthens the message that New York’s construction accident jurisprudence is intensely fact-driven: summary judgment will be denied where the evidence supports reasonable disputes about misuse, causation, and notice. Araujo will be frequently cited for its careful articulation of the sole proximate cause defense in ladder cases, its insistence on non-speculative causation for illumination claims, and its application of constructive notice principles to recurring wet conditions in active construction basements.