Clisby’s “All Claims” Rule Requires Clear, Independent Pleading: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Where Plea-Advice Ineffective-Assistance Theory Was Not Distinctly Pled

Introduction

In Manuel Emilio Alvarez Hernandez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a federal habeas petition, holding that the district court did not violate the mandate of Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), to resolve “all claims” raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The decision underscores a practical but consequential pleading principle: a habeas petitioner must distinctly and clearly articulate each constitutional claim as an independent ground for relief. Passing or tethered references will not compel a Clisby remand.

The petitioner, convicted in Florida state court of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault with a weapon, and aggravated battery with great bodily harm, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in the plea-bargaining phase. He argued his lawyer failed to raise competency concerns and ensure he rationally understood the case and the consequences of rejecting plea offers—particularly around a September 2019 plea colloquy that followed a reported suicide attempt. After the district court denied relief, a certificate of appealability (COA) issued on a single procedural question: Did the district court commit Clisby error by failing to address a distinct IAC theory—that counsel inadequately advised him about plea offers?

The Eleventh Circuit answered no. It concluded the § 2254 petition, even liberally construed, did not clearly present an independent “failure-to-advise” IAC claim separate from the competency-based IAC theory the district court addressed. The ruling refines how Clisby interfaces with the clarity required of habeas pleadings, even when submitted pro se.

Summary of the Opinion

The court, per curiam (Judges Rosenbaum, Luck, and Lagoa), affirmed. Reviewing de novo whether a Clisby violation occurred, the panel explained:

• Clisby requires district courts to resolve all constitutional claims presented in a § 2254 petition; failure warrants vacatur and remand.
• But there is no Clisby error when a petitioner has not clearly pled a claim as an independent ground for relief. The claim must be presented “in clear and simple language” such that the court cannot misunderstand it, with pro se filings construed liberally.
• Here, the petitioner’s pro se pleading did not clearly present an IAC claim premised on counsel’s failure to adequately advise about plea offers (including a judge’s “court offer” on September 19, 2019). Instead, his IAC argument hinged entirely on alleged incompetency and counsel’s failure to raise or act upon it during plea proceedings.
• The district court addressed that competency-based IAC theory by finding no sufficient indicia of incompetence that would have required counsel to doubt competency, given a prior competency evaluation and the record.

Because the district court resolved the actual claim presented, there was no Clisby violation. The court emphasized that whether the merits analysis was correct fell outside the COA’s scope. The judgment was affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Charged in 2017 with violent felonies, Alvarez-Hernandez was found competent after a court-ordered evaluation and proceeded toward trial. Before trial, the state extended plea offers (seven years, later eleven years), and the court twice extended a “court offer” (six years’ imprisonment plus five years’ reporting probation). Each was rejected after discussions with counsel, including in September 2019. A jury convicted him on all counts, and he received an aggregate 25-year sentence, which was affirmed on direct appeal.

In state postconviction proceedings under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, he alleged IAC during plea negotiations, focusing on counsel’s failure to address his competency and his rational understanding of the case. The state court denied relief under Strickland v. Washington, 488 U.S. 668 (1984), finding he was engaged in plea discussions, understood the proceedings, and made an independent decision to go to trial. The denial was affirmed on appeal. He then filed a pro se § 2254 petition in federal court.

In “Ground Three” of his federal petition, he alleged “Effective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Negotiation Process,” again pointing to mental-health issues and a suicide attempt on September 17, 2019. He argued counsel failed to raise competency during the September 19 plea colloquy or ensure he had a rational understanding of the state’s case and trial risks. The district court denied the petition, characterizing the IAC allegations as conclusory and finding no sufficient indicia of incompetence that would have required counsel to doubt competency beyond the prior evaluation. The court denied a COA. The Eleventh Circuit granted a COA limited to whether the district court violated Clisby by failing to address an assertedly separate IAC “failure-to-advise-about-plea” claim.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
  Clisby requires district courts to resolve all claims for relief in § 2254 petitions, defining a “claim for relief” as any allegation of a constitutional violation. The remedy for failure is vacatur and remand to address unresolved claims. This bedrock procedural rule framed the COA question: Did the district court omit a distinct constitutional claim?
• Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2013).
  Dupree clarifies that petitioners must present claims “in clear and simple language”; pro se filings receive liberal construction, but courts cannot be expected to infer new, independent claims from ambiguous references. The court used Dupree’s clarity principle to assess whether Alvarez-Hernandez’s petition distinctly pled a failure-to-advise IAC theory.
• Barritt v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2020).
  Barritt distinguished between passing references to a concept (coercion) and pleading an independent claim. Where references support a different, fully addressed claim (failure to advise about a vindictiveness defense), there is no Clisby error. The court analogized Barritt to conclude that Alvarez-Hernandez’s references to plea discussions supported his competency-based IAC theory rather than a standalone “failure-to-advise” claim.
• Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2021).
  Cited for Florida’s competency standard, mirroring the federal Dusky test: sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and a rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit used Noetzel to show that the petition framed its IAC theory around competency—not the quality of plea advice.
• Strickland v. Washington, 488 U.S. 668 (1984).
  While the merits of Strickland were not within the COA’s scope, Strickland underpinned the state courts’ and district court’s analysis of counsel’s performance and prejudice. Its presence in the history serves to underscore that the operative claim the district court addressed was the competency-centered IAC claim.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in two steps:

1. What did the § 2254 petition actually plead?
   Although the petitioner labeled Ground Three “Effective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Negotiation Process,” the substance centered on competency. He alleged that due to mental-health issues and a suicide attempt two days before the September 19, 2019 colloquy, he lacked a rational understanding of the case and consequences of rejecting a plea, and that counsel failed to raise competency or ensure understanding at that hearing. The petition did not claim counsel gave incorrect, incomplete, or misleading advice about the content of specific plea offers; nor did it allege counsel failed to communicate offers. In other words, nothing in the petition established an “independent” failure-to-advise IAC theory, as distinct from the competency-driven theory.
2. Did the district court resolve the claim actually presented?
   Yes. The district court concluded there were no “sufficient indicia of incompetence” to require reasonably diligent counsel to doubt competency, relying on the prior competency evaluation and the record. That finding resolved the competency-based IAC theory that was actually pled. Under Barritt, because the district court adjudicated the claim presented, there is no Clisby error even if the petitioner, on appeal, reframes references from his petition as though they raised a different, unaddressed claim.

The appellate panel emphasized that the question on COA was limited to Clisby compliance. Whether the district court’s merits analysis of the competency-based IAC claim was correct remained outside the COA’s scope.

Impact and Implications

This non-precedential decision nevertheless offers practical guidance for habeas litigants and courts:

• Distinctly plead each constitutional theory. In the IAC context, different theories—such as failure to investigate competency, failure to request a competency hearing, failure to advise on plea offers, failure to communicate offers, or defective advice about trial exposure—are separate constitutional claims. A label (e.g., “IAC during plea negotiations”) is not enough; the petition must specify the theory and supporting facts.
• Pro se liberality has limits. Courts will read pro se pleadings liberally, but will not manufacture independent claims from general references. To trigger Clisby’s “all claims” duty, the pleading must put the district court on clear notice of each theory.
• Clisby is about completeness, not correctness. A successful Clisby argument requires showing the district court omitted an entire claim—not that it misanalyzed or incorrectly decided a claim. Here, the competency-based IAC claim was decided; no remand was warranted.
• Practice pointer for plea-bargaining IAC claims. When alleging plea-related IAC, specifically plead:
  • Failure to convey offers (if applicable);
  • Failure to advise about material consequences (e.g., sentencing exposure, elements, defenses, immigration effects);
  • Affirmative misadvice or coercion; and
  • Competency-related deficiencies (failure to raise or investigate competency), with facts establishing “sufficient indicia” at the relevant time.
  Each theory should be set out as its own ground to avoid Clisby pitfalls.
• Florida “court offers” and federal habeas. The record’s references to a judge’s “court offer” (a feature allowed in Florida practice) heighten the need to specify whether the complaint targets the judge’s offer, the prosecutor’s offers, counsel’s advice about them, or counsel’s competency-related duties. Ambiguity risks forfeiture of independent theories under Clisby.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Clisby v. Jones rule. In federal habeas corpus cases by state prisoners, district courts must decide every constitutional claim the petitioner raises. If the court leaves one unaddressed, the court of appeals will usually send the case back to decide it.
• “Claim” versus “argument.” A “claim” is an alleged constitutional violation (e.g., “I was denied the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because my lawyer failed to convey a plea offer”). An “argument” is a reason supporting a claim. Clisby requires courts to decide claims, not every supporting argument unless they amount to separate constitutional violations.
• Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show (1) deficient performance (counsel acted unreasonably) and (2) prejudice (a reasonable probability the result would have been different). In plea contexts, prejudice typically requires showing a reasonable probability the petitioner would have accepted a plea and that the court would have accepted it, resulting in a lesser conviction or sentence.
• Competency to proceed. A defendant is competent if he can consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. If counsel has sufficient signs of incompetence, failing to act can give rise to IAC claims or due-process claims. Here, the claim pled was that counsel should have acted given alleged signs before the September 2019 colloquy.
• Certificate of Appealability (COA). In § 2254 cases, appeals are limited to the questions certified by the court. The Eleventh Circuit confined its review here to the procedural Clisby issue, not the ultimate merits of the IAC claim.

What This Decision Does Not Decide

• It does not decide whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient or whether the petitioner suffered Strickland prejudice.
• It does not address the merits of any standalone “failure-to-advise-about-plea” IAC theory under cases like Missouri v. Frye or Lafler v. Cooper (which the opinion did not cite).
• It does not alter competency standards; it references Florida’s standard to read the petition’s gravamen, not to adjudicate competency anew.

Key Takeaways

• Clisby compels adjudication of all pled claims—but only those clearly pled as independent constitutional violations.
• Labeling a ground “IAC during plea negotiations” is not enough; petitioners must specify the distinct IAC theory and factual basis (e.g., failure to advise, failure to convey, failure to raise competency) to ensure the court addresses it.
• Courts will construe pro se pleadings liberally but will not reframe competency-centric allegations into a separate plea-advice claim.
• On appeal, a petitioner cannot manufacture a Clisby error by recasting a resolved claim as though another, unadjudicated claim had been presented.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Alvarez Hernandez refines the practical contours of Clisby’s “all claims” rule: it is a completeness mandate, not an invitation to infer unpled theories from generalized labels or tangential references. For habeas practitioners—especially those litigating pro se—the opinion highlights the importance of distinctly articulating each constitutional theory with clarity and factual specificity. When ineffective assistance is alleged in the high-stakes context of plea bargaining, separating competency-based claims from failure-to-advise claims can be outcome determinative at the procedural gateway. Affirmance here signals that clarity at the pleading stage remains the surest way to secure full adjudication of all intended claims.