Clark County v. District Court (Eggleston): Interlocutory Mandamus Review Recognised for Immunity Denials and the Scope of Social-Worker Immunities in Parental-Rights Investigations

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Nevada, sitting en banc, in Clark County & Stuart v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Eggleston), 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 31 (2025), delivers a landmark opinion that:

• Authorises the use of an original writ of mandamus to obtain immediate appellate review when a district court denies a motion for summary judgment grounded on qualified immunity or discretionary-act immunity.
• Holds that, on the undisputed facts, a social worker’s ultimatum that a parent either sign temporary guardianship papers or face formal removal proceedings did not violate “clearly established” constitutional rights as of January 2015; therefore the social worker is entitled to qualified immunity on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive and procedural due-process claims.
• Extends discretionary-act immunity under NRS 41.032(2) to the same conduct, foreclosing state-law intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims.

The decision not only shields the petitioners—Clark County and family-services caseworker Georgina Stuart—from further litigation costs, but also sets procedural and substantive guardrails for future child-protective-services (CPS) lawsuits in Nevada.

Background of the Case

• Parties
  • Petitioners: Clark County and social worker Georgina Stuart (Department of Family Services, “DFS”).
  • Real Party in Interest: Steve Eggleston, father of two minor children.
  • Respondents: Eighth Judicial District Court (Judge Susan Johnson).
• Factual Setting
  • December 2014–January 2015: DFS investigates recurring substance-abuse, mental-health, and supervision issues involving the children’s mother, Laura Rodriguez, and the children’s safety once visiting relatives depart.
  • 7 January 2015: Social worker Stuart, accompanied by police officers, offers Eggleston two options—sign temporary guardianship to maternal relatives (the Callahans) or face immediate protective-custody removal and court petition.
  • After consulting his attorney by telephone, Eggleston signs a six-month guardianship; the children leave Nevada and, according to Eggleston, have remained away for years.
• District-Court Action
  • Eggleston sues under § 1983 for substantive and procedural due-process violations and for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED).
  • Petitioners move for summary judgment invoking qualified and discretionary-act immunity; motion denied.
  • They petition the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus.

Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

1. Mandamus Jurisdiction: The Court, per Chief Justice Herndon, exercises discretion to entertain the writ because post-trial appeal would not restore immunity—immunity is “from suit,” not merely from liability.
2. Qualified Immunity (Federal Claims):
   • Applying the two-step Saucier / Pearson framework, the Court holds Eggleston failed to show that, in 2015, clearly established law forbade a social worker from presenting an either-or choice between a voluntary guardianship and removal supported by statutory authority.
   • Consequently, Stuart is immune from substantive- and procedural-due-process claims.
3. Discretionary-Act Immunity (State Tort):
   • Under Martinez v. Maruszczak, the conduct involved discretionary judgment intertwined with child-protection policy; no showing of bad faith exists. IIED claim is barred.
4. Mandamus Issued: District court ordered to enter summary judgment for petitioners; stay dissolved.

Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) & Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996) — Established that qualified immunity is immunity from suit; interlocutory relief appropriate.
• United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) & Nevada’s own Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. 433 (2007) — Two-prong “discretionary-function” test adopted for state immunity.
• Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) & Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) — Two-step qualified-immunity methodology.
• Child-welfare cases used for “clearly established” inquiry:
  • Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006)
  • Sangraal v. San Francisco, 2013 WL 3187384 (N.D.Cal.)
  • Mabe v. San Bernardino Cty., 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001) and others contrasted to show factual distinctions.
• Nevada statutes: NRS 432B.340 (advising parents of potential removal) & NRS 432B.490 (petitioning for removal).

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Availability of Mandamus Review
   • Denying immunity forces officials to endure discovery & trial; that irreparably destroys the immunity benefit.
   • The Court aligns Nevada with federal circuits & other states that allow interlocutory review.
2. Qualified-Immunity Application
   • Step 1 – Constitutional Violation? Even assuming parental rights were infringed, the Court skips to Step 2 because it is dispositive.
   • Step 2 – Clearly Established?
     • No precedent in January 2015 unmistakably condemned giving a parent the choice between voluntary placement and court-ordered removal when statutory grounds existed.
     • Existing cases show liability only where removal occurred without adequate grounds, warrants, or exigency—circumstances absent here.
3. Discretionary-Act Immunity
   • Prong 1 – Judgment/Choice: Stuart exercised professional discretion in choosing among lawful child-safety options.
   • Prong 2 – Policy-Grounded: Decisions about child welfare squarely implicate the State’s policy to protect minors’ best interests; exposure to tort liability would chill decisive action.

4.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Procedural Impact: Creates a binding Nevada rule that writs of mandamus are the proper vehicle to challenge the denial of immunity-based summary-judgment motions. Expect uptick in pre-trial appellate practice.
• Substantive Impact – Child-Welfare Litigation:
  • Clarifies that as of 2015 (and likely today), social workers do not violate clearly established due-process norms by proposing voluntary guardianships backed by statutory authority.
  • Raises the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs to show “obvious” unconstitutionality when challenging CPS negotiations.
• Government-Employee Liability: Reinforces Nevada’s protective posture under NRS 41.032 for discretionary, policy-laden acts; could reduce settlement leverage for plaintiffs in similar suits.
• Legislative Signal: If broader procedural safeguards are desired for parents during “voluntary” placements, statutory amendments—not judicial expansion—will be necessary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity

Shields officials from being sued (not just from liability) unless they violated a right so clearly established that every reasonable official would have known the conduct was unlawful.

Discretionary-Act Immunity (Nevada)

Protects state employees from tort suits when (i) their acts involve personal judgment, and (ii) that judgment is rooted in social, economic, or political policy considerations—unless behaviour is done in bad faith.

Writ of Mandamus

An extraordinary appellate order directing a lower court to perform a required legal duty. Used here to review an interlocutory (non-final) order.

“Clearly Established” Law

Legal rule must be specific enough that any reasonable official, looking at the situation’s particular facts in real time, would know the act is unconstitutional.

Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Clark County v. District Court (Eggleston) forges two significant guideposts for Nevada jurisprudence:

1. Denials of qualified- or discretionary-act immunity are immediately reviewable by mandamus because the immunities protect against the burdens of litigation itself.
2. Within the child-protection context, a social worker’s ultimatum that a parent choose between voluntary temporary guardianship and statutorily supported removal does not, absent further egregious facts, breach clearly established constitutional or tort duties; thus qualified and discretionary-act immunities apply.

The ruling underscores the judiciary’s deference to the discretionary judgments of child-welfare professionals while preserving a narrow pathway for redress when conduct crosses into plainly unlawful territory. Future litigants must now clear a higher hurdle to strip social workers of immunity, and district courts must address such immunity questions at the earliest possible stage to avoid unnecessary trials.