Clarifying Trial Court’s Authority to Correct Invalid Sentences Before Finality

Introduction

State of Nebraska v. Keloni Jones, 318 Neb. 840 (2025), addresses a question of fundamental importance in criminal procedure: when and under what circumstances may a trial court modify a sentence it has already pronounced? The defendant, Keloni Jones, pleaded no contest to manslaughter (Class IIA felony) and possession of a deadly weapon during a felony (Class II felony). At sentencing the court inadvertently pronounced a manslaughter term of “20 to 20 years” imprisonment—a minimum equal to the maximum and contrary to Nebraska’s sentencing statutes—and then, within hours and before entry of any written order, recalled the parties and corrected the manslaughter sentence to “19 years 364 days to 20 years.”

On appeal, Jones contended that (1) the court lacked power to modify a validly pronounced sentence, (2) the doctrine of inadvertent mispronouncement did not apply to an otherwise valid sentence, and (3) her aggregate term approached the maximum and was thus excessive. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Cassel, affirmed. It held that because the original manslaughter sentence was invalid under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204(1), the court retained jurisdiction to correct it before final entry; and that all imprisonment terms were within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the district court’s corrected sentence. Key holdings:

An originally pronounced sentence containing an invalid minimum term is subject to correction by the sentencing court while it still retains jurisdiction.
The narrow doctrine of inadvertent mispronouncement applies only when a valid sentence is orally misstated but the court’s intended sentence was lawful and no written order has issued.
Precedent in State v. Davis (317 Neb. 59, 8 N.W.3d 247 (2024)) is expressly limited to the rare procedural posture of a postconviction court’s attempted resentencing after erroneously declaring an otherwise erroneous sentence void.
All terms imposed—19 years 364 days to 20 years for manslaughter, and 20 years to 20 years + 1 day for weapons possession, consecutive—fall within statutory ranges and were not clearly untenable or excessive.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

State v. Geller, ante p. 441, 16 N.W.3d 365 (2025): Confirms that a valid sentence, once in execution, cannot be modified by the trial court after pronouncement or after the judicial term ends, except under very limited mispronunciation circumstances.
State v. Lessley, 301 Neb. 734, 919 N.W.2d 884 (2018): Held that an invalid sentence (20–20 years for a Class II felony) may be corrected to include “+ 1 day” while the court retains jurisdiction.
State v. Shelby, 194 Neb. 445, 232 N.W.2d 23 (1975): Articulates the long-standing rule that an invalidly pronounced sentence is “of no effect” and may be replaced with a lawful one before finality.
State v. Davis, 317 Neb. 59, 8 N.W.3d 247 (2024): Addressed a unique postconviction scenario in which a court—having erroneously declared a sentence void—attempted to resentence without an appeal. The Jones court expressly limits Davis to its uncommon facts.

2. Legal Reasoning

Statutory Framework: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105(1) defines felony class ranges. Section 29-2204(1) requires that the court fix a minimum below the maximum or adopt the statutory minimum. A “20 to 20” term violates § 29-2204(1).
Valid vs. Invalid Sentences: A valid sentence takes immediate effect and cannot be modified once executed. An invalid sentence is “of no effect” and may be corrected by the sentencing court while it retains jurisdiction, up to final entry or before the appeal becomes final.
Mispronunciation Doctrine: Permits correction of a lawful sentence mis-stated orally if the defendant remains in court, no written order has issued, and no change in the intended sentence results. Here, the original minimum was unlawful, so inadvertent-mispronouncement principles did not alone resolve the issue.
Postconviction Limitation in Davis: The court clarifies that Davis applies only where (a) an invalid minimum went unchallenged through direct appeal, (b) a postconviction court incorrectly voids the term, (c) that ruling is unappealed, and (d) the postconviction court then resentences. Jones’s case involves direct correction by the sentencing court prior to final entry, not postconviction relief.
Abuse of Discretion—Excessiveness: The sentences imposed were within statutory limits (Class IIA: 0–20 years; Class II: 1–50 years) and the court considered all required factors (defendant’s age, background, criminal record, offense nature and violence). No “clearly untenable” or unfair rationale appears.

3. Impact

This decision provides practitioners and trial judges with clarity on three fronts:

Reaffirms that sentencing courts may correct an invalid sentence on the spot—by substituting a lawful minimum term—so long as jurisdiction has not lapsed.
Limits the reach of State v. Davis to its narrow fact pattern, cautioning courts against invoking that postconviction rule in ordinary sentencing corrections.
Confirms that appellate courts will not disturb within-limit sentences absent a clear abuse of discretion in applying sentencing factors or statutory principles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Valid vs. Invalid Sentence: A valid sentence conforms to statutory minimums and maximums. An invalid sentence—e.g., a minimum equal to the maximum when the law requires a lower minimum—can be fixed by the judge before the judgment is final.
Inadvertent Mispronouncement Doctrine: A narrow rule that allows a judge to orally correct a slip of the tongue when stating a lawful sentence, provided no written order has issued and the defendant has not yet left the courtroom.
Direct Appeal vs. Collateral Attack: Direct appeal challenges a sentence before it becomes final. Collateral attack (e.g., postconviction relief) seeks to overturn a sentence after finality. Only void judgments—those the court had no power to issue—are subject to collateral attack.
Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing: Sentencing judges weigh multiple factors (age, background, offense seriousness, prior record). An appellate court will uphold a sentence within the statutory range unless the judge’s reasoning is “clearly untenable” or denies a just result.

Conclusion

State v. Jones reaffirms the longstanding principle that a sentencing court retains authority to correct an invalidly pronounced sentence before final judgment. It underscores the distinction between a valid sentence—immune from later modification once executed—and an invalid sentence, which remains legally malleable until finalized. By expressly confining State v. Davis to its rare procedural posture, the Nebraska Supreme Court provides clarity to trial courts, parties, and appellate tribunals on the proper method and timing for correcting sentencing errors. Finally, the Court’s review of the discretionary factors confirms that lengthy sentences within statutory bounds will stand unless shown to be manifestly unreasonable.