Clarifying the Policy-Influencing Intent Requirement Under New York’s Crime of Terrorism Statute

1. Introduction

People v. Parker, 2025 NY Slip Op 02108 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t Apr. 10, 2025), arises from the violent aftermath of a protest in Albany following the murder of George Floyd. The People charged Dwight Parker with six counts, including attempted aggravated assault upon a police officer as a crime of terrorism under Penal Law § 490.25(1). After a jury verdict of guilt on all counts, County Court imposed an aggregate prison term of 20–24 years. Parker appealed, challenging (1) the sufficiency of evidence supporting the terrorism enhancement, (2) the admissibility of certain social‐media evidence, and (3) the severity of his aggregate sentence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division affirmed Parker’s convictions on counts 2 through 6 but reversed count 1 (terrorism enhancement) for legal insufficiency. The court held that although Parker used Molotov cocktails against police officers during a riot, he lacked the requisite intent “to influence the policy of a unit of government,” as distinguished from general animus or protest against perceived systemic misconduct. The panel vacated and dismissed count 1, reduced Parker’s determinate terms on counts 2 and 3 (attempted aggravated assault and attempted first‐degree assault) from 15 years to 10 years each (plus five years postrelease supervision), and directed that all sentences run concurrently.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

People v. Morales (20 NY3d 240 [2012]): Emphasized that “terrorism” must be construed narrowly, guided by seven enumerated historical acts (9/11, Oklahoma City, etc.) and requiring intent to influence government policy or affect government conduct by extreme means.
People v. Kaplan (168 AD3d 1229 [3d Dep’t 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1032 [2019]): Held that mere interference with police duties, absent specific policy‐influencing intent, does not qualify as a terrorism act.
People v. Richardson (167 AD3d 1064 [3d Dep’t 2018]): Reversed a terrorism enhancement where defendant’s violence aimed only to express anger, not to change a defined government policy.
People v. Jenner (39 AD3d 1083 [3d Dep’t 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 845 [2007]): Contrasted broad protest motives with the statutory requirement of targeting specific governmental policies.
People v. Madison (148 AD3d 1289 [3d Dep’t 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1130 [2017]): Procedural rule that sufficiency challenges must be preserved by appropriate pre-trial motion.
People v. DeBlasio (190 AD3d 595 [1st Dep’t 2021]): Discussed guideposts for terrorism charges in protest contexts.
Sentencing precedents including People v. Brisman (2025 NY Slip Op 00123 [Ct. App.]) and People v. Harris (206 AD3d 1454 [3d Dep’t 2022]) on interest-of-justice reductions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court first reiterated the elements of the crime of terrorism enhancement: (1) commission of a “specified offense” (here, attempted aggravated assault against an officer), and (2) intent “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping” (Penal Law §§ 490.25[1], 490.05[3][a]). While Parker admitted—on video and in interview—to throwing two Molotov cocktails at uniformed officers, the Appellate Division found no proof that he intended to influence any identifiable government policy. Parker’s social-media posts and interview statements expressed general anger at “police brutality” and a desire for “change,” but never identified a particular policy objective or mechanism by which his actions would coerce a defined governmental measure.

Relying on Morales and Kaplan, the court emphasized that "'policy' . . . is a standard course of action officially established by a government unit" and that violence aimed merely at venting frustration or obstructing law enforcement duties falls outside the terrorism statute’s scope. Consequently, the terrorism count was vacated for failing to meet the specific policy‐influencing intent requirement.

3.3 Impact

This decision clarifies and limits the reach of New York’s crime of terrorism statute in protest-related violence. Prosecutors must now plead and prove a demonstrable nexus between a defendant’s violent act and a defined governmental policy they seek to change or coerce. Ordinary riotous violence—even if directed at police—cannot be elevated to a terrorism offense unless accompanied by articulable policy objectives. Going forward, charging decisions and jury instructions will need to address this heightened mens rea requirement, protecting the terrorism label from overbroad application and preserving the statute’s unique historical and moral gravity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Crime of Terrorism Enhancement (Penal Law § 490.25): Elevates an underlying felony by one class if committed with the specific intent to influence policy or coerce a population.
Specified Offense: In Parker’s case, attempted aggravated assault on a police officer (PL § 120.11).
Policy: An officially adopted course of action (e.g., a written regulation, statute, or executive directive).
Molineux Evidence: Prior bad acts or uncharged misconduct offered to prove motive or intent, normally requiring a balancing test; here, social media posts were deemed directly relevant to intent and identity, not uncharged misconduct.
Interest of Justice Reduction (CPL 470.15[6][b]): Appellate power to modify an otherwise lawful but excessively harsh sentence.

5. Conclusion

People v. Parker establishes a critical check on the application of New York’s terrorism statute: a defendant’s violent act must be undertaken with the express aim of influencing a specific government policy or coercing government action as defined by the statute’s guideposts. Generalized protest violence—even directed at uniformed officers—does not suffice. This ruling preserves meaningful distinctions between felony assault, riot, arson, criminal mischief, and the uniquely grave label of terrorism. It thereby ensures that New York’s anti-terrorism law remains focused on truly extraordinary threats to governmental order and public safety.