Clarifying the Evidentiary Threshold for “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Post-Wilkinson
Commentary on Luis Tubon Guangatal v. Attorney General (3d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

The Third Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Luis Tubon Guangatal v. Attorney General delivers a timely post-Wilkinson v. Garland application of judicial review over hardship determinations in cancellation-of-removal proceedings. Although designated “Not Precedential,” the decision provides a concrete roadmap for immigration practitioners on (i) how the hardship inquiry is now reviewable, (ii) what quantum and quality of proof is required, and (iii) the limited circumstances in which courts will disturb agency findings made under the demanding “substantial evidence” standard.

Parties: Petitioners—Luis Gonzalo Tubon Guangatal and his spouse, Maria Josefina Iza Chadan, undocumented Ecuadorian nationals; Respondent—Attorney General of the United States. Key Issue: Whether the couple showed that the removal of their family would inflict “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on their 7-year-old U.S.-citizen son, J.A.T.I., primarily because of alleged medical and educational difficulties in Ecuador.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied cancellation of removal on the ground that the evidence did not prove the requisite hardship to the child. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily affirmed. On petition for review, the Third Circuit:

• Confirmed that—after the 2024 Supreme Court decision in Wilkinson v. Garland—federal courts have jurisdiction to review mixed questions of law and fact arising from hardship determinations (8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D)).
• Applied the “substantial evidence” standard and held that no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion on hardship.
• Rejected challenges to the IJ’s treatment of sister-authored letters concerning Ecuadorian medical care as unreviewable factual weighing.
• Therefore denied the petition and left the removal order intact.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024) — Pivotal precedent holding that a hardship finding under §1229b(b)(1)(D) is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact. The Third Circuit treats the present case as a first substantive application of Wilkinson within the Circuit.
• Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020) — Foundation for jurisdiction over mixed questions in immigration appeals; cited in Wilkinson and here.
• Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020) — Source of the “any reasonable adjudicator” articulation of the substantial-evidence test.
• In re Monreal-Agundia, 23 I.&N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) — Classic BIA precedent defining “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
• Third Circuit Posture Case: Wilkinson v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 131 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2025) (on remand from SCOTUS), which clarifies Circuit-level application of Wilkinson v. Garland.
• Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. 2012) and Huang v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010) — Confirming that the agency need not discuss every item of evidence if the record shows consideration as a whole.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in two concentric layers:

1. Threshold Jurisdiction: Relying on Wilkinson v. Garland, the panel states that hardship determinations are judicially reviewable to the extent they involve a mixed question. However, pure fact-finding (e.g., credibility, seriousness of medical conditions, financial means) remains insulated.
2. Substantial-Evidence Review: The Court then assesses whether the IJ’s findings are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” Key points:
   • Medical Care: Ecuador operates a national health-care system; petitioners provided no credible, corroborated evidence that adequate asthma or orthotics treatment would be unavailable or unaffordable.
   • Financial Prospects: Petitioners own a home, hold assets, and have historically earned livelihoods in depressed economies. The IJ found assertions of destitution speculative.
   • Educational Adjustment: Child is bilingual; no showing that comparable schooling could not be obtained.
   • Mental Health Claim: Unsupported—medical and school records silent; no counseling sought.
   Because substantial evidence supports each sub-finding, the cumulative hardship conclusion survives.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

Even as a non-precedential opinion, the case offers persuasive guidance within and beyond the Third Circuit:

• Post-Wilkinson Template: Courts will now articulate the two-step approach—(1) jurisdiction to review; (2) deference in result—preserving agency primacy while ensuring legal questions are answerable.
• Evidentiary Burden Heightened: Uncorroborated anecdotal statements about foreign medical systems will rarely suffice. Objective evidence—official health-care data, expert opinions, or documentary proof of cost/availability—will be indispensable.
• Scope of Review Demarcated: Litigants must frame arguments as legal or mixed questions; mere disagreements over credibility or factual weight will not pierce the §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bar.
• Strategic Filing: Practitioners may seek cancellation in removal but must amass extensive, country-specific materials at the IJ stage—once in federal court, supplementation is impossible.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cancellation of Removal (COR): A discretionary form of relief allowing certain long-term, non-permanent residents to remain in the U.S. if they meet four statutory requirements—including the heightened hardship standard at issue.
• “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship”: The highest hardship threshold in immigration law (short of torture or persecution). It demands proof that the U.S. citizen or lawful resident relative will suffer hardship far above that normally expected from deportation.
• Substantial-Evidence Standard: A deferential lens—reviewing court affirms agency findings unless no reasonable fact-finder could agree. Not a “clear-error” or “de novo” review.
• Mixed Question of Law and Fact: An issue requiring the application of a legal standard to established facts (e.g., whether proven facts amount to “exceptional hardship”). Such questions are reviewable after Wilkinson.

5. Conclusion

Luis Tubon Guangatal crystallizes the post-Wilkinson landscape: Courts may entertain challenges to the legal sufficiency of hardship analysis, but they will rarely overturn an IJ’s adverse finding absent robust, corroborated evidence. Practitioners must therefore build a meticulous factual record at the agency level. The decision underscores the continuing vitality of the substantial-evidence doctrine, demarcates the boundary between reviewable and unreviewable issues, and sets an evidentiary benchmark for future COR applicants invoking medical, financial, or educational hardship to minor U.S.-citizen children.