Clarifying the 'Copy of the Ordinance' Requirement for Municipal Income Tax Levy Ballots in Ohio

I. Introduction

The case THE STATE EX REL. CITY OF NEW CARLISLE v. CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS (2025 Ohio 814) tackles a critical issue in municipal election law concerning the procedural requirements for placing a municipal income tax levy on the ballot. Central to this case is the interpretation of the statutory phrase “a copy of the ordinance” as provided in R.C. 718.04(C)(2), specifically whether the city council must have already passed an ordinance enacting an income tax increase or whether submission of a proposed ordinance is sufficient.

The parties involved in this litigation are the City of New Carlisle, acting as the relator seeking an expedited election remedy, and the Clark County Board of Elections, the respondent charged with initially refusing to place the income-tax levy on the ballot. At issue is the interpretation of municipal procedure for a tax levy that exceeds one percent, in this instance a 1.5 percent municipal income tax increase designated for funding police expenses.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Ohio Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the Clark County Board of Elections' decision by granting a writ of mandamus ordering the board to place the income-tax levy on the May 6, 2025 primary-and-special-election ballot. The Court clarified that under R.C. 718.04(C)(2), the submission requirement “a copy of the ordinance” refers to the proposed ordinance that will be presented to the voters for approval. It held that the city is not required to enact or pass the ordinance prior to its submission for ballot placement. The decision was reached after dismissing the claim against respondent Baker, while holding the board responsible for its misinterpretation of the statute.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Court’s decision references several notable precedents and statutory interpretations:

State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, which sets out the elements required for establishing a mandate for relief, including a clear legal right, an unequivocal duty, and the absence of an adequate alternative remedy.
State ex rel. Clark v. Twinsburg, emphasizing that the lack of adequate relief through conventional channels (especially when an election is imminent) may justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
State ex rel. Mann v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, underlining the necessity to determine whether an agency has abused its discretion or clearly disregarded statutory requirements.
The Court also references general interpretive principles derived from cases such as Total Renal Care, Inc. v. Harris and State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, which advocate for reading statutory language in context and according to common usage.

These precedents reinforced the principle that statutory language must be interpreted by considering the legislative scheme as a whole and that requirements imposed for public approval processes should not be redundant to the underlying democratic mechanism.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning pivots substantially on the plain language of R.C. 718.04(C)(2). With careful exegesis, the Court noted:

The statute mandates that “a copy of the ordinance” be filed with the board of elections along with a resolution specifying the election date. The emphasis on the wording is central—since the ballot language also invokes “the ordinance,” it signifies that the document forwarded to voters is meant to be the instrument of their approval.
The Court rejected the board's interpretation that would require an already enacted ordinance, noting that such a construction is inconsistent with the inherent requirement that any municipal tax increase in excess of one percent must be approved directly by the electorate.
In addressing the board’s reliance on analogous provisions from other statutes (such as R.C. 715.84 and references to constitutional requirements regarding ordinances), the Court clarified that those instances involve ordinances that already possess the force of law upon enactment, a context distinctly different from the tax levy process dictated by R.C. 718.04(C)(2).
Finally, the Court addressed the argument concerning the absence of the word “proposed” in the statutory language. It held that the absence is immaterial in light of the context – since the ordinance at issue, by its very nature, is proposed and subject to voter approval.

By eliminating the board's obfuscatory reading and reaffirming the statute’s plain language, the Court underscored that a municipality’s legislative authority does not have to pass the proposed ordinance before submitting it to the board; rather, it is the voters who ultimately enact the ordinance.

C. Impact on Future Cases and the Area of Law

The decision is poised to have significant ramifications in both municipal election law and the broader realm of statutory interpretation:

Municipal corporations in Ohio now have clarified guidance: they may submit a proposed ordinance alongside a resolution to have a municipal income tax levy placed on the ballot without first enacting the ordinance. This reinforces the primacy of voter approval in matters designated by statutory thresholds.
The decision may serve as persuasive authority for future cases where the interpretation of procedural language in election statutes is at issue, thereby reducing administrative barriers that can delay or impede timely electoral decisions.
The ruling streamlines the process for municipalities seeking to implement tax increases for specific purposes, such as funding for public safety, thereby promoting efficiency and responsiveness in local governance.
Finally, it underscores the willingness of Ohio courts to issue mandamus relief in expedited election contexts, setting a precedent for when immediate judicial intervention is justified due to an impending election deadline.

D. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts within this judgment can be simplified for enhanced understanding:

Mandamus: This is a court order compelling a government official or body to perform a duty that they are legally obligated to complete. In this case, the court orders the board to place the tax levy on the ballot.
“Copy of the Ordinance”: The statute’s language refers to the document being presented to voters. The Court clarified that this does not require a finalized, enacted ordinance, but rather a proposed one that the voters will approve or reject.
Statutory Interpretation: The court uses standard rules of interpretation which require reading the statute as a cohesive whole, considering both the plain language and the legislative intent behind the law.
Separation of Roles: Municipal legislative authorities create proposals (ordinances), but it is ultimately the electorate’s role to decide whether such proposals should become law – a process vital for maintaining democratic legitimacy.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in THE STATE EX REL. CITY OF NEW CARLISLE v. CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS represents a significant development in municipal election law. By affirming that “a copy of the ordinance” under R.C. 718.04(C)(2) means the proposed ordinance submitted for voter approval, the Court has clarified a longstanding ambiguity and reinforced the primacy of the electorate in approving municipal tax increases.

The ruling not only rectifies the procedural misstep by the Clark County Board of Elections but also sets a clear precedent for how similar cases will be treated in the future. Municipal corporations now have a more transparent and accessible process for raising necessary revenues while upholding constitutional and statutory mandates that protect democratic participation in governmental actions.

This decision underscores the balance between administrative procedure and voter sovereignty, ensuring that the power to enact local tax measures rests directly in the hands of the citizens.