Clarifying the “Sole Cause” Standard in Workers’ Compensation: Intoxication and Course-of-Employment under WCL §10(1) & §21(4)

1. Introduction

Matter of Ferra v. Paramount Global (2025 NYSlipOp 01847) was decided March 27, 2025, by the Appellate Division, Third Department of the New York Supreme Court. The dispute arose when Jorge Ferra, a traveling sound engineer employed by Paramount Global, was injured after his vehicle was struck from behind while he was parked at the scene of a prior “bumper-to-bumper” collision. A post-accident toxicology screen revealed he was legally intoxicated (BAC .18). His employer and its carrier denied liability under Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) §10(1), arguing either that no compensable accident occurred because Ferra deviated from his employment or that intoxication was the “sole cause” of his injuries. The Workers’ Compensation Board disagreed, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

Key Parties:

Claimant: Jorge Ferra, sound engineer
Employer/Appellants: Paramount Global and its workers’ compensation carrier
Respondent: Workers’ Compensation Board

Core Legal Issue: Whether an employee’s intoxication can be deemed the “sole cause” of a compensable on-the-job accident or, alternatively, whether driving while intoxicated constitutes a per se deviation from employment that negates coverage.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s award of benefits. It held:

Under WCL §10(1), a worker is entitled to no-fault compensation for injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment,” except where the injury is “solely occasioned by intoxication.”
WCL §21(4) creates a rebuttable presumption that intoxication was not the sole cause of an on-duty injury. The employer carries the “heavy burden” of proving to the contrary.
Ferra’s intoxication, though legally excessive, was not the sole cause of the crash that injured him; the third driver’s conduct also contributed.
An employee’s intoxicated driving does not automatically constitute a deviation from employment that eliminates coverage absent proof that intoxication alone caused the harm.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Matter of Post v. Tennessee Prods. & Chem. Corp. (19 AD2d 484 [3d Dept. 1963], aff’d 14 NY2d 796 [1964]): Established that an employer must show intoxication was the “sole cause” before relief from liability.
Matter of Lujan-Espinzo v. Electrical Illuminations by Arnold, Inc. (231 AD3d 1252 [3d Dept. 2024]): Reaffirmed the presumption in WCL §21(4) and the employer’s heavy burden.
Shannon v. American Can Co. (278 App Div 546 [3d Dept. 1951]): Held that drinking on the job or driving while intoxicated does not itself create a non-work-related deviation unless intoxication alone caused the injury.
Matter of Pernice v. Harlan Elec. Co. (217 AD3d 1027 [3d Dept. 2023]): Confirmed that intoxicated driving even as a predominant factor remains compensable absent sole-cause proof.
Additional Third Department decisions, e.g., Villapol, Milz, Rosebrook, reconfirmed that contributory or intervening third-party conduct precludes a finding of “sole cause.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Statutory Presumptions: WCL §10(1) provides broad no-fault coverage for job-related injuries. A statutory carve-out denies coverage only when the injury is “solely occasioned by intoxication.” WCL §21(4) then presumes intoxication was not the sole cause, shifting to the employer the burden of proof to establish sole causation.

Burden and Inferences: The Court emphasized that the Board’s factual findings and credibility assessments are entitled to great deference. Here, substantial evidence showed that at the moment of the second crash:

Ferra was lawfully parked and engaged in a work-related task (documenting the prior collision).
There was no evidence of intoxication-induced misconduct (e.g., walking into traffic or failing to move off the highway).
The third vehicle’s negligent rear impact was an independent, contributing cause.

Because reasonable inferences supported that intoxication was only one factor, the carrier failed to rebut the presumption.

Course-of-Employment/Deviation Doctrine: The carrier’s alternative theory—that any intoxicated driving automatically constitutes a deviation—was rejected. The Court reasoned that accepting such a rule would nullify the clear statutory design: the WCL guarantees coverage for on-duty accidents unless intoxication is the sole cause.

3.3 Impact

This decision reinforces and clarifies several critical points:

Intoxicated employees retain coverage for job-related injuries unless the employer proves intoxication alone caused the accident.
Employers and carriers must marshal clear, unequivocal evidence that no other factor contributed.
Employee deviation or misconduct defenses cannot bypass the sole-cause presumption in §21(4).
Courts will continue to defer to Board credibility determinations and draw reasonable inferences favorable to claimants when evidence is contested.

In practice, carriers will have to investigate and document alternative causative factors (road conditions, third-party negligence) much more rigorously when intoxication is present.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Rebuttable Presumption”: A legal shortcut that assumes intoxication was not the sole cause of an injury, unless the employer proves otherwise.
“Sole Cause” Standard: The injury must have occurred only because the worker was intoxicated. If any other factor contributed even slightly, coverage stands.
“Course of Employment”: The employee’s activity must be part of his assigned work duties or reasonably incidental to work travel.
“Deviation from Employment”: A departure into purely personal activities. Mere wrongdoing (e.g., DUI) does not automatically constitute a deviation unless it alone causes the accident.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Ferra v. Paramount Global cements the principle that an intoxicated on-duty employee is nevertheless entitled to workers’ compensation benefits unless the employer meets its “heavy burden” to show intoxication was the only cause of the injury. It rejects any categorical rule that intoxicated driving is itself a non-work activity or deviation. By upholding the statutory presumptions in WCL §§10(1) and 21(4) and deferring to Board findings, the decision preserves broad coverage for workplace injuries and clarifies the rigorous sole-cause standard carriers must satisfy when intoxication is at issue.