Clarifying the “Conscience-Shocking” Standard in State-Created Danger Claims: Sixth Circuit’s Ossege v. Oxford Community School District

Introduction

In Kylie Ossege v. Oxford Community School District (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025), a panel of the Sixth Circuit confronted a consolidated array of civil‐rights suits brought by victims and families of the tragic November 30, 2021 Oxford High School shooting. Plaintiffs sued two school officials—a counselor (Shawn Hopkins) and the dean of students (Nicholas Ejak)—under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, invoking the “state‐created danger” doctrine. They claimed that certain affirmative acts and omissions by Hopkins and Ejak increased the risk posed by the shooter, who was a fellow student, and therefore deprived the victims of life and security without due process. The core legal question: do warnings, parental demands, and a return of the shooter’s backpack rise to the level of “conscience-shocking” due process violations? The Sixth Circuit answered “no,” affirming dismissal of all claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). With one narrow exception, the court held that neither the return of the shooter’s backpack nor the alleged concealment of danger by school officials constituted affirmative state action sufficient to trigger due‐process liability. It further held that the one arguably affirmative act—a threat by the school counselor to involve Child Protective Services unless the shooter’s parents secured counseling for him within 48 hours—was aimed at risk reduction, not risk creation, and fell far short of “shocking the conscience.” Accordingly, all state‐created danger claims were dismissed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Doe v. Jackson Local School District, 954 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2020)
— Recognized that not every negligent omission by a school official constitutes a due process violation; only affirmative conduct that “shocks the conscience.”
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)
— Established the “conscience-shocking” standard for executive‐action due process claims.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
— Held that the Due Process Clause generally does not require government to protect individuals from private violence unless the state itself creates or increases the danger.
McQueen v. Beecher Community Schools, 433 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2006)
— Outlined the three elements of a “state‐created danger” claim: (1) an affirmative act creating or increasing risk; (2) a special danger to a specific victim; (3) conscience‐shocking conduct.
Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger County, 819 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2016)
— Emphasized that nondisclosure (omission) is typically not an actionable “affirmative act.”

2. Legal Reasoning

The court first confirmed that Rule 12(c) dismissal requires the complaint to plead facts that, taken as true, plausibly state a due process violation. Under qualified immunity, plaintiffs must show (a) a constitutional violation and (b) clearly established law at the time. Here, they invoked the “state‐created danger” exception to the general rule that the state has no constitutional duty to protect individuals from private violence.

Applying Sixth Circuit precedent, the court examined three elements:

Affirmative Act: Did Hopkins or Ejak do anything to place the victims in greater danger?
– The return of the backpack was neutral; it restored the shooter to precisely the same physical condition (backpack plus gun) he had before the meeting.
– “Concealment” allegations were omissions, not overt conduct, and unsupported by facts suggesting any intentional cover‐up.
Special Danger: Even if a risk existed, was it targeted and greater than that faced by the public generally? Plaintiffs failed to isolate a danger specific to them created by the officials.
Conscience-Shocking Conduct: Did the officials’ act or omission display a level of culpability “so outrageous, and so callous,” that it violated the Due Process Clause?
– The lone arguably affirmative act was Hopkins’s warning to the parents that he would call Child Protective Services if they did not obtain counseling for their son within 48 hours.
– The panel held this demand was directed at getting help, not at exposing or creating risk. It served a legitimate governmental purpose—to protect a potentially suicidal teenager—and thus could not “shock the contemporary conscience.”

3. Impact on Future Cases

Ossege sharpens the boundaries of the “state‐created danger” doctrine in the school setting. It confirms that:

Basic parental calls or threats of mandated reports, made to secure mental‐health intervention, are not so extreme as to trigger constitutional liability.
Returning personal effects to a student—even with knowledge of suspicious behavior—does not alone constitute an affirmative act that increases risk.
Pure omissions or failures to inform colleagues, absent intentional concealment, remain non-actionable under Due Process.

Going forward, plaintiffs must allege truly egregious affirmative conduct—beyond policy enforcement, reporting threats, or neutral hand‐offs—to meet the “conscience-shocking” threshold.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Due Process Clause (Fourteenth Amendment): Protects individuals from deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the state without legal process.
State-Created Danger Doctrine: A narrow exception that can impose liability when government actors create or worsen safety risks from private parties.
Affirmative Act: An overt, positive action by a state official that exposes someone to new or greater danger.
Conscience-Shocking Standard: The level of government misconduct necessary for a substantive due process violation—extreme, outrageous, and intentional or recklessly indifferent to rights.
Qualified Immunity: Shields government officials from civil liability unless they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Conclusion

Ossege v. Oxford Community School District reinforces that mere negligence or routine school‐safety measures—even imperfect ones—do not rise to constitutional violations under the state‐created danger doctrine. By affirming dismissal, the Sixth Circuit underscored that only state acts so egregious they “shock the contemporary conscience” will sustain due process claims against educators and counselors. This decision will guide lower courts and school districts in evaluating future claims, ensuring that constitutional litigation does not supplant traditional tort remedies where no truly conscience-shocking conduct occurred.