Clarifying the “Compelling Reason” Standard for Psychological Examinations of Complainants

1. Introduction

In People of the State of Michigan v. Jason Lee Fedewa (Sup. Ct. Mich., May 9, 2025), the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal a Court of Appeals decision upholding a trial court’s refusal to compel a complainant to undergo a formal psychological evaluation. The defendant, charged with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct against his 13-year-old child (identified as “AF”), sought an order requiring AF to submit to an MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) test to probe possible personality deficits that might affect credibility. The trial court declined, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court majority refused to review. Chief Justice Cavanagh dissented, arguing that the case presented an ideal vehicle to refine what constitutes a “compelling reason” under People v. Freeman and People v. Graham for compelling a psychological exam of a complainant.

Key issues:

Whether a defendant must “adequately demonstrate the need” for a psychological examination of the complaining witness.
What level of factual support (e.g., a treating doctor’s note indicating “strong deficits”) suffices as a “compelling reason.”
How cross-examination rights and privacy interests of minors factor into the discovery balance.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, by order dated May 9, 2025, denied the application for leave to appeal. The majority concluded it was not persuaded that the Court of Appeals’ decision warranted review. The lower courts had applied a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard in denying the motion to compel AF’s MMPI testing. They held that generalized or speculative allegations about personality defects do not meet the “compelling reason” threshold and that cross-examination was sufficient to test credibility.

In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Cavanagh argued:

The doctor’s note here was materially more concrete than the “unsupported” assertions rejected in Freeman (1979) and Graham (1988).
Defendant’s request was not a “roving fishing expedition” but a targeted test suggested by a treating professional.
Without clear guidance on what constitutes “compelling reason,” lower courts lack direction, and legitimate requests for credibility-related testing may be unjustly denied.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

People v. Freeman (After Remand), 406 Mich 514 (1979): Established that a defendant must “adequately demonstrate the need for the discovery” and that “amorphous contentions” (e.g., “highly nervous” or intellectually disabled) are insufficient to compel a psychological exam of a complaining witness.
People v. Graham, 173 Mich App 473 (1988): Introduced the requirement of a “compelling reason” for ordering psychological testing of a victim or witness. The Court of Appeals held that allegations—such as accusing a parent of alcoholism—without greater factual foundation do not justify an exam, and that credibility concerns can be explored through cross-examination.
People v. Shahideh, 277 Mich App 111 (2007), rev’d on other grounds 482 Mich 1156 (2008): Confirmed the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing trial courts’ decisions on psychiatric or psychological exams.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Courts Below

• Trial Court: The bare doctor’s note—recommending “a full battery of psychological and neuropsychological tests” based on “strong deficits”—did not justify compelling AF to undergo MMPI testing. Cross-examination was deemed adequate to challenge credibility.

• Court of Appeals: Acknowledged the note was “more compelling” than the unsupported allegations in Freeman and Graham but held that without a direct link to credibility or specific hypothesis about the test results, the request amounted to an impermissible “fishing expedition.”

• Supreme Court Majority: Declined to review, signaling satisfaction with the lower courts’ application of Freeman and Graham without offering additional guidance.

3.3 Impact of the Dissent and Potential Future Influence

Chief Justice Cavanagh’s dissent spotlights a persistent ambiguity in Michigan discovery law: what factual showing will persuade a court to order a psychological exam of a complaining witness, particularly a minor? Trial judges, defense lawyers, and prosecutors now face continued uncertainty:

Defense counsel may be reluctant to bring motions absent still more detailed expert affidavits.
Trial courts may continue to apply Freeman and Graham narrowly, denying exams even where credible professional concerns exist.
Prosecutors may worry about chilling legitimate defense inquiries into witness veracity.

Unless the Supreme Court revisits the issue, there will be no clear benchmark for what constitutes a “compelling reason” or “adequate demonstration” of the need for psychological testing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Compelling Reason” Standard: A legal threshold requiring the defendant to show a strong, specific factual basis—beyond mere speculation—for why a court should order a psychological examination of a witness. It protects witnesses’ privacy while ensuring fair trial rights.
MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory): A widely used psychological test that evaluates personality traits and psychopathology. It can reveal symptoms of depression, anxiety, personality disorders, and other mental health issues.
Abuse of Discretion: A deferential appellate review standard. A trial court’s discovery decision will be upheld unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
Fishing Expedition: A request for broad or undefined information in discovery, often based on little or no specific evidence. Courts disfavor such requests to prevent unwarranted invasions of privacy and to limit unnecessary delays.

5. Conclusion

People v. Fedewa underscores an enduring tension between a defendant’s right to test a witness’s credibility via psychological evidence and the need to protect witnesses—especially minors—from invasive or speculative discovery. The denial of leave to appeal leaves Michigan’s “compelling reason” standard for psychological testing unresolved. Chief Justice Cavanagh’s dissent calls for the Supreme Court to articulate clear guidance on:

What factual showings suffice to ground a motion for psychological examination.
How courts should weigh privacy interests, the probative value of testing, and fairness to the defense.

Until that guidance arrives, practitioners must navigate Freeman and Graham without a definitive benchmark, and trial courts will continue to exercise broad discretion in making difficult determinations on witness-examination motions.