Clarifying Sufficiency Review and Immediate Post‑Invocation Interrogation in Arkansas: Commentary on Reggie Matthews v. State

Clarifying Sufficiency Review and Immediate Post‑Invocation Interrogation in Arkansas: Commentary on Reggie Matthews v. State, 2025 Ark. 213

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Arkansas’s decision in Reggie Matthews v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 213, is a significant opinion for at least two reasons:

  1. It reaffirms and applies Arkansas’s demanding standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in capital cases, while a separate concurrence emphasizes the precise formulation of that standard.
  2. It clarifies the operation of Miranda/Edwards protections when a suspect invokes the right to counsel but almost immediately reinitiates conversation and agrees to answer questions.

The case arises from the capital-murder conviction of Reggie Matthews for the shooting death of Tiana Robinson at a crowded barbecue in Osceola, Arkansas. The relationship between Matthews and Robinson was marked by escalating domestic abuse, threats, and stalking behavior, culminating in a public killing witnessed by multiple bystanders.

On appeal, Matthews raised four principal claims:

  1. Insufficient evidence of capital murder (both as to premeditation/deliberation and, on appeal, identity).
  2. Violation of his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona and Edwards v. Arizona, based on the admission of statements made after he had invoked counsel.
  3. Entitlement to a mistrial when an officer, while narrating body-camera footage, blurted out that a bystander had identified Matthews as the shooter, allegedly in violation of a pretrial order.
  4. Violation of the “best-evidence” rule (Arkansas Rule of Evidence 1002) when an officer testified about what was said during a recorded interrogation whose audio quality was poor.

The court (per Associate Justice Bronni) rejected each contention and affirmed the conviction and sentence of life without parole. Chief Justice Karen R. Baker, joined by Justice Webb, concurred separately to underscore Arkansas’s specific formulation of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

The opinion details a pattern of escalating domestic violence and threats:

  • September 2022: Police intervened in a loud argument about Matthews’s refusal to return a key to Robinson’s house.
  • May 2023: Police responded when Matthews refused to leave a party Robinson hosted; he left only after being warned he could be arrested for criminal trespass.
  • August 2023 (approx. one month before the murder): Robinson called 911 and reported that Matthews, present and armed, was threatening to kill her. The operator overheard Matthews making threats; he fled before officers arrived.
  • Two weeks before the murder: Robinson filed an affidavit with the Osceola Police Department, emotionally distraught and expressing fear for her life. Her roommate testified that Robinson was living in fear during this period.
  • Two days before the murder: Matthews was seen driving around Robinson’s home. She again called police, stated she feared for her safety, and officers warned Matthews (after a traffic stop) about his prowling behavior.

On the night of September 6, 2023, Robinson attended a barbecue in Osceola. A neighbor’s doorbell camera showed Matthews arriving, parking around the corner, and lurking behind a truck. Four eyewitnesses testified that:

  • Matthews made a “beeline” toward Robinson.
  • Robinson tried to flee; Matthews chased her, bumping into one witness.
  • Matthews tried to grab Robinson, then opened fire, shooting her five times in the back.
  • After she collapsed, Matthews stood over and taunted her as she lay dying.

Matthews fled the scene. Robinson died there.

After his arrest, Matthews was advised of his rights. He initially stated that he did not want to answer questions without a lawyer. The officers acknowledged this invocation, but Matthews then immediately interjected that he would answer questions and proceeded to make recorded statements expressing remorse (especially with reference to Robinson’s children), wishing he could “go back in time,” and blaming the police for Robinson’s death. The audio quality of this recording was poor.

At trial:

  • Four eyewitnesses identified Matthews as the shooter and described the killing.
  • Matthews’s recorded custodial statements were admitted over his objection that they violated his right to counsel.
  • Police body-camera video from the murder scene was shown to the jury, but, pursuant to a pretrial order, without its original audio; instead, an officer narrated the footage.
  • During this narration, the officer blurted out that a bystander had told him Matthews was the shooter. The defense moved for a mistrial; the court denied the motion but gave a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard the remark.

At the close of the State’s case and again after all evidence, Matthews moved for a directed verdict, arguing inadequacy of the evidence to show premeditation and deliberation. He did not argue insufficiency as to identity. The court denied the motions, the jury convicted him of capital murder, and he received life without parole.

B. Holdings

  1. Sufficiency of the Evidence:
    • There was substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation, based on the manner of the killing (targeting the victim, chasing her, shooting her five times in the back).
    • The appellate court refused to consider Matthews’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the killer because that specific ground had not been raised in his directed-verdict motion, and thus was not preserved under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1.
  2. Post‑Invocation Statements:
    • While an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda/Edwards ordinarily prohibits further police-initiated questioning, an exception applies when the accused himself “initiates further communication” and expresses willingness to talk.
    • Because Matthews, immediately after invoking counsel and after the officers acknowledged that invocation, interjected and volunteered that he would answer questions, he initiated further conversation and validly waived his right to counsel. His statements were admissible.
  3. Mistrial Request:
    • An unsolicited comment by a witness that violated a pretrial limitation is ordinarily remediable by a curative instruction.
    • A mistrial is appropriate only when no lesser remedy, such as a curative instruction, could remove the prejudice.
    • Given that four eyewitnesses directly identified Matthews as the shooter, the officer’s stray remark that a bystander had said the same thing was cumulative and not so prejudicial that a mistrial was required. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion.
  4. Best‑Evidence Rule / Interrogation Recording:
    • The best-evidence rule (Ark. R. Evid. 1002) applies when a party seeks to prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph without producing it.
    • Here, the State actually played the interrogation recording for the jury (the “best evidence”), and an officer merely testified to clarify and explain portions difficult to hear. That is not a violation of Rule 1002.
    • To the extent Matthews’s real concern was hearsay, the officer’s repetition of Matthews’s out-of-court statements was admissible as statements of a party-opponent under Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).

C. The Concurrence

Chief Justice Baker concurred in the result but wrote separately to stress that the majority’s description of the sufficiency standard was incomplete. The majority recited that on sufficiency review, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and does not reweigh evidence or substitute its own judgment for the jury’s, citing Jackson v. Virginia.

Baker emphasized that Arkansas precedent for more than forty years has consistently added a key limitation: in sufficiency review, the appellate court considers only the evidence that supports the verdict; contrary evidence is disregarded. She cited a long line of Arkansas cases reaffirming that formulation and cautioned against even casual omission of this element, lest it generate doctrinal confusion.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Jackson v. Virginia and Arkansas’s Sufficiency Standard

The majority anchored its sufficiency review in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court’s foundational habeas corpus decision. Jackson held that a state conviction violates due process if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard is now widely used in both federal and state sufficiency analyses.

The majority quoted Jackson for the proposition that on sufficiency review, the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and does not reweigh evidence or substitute its own view for the jury’s. It supplemented that by invoking Arkansas cases:

  • Jones v. State, 269 Ark. 119, 598 S.W.2d 748 (1980), which first adopted the “substantial evidence” standard in the wake of Jackson.
  • McDaniels v. State, 2025 Ark. 139, 720 S.W.3d 82, which:
    • Reaffirmed the use of “substantial evidence” as the operative sufficiency test; and
    • Discussed preservation requirements under Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1—particularly important here given Matthews’s failure to preserve his identity-based sufficiency challenge.

Chief Justice Baker, in concurrence, cites additional Arkansas cases (e.g., Brown v. State, Clevenger v. State, Wofford v. State, Cone v. State, Meadows v. State, Zachary, Reinert, Williams, Edwards, and Hervey) to demonstrate that Arkansas’s version of the Jackson test has long included the rule that the court considers only the evidence supporting the verdict, ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Her concern is to ensure continuity and clarity in this doctrinal point.

2. Stout v. State and McDaniels v. State on Premeditation and Deliberation

On the mental state requirement for capital murder—premeditation and deliberation—the court relied on:

  • Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978), which holds that:
    • Premeditation and deliberation can be formed “in an instant”; and
    • These mental states can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including:
      • Character of the weapon used,
      • Manner of its use,
      • Nature, extent, and location of the wounds,
      • Conduct of the accused before, during, and after the incident.
  • McDaniels v. State, 2025 Ark. 139, which updated and elaborated on the kinds of circumstantial evidence from which premeditation and deliberation can be inferred, continuing the Stout line.

These cases permitted the jury to infer premeditation and deliberation from the fact that Matthews targeted Robinson, chased her when she tried to flee, shot her five times in the back, and taunted her as she lay dying, especially against a backdrop of prior threats and stalking behavior.

3. Preservation of Sufficiency Challenges: McDaniels and Rule 33.1

On preservation, the court again cited McDaniels, which explains Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1. That rule requires a defendant seeking a directed verdict to:

  • State specific grounds for insufficiency; and
  • Renew the motion at the close of all the evidence.

Failure to articulate a particular insufficiency theory (e.g., lack of proof of identity) bars appellate review of that theory, even if another sufficiency ground (e.g., premeditation) was raised. In Matthews, this doctrine is applied rigorously: his identity-based sufficiency argument is summarily deemed unpreserved and not reached.

4. Miranda v. Arizona and Edwards v. Arizona

On the admissibility of Matthews’s custodial statements, the court invoked the familiar federal benchmarks:

  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966):
    • Requires that suspects in custody be advised of their rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.
    • Holds that once a suspect asserts the right to counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is made available, unless the suspect himself initiates further communications.
  • Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981):
    • Strengthens Miranda by forbidding police-initiated interrogation after the right to counsel has been invoked, “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”
    • Requires that any subsequent waiver of counsel be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

The court found that Matthews’s conduct—immediately interjecting that he would answer questions after invoking counsel and after the officers acknowledged that invocation—fell squarely within the Edwards exception. He, not the police, restarted the conversation, and he expressed a clear willingness to answer questions.

5. Unsolicited Witness Statements and Mistrial: King v. State

On the mistrial question, the court relied on King v. State, 847 Ark. 89, 847 S.W.2d 37 (1993) (as cited in the opinion), for two principles:

  1. When a witness makes an unsolicited comment that violates a pretrial order, a curative instruction is generally a sufficient remedy.
  2. A mistrial is an extreme remedy, appropriate only when a lesser measure (such as a curative instruction) cannot correct the error or remove the prejudice.

This framework guided the court’s conclusion that the trial judge acted within his discretion by instructing the jury to disregard the officer’s blurting that a bystander had identified Matthews, rather than declaring a mistrial.

6. Arkansas Rules of Evidence 1002 and 801(d)(2)(A)

The best-evidence and hearsay issues turned on two evidentiary rules:

  • Rule 1002 (Best-Evidence Rule):
    • Provides that, to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original is required, except as otherwise provided by the rules or law.
    • Is triggered only when a party attempts to prove the contents of such an item without introducing the item itself.
  • Rule 801(d)(2)(A) (Admission by Party-Opponent):
    • Defines as “not hearsay” a statement offered against a party that is the party’s own statement.
    • Thus, a police officer can generally testify to the defendant’s own out-of-court statements.

In Matthews, because the interrogation recording was actually played in court, the State satisfied Rule 1002. The officer’s explanatory testimony neither replaced the recording nor sought to prove its contents without it. Moreover, the officer’s repetition of Matthews’s statements was independently admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Capital Murder

a. Substantial Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation

The key factual elements supporting premeditation and deliberation included:

  • Matthews’s deliberate approach to the barbecue (parking around the corner, lurking behind a truck, and making a direct line for Robinson).
  • Robinson’s attempt to flee upon seeing him, and his decision to chase her.
  • His attempt to grab her and then his decision to shoot her five times in the back as she tried to escape.
  • His conduct in standing over and taunting her as she lay dying.

Under Stout and McDaniels, the jury could reasonably infer premeditation and deliberation from:

  • The choice and use of a deadly weapon (a firearm).
  • The number and placement of wounds (five shots to the back, consistent with a fleeing victim).
  • His conduct both in pursuing and in mocking the victim.
  • The broader context of escalating threats and stalking behavior.

The court emphasized that even “based on those facts alone,” without recourse to the prior threats, a rational jury could find the requisite mental state. The prior incidents, while probative of motive and context, only strengthen the inference that this was a calculated killing of a targeted victim rather than a rash, unplanned act.

b. Failure to Preserve Identity-Based Insufficiency

A distinct aspect of Arkansas law, and one reinforced here, is the strict application of preservation requirements to sufficiency challenges. Matthews raised one sufficiency theory at trial: that the evidence did not establish premeditation and deliberation. On appeal, he also argued that the State had not adequately proved that he was the person who committed the crime (identity).

The court refused to consider the identity-based argument because Matthews’s directed-verdict motion did not specify that ground. Under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1 and decisions such as McDaniels:

  • The defendant must clearly articulate each sufficiency ground in a directed-verdict motion.
  • New or different sufficiency theories cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

This part of the opinion serves as a reminder that in Arkansas, sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are granular; a general assertion that the State “hasn’t proved its case” is not enough. Defense counsel must identify each distinct element—identity included—if they hope to preserve that issue for appeal.

2. Post‑Invocation Statements and the Edwards Exception

One of the most practically important aspects of the opinion is its treatment of the interrogation. The critical sequence was:

  1. Matthews was advised of his rights.
  2. He stated he did not want to answer questions without a lawyer.
  3. Police acknowledged the request.
  4. Immediately thereafter, Matthews interjected and said he would answer questions and then made incriminating statements.

Ordinarily, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, Edwards prohibits law enforcement from continuing interrogation unless:

  • The suspect’s attorney is present; or
  • The suspect initiates further communication with the police and then validly waives the right to counsel.

The court found that Matthews’s case fit squarely within the second scenario. The opinion underscores two elements:

  • Who initiated the further conversation? After the invocation was acknowledged, the officers did not ask more questions before Matthews spoke; instead, Matthews himself interjected, expressing willingness to talk. That broke the causal chain of police-initiated interrogation.
  • Voluntariness and willingness to answer: Matthews’s spontaneous statement that he would answer questions demonstrated a willingness to waive the previously asserted right. There is no indication of coercion, misunderstanding, or continued badgering.

Accordingly, the general Edwards bar did not apply. The court concluded there was “nothing problematic—constitutionally or otherwise” with admitting Matthews’s subsequent voluntary statements.

Implicit in the opinion is an important clarification: timing alone does not defeat the Edwards exception. The court did not require a significant temporal break between invocation and re-initiation; the decisive factor is who decides to continue the conversation and whether the suspect makes a knowing and voluntary choice to speak without counsel.

3. Mistrial Denial and Curative Instruction

The mistrial question arose from the officer’s narration of body-camera video. The trial court had:

  • Allowed the State to show the video from body cameras, but
  • Barred the State from playing the associated audio to the jury.

While narrating the silent video, the officer blurted out that a bystander had told him that Matthews was the shooter. Defense counsel requested a mistrial on the ground that this violated the pretrial order. The trial court:

  • Denied the motion for mistrial; and
  • Issued a curative instruction telling the jury to disregard the officer’s statement.

In reviewing this decision, the court applied two related principles, drawn from King v. State:

  1. Mistrial is a drastic remedy, reserved for situations where the error is so serious that it cannot be cured by a jury instruction.
  2. When a statement is unsolicited and violates a pretrial order, a curative instruction is typically the appropriate remedy unless the prejudice is irreparable.

Several factors supported the trial court’s decision:

  • The officer’s comment was unsolicited; it was not elicited through prosecutorial questioning that deliberately sought to violate the pretrial order.
  • The substance of the statement—that someone identified Matthews as the shooter—was cumulative of other, much stronger evidence: four eyewitnesses testified directly that they saw Matthews kill Robinson.
  • The trial court promptly gave a curative instruction, and juries are presumed to follow such instructions unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.

Given these points, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial.

4. Best-Evidence Rule and Officer Interpretation of a Recording

Matthews’s final argument was that the State violated the best-evidence rule by allowing an officer to testify about a poor-quality recording that was played for the jury. His trial objection was framed only as the testimony being “not proper,” and the appellate court noted some doubt about whether a best-evidence argument was even preserved. However, it proceeded to address the merits and found no error.

The analytical steps were straightforward:

  1. Rule 1002 applies only when the content of a recording is being proved without the recording itself.
    • Here, the State introduced the actual audio recording (the “best” evidence).
    • The officer’s testimony served to assist the jury in understanding what was being said on the recording, given the poor audio quality.
  2. Nothing in Rule 1002 prohibits explanatory testimony once the original recording is in evidence.
    • Courtroom practice often includes the use of transcripts or explanatory testimony for difficult recordings.
    • The rule is aimed at preventing substitution of secondary evidence when the original is available, not at barring all testimony about admitted recordings.
  3. Hearsay concerns are displaced by Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
    • To the extent the officer was repeating Matthews’s own statements, these constitute admissions by a party-opponent and are not hearsay.
    • Thus, they are independently admissible even apart from the best-evidence analysis.

This part of the opinion reinforces that the best-evidence rule is a limited doctrine: once the original recording is before the jury, courts have latitude to allow witnesses to explain, interpret, or clarify what can be heard, particularly when audio quality or intelligibility is in question.

C. Impact on Arkansas Law and Practice

1. Sufficiency Review: The Majority and the Concurrence

As to sufficiency of the evidence, the majority’s holding itself is unsurprising: few appellate courts will disturb a capital-murder conviction where the defendant is seen chasing and shooting a fleeing victim in the back multiple times, especially against a background of documented threats and stalking.

The more subtle doctrinal importance lies in the articulation of the sufficiency standard and the Chief Justice’s insistence on its completeness.

  • The majority used broad language drawn from Jackson: review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, do not reweigh evidence or second-guess the jury.
  • The concurrence stresses that Arkansas’s version of the standard expressly limits review to only the evidence supporting the verdict, a formulation that makes the standard even more deferential to jury findings.

By cataloging decades of Arkansas precedent, Chief Justice Baker is sending a clear signal to future panels and litigants: any restatement of the sufficiency standard that omits the “only evidence supporting the verdict” component is incomplete. While the majority does not explicitly reject that line of cases, the concurrence operates as a doctrinal safeguard, ensuring that Arkansas continues to apply its historically strict sufficiency test.

The practical effect:

  • Going forward, appellate courts in Arkansas are likely to frame sufficiency review as:
    Viewing the evidence supporting the verdict in the light most favorable to the State, and disregarding evidence contrary to the verdict, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of guilt.
  • This makes it especially hard for defendants to prevail on sufficiency claims; the appellate court will not weigh competing versions of facts but will focus only on evidence favorable to the prosecution.

2. Preservation of Element-Specific Sufficiency Arguments

The refusal to consider Matthews’s identity-based sufficiency claim underscores an already strict doctrine: each specific element or theory of insufficiency must be preserved by a targeted directed-verdict motion.

For defense counsel, the lesson is unambiguous:

  • When moving for a directed verdict, counsel must enumerate every element they contend is lacking—e.g., identity, intent, causation, use of a deadly weapon, etc.
  • General statements that the State has failed to prove its case or failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are inadequate.
  • Failure to include a specific element (as with “identity” here) will bar that theory on appeal, even if evidence on that point was genuinely thin.

3. Interrogation Practices After Counsel Invocation

The opinion has important implications for police interrogation practices in Arkansas:

  • Once a suspect invokes counsel, officers must acknowledge and cease questioning unless the suspect spontaneously indicates a desire to talk further.
  • If a suspect—without prompting or further questioning—volunteers that he is willing to answer questions after invoking counsel, the officer may lawfully proceed, so long as the waiver remains voluntary and knowing.
  • No explicit “cooling-off” interval is required. The key is the suspect’s agency in reinitiating the dialogue, not the passage of time.

That said, prudent law enforcement practice will often involve:

  • Clearly recording the entire exchange, showing that the suspect was not cajoled or pressured into retracting his invocation.
  • Re-advising the suspect of his rights or clarifying that he is choosing to proceed without counsel, to strengthen the record on voluntariness.

For defense counsel, Matthews reinforces that the viability of a suppression motion after an Edwards invocation will turn heavily on the precise sequence of events and whether it can be fairly said that the suspect—not the police—restarted the conversation.

4. Limits on Mistrial and Reliance on Curative Instructions

By upholding the denial of a mistrial based on a single unsolicited statement, the court reiterates a familiar but consequential principle: mistrials are disfavored; curative instructions are the default corrective tool.

This has several practical effects:

  • Trial judges are afforded substantial discretion to manage inadvertent violations of pretrial rulings, particularly where the evidence is cumulative.
  • Appellate courts will look to whether the improper remark added anything materially new or uniquely prejudicial when compared to other, properly admitted evidence.
  • Defendants will face an uphill battle arguing that a mistrial was the only cure when there is already strong independent evidence of guilt.

5. Use of Recordings and Clarifying Testimony

The best-evidence analysis in Matthews is a practical green light for common evidentiary practices:

  • Prosecutors can safely:
    • Introduce an audio or video recording; and
    • Have an officer or participant testify about what was said, particularly when audio is poor or unclear.
  • Defense objections framed purely under Rule 1002 are unlikely to succeed when the original recording is in evidence.
  • The real battleground may shift to:
    • Accuracy and reliability of the witness’s interpretation (cross-examination issue); and
    • Other evidentiary objections (e.g., Rule 403 unfair prejudice, or general voluntariness of the statement).

Combined with Rule 801(d)(2)(A), the opinion reinforces that a defendant’s own statements, captured on recordings and then repeated or clarified by officers, are among the most robust forms of evidence available to the State.

6. Domestic Violence, Prior Threats, and Premeditation

Though not explicitly framed as a domestic-violence case, the factual background in Matthews is paradigmatic:

  • Repeated police involvement in domestic disputes;
  • Prior explicit threats to kill the victim;
  • Victim’s documented fear (a sworn affidavit, calls to police);
  • Stalking-like behavior immediately before the killing (prowling around the victim’s home).

By affirming the capital-murder conviction on these facts, the court effectively signals that such patterns can strongly support inferences of:

  • Premeditation (planning over time, not merely in the moment); and
  • Deliberation (a considered choice to kill a specific, targeted victim).

Future prosecutions of intimate-partner homicides in Arkansas will likely cite Matthews as a model of how prior threats, stalking, and victim affidavits can frame a later killing as the culmination of a deliberate plan rather than a sudden confrontation.

IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Substantial Evidence” and Sufficiency Review

“Substantial evidence” means evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or another. In sufficiency review:

  • The appellate court does not decide who it believes; it assumes the jury believed the State’s witnesses.
  • In Arkansas (as the concurrence emphasizes), the court looks only at evidence that supports the verdict and ignores that which contradicts it.
  • If that supporting evidence is strong enough that a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction stands.

2. Premeditation and Deliberation

For capital murder, the State generally must prove the defendant killed with premeditation and deliberation:

  • Premeditation: the decision to kill was made before the act; it need not involve long planning and can form “in an instant.”
  • Deliberation: the decision was the result of a weighing of considerations, not a purely impulsive or reflexive act.

Because we cannot see into a defendant’s mind, these mental states are almost always inferred from:

  • How the killing was carried out (multiple shots, targeting vital areas, attacking a fleeing victim);
  • Any prior threats or animosity;
  • Preparatory actions (lying in wait, bringing a weapon);
  • Conduct after the act (taunting the victim, fleeing, attempting to cover up).

3. Miranda, Edwards, and “Initiating Further Communication”

Under Miranda and Edwards:

  • If a suspect in custody asks for a lawyer, the police must stop questioning.
  • The police cannot restart questioning on their own until a lawyer is present.
  • However, the suspect can change his mind and re-initiate the conversation. If he says—on his own initiative—that he is willing to talk without a lawyer, and he understands his rights, his statements can be used.

In Matthews, the court held that he did exactly that: immediately after invoking counsel, and after officers acknowledged that invocation, he spontaneously announced he would answer questions. That counted as his own initiation of communication, making his subsequent waiver valid.

4. Mistrial vs. Curative Instruction

A mistrial ends the trial midstream and requires starting over with a new jury; it is reserved for serious errors that cannot be corrected. A curative instruction is when the judge tells the jury to ignore a particular statement or piece of evidence.

Courts presume juries follow instructions. Therefore:

  • Most inadvertent or minor errors are dealt with via curative instructions.
  • Mistrials are granted only when an error is so prejudicial that no instruction could realistically erase its impact.

5. Best-Evidence Rule (Rule 1002)

The best-evidence rule says:

  • If a party wants to prove what was written in a document or said in a recording, they must usually present the original document or recording.
  • They generally cannot, for example, prove what was in a contract solely through someone’s memory if the contract is available.

However:

  • Once the original is in evidence (e.g., a recording is played for the jury), witnesses can testify about what the recording contains without violating Rule 1002.
  • Interpretive or clarifying testimony is permissible; the rule only forbids using secondary evidence as a substitute when the original is absent without justification.

6. Hearsay and Admissions by a Party-Opponent

“Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. It is generally inadmissible unless an exception or exclusion applies.

One of the most important exclusions is Rule 801(d)(2)(A): a statement made by a party and offered against that party is not hearsay. That means:

  • The defendant’s own statements to police are almost always admissible against him (subject to constitutional constraints like Miranda).
  • A police officer may testify to the defendant’s own words, and those words can be played from a recording, without hearsay problems.

V. Conclusion: Significance of Matthews in Arkansas Law

Reggie Matthews v. State is not a pathbreaking opinion in the sense of creating a dramatically new doctrine, but it is an important consolidating decision in several areas of Arkansas criminal law:

  • It reaffirms the stringent sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, and—via the concurrence—clarifies that review is limited to evidence supporting the verdict, maintaining continuity with decades of Arkansas precedent.
  • It illustrates the strict application of preservation rules under Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1, especially the need for element-specific directed-verdict motions.
  • It clarifies that a suspect’s immediate re-initiation of conversation after invoking counsel, if truly spontaneous and voluntary, falls within the Edwards exception and supports admissibility of subsequent statements.
  • It reinforces that mistrial is an extraordinary remedy and that unsolicited, cumulative statements by a witness can almost always be remedied by a curative instruction.
  • It provides practical guidance on the use of recordings and explanatory testimony under the best-evidence rule, and on the admissibility of a defendant’s own statements as party-opponent admissions.
  • It underscores how patterns of domestic abuse, threats, and stalking can be marshaled, along with the manner of killing, to prove premeditation and deliberation in capital-murder prosecutions.

Taken together, the majority opinion and the concurrence in Matthews provide a lucid, if unforgiving, roadmap for prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial judges navigating sufficiency challenges, custodial interrogations, evidentiary rulings, and mistrial motions in serious felony cases in Arkansas.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

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