Clarifying Section 1983 Remedies: No Private Right Under § 242 & Limits on Grand Jury and Malicious-Prosecution Claims

Introduction

Phillips v. Rose (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025) arises from an incident in which Matthew Lee Phillips witnessed four individuals burglarizing his truck, confronted them, and was then charged—through alleged political influence—with child abuse and assault with a deadly weapon. Those charges were later dropped via nolle prosequi. Phillips filed a § 1983 action in New Mexico state court—and added two state tort claims—against the prosecutor (Timothy Rose), an investigator (Lorenzo Emilio), and the Tenth Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Defendants removed the case, moved to dismiss, and after Phillips failed to respond adequately, the district court dismissed all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Phillips appealed; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

Exercising de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It agreed that:

No private cause of action exists under 18 U.S.C. § 242;
Section 1983 does not reach a state‐law grand‐jury requirement that is not incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment;
A Fourteenth Amendment due‐process claim based on pre‐deprivation misconduct can be satisfied by an adequate state‐law remedy;
No authority supports a standalone Second Amendment claim to challenge pre-indictment firearm restrictions;
The speedy‐trial claim was moot once charges were dismissed;
The malicious‐prosecution claim failed for lack of facts showing absence of probable cause or malice.
After dismissing all federal claims, the district court properly remanded the state‐law claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005) – pro se complaints receive liberal construction.
Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1994) – § 242 is purely criminal, no private civil remedy.
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – municipal liability under § 1983 requires a government policy or custom.
Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1997) – Fifth Amendment grand‐jury right not incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2013) – due‐process deprivation without pre‐deprivation process may be remedied by adequate post-deprivation remedies.
Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016) – dismissal of charges is the sole remedy for a speedy‐trial violation.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) – conclusory allegations insufficient under the plausibility standard.
Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2020) & Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2015) – elements of Fourth Amendment malicious‐prosecution claims.

Legal Reasoning

The panel applied de novo review and Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standards, parsing five federal claims: criminal-rights deprivation (18 U.S.C. § 242), municipal liability, Fifth Amendment grand‐jury and due‐process, Second Amendment, Sixth Amendment speedy‐trial, and Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution.

For each, the court found legal or factual deficiencies: § 242 lacks a civil cause; Monell claims must allege policy‐based causation; grand‐jury indictment is not a § 1983 claimable right; due‐process is satisfied by state tort remedies; no recognized Second Amendment violation here; speed‐trial is moot post-dismissal; malicious‐prosecution demands factual support on probable cause and malice, not conclusory assertions.

After rejecting all federal counts and acknowledging absolute immunity as an alternative basis, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims and remanded them.

Impact

Phillips v. Rose reinforces strict pleading requirements under § 1983. It clarifies that:

Plaintiffs cannot rely on criminal statutes to create civil remedies;
Constitutional rights not incorporated against states cannot underpin § 1983 suits;
State actors’ unanticipated misconduct can be addressed through state tort law;
Malicious-prosecution claims require detailed factual predicates (lack of probable cause, malice);
District courts should routinely remand state‐law claims post-federal dismissal.

Future litigants must plead specific facts to overcome immunity defenses and satisfy plausibility. Prosecutors and investigators gain reaffirmation of absolute immunity doctrines and the narrow scope of § 1983.

Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 242 – A criminal prohibition on civil‐rights deprivations by persons acting under color of law; it does not create a private civil right.
Monell Liability – To hold a municipality (or analogous entity) liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a municipal policy or custom caused the violation.
Incorporation Doctrine – Not all federal‐constitutional protections automatically apply to the states; the Fifth Amendment’s grand‐jury clause has not been incorporated.
Malicious Prosecution under the Fourth Amendment – Requires (1) initiation or continuation of legal process against the plaintiff, (2) lack of probable cause, (3) malice, and (4) favorable termination.
Absolute Immunity – Prosecutors and certain government actors are immune from civil suits for acts within the scope of their duties, even if those acts involve allegations of malicious or wrongful conduct.

Conclusion

Phillips v. Rose stands as a comprehensive reaffirmation of pleading standards and substantive limits in § 1983 jurisprudence. It underlines that federal remedies under § 1983 are not coextensive with criminal statutes, that incorporation is not automatic, and that detailed factual allegations—rather than conclusory statements—are essential to overcome immunities and state‐law alternatives. The case will guide lower courts and practitioners in structuring § 1983 complaints, immunities, and the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.