Clarifying Redaction Exemptions and Remedies under Ohio’s Public Records Act:
Commentary on State ex rel. Mauk v. Sheldon, 2025-Ohio-5611

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Mauk v. Sheldon, 2025-Ohio-5611, is a significant addition to Ohio public-records jurisprudence. It clarifies when law-enforcement agencies may redact information from records responsive to public-records requests, what qualifies as a “confidential law-enforcement investigatory record” (CLEIR), and how the “personal notes” doctrine applies. The court also refines the approach to statutory damages and attorney-fee awards where a relator only partially succeeds in a mandamus action under R.C. 149.43.

The case arises from the efforts of relator, Andrea Mauk, whose son Damon was killed in a June 2023 automobile accident, to obtain public records concerning the incident and related matters. Mauk sued the Richland County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Steve Sheldon (collectively, “the sheriff”), as well as the Ohio Department of Public Safety (ODPS) and its director, Andy Wilson, under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, seeking production of various records, statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.

In an earlier opinion in the same case, the court denied relief as to ODPS and largely denied relief as to the sheriff but held several issues in abeyance, ordering in camera review of unredacted records for three specific requests. The present opinion resolves:

Mauk’s motion for reconsideration of portions of the prior decision;
The lawfulness of the sheriff’s redactions to records responsive to public-records request Nos. 6, 10, and 11;
Whether those redactions amount to improper denials under R.C. 149.43(B); and
Whether Mauk is entitled to statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs.

The majority opinion (per curiam, joined by DeWine, Deters, Hawkins, and Shanahan, JJ.) grants the writ in part, awards $2,000 in statutory damages and court costs, and denies attorney fees. Justice Fischer concurs except as to statutory damages. Chief Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Brunner, concurs in part and dissents in part, agreeing with the grant of the writ and damages but arguing that attorney fees should also be awarded.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Motion for Reconsideration

Mauk sought reconsideration of two aspects of the court’s earlier decision (2025-Ohio-1221):

The court’s conclusion that her July 10, 2023 request for “body-worn camera footage relating to Damon Mauk’s accident” did not clearly include footage from the scene of the accident (as opposed to at the hospital); and
The court’s refusal to treat the sheriff’s failure to timely respond to Civ.R. 36 requests for admission as binding admissions that (a) all allegations in her amended complaint were true, (b) the sheriff possessed unproduced responsive records, and (c) the sheriff acted in bad faith.

The court denies reconsideration on both points, emphasizing that:

Reconsideration is not available to reargue issues already presented;
The sheriff’s answer admitting a request for “body-worn camera footage relating to the accident” is not necessarily inconsistent with the sheriff’s affidavit asserting that only hospital footage was requested; and
The Civ.R. 36 issue was fully litigated in the merits briefing, and the court’s prior analysis stands; Mauk’s disagreement does not justify reconsideration.

B. Redactions to Public-Records Request Logs (Requests Nos. 6, 10, and 11)

The core unresolved issue concerned the sheriff’s redactions to records produced in response to three requests for public-records logs:

Request No. 6: All public-records requests received by the sheriff from September 1–14, 2023;
Request No. 10: All public-records requests received July 1–14, 2023; and
Request No. 11: All public-records requests received August 1–14, 2023.

The sheriff had produced responsive records but with extensive redactions, claiming exemptions for:

Social Security numbers (R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(dd) and 149.45(A)(1)(a));
Victims’ names and addresses under the CLEIR exemption, R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h), (A)(2)(d);
Victims’ phone numbers, under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(mm); and
Handwritten notes and descriptions as “personal notes” under State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft and State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland.

After in camera review of unredacted records (filed under seal), the court holds:

Redaction of Social Security numbers was proper under the express statutory exemption.
All other redactions—names, addresses, telephone numbers, and handwritten notes/descriptions—were improper because the sheriff failed to prove that any applicable exemption under R.C. 149.43 applied.

The court grants a writ of mandamus in part, ordering the sheriff to re-produce the same records previously provided for request Nos. 6, 10, and 11 (identified as exhibit Nos. 3 and 6 in the sheriff’s evidence), but this time redacting only Social Security numbers and leaving all other information unredacted.

C. Statutory Damages, Attorney Fees, and Court Costs

On the remedial issues that had been held in abeyance, the court concludes:

Statutory damages:
- Mauk is not entitled to statutory damages for requests Nos. 4 and 5, because she did not demonstrate a violation of R.C. 149.43(B) (no showing that the time taken to respond was unreasonable; and those communications may not have been proper “public-records requests” at all).
- She is entitled to statutory damages for the improper redactions to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11, which constitute denials under R.C. 149.43(B)(1).
- Applying R.C. 149.43(C)(2), and recognizing that request Nos. 10 and 11 constitute a single request for damages purposes (same general subject matter and same office), the court awards:
  - $1,000 for request Nos. 10 and 11 together; and
  - $1,000 for request No. 6;
  for a total of $2,000 in statutory damages.
Court costs: Because a writ of mandamus issues, an award of court costs is mandatory under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i). The court awards Mauk her court costs.
Attorney fees: Although Mauk is statutorily eligible for attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) (she obtained an order compelling compliance with division (B)), the court exercises its discretion to deny an award as “disproportionate” given that she prevailed on only a small fraction (3 of 20) of her original mandamus claims and those victories relate only to improper redactions, not wholesale refusal to provide records.

D. Kennedy, C.J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

Chief Justice Kennedy agrees with the majority’s grant of a partial writ, the award of statutory damages, and the assessment of court costs. She dissents, however, from the denial of attorney fees.

The separate opinion argues that:

The Public Records Act is designed to facilitate citizen monitoring of government, and litigation costs can chill that right;
Attorney-fee awards are a key mechanism “assisting citizens in vigorously enforcing their rights”;
The majority improperly relies on State ex rel. Pool v. Sheffield Lake to deny fees, because Pool involved a three-day delay and no success on the merits (no writ issued), whereas Mauk has obtained a partial writ and has been waiting hundreds of business days for full compliance;
The better approach, as in State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Bd. of Edn., is to award attorney fees tied to the portion of the writ that is granted and then determine a reasonable amount through a fee-application process.

Kennedy would award Mauk attorney fees and remand or permit a fee application to determine the appropriate amount, rather than denying fees entirely.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Events

In June 2023, Mauk’s son Damon died in an automobile accident. Mauk alleges that a sheriff’s deputy recovered her son’s personal effects at the scene and gave them to a man who represented himself as Damon’s father. Mauk has been attempting to locate and recover her son’s belongings since the incident.

In pursuit of information, Mauk submitted multiple public-records requests to the Richland County Sheriff’s Office and to ODPS. Among these requests were:

Requests for body-camera footage related to Damon’s accident and the hospital;
Requests relating to next-of-kin notification and property-handling policies; and
Requests for logs or copies of public-records requests received by the sheriff’s office during specific time windows in July, August, and September 2023.

B. The Litigation and Prior Decision

Mauk brought a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio against:

The Richland County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Sheldon; and
ODPS and its director, Andy Wilson.

She sought:

A writ of mandamus compelling production of various public records responsive to 20 identified public-records requests;
Statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2);
Attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b); and
Court costs.

In an earlier opinion (2025-Ohio-1221), the court:

Denied all requested relief against ODPS;
Rejected most of Mauk’s claims against the sheriff, including her claim regarding body-worn camera footage, largely based on the evidentiary record;
Found some requests moot because records had been produced after suit was filed; and
Held in abeyance the question whether the sheriff’s redactions in response to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11 were lawful, and whether Mauk was entitled to statutory damages, fees, and costs.

The court ordered the sheriff to file unredacted versions of the records responsive to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11 under seal for in camera review. The present opinion addresses those deferred issues and Mauk’s motion for reconsideration.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Standards for Reconsideration

State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2017-Ohio-7577, and State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 381 (1995):
These cases establish that reconsideration under S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02 is available to correct decisions made in error upon reflection, not to provide an opportunity to reargue the case.
Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2014-Ohio-1940:
Clarifies that reconsideration is not appropriate when the movant simply reasserts arguments previously raised and rejected.

The court applies these principles to deny Mauk’s motion for reconsideration, finding she merely restated prior arguments regarding the sheriff’s answer and Civ.R. 36 admissions.

2. Burden of Proving Exemptions and CLEIR

State ex rel. Culgan v. Jefferson Cty. Clerk of Courts, 2024-Ohio-5699:
Reaffirms that a public office bears the burden of proving that information it withholds or redacts “falls squarely within” an exemption under R.C. 149.43.
State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 2013-Ohio-3720:
Explains the two-part test for CLEIR under R.C. 149.43(A)(2): a document must (1) be a “confidential law enforcement record” and (2) meet one of the specified harm-based criteria (such as creating a high probability of endangering a victim’s life or safety).
State ex rel. Standifer v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-3711:
Confirms that the government bears the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the CLEIR exemption when withholding or redacting records.
State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 57 Ohio St.3d 77 (1991):
Identifies “records compiled pursuant to criminal investigations” as a paradigm of law-enforcement records within the CLEIR definition.

These authorities are central to the court’s conclusion that public-records requests themselves, received by a sheriff’s office, are not CLEIR, even if they relate to law-enforcement matters. Nor did the sheriff demonstrate a “high probability” that disclosure of redacted names or addresses would endanger crime victims.

3. Phone Numbers and Lack of Analysis

Adams v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-4640:
The court cites this case for the proposition that an argument unsupported by “meaningful analysis” may be rejected on that basis alone.

Applying this, the court notes that the sheriff offered no substantive analysis explaining how R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(mm) (protecting victim or witness phone numbers on a “law enforcement record or report”) could apply to public-records request forms, which are not law-enforcement records.

4. “Personal Notes” Doctrine

State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 1993-Ohio-32:
Held that a trial judge’s personal handwritten notes, kept solely for his convenience and not part of official court records, were not “public records.”
State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 2004-Ohio-4884:
Similarly held that a public official’s personal notes, kept for personal convenience and not integrated into the public office’s official records, were not public records subject to disclosure.
State ex rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2024-Ohio-2748:
Emphasized that unsworn statements by counsel are not evidence and cannot support a denial of a writ in a public-records case.

The court distinguishes these precedents, holding that:

The sheriff produced no sworn evidence that the handwritten notes at issue were “personal notes” as defined in Steffen and Cranford; only unsworn statements of counsel, which are insufficient; and
The notes appear on records maintained as part of the sheriff’s official files, accessible to multiple employees, meaning they are part of the office’s “records” and not purely private jottings.

5. Statutory Damages and Redactions as Denials

State ex rel. Grim v. New Holland, 2024-Ohio-4822:
Confirms that:
- Statutory damages require clear and convincing proof of a failure to comply with R.C. 149.43(B); and
- Multiple requests on the same day to the same office concerning the “same general subject matter” yield only a single statutory-damages award.
State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh, 2023-Ohio-2536:
Cited for the “same general subject matter” rule limiting multiple statutory awards for related requests to a single award.
State ex rel. Woods v. Lawrence Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2023-Ohio-1241:
Holds that production of records after suit is filed does not moot a statutory-damages claim, but the requester still must prove a violation of R.C. 149.43(B).
State ex rel. Stuart v. Greene, 2020-Ohio-3685:
Denying statutory damages where the relator did not explain why the agency’s response time was unreasonable or what a reasonable time frame would have been.

The opinion embraces these authorities to:

Reject statutory damages for request Nos. 4 and 5 (no proven violation); and
Award damages where improper redactions constituting “denials” persisted in response to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11.

6. Court Costs and Attorney Fees

State ex rel. Hicks v. Fraley, 2021-Ohio-2724:
Holds that costs are mandatory when a writ issues in a public-records mandamus case.
State ex rel. Pool v. Sheffield Lake, 2023-Ohio-1204:
The court there held that an attorney-fee award under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) may be denied as “disproportionate” when the violation constituted only a minor fraction of the case (in Pool, a three-day delay in providing already-identified records, in a suit encompassing many more requests, and no writ issued).
State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 2020-Ohio-3686:
Defines “bad faith” in this context as involving a “dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.”
State ex rel. Griffin v. Sehlmeyer, 2021-Ohio-3624:
Clarifies that mere “requests for information” are not public-records requests; the Act requires a request for “records,” not for generalized information or explanations.
State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-3316:
Cited by Kennedy, C.J., to show that where a writ is granted in part, the court can award attorney fees proportionate to the claims on which the relator prevailed.
State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts, 2000-Ohio-345, and State ex rel. Rogers v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-1511:
Emphasize the public’s right to monitor government under the Public Records Act and the role of fee-shifting in enabling citizens to vindicate that right despite litigation costs.

These authorities provide the framework for:

Mandatory court-cost awards when a writ issues;
Discretionary attorney-fee awards based on statutory eligibility plus case-specific proportionality considerations; and
The rejection of “bad faith” arguments absent evidence meeting the high McDougald standard.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Denial of Reconsideration

The court first addresses Mauk’s motion for reconsideration and quickly disposes of it.

On the body-camera issue, Mauk argued that the sheriff’s answer admitting a request for “body worn camera footage relating to Damon Mauk’s accident” proved that the request encompassed footage from the accident scene, contrary to Captain Sweat’s affidavit (which stated that no hospital footage existed and that no request for scene footage was made). The court holds that:

The admission is not necessarily inconsistent with the affidavit, because “relating to the accident” could still be understood as referring to hospital footage; and
Mauk’s argument was previously raised and rejected; reasserting it is not grounds for reconsideration.

Regarding the Civ.R. 36 requests for admission, served during a mediation stay and answered months later, Mauk argued that the sheriff’s failure to respond timely should be deemed admissions establishing the truth of her allegations and bad faith. The court again notes that:

This argument was fully litigated in the merits briefs;
The prior opinion explained why the court would not treat the requested matters as conclusively established; and
Disagreement with that reasoning is not a valid basis for reconsideration.

Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied in full.

2. Redactions in Response to Request Nos. 6, 10, and 11

a. Social Security Numbers

After in camera review, the court finds that the sheriff redacted Social Security numbers from at least three records. The court upholds these redactions under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(dd) and R.C. 149.45(A)(1)(a), which exempt Social Security numbers from disclosure. This is a straightforward application of a clear statutory exemption.

b. Names and Addresses: CLEIR and Victim-Information Exemption

The sheriff had redacted many names and addresses appearing on the public-records request forms, invoking R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(d) (part of the CLEIR definition) and citing the need to protect “victims’ names and addresses.”

Under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(d), a record qualifies as CLEIR only if:

It “pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature” (i.e., it is a law-enforcement record); and
Its release would create a “high probability” of disclosing certain enumerated categories of sensitive information, such as information that would endanger a crime victim’s life or physical safety.

The court concludes that neither requirement is met:

Not law-enforcement records: The documents at issue are public-records requests submitted to the sheriff, not investigative or enforcement files compiled in the course of investigating crimes. While some requests seek law-enforcement records, the requests themselves are administrative communications from the public, not “law enforcement records or reports” within the CLEIR framework.
No showing of “high probability” of endangerment: The sheriff provided no evidence—such as affidavits or concrete explanations—showing that the disclosure of a name or address on these request forms would create a high probability of endangering any victim’s life or physical safety. In many instances, it was not apparent even that the redacted individual was a crime victim. Without such evidence, the second prong of R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(d) is not satisfied.

Because the sheriff bears the burden of proof and fails to carry it, these redactions are held improper.

c. Phone Numbers and R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(mm)

The sheriff also redacted some requesters’ phone numbers, citing R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(mm), which exempts from disclosure “telephone numbers for a victim or a witness to a crime that are listed on any law enforcement record or report.”

The court finds this exemption inapplicable because:

The phone numbers at issue appear on public-records request forms, not on “law enforcement record[s] or report[s]” as required by the statute; and
The sheriff provides no meaningful analysis explaining how these forms could be characterized as law-enforcement records; thus, under Adams v. Harris, the argument is properly rejected for lack of analysis.

Consequently, the phone-number redactions are deemed improper.

d. Descriptions and Handwritten Notes: CLEIR and Personal Notes

Finally, the sheriff had redacted:

Descriptions of what certain public-records requests sought; and
Handwritten notations appearing to document processing steps or internal handling of those requests.

Two justifications were advanced: (1) the CLEIR exemption and (2) the “personal notes” doctrine from Steffen and Cranford.

The court rejects both:

CLEIR: As with names and addresses, the underlying documents are not law-enforcement records, and no evidence demonstrates that releasing these descriptions or notes creates a high probability of endangering victims. CLEIR does not apply.
Personal notes doctrine:
- The doctrine protects only truly personal notes: those kept for the sole convenience of the public official, not used by others, and not integrated into the agency’s official records.
- Here, there is no sworn evidence (only counsel’s unsworn statements) that the notes are personal in this sense. Per Mack, counsel’s statements are not evidence.
- The notes appear on records maintained as official files, accessible to multiple employees. This indicates that they are part of the office’s record-keeping system, not private memory aids.

Therefore, the redacted handwritten notations and descriptions must be disclosed.

e. Partial Grant of the Writ

Because the sheriff has not justified any redactions other than those of Social Security numbers, the court grants the writ in part. The sheriff must:

Reproduce the same records previously provided in response to request Nos. 6, 10, and 11; and
Redact only Social Security numbers, leaving all other information unredacted.

This relief enforces the statutory requirement that non-exempt records be made available and underscores that redactions must be narrowly tailored to valid exemptions.

3. Statutory Damages and Court Costs

a. Legal Standard for Statutory Damages

Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2), a requester is entitled to statutory damages if:

The request was transmitted by hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail;
It was directed to the appropriate public office or records custodian;
The request fairly described the public records sought; and
The office or custodian failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B).

Damages are calculated at $100 per business day of noncompliance (beginning on the day the mandamus action is filed), capped at $1,000 per request (subject to the same-subject-matter rule).

b. Requests Nos. 4 and 5: No Damages

Mauk argued that the sheriff owed statutory damages related to public-records request Nos. 4 and 5 because the responsive records were not produced until nearly a month after she filed suit and almost two months after the requests.

The court notes:

In the prior opinion, the court found request Nos. 4 and 5 moot due to the subsequent production of records; mootness does not bar statutory damages (per Woods), but a violation must still be shown.
Mauk’s only argument as to these requests is that there was a 20-day lag after filing suit; she does not explain why the delay was unreasonable, nor suggest a more reasonable time, as required under Stuart.
Moreover, the communications on which these “requests” are based are better characterized as requests for information (asking for “clarification” of policies and “publicly available information,” not for specific identifiable records), which do not qualify as proper public-records requests under Griffin.

Given this, Mauk fails to show that the sheriff violated R.C. 149.43(B) regarding request Nos. 4 and 5; no statutory damages are awarded for these.

c. Requests Nos. 6, 10, and 11: Damages Awarded

For request Nos. 6, 10, and 11, the court concludes that the sheriff’s improper redactions (other than Social Security numbers) amounted to denials of Mauk’s requests, because:

R.C. 149.43(B)(1) expressly provides that a redaction is deemed a denial of the request as to the redacted information unless the redaction is authorized or required by law; and
The sheriff failed to justify the redactions under any exemption except the Social Security number exemption.

As a result:

Mauk is entitled to statutory damages of $100 per business day of noncompliance, up to $1,000 for each qualifying request or set of requests.
Because request Nos. 10 and 11 concern the same subject matter and the same office, they yield a single award of $1,000. The sheriff has not yet fully complied with these requests by providing properly redacted records, so the court awards the maximum of $1,000.
Request No. 6, also improperly handled and not yet cured as of the opinion, yields another $1,000, for a total of $2,000.

The court thus uses the damages provision both to compensate Mauk for the denial and to incentivize timely and proper compliance by public offices.

d. Mandatory Court Costs

Under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i), if a court grants a writ of mandamus ordering compliance with R.C. 149.43(B), it “shall” award court costs. Citing Hicks v. Fraley, the court holds that because Mauk is obtaining a partial writ, an award of costs is mandatory and is therefore granted.

4. Attorney Fees: Eligibility and Disproportionate Relief

a. Statutory Framework

R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) provides that a court may award reasonable attorney fees to a relator if:

The court orders the public office to comply with R.C. 149.43(B); or
Certain specified conditions are met, such as:
- Failure to respond affirmatively or negatively within a reasonable time (C)(3)(b)(i); or
- Bad faith in voluntarily producing records only after suit is filed (C)(3)(b)(iii).

Thus, eligibility can rest either on obtaining a writ (as here) or on specific statutory misconduct. However, even when eligibility exists, the award is discretionary.

b. Majority’s Denial of Attorney Fees

The majority acknowledges that Mauk is eligible for attorney fees because she secured a writ compelling compliance with R.C. 149.43(B) in connection with request Nos. 6, 10, and 11. Nonetheless, the court declines to award fees as “disproportionate.”

The key reasoning is:

Mauk initially litigated 20 public-records requests, directed to both the sheriff and ODPS (and earlier, also the Mifflin Township Fire Department, later dismissed by settlement).
She achieved a violation finding as to only 3 of those 20 requests—and even in those, the sheriff did not completely withhold records but merely over-redacted them.
For the other 17 requests, the court either denied the writ, found records had been provided, noted Mauk conceded that no responsive records existed, or treated the requests as moot or no longer at issue.
Following Pool, where an attorney-fee award was denied because the cognizable violation was minor relative to the whole case, the majority concludes that an award here would be disproportionate to the limited nature and scope of Mauk’s success.

The court also rejects two alternative bases for attorney fees:

Bad faith (R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii)): Mauk accuses the sheriff of bad faith, but the court reiterates that bad faith requires a “dishonest purpose” or conscious wrongdoing akin to fraud, per McDougald. Because Mauk provides no analysis showing how the sheriff’s conduct reaches that level, this basis fails.
Failure to respond affirmatively/negatively (R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(i)): Mauk claims the sheriff did not respond to request Nos. 4 and 5 before suit was filed. The court finds that:
- The communications at issue were requests for “information” and “clarification,” not clear requests for identifiable public records; and
- Even if the sheriff had some residual responsibility, she provided policies containing the requested information within a month after suit was filed, rendering any delay relatively modest and not clearly unreasonable.

Accordingly, the majority exercises its discretion to deny attorney fees.

c. Kennedy, C.J.: Fee-Shifting and Partial Success

Chief Justice Kennedy challenges the majority’s reliance on Pool. She notes:

In Pool, the relator did not obtain a writ and suffered only a three-day delay in receiving records that were already identified and forthcoming. The proportionality analysis there focused on that minor delay relative to the resources expended across many requests.
By contrast, Mauk has obtained a partial writ and still has not received fully compliant records more than 400 business days after filing her amended complaint and over 500 since filing suit. Her success is substantively more significant.
The statutory bars to attorney fees (in R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c)) parallel the bars to statutory damages, and here the court has awarded full statutory damages without reduction. This suggests that the conduct is not trivial and does not justify denying fees altogether.
The General Assembly’s policy is to enable citizens to enforce their public-records rights without being deterred by litigation costs; a categorical denial of fees in a case where a writ is granted undermines that policy.
Cases like Wells demonstrate that the court can calibrate fee awards to the specific issues on which the relator prevailed—for example, by awarding fees only for work related to certain successful claims—rather than denying fees entirely.

Kennedy would therefore award Mauk attorney fees and permit a fee application to determine a reasonable amount limited to the successful portion of the case.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Mandamus in the Public-Records Context

A writ of mandamus is a court order directing a public official or agency to perform a clear legal duty. In public-records cases, mandamus is the primary enforcement mechanism: when a public office improperly refuses or fails to provide public records, a requester may bring a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio to compel compliance with R.C. 149.43.

B. Ohio’s Public Records Act (R.C. 149.43)

The Public Records Act:

Broadly defines “public record” to include documents, electronic data, and other materials “kept by” a public office and relating to its functions.
Imposes a duty on public offices to promptly make public records available upon request, unless a specific statutory exemption applies.
Requires public offices to provide an explanation when they deny a request, including the legal authority they rely on.
Treats redactions as denials for the redacted information, except where authorized or required by law.

C. CLEIR: Confidential Law-Enforcement Investigatory Records

CLEIR is one of the most litigated exemptions. A record is CLEIR only if:

It pertains to a law-enforcement matter (criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative), usually meaning it is part of a police or enforcement file; and
Releasing it would create a high probability of disclosing certain sensitive information, such as:
- Confidential sources;
- Specific investigatory techniques;
- Information that would jeopardize a fair trial; or
- Information that would endanger the life or physical safety of law-enforcement personnel, a crime victim, or a witness.

In Mauk, the court stresses that administrative documents such as public-records request forms are not themselves law-enforcement records, even if they reference law-enforcement activities. Hence, CLEIR generally does not shield such forms.

D. The “Personal Notes” Doctrine

Ohio courts recognize that some writings created by public officials are “personal notes” and not public records. These are:

Created solely for the official’s convenience or to refresh their own recollection;
Not shared with other staff or integrated into the agency’s official files; and
Not used as part of the office’s decision-making process.

When notes are written on official forms or case files, available to other employees, and kept as part of the office’s records system, they usually lose “personal” status and become public records subject to disclosure. Mauk applies this logic to reject the sheriff’s reliance on Steffen and Cranford.

E. Statutory Damages vs. Attorney Fees vs. Court Costs

Statutory damages: A fixed monetary remedy ($100 per business day, up to $1,000 per request or subject-matter group) for violations of R.C. 149.43(B). Meant to incentivize compliance and partially compensate the requester.
Attorney fees: Payment of part or all of the requester’s lawyer’s fees, awarded at the court’s discretion when statutory criteria are met (e.g., when a writ is granted or certain misconduct occurs). Intended to make it economically feasible for citizens to enforce public-records rights.
Court costs: Filing fees and similar litigation-related expenses. When a writ issues, these are mandatory under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i).

F. Requests for Records vs. Requests for Information

The Public Records Act obliges public offices to provide existing records, not to create new summaries or answer abstract questions. A valid public-records request:

Identifies existing records with reasonable clarity; and
Does not merely ask “what is your policy on X?” or “please explain why Y occurred.”

In Mauk, emails asking for “clarification” of policies and “any publicly available information” about those policies were deemed closer to information requests than to concrete records requests, limiting the sheriff’s obligations and undermining claims based on those emails.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Limits on Redacting Public-Records Request Logs

A major practical outcome of Mauk is the clarification that:

Public offices, including sheriffs, cannot reflexively redact the names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals who submit public-records requests, or of persons mentioned in those requests, by invoking CLEIR or victim-protection provisions, without meeting the statutory requirements.
Public-records requests themselves are generally administrative records, not law-enforcement records, and thus typically fall outside the scope of CLEIR and the victim/witness phone-number exemption limited to law-enforcement records or reports.

This significantly restricts the ability of law-enforcement agencies to anonymize or obscure the identities of requesters or referenced individuals in their public-records logs without strong, record-specific justifications.

B. Reinforcing the Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Standards

The opinion underscores that:

Public offices carry the burden of showing that each redaction “falls squarely within” an exemption; generic citations to statutes or vague assertions are not enough.
Claims that certain notations are “personal notes” require sworn evidence and must conform to the narrow doctrine developed in Steffen and Cranford.
Counsel’s arguments in briefs or letters, without evidentiary support, cannot justify withholding records.

For public offices, this decision is a reminder to:

Develop clear, evidence-backed justifications when invoking exemptions;
File affidavits or other competent evidence in mandamus actions; and
Carefully distinguish between truly personal jottings and notes that form part of official files.

C. Redactions as Denials and Statutory Damages Exposure

By applying R.C. 149.43(B)(1) to treat improper redactions as denials, the court:

Confirms that partial responses with unjustified redactions do not shield a public office from statutory damages;
Highlights that damages run from the date the mandamus is filed until the office properly complies, up to the statutory cap; and
Signals that offices should scrutinize redactions carefully to avoid needless financial exposure and litigation.

As a practical matter, agencies may now be more cautious about redacting requesters’ identities or internal processing notes, given that unjustified redactions can lead to damages even when records are otherwise produced.

D. Attorney Fees and the “Proportionality” Theme

The majority opinion continues and extends a “proportionality” approach to discretionary attorney fees:

When a relator brings a broad, multi-request mandamus action but prevails on only a narrow subset of claims, the court may view a full fee award as disproportionate even if the relator is statutorily eligible.
Mauk, like Pool, reflects judicial concern that fee awards match the scope and significance of the violation relative to the broader litigation.

Kennedy’s partial dissent, however, emphasizes an alternative perspective:

The statutory scheme and public policy favor fee-shifting to enable enforcement, especially where a writ is granted and the violation persists over a long period.
Courts can manage proportionality through the amount of the fee award—limiting it to time spent on successful claims—rather than by denying fees outright.

Future litigants should expect:

Courts to examine the ratio of successful to unsuccessful claims when deciding whether to award fees and in what amount;
Enhanced strategic pressure on relators to focus their actions on the strongest, clearest violations; and
Continued debate about how best to reconcile proportionality with the public-policy purpose of fee-shifting in public-records enforcement.

E. Guidance for Public Offices and Requesters

For public offices, the case highlights the importance of:

Training staff on the narrow scope of exemptions, especially CLEIR;
Recognizing that logs of public-records requests are presumptively public;
Maintaining clear internal policies on when and how to redact information; and
Preparing to substantiate exemptions with affidavits if litigation arises.

For requesters and their counsel, Mauk offers:

A roadmap for challenging overly broad redactions, particularly when agencies attempt to mask requester identities or internal handling notes;
Confirmation that statutory damages are available even when records are partially produced but improperly redacted; and
A caution that attorney-fee awards are not automatic, especially in cases where success is limited; careful framing of claims and emphasis on the central, meritorious issues may improve the odds of a fee award.

VII. Conclusion

State ex rel. Mauk v. Sheldon refines Ohio public-records law in several important ways:

It draws a clear line between administrative records (such as public-records requests themselves) and “law enforcement records,” limiting the reach of the CLEIR exemption and certain victim/witness protections.
It reaffirms that Social Security numbers are exempt but rejects expansive claims to redact names, addresses, phone numbers, and internal notations without rigorous justification.
It rejects overuse of the “personal notes” doctrine, insisting that notes integrated into official files and accessible to multiple staff are public records.
It confirms that unjustified redactions constitute denials of public-records requests and can trigger statutory damages, which are awarded here.
It continues an emerging proportionality doctrine for attorney-fee awards, though not without controversy, as expressed by Chief Justice Kennedy’s partial dissent.

At a broader level, the decision reinforces the core principle that the Public Records Act is to be construed in favor of openness and transparency, with exemptions narrowly applied. While the court is cautious about awarding attorney fees where success is limited, it remains clear that public offices must treat redactions as a serious matter, backed by concrete statutory authority and evidence, or risk exposure to damages and judicial orders compelling disclosure.

Clarifying Redaction Exemptions and Remedies under Ohio’s Public Records Act: Commentary on State ex rel. Mauk v. Sheldon, 2025-Ohio-5611