Clarifying Government’s Disclosure Obligations and Supervised Release Cost Conditions in Plea Agreements: United States v. London

Introduction

United States v. London, 24-817-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2025), presents important questions about the scope of the Government’s disclosure obligations under plea agreements and the proper imposition of cost-contribution conditions in supervised release. Maurice London pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing more than 40 grams of fentanyl under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B). At sentencing, without prior notice to defense counsel, the Government revealed that the investigation originated from a fatal overdose traceable to London’s distribution. London argued that this late disclosure breached his plea agreement, depriving him of a fair sentencing and vitiating his waiver of appellate rights; he also challenged a special condition requiring him to contribute to his drug treatment costs. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part, setting forth guiding principles for plea-agreement interpretation and supervised-release conditions.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held:

The plea agreement did not obligate the Government to disclose every fact or argument it intended to present at sentencing. The Government’s revelation about the overdose did not breach the agreement, because the contract expressly allowed the Government to “provide to the Probation Office and the Court all the information and evidence” it deemed relevant.
London’s challenge to the fairness of his sentence was procedurally unreasonable—no plain-error relief was warranted given the District Court’s clear statement that it would disregard the undisclosed overdose information, and the sentence fell within the agreed Guidelines range (130–162 months). Any error was harmless.
The challenge to the special condition requiring cost contributions for drug treatment was not ripe for review and, in any event, such conditions are typically contingent on a defendant’s ability to pay and subject to later modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
The judgment was affirmed as to London’s term of imprisonment and general supervised release conditions, and dismissed as to his appeal of the cost-contribution condition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Reyes-Arzate, 91 F.4th 616 (2d Cir. 2024): Plea agreements are contracts construed strictly against the Government.
United States v. Wilson, 920 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2019): Interpretation of plea-agreement terms focuses on parties’ reasonable expectations.
United States v. Palladino, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003): Late disclosure of sentencing facts does not breach if it does not seek an enhancement beyond agreed Levels.
United States v. Helm, 58 F.4th 75 (2d Cir. 2023): Breach of plea agreement requires a Government deviation producing “serious unfairness.”
United States v. Doe, 741 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2013): Unobjected sentencing errors reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742 (2d Cir. 2013): Sentences based on clearly erroneous facts require reversal only if the error was not harmless.
United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2009): A district court’s harmless-error determination is upheld when the record shows the same sentence would have been imposed.
United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010): Special supervised-release conditions are subject to plain-error review absent timely objection.
United States v. Birkedahl, 973 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2020): Ripeness requires certainty about cost, need for services, and defendant’s ability to pay.
United States v. Rasheed, 981 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2020): Cost-contribution conditions are construed as contingent on ability to pay and modifiable under § 3583(e).

Legal Reasoning

1. Plea Agreement Interpretation
The court applied contract-law principles to the plea agreement. It found that the agreement unambiguously preserved the Government’s right to submit any “information and evidence” it considered relevant to sentencing. Nothing in the text required advance notice to defense counsel of every fact the Government intended to rely on. London’s reasonable expectations, therefore, did not include an implicit promise of complete pre-sentencing disclosure.

2. Procedural Reasonableness and Plain-Error Review
Because London made no contemporaneous objection when the Government disclosed the overdose link, the Second Circuit reviewed for plain error. The District Court expressly stated it would disregard the Government’s allegation and did not adjust the Guidelines calculation based on it. Under Jass, any error in allowing the statement was harmless, as the ultimate sentence was within the stipulated range and the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless.

3. Ripeness of Cost-Contribution Condition
The court held that London’s challenge to the special condition mandating contributions toward his drug treatment costs was unripe. At the time of appeal, it was unknown whether London would require those services, how much they would cost, or whether he could pay. Moreover, Rasheed confirms that such conditions are contingent on ability to pay and may be modified under § 3583(e), ensuring protection against undue hardship.

Potential Impact

Prosecutors will recognize that plea agreements need not delineate every sentencing fact so long as the contract broadly reserves the Government’s right to present relevant information.
Defense counsel may seek explicit contractual language requiring prior notice of any sentencing facts to guard against surprise disclosures.
Sentencing courts are reminded that harmless-error analysis can sustain a sentence when a defendant cannot show prejudice from undisclosed allegations.
Judges imposing special supervised-release conditions will understand that cost contributions are typically conditional on ability to pay and subject to later review under § 3583(e).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Plea Agreement as Contract: Plea agreements are evaluated like private contracts: the courts look to what parties reasonably agreed, construing ambiguities against the Government.
Plain-Error Review: If a defendant fails to object at trial or sentencing, appellate courts will reverse only for “plain” (clear and prejudicial) error affecting substantial rights.
Harmless Error: An appellate court can uphold a decision despite a mistake if it is convinced that the error had no effect on the outcome.
Ripeness Doctrine: A claim is not ripe if it depends on future events that may never occur, such as the actual cost of and need for treatment services.
Special Condition — Cost Contribution: A supervised-release condition requiring a defendant to share the cost of programs (e.g., drug treatment). Such a condition typically applies only if the defendant can afford it and can be modified later.

Conclusion

United States v. London clarifies that, under a broad reservation of rights in a plea agreement, the Government may introduce additional sentencing facts without breaching the agreement, unless it expressly promises otherwise. Sentencing courts may disregard irrelevant allegations and need not vacate a sentence absent demonstrated prejudice. Challenges to cost-contribution conditions in supervised release must await a concrete showing of need, cost, and ability to pay, and defendants retain recourse under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). This decision offers valuable guidance for prosecutors drafting plea agreements, defense counsel negotiating notice provisions, and judges imposing fair and administrable supervised-release conditions.