Clarifying CPL 30.30 After Reindictment: Motion‑Practice Delays Remain Excludable Even When the First Indictment Is Jurisdictionally Defective

Introduction

In People v. Ferrara, 2025 NY Slip Op 06099 (3d Dept Nov. 6, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed a conviction for predatory sexual assault against a child and, in doing so, delivered a compact but consequential reaffirmation—and practical clarification—of New York’s speedy trial framework under CPL 30.30 when an initial indictment is dismissed as jurisdictionally defective and the People re-present promptly. The court also addressed three other recurring issues in child sex-abuse prosecutions: (1) the sufficiency of a child complainant’s testimony in “he-said/she-said” cases, (2) the permissible breadth of temporal allegations in an indictment charging course-of-sexual-conduct offenses, and (3) the proper handling of a disruptive courtroom outburst by a witness in front of the jury.

The defendant, John Ferrara, was first indicted in October 2021 for predatory sexual assault against a child arising from conduct alleged to have occurred between February 2016 and June 2018, when he and his girlfriend babysat the victim. The initial indictment misstated the victim’s date of birth—an error the trial court deemed a jurisdictional defect—and the indictment was dismissed. Within days, the People re-presented to a grand jury and obtained a new indictment with the correct date of birth. After denial of Ferrara’s CPL 30.30 motion and a jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life. On appeal, he challenged the weight of the evidence (arguing that the case turned solely on the child’s testimony and lacked precise dates), the CPL 30.30 ruling (arguing excessive chargeable time between the first accusatory instrument and the People’s statement of readiness on the reindictment), the reasonableness of the two-year time frame pleaded in the indictment, and the trial court’s denial of a mistrial when the victim’s brother spat on him in the jury’s presence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department affirmed the judgment, holding that:

• The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The jury’s credibility determinations in a “he-said/she-said” case are entitled to deference, and the child’s testimony satisfied the elements of the charged offense (Penal Law §§ 130.96, 130.75[1] former [b]).
• The defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion was correctly denied. When a reindictment supplants a prior indictment, the six-month readiness period relates back to the first accusatory instrument; time devoted to defense motion practice and the court’s decision on those motions is excludable—even if the first indictment is ultimately dismissed as jurisdictionally defective—leaving the People within the statutory six-month window (citing People v Flowers, 240 AD2d 894 [3d Dept 1997]; People v Chrysler, 152 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2017]).
• The indictment’s two-plus-year time frame was reasonable for a continuing-crime “course of sexual conduct” count given the victim’s young age and the nature of the allegations (citing People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529 [1995]).
• The trial court providently denied a mistrial after the victim’s brother’s outburst. Prompt curative instructions and individual juror inquiry sufficed to ameliorate any prejudice (citing People v Lamb, 211 AD3d 1345 [3d Dept 2022]).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

The court’s reasoning is anchored in familiar strands of New York criminal procedure and evidentiary review:

• Weight of the evidence and credibility assessments:
  • People v. Monk, 237 AD3d 1250 (3d Dept 2025): Confirms that a weight of the evidence review permits the appellate court to assess whether each element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, while according deference to the jury’s credibility determinations.
  • People v. Kiah, 156 AD3d 1054 (3d Dept 2017); People v. Njoku, 218 AD3d 1047 (3d Dept 2023); People v. Dennis, 221 AD3d 1278 (3d Dept 2023); People v. Watkins, 180 AD3d 1222 (3d Dept 2020); People v. Christie, 224 AD3d 1097 (3d Dept 2024): These decisions reflect the settled principle that, in “he-said/she-said” cases, appellate courts defer to the jury’s superior vantage in evaluating witness demeanor and credibility.
• CPL 30.30 readiness and excludable time:
  • People v. Flowers, 240 AD2d 894 (3d Dept 1997), lv denied 90 NY2d 1011 (1997); People v. Skinner, 211 AD2d 979 (3d Dept 1995), lv denied 86 NY2d 741 (1995): Establish that upon reindictment in the same criminal action, the six-month readiness period “relates back” to the original accusatory instrument—even if that first indictment is dismissed as jurisdictionally defective—and that not all time between the two indictments is automatically chargeable to the People.
  • People v. Chrysler, 152 AD3d 825 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 948 (2017): In a single-defendant prosecution, delay from motion practice is not chargeable to the People.
  • People v. McCarty, 221 AD3d 1360 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1093 (2024); People v. Catalan, 204 AD3d 1240 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1132 (2022): Outline the computation: measure the interval from the first accusatory instrument to the People’s readiness, subtract excludable prereadiness delays, and add any postreadiness delays attributable to the People.
  • People v. Pope, 96 AD3d 1231 (3d Dept 2012), lv denied 20 NY3d 1064 (2013); People v. Hicks, 55 AD3d 1138 (3d Dept 2008), lv denied 12 NY3d 758 (2009): Reinforce exclusion of time devoted to motion practice and the court’s resolution of those motions.
• Temporal pleading in continuing offenses:
  • People v. Shack, 86 NY2d 529 (1995): A continuing crime may be pled over a significant period when the statute permits commission by multiple acts over time; the indictment must still provide fair notice enabling a defense.
  • People v. Smith, 137 AD3d 1323 (3d Dept 2016), lv denied 28 NY3d 974 (2016); People v. Wolf, 151 AD3d 1459 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 32 NY3d 1179 (2019); People v. Weber, 25 AD3d 919 (3d Dept 2006), lv denied 6 NY3d 839 (2006): Approve broader time frames in child sex-abuse cases, depending on age, memory, and nature of the alleged continuing conduct.
  • People v. Crumedy, 203 AD3d 1240 (3d Dept 2022): A counterpoint cautioning that some time frames may be unreasonably overbroad; Ferrara distinguishes itself by the child’s age and the continuing-offense element.
  • People v. Johnson, 24 AD3d 967 (3d Dept 2005), lv denied 6 NY3d 814 (2006); People v. Keefer, 262 AD2d 791 (3d Dept 1999), lv denied 94 NY2d 824 (1999): Recognize practical flexibility where very young complainants recall abuse occurring repeatedly over extended periods.
• Mistrial and courtroom outbursts:
  • People v. Lamb, 211 AD3d 1345 (3d Dept 2022); People v. Harp, 20 AD3d 672 (3d Dept 2005), lv denied 5 NY3d 852 (2005): Emphasize that a mistrial is a last resort; immediate curative instructions and individualized juror inquiry can adequately dissipate prejudice from an outburst in the jury’s presence.
  • People v. Gaylord, 194 AD3d 1189 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 972 (2021): Supports the trial court’s discretion to limit voir dire scope to whether jurors can be fair, impartial, and follow instructions.

Legal Reasoning

1) Weight of the Evidence. Although defendant’s legal-sufficiency arguments were unpreserved (he did not raise the specific contentions in his trial order of dismissal; see People v. Burdo, 210 AD3d 1306 [3d Dept 2022]), the Third Department conducted a weight-of-the-evidence review. The complainant—born in June 2010—testified that between February 2016 and June 2018 (after the defendant and his girlfriend moved from Watervliet to Green Island), the defendant forced her to perform oral sex and sometimes touched her vagina with his penis, occurring two to three times per week across multiple locations in the residence. Family witnesses corroborated circumstances placing the child with the defendant in his bedroom (e.g., the child emerging wearing the defendant’s shirt and underwear; being found lying in bed with him), even as the defendant denied ever being alone with her or engaging in sexual acts.

The panel recognized the competing narratives as a “classic he-said/she-said credibility determination for the jury to resolve” (citing Kiah, Njoku) and, affording deference to the jury’s assessment, concluded that the verdict—viewed in a neutral light—accords with the weight of the evidence (citing Watkins, Monk, Dennis, Christie). The testimony, if credited, satisfied Penal Law § 130.75(1) (former [b])’s requirement of at least two acts of sexual conduct (including at least one act of intercourse or oral sexual conduct) occurring over a period of at least three months with a child under 13, thereby meeting the predicate for predatory sexual assault against a child under § 130.96 (defendant being over 18).

2) CPL 30.30 and Reindictment. The centerpiece procedural issue concerned the computation of chargeable time where the first indictment was dismissed as jurisdictionally defective and the People promptly reindicted. The defense tallied 483 days from June 29, 2021 (the first accusatory instrument) to October 25, 2022 (the People’s statement of readiness and certificate of compliance on the second indictment). The People contended that 332 days—from November 19, 2021, when the court set a schedule for defense motions after the People had declared readiness on the first indictment, through October 17, 2022, when the motion to dismiss the first indictment for a DOB defect was granted—were excludable as time “devoted to pre-trial motions and the [c]ourt’s decision on those motions and scheduling of trial.”

The Third Department agreed. Relying on Flowers and Skinner, the court reaffirmed that, when a new indictment supplants an earlier one in the same action, the six-month readiness period “relates back” to the original instrument—even if that first indictment is dismissed as jurisdictionally defective. Just as importantly, the court underscored that not all intervening time is chargeable; delay attributable to defense motion practice and the court’s deliberation/decision is excluded under CPL 30.30(4) (see Chrysler; Pope; Hicks). Netting out the 332 excludable days left only 151 chargeable days—well within the statutory six-month limit for felony charges (CPL 30.30[1][a]).

Notably, the court also signaled a preservation caution: to the extent the defense argued the trial court should have probed the People’s “actual readiness” on the second indictment (after filing a certificate of compliance), that claim was unpreserved because it was not raised via a motion to dismiss (see People v. Stoby, 232 AD3d 1298 [4th Dept 2024]).

3) Breadth of the Indictment’s Time Frame. The indictment alleged a period spanning more than two years (February 2016–June 2018). Applying Shack’s continuing-offense framework, the court held that the time frame was reasonable and not so overbroad as to deprive the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to defend. The victim’s young age, the repetitive nature of the alleged conduct, and the difficulty in anchoring precise dates years later all supported the broader period (see Johnson; Keefer; Wolf; Weber). The panel distinguished Crumedy, where the pleaded period was deemed unreasonably expansive under different facts, underscoring that reasonableness turns on the totality of circumstances.

4) Courtroom Outburst and Mistrial. After the victim’s brother entered the courtroom as a prosecution witness, he refused to remove his hood, spit on the defendant in the jury’s view, and uttered profanity as he was removed. The trial court immediately instructed the jury that the conduct was not evidence and was not to be considered. It then individually questioned each juror about their ability to remain fair and impartial; each affirmed they could. The court later issued additional curative instructions and denied the defense’s mistrial motion. The Third Department found no abuse of discretion. In line with Lamb and Harp, the trial court’s prompt corrective steps sufficed to neutralize potential prejudice. And consistent with Gaylord, it did not err in limiting the scope of juror questioning to whether jurors could be fair and follow instructions.

Impact and Practical Significance

The decision does not announce a wholly new rule, but it crystallizes and operationalizes several bedrock principles in ways that matter for day-to-day practice:

• CPL 30.30 after dismissal for a jurisdictional defect:
  • Ferrara effectively confirms that defense motion practice resulting in dismissal of the first indictment remains excludable time when calculating readiness on a promptly re-presented indictment. Prosecutors need not fear that litigating (and even losing) a defense motion on a defective indictment will automatically consume the CPL 30.30 clock. Conversely, defense counsel must be prepared to identify and segregate truly chargeable intervals and to preserve challenges to “actual readiness” post-COC with a targeted motion.
  • The case offers a workable template for computing time when indictments are sequential: identify the first accusatory instrument; relate the readiness period back; exclude defense motion periods and the court’s decision time; then add any postreadiness or other delays attributable to the People.
• Drafting and attacking time frames in continuing-offense indictments:
  • Ferrara solidifies that multi-year ranges can be reasonable where the offense is a statutorily defined continuing crime and the complainant is a young child. The case supplies prosecutors with appellate support for alleging longer windows when precise dates are unavailable despite diligent investigation. Defense counsel, mindful of Crumedy, should focus on demonstrating prejudice from overbreadth and the lack of any narrowing facts where appropriate.
• Managing courtroom disruptions:
  • The panel endorses a calibrated, “least drastic alternative” approach: immediate curative instruction; individualized juror assurances; and continued vigilance through additional instruction. Trial courts are reminded that such measures can preserve a fair trial even after an inflammatory outburst, and defense counsel should develop a record on juror hesitation or inability to follow instructions to support any mistrial request.
• Appellate preservation and strategic motions:
  • Ferrara reiterates the importance of specificity in trial-order-of-dismissal motions to preserve sufficiency issues; on CPL 30.30, it flags the need to move to dismiss on “actual readiness” grounds if the defense wishes to appellate review of that contention.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Jurisdictionally defective indictment:

  An indictment can be “jurisdictionally defective” if it omits or misstates facts essential to an element of the crime—here, the victim’s age (a core element of the charged sex offense). A court must dismiss such an indictment; the People may re-present corrected charges to a grand jury.

• CPL 30.30 “speedy trial” time:

  This statute measures prosecution readiness, not constitutional speedy-trial rights. For felony cases, the People must be ready for trial within six months. The clock starts with the first accusatory instrument in the criminal action, and certain periods don’t count (are “excludable”), such as time devoted to defense motions and the court’s decisions on those motions. When a new indictment replaces the first, the six-month period “relates back” to the first filing.

• Certificate of compliance (COC) and “actual readiness”:

  Post-discovery reform, the People must certify that they have complied with discovery obligations (COC) to declare “ready.” A defendant can challenge “actual readiness” if discovery is incomplete or the People cannot proceed, but must do so through a proper motion to preserve the issue for appeal.

• Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence:

  Legal sufficiency asks whether, viewing evidence most favorably to the People, there is a valid line of proof for each element. Weight of the evidence permits the appellate court to sit as a “thirteenth juror,” viewing the proof neutrally but still deferring to the jury’s credibility assessments—especially important in cases turning on a complainant’s testimony.

• Continuing offense and broad time frames:

  Some crimes—like course of sexual conduct against a child—are defined as occurring over a period of time. For such offenses, indictments may allege broader ranges, particularly where young victims cannot pinpoint dates. The key is reasonableness under the circumstances and adequate notice to prepare a defense.

• Mistrial and curative measures:

  A mistrial is warranted only when an error or event irreparably prejudices the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Courts often try curative instructions and targeted juror inquiry first. If jurors credibly affirm they can be fair and follow the court’s instructions, a mistrial is generally unnecessary.

Conclusion

People v. Ferrara is a thorough reaffirmation of core New York criminal procedure principles applied to the recurring realities of child sex-abuse prosecutions. Its most significant contribution is the clear, practice-oriented confirmation that, under CPL 30.30, motion-practice delays remain excludable even when the defense successfully moves to dismiss a jurisdictionally defective first indictment and the People subsequently reindict—the readiness period still relates back to the first accusatory instrument, and not every day between indictments is chargeable to the People.

The opinion further underscores that a child complainant’s testimony, if credited, can sustain a verdict; that multi-year indictment time frames can be reasonable for continuing course-of-conduct charges involving young victims; and that swift curative instructions plus individualized juror questioning can effectively remedy a spectator or witness outburst without aborting the trial. For practitioners, Ferrara offers a compact map: preserve specificity in sufficiency challenges, document excludable periods meticulously in CPL 30.30 litigation, tailor indictment time frames to the complainant’s age and the nature of the offense, and handle courtroom disruptions with prompt, measured remedies. Collectively, these rulings will guide trial courts and litigants in navigating the procedural and evidentiary complexities that often accompany serious child sex-abuse prosecutions.