Clarifying Control: Attorneys Do Not Possess Clients’ Choses in Action for Garnishment under NRS 31.290

Introduction

On 21 August 2025 the Supreme Court of Nevada delivered AZG Limited Partnership v. Dickinson Wright PLLC, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 37, a decision tackling a deceptively simple but commercially significant question: Does an attorney “control” the client’s chose in action merely by litigating it, such that the attorney is subject to garnishment as a holder of that property?

The case arises from AZG Limited Partnership’s efforts to collect on a judgment against Dickinson Wright’s client. AZG served garnishment interrogatories on the law firm under NRS 31.290, asking, among other things, whether the firm had “in its possession, charge or control” any money, property, credits, or choses in action belonging to the judgment debtor. Dickinson Wright answered “no.” AZG moved to traverse that response, alleging that by virtue of representation the firm necessarily controlled the client’s chose in action and therefore held garnishable property. The district court disagreed and denied the motion. AZG appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Stiglich affirmed the district court. The Court held:

• The word “control” in NRS 31.290(1) concerns possessory or ownership control, not the strategic or agency-based control that an attorney exercises over litigation.
• An attorney’s authority to manage litigation tactics does not confer a property interest in, or unilateral power to dispose of, the client’s chose in action.
• Accordingly, Dickinson Wright’s negative answer to the interrogatory was truthful; the motion to traverse was properly denied.
• The Court also declined to compel production of documents reviewed in camera, noting that AZG had not provided an adequate record or pursued discovery mechanisms.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Newitt v. Dawe
• Reynolds v. Tufenkjian
• Gallegos v. Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc.
• Rhyne v. State
• Estate of Adams v. Fallini
• Gottwals v. Rencher
• Molezzo Reports v. Patt

The Court used Newitt, Reynolds, and Gallegos to confirm that a chose in action is a form of personal property transferable under property law. That status underpins the statutory garnishment scheme: creditors may seize a debtor’s assignable property interests.

Conversely, authority on the attorney–client relationship—Rhyne, Estate of Adams, Gottwals, and Molezzo—shows that although attorneys have extensive procedural control (tactics, stipulations, and some liability for costs), clients retain ultimate authority over objectives and settlements. None of these cases suggests that counsel obtains a property right in the client’s cause of action. These dual lines of precedent allowed the Court to draw a sharp line between procedural control and possessory control.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Analysis. Because NRS 31.290 lacks an explicit definition of “control,” the Court turned to dictionary meanings and the noscitur a sociis canon: a word is known by the company it keeps. Surrounded by “possession” and “charge”—both property terms—“control” must bear a similar possessory connotation.
2. Statutory Harmonization. Other provisions of NRS 31.240–.460 empower courts to order a garnishee to deliver or transfer ownership of property. An attorney cannot unilaterally deliver the client’s cause of action; only the client can assign or settle it.
3. Avoidance of Absurd Results. Extending garnishment liability to every attorney merely because they direct litigation would “shock common sense” and chill access to justice—an absurd result that statutory interpretation must avoid.
4. Application to the Facts. Since Dickinson Wright lacked any retainer balance or contingency lien, and had no unilateral right of disposition, it did not “control” the chose in action within the statutory meaning.

3. Potential Impact of the Decision

The ruling provides long-needed clarity for:

• Attorneys and Law Firms. Representation alone does not expose counsel to liability as garnishees of the client’s cause of action; only funds actually held, such as trust-account balances, are vulnerable.
• Litigation Financing. The Court hinted at the discoverability of third-party funding arrangements, but drew a line at compelled disclosure absent proper discovery requests. Expect heightened scrutiny of financing structures in collection practice.
• Judgment Creditors. Creditors must aim garnishment writs at property holders—banks, employers, or assignees—not at the debtor’s counsel, unless counsel actually holds client funds.
• Nevada Garnishment Doctrine. The opinion cements a possessory definition of “control” that will guide lower courts and practitioners in future garnishment disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

AZG Ltd. Partnership v. Dickinson Wright PLLC solidifies a boundary around the attorney-client relationship: while lawyers may steer litigation, they do not own the client’s cause of action for garnishment purposes. By anchoring its analysis in statutory text, established canons, and pragmatic policy, the Nevada Supreme Court has limited the reach of judgment creditors, protected the integrity of representation, and provided a clear precedent for courts confronting similar interrogatories. Going forward, creditors will need concrete evidence of funds or property actually held by counsel before attempting garnishment, and attorneys can litigate without fear that mere advocacy will make them involuntary debt collectors.