Clarifying “Interest in Lands” Under New Mexico Venue Law

Blanchard Corona Ranch, LLC v. Garcia Richard (2025)

Introduction

In Blanchard Corona Ranch, LLC v. Garcia Richard, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed a fundamental question of civil procedure: what it means for a suit to have “lands or any interest in lands” as its object under the state’s venue statute (NMSA 1978, § 38-3-1(D)(1)). Blanchard Corona Ranch, LLC (“Blanchard”) sued Stephanie Garcia Richard, the State Land Commissioner, alleging she violated State Land Office rules when she issued two overlapping wind-energy leases on land already leased to Blanchard for grazing. The district court held that because Blanchard’s complaint aimed to protect its existing leasehold interest, Lincoln County—where the land sits—was the proper venue. On interlocutory appeal, the Commissioner challenged that ruling, and this Court granted certiorari to decide the question.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Vargas, reversed the district court. Adopting the reasoning of Kaywal, Inc. v. Avangrid Renewables, LLC (2021-NMCA-037), the Court held that § 38-3-1(D)(1) requires that the relief sought must itself create, transfer, or revoke a title or possessory interest in land. Because Blanchard sought only declaratory relief as to the Commissioner’s leasing procedures—and did not seek to alter the leasehold estate itself—the “object” of its suit was not an interest in land. Venue in Lincoln County was thus improper, and the case must be dismissed without prejudice. Venue properly lies under § 38-3-1(G) in Bernalillo County (where Blanchard resides) or Santa Fe County (where the Commissioner’s office sits).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Kaywal, Inc. v. Avangrid Renewables, LLC (2021-NMCA-037): Established that § 38-3-1(D)(1) applies only when the judgment sought “would create, transfer, or revoke” a property interest.
• Team Bank v. Meridian Oil, Inc. (1994-NMSC-083): Held that a suit to recover unpaid royalties did not implicate title to land and thus was not subject to the local-lands venue rule.
• Historic “local actions” cases (e.g., Jemez Land Co. v. Garcia, 1910-NMSC-013; Atler v. Stolz, 1934-NMSC-079) that recognized suits directly altering title or possession must be filed where the land lies.
• Cases rejecting § 38-3-1(D)(1) venue for tort actions (trespass, nuisance) or contract disputes that only indirectly affect land interests (e.g., Cooper v. Chevron, 2002-NMSC-020; Bank of Am. v. Apache Corp., 2008-NMCA-054).

2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Statutory Text & Dictionary Meanings
The Court began with the plain language of § 38-3-1(D)(1): “When lands or any interest in lands are the object of any suit … the suit shall be brought in the county where the land … is situate.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines the “object” of an action as “the relief sought.” The Court concluded that only suits whose relief would directly affect the scope of a land interest—by creating, transferring, or revoking it—fall under that rule.

(b) Purpose of the Rule
Venue in the land’s county protects local titles from confusion and ensures access to local evidence. If a suit merely challenges administrative procedures or seeks monetary or declaratory relief unconnected to altering title, the rationale for a local-lands rule does not apply.

(c) Application to Blanchard’s Claim
Blanchard sought declarations that the Commissioner failed to follow SLO rules when issuing overlapping wind leases—and that the lease’s reservation clause was void. These remedies would not themselves cancel or modify any leasehold estate. Any impact on Blanchard’s grazing rights would be speculative and contingent on further action, placing the suit outside § 38-3-1(D)(1).

3. Impact

This decision refines venue practice in New Mexico by:

1. Limiting § 38-3-1(D)(1) to cases where the judgment directly alters real property interests.
2. Preventing plaintiffs from forcing suits into distant forums on mere “relatedness” to land.
3. Encouraging proper forum selection under § 38-3-1(G) for administrative or declaratory challenges against state officers.

Future litigants must analyze whether their requested relief equates to creation, transfer, or revocation of title or possession before invoking the local-lands venue rule.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Venue: The geographic location where a lawsuit must be filed.
• Object of the Suit: The remedy or relief the plaintiff asks the court to grant.
• Leasehold Estate: A tenant’s right to possess and use land under a lease.
• Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal of a trial court’s ruling before the final judgment.
• Certiorari: A higher court’s discretionary review of a lower court decision.

Conclusion

Blanchard Corona Ranch v. Garcia Richard establishes that under New Mexico law, a suit has “lands or any interest in lands” as its object—and thus must be brought where the land lies—only when the relief sought would create, transfer, or revoke title or possession. By clarifying this threshold, the Supreme Court preserved the balance between convenient forums for plaintiffs and the integrity of local land-title adjudications. The ruling underscores that declaratory or administrative claims unmoored from direct alteration of property interests belong in the forum prescribed by § 38-3-1(G), not under the local-lands provision.